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Episode: 2850
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Title: HPR2850: NIST Cybersecurity Framework
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr2850/hpr2850.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-24 12:08:30
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---
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This is HPR Episode 2850 entitled, NIST I'm a Security Framework and in part of the series,
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Privacy and Security, it is hosted by AYUKA and in about 28 minutes long and Karimaklin flag.
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The summary is, what NIST SUGES at SANA Framework to improve security at the enterprise level.
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This episode of HPR is brought to you by AnanasThost.com.
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Get 15% discount on all shared hosting with the offer code HPR15. That's HPR15.
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Better web hosting that's honest and fair at AnanasThost.com.
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Hello, this is AYUKA, welcoming you to Hacker Public Radio and another exciting episode in our security and
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privacy series. We recently did a show that talked about the CERT recommendations for home networks,
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so that's aimed at the average home user. What I want to do today is go on the other side and take a
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look at enterprise level issues involving insecurity. What I want to do is take a look at something
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from the National Institute of Standards and Technology here in the United States,
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which they call their Cybersecurity Framework. Now, National Institute of Standards and Technology
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does have a number of responsibilities, but one of them certainly is information, technology,
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and security, and so when they issued this Cybersecurity Framework, I thought, you know,
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not a bad thing to take a look at, and I think we do have some people who are in an enterprise level
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environment that would perhaps be interested in seeing what this says. Now, their cybersecurity
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framework sets standards for best practices that private companies are urged to adopt,
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but federal government agencies are also directed to follow these guidelines.
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Now, that is not to say that they are doing so in all cases. Its actual compliance is somewhat
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spotty, and that certainly in the United States at least is something that's an ongoing problem is
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you can lay down rules as to what people are supposed to do, whether they'll actually do them
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is another thing entirely. Now, one of the things we're going to see as we look at this,
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and this explains part of the problem, I think, is that there's always a conflict between security
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and ease of use that we talk about with people at the individual level. So, we talk about things
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like doing firmware updates and using strong passwords and everything. That's a little more work
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for people to do. When you get to the enterprise level, now you add in cost and other resources
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as an issue. Achieving security at the enterprise level is not free. It is going to require you
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to spend money. It's going to require you to devote person hours, staff resources,
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and change your methods in some way. So, all of these things are reasons why the compliance
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level is not what it should be. Now, is that a bad thing? You know, that's a question that
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management has to address. Since resources are not infinite, you do need to choose priorities,
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and I would be the first to admit, in my private life, I don't necessarily do every single thing
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that is recommended as a security requirement, because in some cases, it's like, I don't think
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it's a big deal for me, and I'll make my own decisions. So, as we go through this list of
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recommendations, it's quite possible that you're not going to find many, if any, organizations
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that do every single thing in this list. But it's a useful look at this one group, the NIST,
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what their take is on best practices. And I think it's important because we are becoming more and
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more reliant on large organizations to handle critical infrastructure, and that infrastructure is
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controlled by computers, and security of those devices becomes important. I was recently reading
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an interesting article about how Russia is targeting utilities, and they basically started by going
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after Ukraine, but they're starting to also target utilities here in the United States, and
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if tensions increase, what can they do? Well, probably nothing good. Now, if you want to take a look
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at the document yourself, which you're encouraged to do, the link is going to be in the show notes
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for this. Now, the key term to understanding the approach that NIST uses is something called
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risk management. That does not always mean adopting strict measures. You know, conceptually,
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the responses to risk are one mitigation, two insurance, or three, except the risk.
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Mitigation is what we normally think of as a response to risk, but ensuring against the outcome,
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or simply accepting that something may happen, can be valid responses as well. It depends on the
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situation. Deciding which way to approach it usually starts with a calculation involving both
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the probability of an occurrence and the cost if it happens. If a risk has a low probability of
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occurring and a low cost if it does occur, it is entirely rational to just accept the risk.
