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323 lines
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323 lines
17 KiB
Plaintext
Episode: 3626
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Title: HPR3626: The stuff Evil Steve doesn't want you to know S01E06: Use a Password Manager
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3626/hpr3626.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-25 02:22:39
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---
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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3626 from Monday the 27th of June 2022.
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Today's show isn't titled.
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The stuff evil Steve doesn't want you to know Saeyi, use a password manager.
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It is part of the series' privacy and security.
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It is hosted by Lerking Pryon, and is about 18 minutes long.
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It carries an explicit flag.
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The summary is, making ourselves a less attractive target by utilizing a password manager.
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Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, good night, wherever it happens to be, wherever
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you are in the world.
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You're listening to the stuff evil Steve doesn't want you to know, and I'm your host,
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Lerking Pryon.
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For those of you that have been following, you may have noticed the title of the show
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has changed from Edmund Edmund to the stuff evil Steve doesn't want you to know.
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While searching the internet to find the name for this podcast, I overlooked the fact
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that there already was a podcast called Edmund Edmund, and the great Ken Fallon pointed
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that out to me.
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So we will see since it is from using that and henceforth be known as the stuff evil
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Steve doesn't want you to know.
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On the last episode I talked about two-factor authentication and making sure that you set
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that up on all of your accounts.
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Some of you might find it strange that I recommended implementing that before touching
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your passwords.
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Granted in the first episode I talked about passwords and the fact that you need to change
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them.
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However, two-factor authentication is going to be a big stopgap when stopping someone from
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trying to get into your account.
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Even if they do have your username and password, there's still that second layer of authentication
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that's going to present a barrier.
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Now can these be bypassed?
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Absolutely.
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Everything can be bypassed.
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We know this.
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Which one is best?
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Yes.
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Again, it depends on whether or not you want to pay, if you want to use something free,
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how many platforms it has to be compatible with, and whether or not you and or your family
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will use this.
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What does it have to integrate with?
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These are all things that you're going to have to think about and consider.
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Now do I recommend putting passwords and two-factor authentication in the same app?
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No.
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No, I don't.
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I don't recommend that at all.
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So I would highly recommend keeping your passwords and your two-factor authentication
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separate.
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Now some of you might be asking, well what about Google or Apple remembering my passwords?
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I am not a fan of this.
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And depending upon what literature you read, some people say, okay, it's to care other people
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and not so much.
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The key to remember with Google and Apple remembering your password is the key to your
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kingdom is simply unlocking your device.
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Your password that you use for your Apple iCloud or for your Google account is solely the
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key to your kingdom.
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That's it.
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You don't have any other backup, there's nothing else.
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So if you walk away and you leave your phone sitting on the desk and it's unlocked, they
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have access to literally everything that you have.
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All they have to do is open up your banking app, Apple automatically fills it in, and then
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they can transfer your funds to whatever account they want.
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This I'm hoping is not a happy situation for you.
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I'm going to do this, use a separate authenticator app and make sure that it has a pin so that
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you have to enter a pin every single time to open the app.
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That way even if you leave your phone laying around and the screen happens to be unlocked,
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then they could open the authenticator app but there's a pin now blocking it.
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Any important app on your phone should have a pin lock and it should not be the same
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pin as you use to lock your phone.
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So to factor authentication, it's a good thing, let's use it.
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Now let's talk a little bit about your passwords and password managers.
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I've already thrown out the flaws in using Google and Apple.
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The flip side is they're very easy to use and chances are your family will use them readily.
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So is it better than nothing, yes.
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So if you're going to be doing that, here's a few recommendations.
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First of all, make sure that you have a strong pin or password to unlock the device.
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Set the device to time out, let the screen lock after 3 minutes, 5 minutes, 10 minutes
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and force the reentry of a pin to get back in.
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If you're using biometrics to unlock your device, okay, again, do your homework and it
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all depends on how comfortable you are with that level of security.
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Keep in mind, locking your device is important.
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We've all walked away and left our phone sitting somewhere and then gone back to find it.
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Another thing that I like to point out when it comes to your phone is your lock screen.
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I always recommend putting a phone number on your lock screen that someone can call if
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they find your phone.
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For example, in my lock screen, it's got the name of my phone and it's got my wife's
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phone number.
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It doesn't do it good to put your phone number on the phone because they find your phone.
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They're going to call and the phone in the hand is going to ring.
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It does you know good.
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Now while we tend to focus on security and we focus on the evil steves of the world, the
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reality is is that most people in the world are actually good, decent human beings who
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try to do the right thing.
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Chances are if someone finds your phone, they're going to try and get it back to you.
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They're going to take it to the lost and found or if there's a phone number on the lock
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screen, then they're going to call that number and try and get the phone back to you.
