123 lines
9.7 KiB
Plaintext
123 lines
9.7 KiB
Plaintext
|
|
Episode: 3719
|
||
|
|
Title: HPR3719: HPR News
|
||
|
|
Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3719/hpr3719.mp3
|
||
|
|
Transcribed: 2025-10-25 04:37:35
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
---
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3,719 for Thursday, the 3rd of November 2022.
|
||
|
|
Today's show is entitled HPR News.
|
||
|
|
It is hosted by some guy on the internet and is about 10 minutes long.
|
||
|
|
It carries a clean flag.
|
||
|
|
The summary is Infosic, the language of security.
|
||
|
|
Hello and welcome to another episode of Hacker Public Radio.
|
||
|
|
I'm your host, some guy on the internet.
|
||
|
|
I've made some adjustments to the news with Scotty and I'm going to be calling it HPR
|
||
|
|
News.
|
||
|
|
That way it's a little bit more in line with the branding.
|
||
|
|
It's still early days and I'll be making more adjustments to it trying to figure out
|
||
|
|
what feels good and what not, but this segment I'll call Infosic, the language of security.
|
||
|
|
Our first topic, typo squatting.
|
||
|
|
What is typo squatting and how do scammers use it?
|
||
|
|
The attack known as typo squatting uses modified or misspelled domain names to trick users
|
||
|
|
into visiting fraudulent websites.
|
||
|
|
The heart of this attack is domain name registration.
|
||
|
|
Attackers will employ typo squatting to defraud users by mimicking login pages, redirecting
|
||
|
|
users to fraudulent websites, then downloading malware, and then eventually following up
|
||
|
|
the attack with extortion or theft.
|
||
|
|
In a previous episode, my co-host and I, Archer72, had a discussion on typo squatting.
|
||
|
|
I forgot to post a few links in that show, giving some examples of it, but we discussed
|
||
|
|
it in certain libraries like Rust libraries, the Rust crates that were affected by typo squatting,
|
||
|
|
also the Python libraries that were affected by typo squatting, here I've provided those
|
||
|
|
examples down below.
|
||
|
|
I've done this to inform the user that typo squatting isn't just posting a fraudulent domain
|
||
|
|
to trick you into revealing your credentials so that the attacker can defraud you, but also
|
||
|
|
if you're a developer, someone who codes for a living.
|
||
|
|
There's normally target popular coding libraries, because if they can fool the developer, the
|
||
|
|
developer will then pass the attack on to the users.
|
||
|
|
So as you read through the articles below, I don't want you to think that these languages
|
||
|
|
are unsafe to use because of these attacks, but I want you to understand that the attacks
|
||
|
|
are going to happen no matter what, no matter where you are online, the attacks will be present.
|
||
|
|
Fortunately for you, there's some guy on the internet providing you with solutions that can
|
||
|
|
help you fight typo squatting. In my personal experience, a good security focus font like the
|
||
|
|
Ubuntu font family is perfect for fighting typo squatting. Think of a security focused font
|
||
|
|
as a font with the least amount of indistinguishable characters. What I mean by this is some fonts will
|
||
|
|
use the same character model for multiple characters, where the character data is different,
|
||
|
|
but the model is identical to other characters. For example, if you have an iPhone,
|
||
|
|
open your phone, go to a web browser, or just pull up the keyboard, and type in
|
||
|
|
lowercase l capital i. You'll notice that both characters look identical.
|
||
|
|
In other fonts, like the Liberation Sans font, if you open up LibreOffice and just type in a
|
||
|
|
lowercase l in a capital i, highlight and change the font to Liberation Sans, the models are technically
|
||
|
|
different, but visually you can be tricked into believing they're the same model because they're
|
||
|
|
slightly different. Attackers rely on this resemblance in order to prey on users. Another method
|
||
|
|
of fighting against typo squatting is using check sums. Check sums will allow users to check the
|
||
|
|
integrity of a file once downloaded. So even if the file appears to be the exact file and it looks
|
||
|
|
and spells the same, if it's been modified in any way past with the developer who originally
|
||
|
|
created it or packaged the file, it will show up in the check sum. Most freedom-based operating systems
|
||
|
|
like Linux and BSD comes with this capability built-in. So you basically open up a terminal,
|
||
|
|
generate the files hash, compare it with what the developer told you it should be from the website
|
||
|
|
or wherever, and if it matches, it's good, if it doesn't, it's probably been tampered with.
|
||
|
|
When compatible squatting with websites, DNS is also a very good measure.
|
||
|
|
Setting a pie hole is basically the extent of my knowledge on DNS, so you may want to check some
|
||
|
|
of the articles if you wish to self-host your own DNS, but pie hole has some wonderful documentation
|
||
|
|
available for everyone. There's also some great websites out there like DNS Twister Report,
|
||
|
|
and who wears look up? They're great for identifying fraudulent websites.
