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233 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
Episode: 3612
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Title: HPR3612: Who is Evil Steve? Part 2
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3612/hpr3612.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-25 02:10:28
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---
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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3612 for Tuesday the 7th of June 2022.
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Today's show is entitled, Who Is Evil Steve, Part 2.
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It is part of the series' privacy and security.
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It is hosted by Lurking Private and is about 16 minutes long.
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It carries an explicit flag.
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The summary is, we take a closer look at the types of evil steves attacking us.
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Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, wherever it happens to be, where you're listening
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to this on this little planet that we call Earth.
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You are listening to another episode of Abin Admin.
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I'm your host, Lurking Pryon.
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Today's episode is going to be Who Is Evil Steve, Part 2.
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This week I spoke generally about who Evil Steve was and the kind of things that they
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do.
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He, they, I'm going to use all those pronouns and mix them up, look, just understand
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that there's a human that's attacking you.
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That's the important thing to understand.
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Now there's really two classes of attackers.
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Now I know that people who are in cybersecurity are going to get a little bit defensive about
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this, but just bear with me for a second.
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First of all, we have the low level hackers who are really just interested in your data.
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They're using tools that they don't develop, they just find them online, they can follow
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a quick tutorial and use them, or they can even just hire as a service on the dark web.
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The barrier to entry as far as hacking goes is almost zero today for a vast majority of
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the attacks that you would want to launch on people.
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So at this point for these attackers is simply a matter of finding information that they
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can turn around and monetize.
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So let's sit around for a minute and think about the information you have that could be valuable
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to someone else.
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First of all, valid email addresses.
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These are something that is very valuable, there are resellers that will buy these.
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Granted the payout on isn't very much.
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Not when you compare it to things like credit card numbers, banking information, social security
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numbers, or other identification numbers that you have that would allow for different kinds
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of identity theft.
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When it comes to identity theft, we're going to get more into this another episode, but
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I do want to point out that there are a couple of different kinds of identity theft.
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Well identity theft is a big one.
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I had a troop when I was in the military, he was deployed to somewhere stand.
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And when he came back, he started getting past due notices for medical bills from a hospital
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in Seattle.
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Apparently, while he was deployed to somewhere stand, he'd had breast augmentation.
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So even with orders proving that this person was out of the country, was not the person
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who had the surgery, it took him months to get this cleared up and get it off his credit
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report.
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So keep in mind that once identity theft happens, it is incredibly hard to get it fixed.
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The other kind I want to mention real quick is child identity theft.
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It is very easy to get a hold of a kid's, so security number, and then use their identity
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to rack up all kinds of death.
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The problem is most parents don't find out about this until their kid turns 18, they
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go to college, they apply for financial aid, only to find out that they have a whole bunch
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of stuff in their credit history that is not theirs.
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And long story short, you are not getting that loan anytime soon.
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So I would recommend if you haven't done it, and if you have children, today go and
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do a credit check on your children.
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Go and look at the credit score, go look at their credit reports, and see what's there.
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Transunion, experience, and I can't remember the other one on top of my head.
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Those are the three major ones in the US.
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You can get a free credit report from each one once a year.
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Hit up experience, get a credit report, and then set a calendar reminder, four months
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later, get one from experience, four months later, get another one, and then you can keep
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rotating through so that you're checking on your kid's current score on a regular basis.
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The thing with identity theft is the sooner you notice it, the easier it is to fix.
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This is really the basis behind life lock.
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Life lock doesn't stop identity theft.
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Life lock identifies you and alerts you to the fact that identity theft probably is happening
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at an early enough stage that you can fight it effectively.
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The longer it goes on, the harder it is to fight.
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These are the kinds of information that people are looking for when it comes to the low-level
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hacker.
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Keep in mind if you are somebody that may generate some kind of animosity toward other people
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on the internet, they may target you specifically looking for information about you that could
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be detrimental to your image.
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There's all kinds of stuff that's out there that you probably don't want falling into
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other people's hands.
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I would recommend doing a good check of your social medias, trying to see what's out there,
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trying to see what other people have about you out there, do a Google search, and then
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those things that you really don't want other people knowing about.
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How about going and checking where you have that data, how it's protected, and maybe
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at the very least, change your passwords for all of those things.
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I'll talk more about passwords in another episode.
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The bariter entry when it comes to being a hacker is extremely low.
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The payout, it could be pretty good depending upon how much effort a person is willing to
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put into it, and what kind of a target audience they happen to be hitting.
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The second level is what we call the advance persistent threat.
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These are the attacks that have a person actively sitting behind.
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What they are doing is they are not just looking for things like your social security number.
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What they are doing is they are getting into your organization, they are using tools that
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are already installed.
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They're not installing malware or anything like that.
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They're using things like PowerShell that's already there.
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What they are doing is they are pivoting through your network to find information that would
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be valuable to them, things like intellectual property, trade secrets, and they are not
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a quick smash and grab.
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They are in there for the long haul.
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They're going to create multiple points of entry so that if one is found and closed,
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they have another way to get in.
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They really want to get in, stay there covertly, and watch what's going on, and slowly
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steal information from your network.
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This is where identifying the who becomes very valuable from a security standpoint.
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When it comes to these kinds of attackers identifying a profile on who they are, how they go
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about doing their business, what tools they use, different ways that they go around doing
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precursors to an attack, the things that they do once they're in the network will help
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you identify other times or other places that they may happen to target you.
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A lot of these APTs are already known, and there's information out there, there's information
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sharing centers if you're in a critical industry, and there's other information if you're
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willing to look around for it.