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I have found people's phones and I've had to open them and go through their contacts
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and look for a contact like mom to call and say, okay, we're going to have an awkward
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conversation here, but I have this phone and I'm trying to return it to its owner.
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I shouldn't be able to do that, however, keep in mind you really don't want people
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poking around on your phone.
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I could have just as easy looked through all of his pictures or everything else that
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was on their phone.
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We don't want that.
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We want to make sure that the phone is locked, people aren't digging through what we have.
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Make it nice and easy for them.
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Also make sure that you're able to track your device.
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There's a number of different apps that you can use for tracking your device.
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I highly recommend that you have one that can not only track your device, but can turn
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on the ringer.
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It's happened to me a few times where I've lost my phone like in my couch or under my car
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seat and it was on silent.
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It doesn't do any good to call that phone because all it's going to do is sit there and
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be quiet while the screen flashes.
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Not too good.
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Use something that will actually turn the volume all the way up so it will ring so you
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can actually hear it if it happens to be in your couch or under your car seat.
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Also make sure that you're able to remotely wipe the device.
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If that device is lost and it's out of your control and you know 100%, it's not in
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your couch, it's not under your car, it is gone, it's in somebody else's hands.
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Remote wipe that device.
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Now you're going to say, oh my gosh, I'm going to lose everything.
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You should be backing up stuff.
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We'll cover that in another episode.
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I back up all of my stuff and on a bi-monthly basis, I remotely wipe all of my devices.
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Blame.
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Wipe them all remotely.
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That way I make sure that it works.
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I remember the passwords to get into what I use to locate and track my devices.
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I make sure that I can call them and that they actually turn on a ring.
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I make sure that I can actually use the location to find the device.
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Does this take a little bit of work and is it a little bit of time?
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Yes.
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I feel that it's personally worth it to me.
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Yes.
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That is the level of security that I am comfortable with.
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Your use case is completely different, however, these are things that you may or may not
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have thought of and these are things that your family may or may not be doing.
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So basic security of not only your accounts but how you access those accounts.
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But we tend to be very cavalier about our phones.
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And the problem is you don't carry a phone.
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You carry a computer that makes phone calls.
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You haven't carried a phone around for over a decade.
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Think about it.
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You're using a computer.
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You're carrying a computer.
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It makes phone calls for you.
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But essentially, it's a computer.
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Let's treat it like a computer and protect it like a computer.
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You wouldn't want to leave your laptop sitting around in the middle of the mall completely
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unlocked.
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That would be absurd.
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Well, think of your phone exactly the same way.
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Now what I really wanted to talk to you today about was your passwords.
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I wanted to get back on that and have a little discussion about this.
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A lot of us tend to use the same username and password on multiple sites because it's
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easy to remember.
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That's great.
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The problem is when you store passwords at a site, we assume that those are going to
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be protected.
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However, that's not always the case.
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And you might even be surprised to learn that some of the sites that you use actually store
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your passwords in plain text, which means if someone gets access to that database, then
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they have complete access to your username and password.
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This takes a short little script to run through to see if that is working on any other
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site.
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Now, there's a website out there called haveibemponed.com.
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That's have I been P-W-N-E-D.com, I'll put the link in the show notes.
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This guy has collected over 350 databases.
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These are open databases of hacked passwords from different companies.
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So all of their username and passwords, they're out there.
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On the web, they're freely available for anyone.
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So what he does, he comes through all those databases.
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If your email address was found in one of those database breaches, it will tell you which
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breach it was, when it was, and that will give you a good indication that you should go
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change that password, not only on the site where it was breached, but everywhere else you
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happen to use that username and password combination.
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You can check all of your emails, you can also check phone numbers.
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There's a number of sites where you use a phone number to identify yourself as a username.
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You might want to check that as well.
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So anywhere your phone number or your email has been breached, definitely go change the
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password on the sites that have been involved in the breach, and anywhere else that you use
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that password.
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So now we have passwords that we know have been exposed.
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We're going to go and we're going to change them.
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Here is where I want you to really start thinking about a password manager.
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This is going to allow you to remember one master passphrase.
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Once you open the password manager, you can then generate passwords for any other site
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that you don't have to remember, and you can create very strong passwords.
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It will remember them, it will auto fill them, and the good thing is is a lot of them will
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tell you, hey, change your password, you can set times to when you want to change your
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password.
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Say you want to change your password every six months.
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You can set up your password manager.
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It will tell you, hey, these passwords are about to expire, let's go change them.
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This allows you to have a different password for every site that you use, every app that
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you use.
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The thing to keep in mind is, since you have a single password or passphrase, which
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I highly recommend, you're definitely going to want to keep that secure.
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Make sure it's something that you can remember and that you don't have to write down.
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Which password manager?
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That is completely up to you.
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Again, your use case is yours.
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Do you want to use something proprietary?
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Do you want to use something open source?
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How many platforms does it have to be?