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Now, the organizations that are the target of this particular document are critical infrastructure,
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which can be both public and private in the United States. Private organizations are encouraged to
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follow these recommendations, but a presidential order in 2017 directed all federal agencies to follow
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them. Now, this framework has three major components. The framework core, which defines a
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common set of practices and outcomes for security, framework implementation tiers, which focuses on
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risk management practices, and three, a framework profile, which lets organizations assess current
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state, compare it to desired future state, and identify opportunities for improvement.
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So, the first of these is the framework core, and the framework provides a common language for
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understanding, managing, and expressing cybersecurity risk to internal and external stakeholders.
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It can be used to help identify and prioritize actions for reducing cybersecurity risk,
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and it is a tool for aligning policy, business, and technological approaches to managing that risk.
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It can be used to manage cybersecurity risk across an entire organization,
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or it can be focused on the delivery of critical services within an organization.
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Different types of entities, including sector coordinating structures, associations,
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and organizations, can use the framework for different purposes, including the creation of
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common profiles. So, that paragraph is really a quote itself from the framework document,
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and lays out what they're looking at here. Now, the framework core has five functions. The core
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functions, number one, identify, and there are two parts of this, identification of the risks,
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and identification of the resources available to deal with the risks.
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Two, protect. That means to put safeguards in place to limit or contain the impact of a cybersecurity
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event. Three, detect. These are activities that involve security monitoring,
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detecting anomalies, and so on.
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Respond. That means to take appropriate action to contain the impact of a potential cyber security
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incident, and five, recover. This is the resilience part. You need to be able to restore normal
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operations and capabilities as quickly as possible. Now, framework implementation tiers.
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This is about the degree of sophistication in cybersecurity risk management practices.
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The document states that these tiers do not represent maturity levels, but I have to admit,
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I am not sure where the distinction lies, since it sure sounds to me like they are maturity levels.
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If you have a better understanding of that than I do, please record a show and explain it.
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I'm sure Ken would love to have more. So, tier one, partial.
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At this level, risk management practices are not formalized.
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Risks are managed in an ad hoc or reactive manner.
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So, clearly, this is the beginning level. Cybersecurity practices are not guided by risk
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objectives, the threat environment, or business requirements.
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I think I still tend to see a certain number of these things going on, even in the large organization
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that I work for. One of the ones that is constantly great on me is this, you must change your
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password every 60 days. Why? There's never a good answer to why. It's just, well, because that's
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what everyone does. So, that's an example of a practice that is not guided by risk objectives,
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a threat environment, or business requirements. Now, also tier one, a limited awareness of cyber
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security risk at the organizational level. And events are handled on a case-by-case basis.
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I think of this when you get some company has been cracked and people have stolen a bunch of
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personally identifiable information from all of the customers. And it's just, oh my God,
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no one could have predicted this. It is a super sophisticated attack. And when you finally learn
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what went on, it was like it was garden variety fishing. But if you don't have any awareness of
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what's going on, and you don't have that awareness at the organizational level, then you're just
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stumbling from one thing to the next. For tier one, information may not be shared within the
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organization. Information should be shared, but maybe you have people that are involved in
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turf battles. Oh my God, if I let anyone know what's going on, it'll make me look bad.
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The organization will tend to view its risks in isolation and does not share information or
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collaborate with other entities. It does not see itself as part of an ecosystem.
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So that's not good. This is really, I think, a lot of organizations are at this level right now,
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particularly a lot of private companies. Now tier two is a little bit better. This is what we
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call risk informed. So for a tier two organization, there are formal risk management policies that
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are approved by management. There's prioritization of cybersecurity activities, and it is informed
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by organizational risk objectives and the threat environment.
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Now in our past discussions of security, I frequently quoted or paraphrased Bruce Schneier
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that everything starts with, identify the threat, and what is it that you want to protect yourself
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against. There's no sense in using a cannon to shoot flies, but on the other hand, you don't
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want to bring a squirt gun to a gunfight. So understand the environment you're operating in
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and what you need to protect. Now in a risk informed tier two organization, cybersecurity
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information is shared within the organization, but it's kind of informal. There is some level of
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awareness of other organizations in the ecosystem, and some information sharing is going on,
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but not in any formal way. So that kind of sounds a little bit like, yeah, there are chief
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information security officer who went to a conference and had some drinks at the bar with a few
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other CISOs, and they chatted about what's going on. It's better than nothing, but it's not a formal
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process of any kind. Tier three, and that tier is what they call repeatable.
