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379 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
379 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
Episode: 3664
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Title: HPR3664: Secret hat conversations
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3664/hpr3664.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-25 03:01:33
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---
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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3664 for Thursday the 18th of August 2022.
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Today's show is entitled Secret Hat Conversations.
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It is hosted by some guy on the internet and is about 18 minutes long.
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It carries an explicit flag.
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The summary is, you'll need your tin hat for this one.
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Hello and welcome ladies and gentlemen to another episode of Hacker Public Radio.
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I'm your host, some guy on the internet.
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Today I'm just going to go through a quick little rambo something I've been thinking about for a while now but I never got to share.
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I know you guys go read into your kitchen cabinets or where you keep your tin foil.
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Go get a nice, big, you know, nice, nice long roll of it and go ahead and find a YouTube video on how to fashion a hat from it.
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Now from this point, you're going to need that hat.
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They're going to be probably future conversations where you're going to want that hat again.
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So just, you know, be careful not to get rid of it.
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You're going to just store it away somewhere where no one else can see it because they'll probably ask you questions you don't want to answer about it.
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So if you're listening to this episode on a speaker, go ahead and turn it down or pause and go get a set of headphones.
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Sorry, sorry about that.
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Yeah, go ahead and get yourself a set of headphones.
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We are going to discuss cell phones today.
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Now, one of the things I've been thinking about is how the cell phone is like our greatest...
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or let me not say out, let me just say my...
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The cell phone is my greatest attack surface.
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It's a proprietary device that I cannot walk out of the house without,
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not because I need to have the cell phone as much as the next guy.
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I think I need to have the cell phone, you know, for work mostly and there's obviously family as well.
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But that's the rub right there, that's the catch.
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Because they've convinced so many people around us to have these things,
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if you, the one guy, does not carry a cell phone,
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that somehow puts you at a tremendous disadvantage in society
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because you aren't able to, you know, receive communications.
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You can't talk to people and they can't send you messages you don't need,
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like, you know, cat videos and whatever else or, you know,
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tell you about the meeting that could have just have easily been an email.
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You can't learn about the meeting, that is also mandatory by the way.
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Now, just putting the cell phone in everybody's hand,
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does it make it the attack surface?
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What makes it the attack surface is the fact that we have never upgraded our phone systems,
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so for instance, the phone number, the thing that is supposed to be unique to everyone can be spoofed.
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So someone can call you from your mother's number,
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even though they're not your mother and they're not at your mother's house.
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They can be anywhere in the world and just use her phone number to contact you.
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You get what I mean?
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And I know you might be saying, okay, your mother's that,
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that's gonna hear the voice and know it's not your mother.
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But what if it's from your bank?
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What if your bank calls you suddenly and tell you there's an issue
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and, you know, they've got some information that seems like they're really your bank?
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You haven't been made aware of that recent data leak
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because companies aren't required to report it immediately,
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at least not in the US.
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By the time you hear about a data leak, it probably happened last year or two years ago, even.
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You know what I mean?
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So somebody's running around with really, really personal information about you
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that truthfully, the only way they could have gotten that level of information
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is if you personally gave it to them or they stole it from the person you personally gave it to.
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So here's the thing, you calling me from my bank,
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you've got information about me that only my bank would know about.
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I mean, really personal stuff.
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And I now believe this is the bank.
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It's the correct number.
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You've got the correct information.
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I mean, why else would you have that information unless you're from the bank
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and you're calling me from the bank's number?
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So when you're telling me, you need me to verify who I am
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and you're going to send me a code.
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And I send you back that code.
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And now you have confirmed who I am.
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And oh, now there's no longer a problem
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because I have verified who I am
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and now you just, you know,
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inform me on yada yada blah blah
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next thing you know my bank accounts empty, completely empty.
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And of course, when I go down to the bank to try to figure out what's going on
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because I talked to someone and so on, they told me it was fine.
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Uh, that person doesn't work here.
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blah blah blah blah.
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Suddenly, we got a major issue here
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and there's no possible way to fix it
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because the system was desiring so long ago
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it was never updated.
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Anybody can do this.
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Anybody can just go around with whatever information they've stolen or purchase.
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Maybe they didn't steal it personally, but they can purchase it from someone that stole it
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and just spoof a number call you and do whatever they want.
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So now I want you to take that bank scenario, fold it up nice and neat, put it in your pocket.
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Keep that with you because you're going to need to remember that for future conversations.
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Right? That's the bank topic
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and you've now got it in your pocket.
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We found a way to try and open the cell phone itself up
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as much as we possibly can to try and eliminate the cell phone itself being the problem.
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But it is the system that the cell phone is created for that is still the issue, the software.
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So you get a pine phone, the most open device that we have at this time
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that is still a development device.
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By the way, I like to point, keep that in the minds of everybody.
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Don't just run out.
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Think you're going to get a pine phone, open it up at the box, attach it to a network
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and begin using it like you could your iPhone or whatever else you have.
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It still requires some knowledge to use.