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Does it have to integrate with a browser?
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Is it a browser based?
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Does it live on the web?
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Is it a standalone database?
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That's all up to you.
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Me personally, I've been using key pass for years.
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I keep my key pass on my one drive.
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I sync that database to all of my devices.
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When I make a change to a password, it automatically syncs up with my database on my one drive.
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If I lose my phone, I don't have to worry about it.
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My database exists on one drive.
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Do I keep my password manager secure?
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Yes.
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Do I remember other passwords?
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Yes.
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And you should too.
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There are going to be email accounts that you're going to want to know the password for.
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First of all, your primary email address.
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You want to make sure that you can remember that password or pass phrase.
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I recommend making the longest pass phrase that you can remember.
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Keep in mind, I talked in the first episode about complexity requirements and all of that.
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Throw it out the window and just create a nice long pass phrase.
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Pick a paragraph from your favorite book that you remembered or a poem that you memorized
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in high school.
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Something that you can easily remember.
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And the length is going to matter more than anything else.
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The length and who you tell about it or where you write it down.
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That's the key.
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You also want to be able to remember your recovery account.
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If you happen to forget that primary email address or other email addresses, you want to
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make sure that you can get into the recovery account so that you can get whatever confirmation
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method is coming in to remember what that is.
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You banks.
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You probably want to be able to remember your banking information so that you can log
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in.
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And depending upon what you do, there might be other sites that you want to remember those
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passwords.
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Aside from those, everything else, you should have a different password for every single
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site and they should all be stored in your password manager.
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So password manager, two-factor authentication, look, can all of these be bypassed?
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Sure.
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Are some better than others?
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Yes.
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Which one is best?
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Yes.
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Should we start layering our security?
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Yes.
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It's all about putting more barriers between us and attacker.
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It's about being a harder victim than the next person.
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Again, Evil Steve is going to go for the easiest target.
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Let's start making ourselves and our family a more difficult target than the next family.
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That's what we're trying to do.
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Let's be a more difficult target.
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Let's be the one that is the hardest to get to.
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Think about being on a battlefield and there's a sniper.
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Do you want to be the person standing in the open or do you want to be the person who
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is completely hidden behind a wall?
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Does that mean you're safe behind the wall?
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No.
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Not at all.
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Are you safer than the person standing in the open?
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Yes.
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Who's the sniper going to go for the person standing in the open?
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If you are standing in the open, well, if you're standing there and there's an officer standing
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next to you, who do you think the sniper is going to take out?
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The officer.
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So again, it's about being a more secure target than the next person.
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Right.
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I'm assuming that at some point, somebody's going to have some feedback, some questions,
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maybe some comments that they want to bring up and I will happily address those.
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Keep in mind, my goal here is just kind of starting out with simple things that we can do
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to make ourselves more secure.
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We're never going to get too secure, just accept that fact.
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It's going to happen as soon or later, something bad is going to happen.
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What I'm hoping to do is help you prepare for that eventuality and hopefully postpone it
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as long as possible.
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So again, two-factor authentication, set up a password manager, start using it and go
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to haveibempone.com and check and see what passwords have been breached and definitely
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change those and anywhere else that you use that username and password combination.
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If you know of any other resources that you would like to share with other people in
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the community, pass them on to me, I'll be more than happy to share that with the community.
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Give me some feedback.
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Do you like what I'm doing here or am I wasting my time or am I wasting your time?
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I'm hoping that you all are getting something out of this.
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I do have 20 years plus worth of experience that I like to share with people.
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A lot of what I say might be old hat.
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You might be sitting here saying, okay, I know this, I know this, I know this.
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Then again, maybe it's something brand new and you're like, wow, I hadn't thought about
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that.
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Let me know.
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I'd love to hear.
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Am I going to get into more advanced stuff as we go down the road?
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Yes, yes I will.
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If there are certain security things that you would like me to talk about, send them to
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me.
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I will gladly talk about them if they are in my wheelhouse.
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There are plenty of topics out there that I am not the expert on or that I don't know
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enough to talk about.
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If that's the case, I will honestly tell you that's outside my wheelhouse.
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But if it's something that I can definitely talk to, then I'll be more than happy to address
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that particular topic for you.
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So until next time, I hope you've enjoyed listening to Admin Admin, this is Lurking
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Pryon.
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Have a wonderful morning, afternoon, evening or night, wherever you happen to be.
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Stay safe.
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You have been listening to Hacker Public Radio at HackerPublicRadio.org.
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Today's show was contributed by a HBR listener like yourself.
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If you ever thought of recording podcasts, then click on our contribute link to find
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out how easy it means.
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The HBR has been kindly provided by an honesthost.com, the internet archive and our sings.net.
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On the Sadois stages, today's show is released under Creative Commons, Attribution 4.0 International
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License.
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