|
||
|
|
For example, if you go on DNS Twister Report, type in Bitwarden, it'll give you a list of
|
||
|
|
just fraudulent websites that type of squatters are using to try and trick users and to,
|
||
|
|
you know, give up their credentials to their password vaults. Using a tool like DNS Twister Report
|
||
|
|
is a very good practice for users. You'll learn more about the common type of squatting techniques
|
||
|
|
used against you by visiting DNS Twister and just looking up certain websites that you visit
|
||
|
|
frequently. The who wears look up is also very important because a lot of these businesses
|
||
|
|
like the legitimate ones will register their websites for multiple years. They're, I mean,
|
||
|
|
the DNS registration for multiple years, but a fraudulent website normally on the registers
|
||
|
|
for like one year. Having only one year's registration time isn't enough to call you a fraud,
|
||
|
|
but it's something to look out for. So, posting your own DNS may even give you the ability to use
|
||
|
|
like community-based block lists, something like CrowdSec. Now, last but not least,
|
||
|
|
your password manager is your best friend when fighting against type of squatting because you
|
||
|
|
store the valid links in the password manager so you never have to worry about misspelling a link,
|
||
|
|
you'll have the valid link, the credentials, and two-factor all in the password manager.
|
||
|
|
That takes us directly into the next topic, two-factor and multi-factor authentication.
|
||
|
|
First, let's talk about authentication. This is the process of verifying the validity of something,
|
||
|
|
usually your username and password. Having this alone is just called single-factor authentication,
|
||
|
|
and it's not enough to stop attackers this day and age. Two-factor authentication
|
||
|
|
increases the difficulty for attackers by providing users with an additional layer of security
|
||
|
|
to accomplish authentication. So, you'll have the first factor or single-factor, which is the
|
||
|
|
username and password, followed by the second factor of a TOTP or OTP, which is the one-time password
|
||
|
|
that six-digit code that you normally get sent to you, either by SMS or email or however you
|
||
|
|
receive it. Your authenticated apps will also help you with TOTP, so bitwarden, keep Asexy, etc,
|
||
|
|
they'll help you with TOTP codes as well, and security keys like Ubike.
|
||
|
|
In short, two-fay works a lot like going to an ATM. You have your bank card and your ATM pen,
|
||
|
|
so that's something you have a physical object and something you know, which is the bank pen,
|
||
|
|
that's how you authenticate. There's also multi-factor authentication, which is very similar to
|
||
|
|
two-fay, except you can include things like biometrics, which are like the fingerprint scans,
|
||
|
|
your retina scans, your facial recognition, or voice recognition. So, now in an attacker,
|
||
|
|
with multi-factor authentication, it's going to have to not only know the username and password,
|
||
|
|
they'll probably have to intercept a TOTP key or possess a physical object like a Ubike,
|
||
|
|
as well as try and navigate the inheritance factor, which is your fingerprint or your retina
|
||
|
|
or your voice or whatever, and they'll have to do that usually within a limited amount of time,
|
||
|
|
and if they fail, they can only fail a certain amount of times, and you know, all sorts of other factors.
|
||
|
|
So, in short, use two-fay. It really, really makes it difficult for attackers to come after you,
|
||
|
|
taking you out of the low-hanging fruit category, and if you can, or if you're willing to, use
|
||
|
|
multi-factor, I personally don't go toward the biometrics, because you can be compelled to use those
|
||
|
|
to unlock devices, especially in airports and things of that nature. Example, if you were stop
|
||
|
|
and detained in an airport, and your facial recognition was used to unlock your device,
|
||
|
|
they can simply hold the phone at your face and unlock the device without your permission.
|
||
|
|
So, even though it's great against attackers, it does have its drawbacks.
|
||
|
|
I've provided links in the show notes to all of the different things talked about in the show,
|
||
|
|
Bitwarden Keypad, Sexy, Ubike, as well as some other information for things like the
|
||
|
|
phytoalign specifications, and a guide on using two-factor authentication, or two-step login.
|
||
|
|
I imagine one day with all these different security layers that we're constantly employing
|
||
|
|
to write off attackers will one day have like a thousand different measures that we'll have to
|
||
|
|
employ, but I think it'll be okay just as long as we have an open standard, as well as open
|
||
|
|
technology and open software to support that technology, because I truly believe nothing can
|
||
|
|
innovate like open source, with more eyes, more minds, and more innovation, all piled in on the
|
||
|
|
same objective, we can't help but succeed. That or will throw the biggest failure party the world
|
||
|
|
has ever seen. All right, ladies and gentlemen, that wraps it up for InfoSec, the language of security.
|
||
|
|
I'm some guy on the internet, also known as Scotty, doing the HPR news. I'll see you in the next episode.
|
||
|
|
You have been listening to Hacker Public Radio at HackerPublicRadio.org. Today's show was
|
||
|
|
contributed by a HPR listener like yourself. If you ever thought of recording podcasts,
|
||
|
|
you can click on our contribute link to find out how easy it really is. Hosting for HPR has been
|
||
|
|
kindly provided by an honesthost.com, the internet archive, and our sings.net. On this
|
||
|
|
otherwise status, today's show is released under Creative Commons, Attribution 4.0 International
|
||
|
|
License.
|