122 lines
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Plaintext
122 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
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Episode: 2860
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Title: HPR2860: Encryption and Quantum Computing
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr2860/hpr2860.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-24 12:22:27
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---
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This is HBR episode 2008 160 entitled Encryption and Quantum Computing and is part of the series
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Privacy and Security. It is hosted by a huker and is about 13 minutes long and carries a clean flag.
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The summary is how will Quantum Computing affect the security of Encryption?
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This episode of HBR is brought to you by an honesthost.com.
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Get 15% discount on all shared hosting with the offer code HBR15. That's HBR15.
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Better web hosting that's honest and fair at an honesthost.com.
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Hello, this is a huker welcoming you to Hacker Public Radio and another exciting episode
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in our security and privacy series. What I want to talk about today is encryption
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and how that is affected by quantum computing because quantum computers are starting to appear
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and they are starting to do things. Now if you've been paying any attention to encryption
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technology you probably know that the safety of encryption from being cracked
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relies on the concept of computational infeasibility which is a fancy way of saying that any
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encryption can be broken if you have enough time and enough resources but if those quantities
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of time and resource are simply impractical you can regard encryption as safe enough.
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Now in previous episodes and I've talked about this and in fact my episode on
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passwords entropy and good password practices I went through numerical examples that a good long
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password with high entropy you know if it was long enough and antropic enough it would take
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longer than it would go past the heat death of the universe basically. Now what we have to understand
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though is that was using current computer technology. So the other thing we've consistently
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talked about with all of this is that it's an arms race so attackers are always getting better.
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You know this is Bruce Schneier's rule attacks always get better they never get worse
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and that means defenders need to improve as well. Now so far that's worked reasonably well
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as computing has gotten cheaper and more powerful thus making it easier to crack encryption.
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The defenders have responded by improving encryption through superior algorithms longer key lengths
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and so on. In this kind of arms race a reasonable view in general is that anything encrypted today
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will if you did it properly remains safe for at least a period of decades before technical
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advances make it unsafe. Now this is not to deny that some older encrypted data may become
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vulnerable over time if anyone cares enough to save it and attack it when the technology has matured
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that far. For example there is speculation that a NSA facility constructed in Utah called the
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Intelligence Community Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative Data Center. That's a long
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title. So the idea is that we think that was probably constructed for this precise purpose
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and that's what the NSA is doing. I suspect either GCHQ is participating with NSA or has
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something similar in mind. Now the facility is capable of storing immense amounts of data
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and is near two sources of low cost hydroelectricity as well as being very favorably situated on
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internet trunk lines. All of this certainly makes a plausible case for what they're doing at the very
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least. Now personally I've not worried too much about this because this is not the threat model I
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need to defend against and I always start by defining the threats I care about. I got this from
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Bruce Schneier you know define the threat that you see and what it can do to you and then pick a
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countermeasure that is going to deal with that threat. So if someone says I just want to be 100%
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secure against everything it's like okay you're not ready for this you're not thinking clearly yet.
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So if the NSA can decrypt my emails 20 years from now I doubt they'd find anything terribly
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interesting and when I read my emails from long ago frequently I'm puzzled by what they're
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about but there are people who have very legitimate reasons to be concerned such as democracy
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activists in totalitarian countries like Russia China Turkey and so on. They should indeed be
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paying attention to the capabilities of the spy agencies and taking steps to protect themselves
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and for anyone who is concerned the biggest wild card has been quantum computing.
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So quantum computing differs from traditional computing we're used to by the way the bits work
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in traditional computing bits are either zero or one. Encryption in that environment is simply
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manipulating those bits such as techniques like XOR exclusive or and where the quantum
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difference comes in is that each quantum bit called a Q bit can take on many values simultaneously.