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Risk management is expressed as formal policies. Cybersecurity practices are regularly updated
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in response to changing business needs, a changing threat environment, and changing technology.
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Now, all of those things are continually changing. So you need to change with it. Things that
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probably seems perfectly valid five or ten years ago are not valid now. So you need to do your
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updating, and then you also want to have an organization-wide approach to manage cybersecurity risk.
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All right, look at the entire environment, and your policy should be regularly reviewed and
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consistently applied. Now, a tier three organization collaborates with other organizations in the ecosystem,
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upstream, downstream, and horizontally. Information is shared with all of these entities.
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So, instead of having a few drinks at the bar with other security professionals,
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there is a process for alerting people to security incidents, to share information,
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and it's a very formal kind of a process, and that's what you want to see.
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And then finally, tier four is adaptive.
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And so here we're talking continuous improvement. Okay, every time there's a security incident,
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you analyze what happened. You generate a lessons learned. You start to look for predictive indicators.
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You have a formal organization-wide approach to managing cybersecurity risk,
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and senior management monitors this just as they monitor financial risks and other organizational
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risks. Okay, very important. Right now, what tends to happen is that in a lot of organizations,
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the people responsible for information security are regarded in some places as an annoyance.
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You know, I'm trying to get sales, and you're interfering with that with all your security,
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or why should I spend all this money to secure our environment? That does not flow to the
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bottom line. And a good way to fix that is with massive fines and jail terms. When your chief
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executive officer is faced with the prospect of jail time, they will suddenly decide it is worthwhile
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to invest in security. All right, so that would be one way to do that. Now, in this case, the
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organization, if it's an adaptive tier four organization, is part of a larger community and
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contributes to that community to help everyone understand the risks.
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And the next thing we want to look at is the framework profile. Now, the framework profile
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aligns the functions that we looked at. Remember the five functions? Identify, protect,
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detect, respond, recover. Now, those have to be aligned with the business requirements,
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risk tolerance, and resources. So you analyze the present state in comparison to the desired
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future state and create a roadmap. And that roadmap can be developed for making improvements to
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achieve that desired future state. As we say in project management, if you fail to plan, you plan
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to fail. So, you know, you need to have a strategy for getting to where you're going and then
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you need to execute that strategy. Now, a comparison of the current profile with the target profile
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is going to reveal gaps. We call that gap analysis. And the whole purpose of gap analysis is to
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identify where action needs to take place. Now, this overall approach is based on risk management.
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So we do expect prioritization is going to happen here. You may identify five gaps, but are they
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all of equal significance? Not necessarily, okay? You want to identify the highest priority ones
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based, as we said before, on how likely they are to happen and what the cost is if they do happen.
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So it's quite possible that you're going to look at this and say, well, some of these risks
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we're just going to accept or we will ensure. Now, insurance is a tricky thing. I noticed there's
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a big thing in the news right now about a lawsuit because a company had cyber insurance.
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And they were victimized by the not-petsha attack. And that not-petsha attack
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looks like it may have come from Russia. And the insurance company said, oh, acts of war,
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that's excluded. We don't have to pay you anything. So insurance is a little bit tricky right now.
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I assume this is going to get sorted out at some point, but I'm not sure I want to rely 100%
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on insurance to protect me. So how do we use this framework? Okay, there's a number of things
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that we can recommend here. Number one, do a basic review of your cyber security practices.
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So compare your practices with those in the framework core and you're going to identify areas for
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improvement. Establish or improve your cyber security program. And the number of elements of that
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prioritize and scope. Okay, assess your business objectives. What are your organizational priorities?
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Figure out what it is you need to do. Then orient, identify related systems and assets,
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regulatory requirements, and the overall risk approach.
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Create a current profile. Where are we right now? What's our starting point?
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Conduct or risk assessment. Analyze both the probability and cost of possible cyber security events.
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And you really want to do both of those, both the probability and the cost. You multiply those two
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things together and you get what in mathematics is called expected value. You don't want to spend
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a million dollars to protect yourself against something with an expected cost of a thousand dollars.