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The advanced persistent threats, these are really not the attackers that are going to show
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up on your alerts.
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It's not going to show up on your SIM, and if it does, it's probably going to be an anomaly.
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Most of these, you're going to have to go find.
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You're going to have to go look for signs that they are there.
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They are very good, and a lot of them can go years without being detected.
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These are state actors, these are well-funded criminal groups, these are threat actors
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that have a very strong ideology.
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We like to think about people like ISIS, and we say, oh, well, they just go and blow
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themselves up.
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Well, I'm going to tell you right now that not every extremist in the world wants to
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blow themselves up.
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They have some very skilled hackers, and yes, there's a lot of terrorist groups out there
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that are hacking different sides and different companies for different reasons.
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So again, the who that is attacking you really plays a difference in how you look for
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signs of an attack and how you defend against those attacks.
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My recommendation is for your business, your organization, the industry that you're in,
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I would highly recommend doing some research into the current act of threat actors, who
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are the ones that target your industry, who are the ones that are targeting the information
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that you are trying to protect and keep secret.
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Those are the people that you're really going to want to study and take a look at and
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other threat actors that may be in the same space, but maybe aren't quite as active to
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give yourself a better threat profile.
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Now the thing that I want to caution you with is when it comes to gathering intelligence
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about threat actors, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and all of the different things
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that you can look for.
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You can very quickly overwhelm your security team with the amount of information that's
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coming in.
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That is not effective at all, which is why I always recommend let's start with the very
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most active people in our sector, who are the ones that are most likely to attack us
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and go through research them and rack and stack them and start with number one and work
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your way down to number 99, whatever happens to be.
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And then start with number one.
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All right.
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So here's this threat actor.
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Here's what they do.
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Here's the tools they use.
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Here's the way they get in.
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Let's take our analysts and let's go out and let's start looking to see if there's any
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signs of compromise that would indicate that we've already been attacked.
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Always work under the assumption that you've already been attacked.
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If you think that you are not already vulnerable, chances are you've been attacked and you just
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don't know it yet.
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It's not a matter of if you're going to be hacked.
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It's going to happen.
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It's not a matter of if it's when.
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It's going to happen.
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The name of the game is getting the attacker out as quickly as possible.
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There's something that we call dwell time.
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This is the amount of time that an attacker is in a network undetected until they're removed.
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And the last time I checked, I believe it was, I think, a 2019.
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The global average for dwell time was 99 days, just shy of four months.
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There's a lot of time that an attacker has undetected in a network.
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We've gotten better.
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I believe the last time I checked, we had come down to, I believe, the 50s for the number
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of days.
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Still 50 days in a network is a long time.
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Let's talk about ransomware.
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What we have found is that with most of the ransomware attacks over the last two years,
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there's about a two-week delay between the time they actually get into the network, to
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the time they actually take action and start going about doing the damage to your network.
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So if that attack had been found and stopped in those two weeks prior to them actually
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activating and doing damage to your network, the attack would have effectively been stopped.
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That's really the name of the game.
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Let's find them as soon as they get in.
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It's really trying to limit that dwell time, limit the amount of time that they have to
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do damage to you.
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So it's not about keeping them out.
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I really want to drive this point home.
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It is not about keeping hackers out.
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That is an impossible task.
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You can't do it.
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There is no such thing as security.
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It does not exist among men or in nature.
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That's a quote from Helen Keller.
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I don't believe I got it quite right, but that's the genital just of it.
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So security doesn't exist.
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It's a myth.
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We can't make something secure.
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If you don't believe me, watch Oceans 11, Oceans 12, Oceans 13, Oceans 8, Oceans
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92.
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How many they made?
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But basically, no matter how much security you put, if someone has enough time, enough
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determination and enough resources, they're going to get in.
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And you have limited time, limited termination, and limited resources.
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That's an asymmetric battle that you will never, ever win.
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So we need to focus on the flip side.
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Okay, let's go and we recognize the fact that they're going to get in.
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What can we do to identify them as soon as they got in, so that we can minimize and stop
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that attack at its earliest stage possible?
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So who are the evil steves out there?
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We've talked about that.
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I'm hoping that this gives you a better idea of who the attackers are out there.
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And keep in mind, it's not things that are attacking you.
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It's people.
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Behind every single one of those attacks, there's a person.
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Now, they may have targeted you specifically, or you may have just been caught in up in
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the mess of IP addresses that they found.
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It really doesn't matter at the end of the day.
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So people attack you, not things, people cause damage to your networks.
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At the end of the day, it's people that we have to worry about.
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Security is, and always will be a people problem.
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And I think if we can start changing our focus and security to thinking about security as
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a people problem, we will go much further in our ability to protect our organization.
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And I'll talk about this in future episodes where I talk about personnel relationships
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within your organization.
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Again, security is a people problem.
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So keep that in mind.
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So talk about different threat actors, hoping that you guys found this useful and helpful.
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I'll be back again with another episode looking forward to hearing your feedback.
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And until next time, this has been Abin Abman, and this is Lurking Pryon, signing off.
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Have a good week.
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You have been listening to Hacker Public Radio, and Hacker Public Radio does work.
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Today's show was contributed by a HBR listener like yourself.
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If you ever thought of recording broadcast, click on our contribute link to find out how
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easy it needs.
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The HBR has been kindly provided by an honesthost.com, the internet archive, and our sings.net.
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On the Sadois status, today's show is released under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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License.
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