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This is a super position that allows both zero and one to exist simultaneously kind of like
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Schrodinger's cat which is both alive and dead until you look and that of course is a classic
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example of quantum weirdness a single qubit can be in two states at once two qubits can be in a
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total of four states at once three qubits can be in eight states at once and so on so take two
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raise it to the power of the number of qubits you have and that tells you how many states you can
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have and you know that's exponential so it gets really big really fast. Now for our purposes I do
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not propose to go into a detailed description of quantum computing best reason of all I'm completely
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unqualified to do it and it tends to make my brain hurt. The point we need to keep in mind is that
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quantum computing has the power to make feasible those decryptions that were previously considered
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infeasible. Now that said we are not there yet so far the quantum computers that have been developed
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are limited and finicky things but given the intense interest it is only a matter of time
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until they are developed to the point that they are practical and when that happens those messages
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the NSA has stored in Utah will be decrypted if they choose to do that. That's unavoidable at this
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point. I'm not sure that is all that much different from the march of decryption capabilities we
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witnessed until now. Encryption standards we once relied on such as MD5 are now considered
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useless for any security purpose. MD5 still lives on as a way of verifying that files have not been
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changed in any way so you will still see that with like downloads of Linux ISOs where file integrity
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matters a whole lot. So while files encrypted today using something like elliptical curve cryptography
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be broken in 20 years I would consider that highly likely. So if you are going to overthrow
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the government you might want to get a move on. But I have some people claim that quantum computing
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means the end of the age of encryption and that is nonsense. The arms race will continue and quantum
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computing will be used to create new forms of encryption that have equivalent safety in the quantum
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age to what we have had over the last 30 years. In fact it's happening right now.
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In the United States the National Institute of Standards and Technology drives encryption standards
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and as a practical matter tends to do that for most of the world not just the United States.
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They have a project called Post Quantum Cryptography and in December of 2016 issued a request
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for nominations for the proposed new standard. As they state, quote,
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if large scale quantum computers are ever built they will be able to break many of the public
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key cryptosystems currently in use. This would seriously compromise the confidentiality and integrity
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of digital communications on the internet and elsewhere. The goal of Post Quantum Cryptography
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also called Quantum Resistant Cryptography is to develop cryptographic systems that are secure
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against both quantum and classical computers and can interoperate with existing communications
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protocols and networks. Okay so December of 2016 they issued a call. Hey all you smart folks out
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there give us some ideas. They did receive a number of submissions. So in March of 2019 on March 20th
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they delivered a briefing to the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board which is a board
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within NIST established by Congressional Mandate. Their Matthew Scholl chief of the computer
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security division at NIST said that they had spent most of the previous year evaluating 69 submissions
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and then selected 26th of the most promising of them for further investigation with an eye to
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whittling down the list some more later in 2019. And I've got links to these lists and things that
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you can take a look at. So the show notes will help if you want more information about all of this.
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Now he did make clear that NIST is not looking for a single algorithm or even a specific number
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of algorithms which may be a good thing. One thing we know from experience is that
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monocultures can fall to a single vulnerability and it also looks like the expected different needs
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will lead to different algorithms being used. Again a very sensible way of looking at these things.
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Now to quote Mr. Scholl this is to ensure that we have some resilience so that when a quantum
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machine actually comes around not being able to fully understand the capability or the effect of
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those machines. Having more than one algorithm with some different genetic mathematical foundations
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will ensure that we have a little more resiliency in that kit going forward.
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So what is this telling us really? To me what it is saying is there is a need for encryption
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that need will continue and even if there's a change in decryption technology
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there are going to be people working on ways of getting around that.
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So I don't expect that there's ever going to be a point in my lifetime where encryption is
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totally useless. And so the arms race is going to continue one way or another and we should probably
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just get used to all of that. And so with that this is Huka for Hacker Public Radio reminding you
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as always to support FreeSoftware. Bye bye.
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You've been listening to Hacker Public Radio at HackerPublicRadio.org.
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We are a community podcast network that releases shows every weekday Monday through Friday.
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If you have comments on today's show please email the host directly leave a comment on the website
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or record a follow-up episode yourself unless otherwise status. Today's show is released on the
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