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That's stupid. Create your target profile. Where do you want to be in the future based on
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your priorities and your risk assessment? Where do we want to be?
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Then determine, analyze, and prioritize the gaps. Create that plan. Where are we now? Where do we
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want to be? And then implement it. And that's important. I came out of a planning meeting the
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other day with upper management and we were on a project. They had kind of laid down, you know,
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here's what we want you to do. And we came up with a plan that said, well, if you can help us do
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ABC and D, we think we can get there. And they said, fine, we will help you get ABC and D. So
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walking out, I said to one of my colleagues, now we just got to execute the plan. You know,
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very important part there. Then repeat these steps. This should be a process of continuous
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improvement. And that is so important. And you know, if you're working in an environment where
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you're doing agile programming, you're a large part of the way they're already. But you want to
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continually assess, you know, every time you do something, where are we? Okay. So you started with
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a current profile. Then you go through a round of improvements. That current profile no longer
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represents where you are. Well, where are we now? Have we gotten to where our target was?
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And if we did, is that still where the target needs to be? Because you're in an environment where
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threats are changing continuously, you need to be thinking continuous improvement.
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Now, one of the things that's important is the communication. So you want to be able to
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communicate with the stakeholders, particularly management. So a current profile is one useful thing
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to communicate to management, to say, you know, here's where we are. And then bring in your target
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profile. So if you can get management buy in, and then that becomes the basis for requirements
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documents for dealing with your business partners, like your suppliers, you know, for large
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organizations, supply chain risk management is now a critical organizational function.
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Target profiles can also help align activities within an organization.
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That's also going to help your buying decisions. All right. Your purchasing decisions should reflect
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where it is you want to be. What's your target profile is saying? So you want to buy things that
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are going to help advance you towards that. And if you currently are buying things that don't
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advance you, then, you know, take a look at that. Maybe that's not what you should be buying anymore.
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You should identify opportunities for new or revised information references.
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For example, your organization has identified a priority for action, but it finds few or inadequate
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informational references. Well, you know, that may mean this is something that has not been well
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developed yet. Well, you could just say, gee, that's a damn shame, but what's even better is
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collaborate with other organizations in your ecosystem and start developing those things.
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You need a methodology to protect privacy and civil liberties. Now, this is an area where,
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for instance, the European Union, I think, has been doing a much better job than the United States
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government. You know, your cybersecurity may involve collecting information from individuals.
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And then, you know, in the European Union, you got the GDPR, just one example, and I don't
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think that's the end of the process by a long shot. So what you need to do is start developing
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formal policies to protect privacy and guard the information from your customers.
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And take a look at what your legal requirements are in that respect as well. And, you know,
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I think a lot of American companies that are suddenly finding themselves subject to this kind
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of regulation, it's kind of a shock because, you know, they succeeded in getting the American
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government to be hands off. Well, you know, what I'm reading right now is the American Congress
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is starting to wake up as well and say, hey, you know, the days of letting you guys run wild are
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over, we need to rein this in now. So that was basically the framework that NIST put together
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for cybersecurity at the organizational level. And so the idea is not so much to lay down specific
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regulations, but to create a framework for self improvement and self assessment. It's more
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of a process than anything. So for every organization, they're going to have to figure out what
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works in their environment with their particular risk profile with their particular goals.
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So you use the framework as a way of moving towards where you need to be.
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And that's not a bad thing, I don't think. So what I'm going to do is this went on a little bit
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longer than most of mine. So I'm going to sign off now and remind you as always to support free
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software. Bye-bye.
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You've been listening to HECCA Public Radio at HECCA Public Radio.org. We are a community podcast
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network that releases shows every weekday Monday through Friday. Today's show, like all our shows,
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was contributed by an HBR listener like yourself. If you ever thought of recording a podcast and
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click on our contributing to find out how easy it really is. HECCA Public Radio was found
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at binwreff.com. If you have comments on today's show, please email the host directly, leave a
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comment on the website or record a follow-up episode yourself. Unless otherwise status, today's show
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