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So you got this open device and even the developers of the pine phone tell you
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there's even though this device is as open as we could possibly make it.
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There's still things within the device that cannot be made open.
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Like I believe it was the modem or whatever.
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That cannot be made open because, you know,
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the people who license you to use this technology,
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tell you that it must not be open, you know, for whatever reason.
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You know, they just make up anything, national security to have it.
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That's a good enough reason.
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Isn't that the reason for anything nowadays though, right?
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Like if we don't want you to know something, it's for national security.
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So don't question it even if you start questioning national security,
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that makes you the bad guy.
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Alright, so we're back on track.
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You got the open device, the most open-aid device could possibly be.
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And let's pretend that it's actually market friendly.
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You can just buy one, put in a SIM card, you know,
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attach it to the network and begin using it like any other device on the market right now.
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It still will not help you because you're still using a flawed network.
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People can still perform the exact same tricks on your open device
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as they could on your close source device.
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So one way or another, the attack surface has not changed at all
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because you're still using the device.
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You still got to get the message about the mandatory meeting
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that could have just easily have been a memo tucked inside of an email,
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an encrypted email, and sent to all the people that's supposed to have it.
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But because management can't be bothered to learn, you know, new things.
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A bunch of one trick pony desk jockeys that must just demand you go to the building
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and attend a lecture about complete horse excrement.
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You have to have that cell phone with you.
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And of course, you know, there's also family, all the people you love.
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They love using cell phones because social media, et cetera, et cetera.
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I'm not going to go too deep into all that.
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But think about it.
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Now, for those of us who have learned to use things like element,
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I mean, think about how much better the world could be if we just started adopting a matrix protocol.
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Imagine if, say, for instance, banks and other things were using this protocol
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to communicate directly with users.
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Say, say, for instance, society decides that, um, okay, users, if you want to,
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you could register an account name with your local government, right?
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And that account name is yours.
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It's, it's, it becomes a part of your ID, your identification.
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This is now attached to your registered number with the government,
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because names don't matter.
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You're just the number to the government.
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Make sure that, that tin foil hat is on real tight now.
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All right.
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You don't want any of this information to be leaked out.
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You don't want anybody to be able to peek into your brain and see this information right away.
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All right, all right.
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I'm, I've calmed down now.
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We're back, we're back on track here.
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So you got your ID that is on the matrix protocol.
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You got a handle, if you will.
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You can use any client you want, element, whatever else is out there that you want to use.
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And you can receive encrypted communication because this thing has security built into it, right?
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So your bank is on that network.
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They've got their own instance, their own servers or whatever.
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And you can federate with it.
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So you can receive direct messages from your bank.
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That's an encrypted channel that only your bank has access to.
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And you know, trade keys or whatever.
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And this is only if you want to, right?
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If you don't want to, then you don't have to, right?
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You can still stay with the phone system until eventually that goes away.
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But right now, there's also a more secure method available.
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And with this new, and we're only using element because right now, or, or matrix,
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because I can't think of anything else right now.
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All right.
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That and the misses took the baby to the store.
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So I got a limited amount of time to go ahead and get this thing recorded without a toddler climbing on the top of my head.
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And the misses chatting with me about coupon. She found online.
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Pro tip, when your misses decides to go to the store and you want to record an episode,
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give her a call shortly after she leaves the door and say,
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hey, honey, I just transferred over a couple hundred dollars over to the joint account.
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Use that to go buy something.
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That'll keep her gone longer than if they get an episode out.
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All right. Now, where was that?
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We were talking about having this, this ID that the bank has.
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The bank sends you their, you know, key, the encryption key or whatever was the public key.
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So that now you send your public key to them.
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The keys form this link of communication.
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Now all communication between you and the bank are secure.
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Or however, element does it because I'm not entirely sure how the encryption works with the,
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excuse me, not element matrix protocol.
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I'm guessing that you exchange keys like with SSH,
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but if you don't, maybe it's handled automatically.
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I'm not sure.
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One way or another, the keys are changed.
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Communication is encrypted.
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And here's another wonderful thing, even if it wasn't encrypted.
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Even if it was just, you know, well, we wanted to be encrypted.
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Let's just keep it as encrypted.
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However, the encryption happens, you're not communicating.
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Say somebody tries to pretend to be your bank.
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Well, you have a contact list with your bank in it.
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And if they're not on that list, they're obviously not from your bank.
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As far as we know, currently you are not able to just pretend to be somebody else on matrix.
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Unlike you could don't like say Facebook or whatever,
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where you could shout out to a hooker once again,
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who told us about, you know, member cloning Facebook accounts,
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where people say that the account was hacked when in actuality,
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it wasn't hacked.
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It was more of a social engineering attempt where they cloned in account,
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use some of the same images, et cetera, et cetera.
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Just go check out a hooker and look for the show there.
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A lot of great stuff.
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Back on track, you can't do that with matrix at least not right now.
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And it's open.
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So even if somebody wanted to attempt that kind of thing,
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you'd see where the flaws are,
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and you can actually point them out and stop it from existing as long as it has now
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with our current phone systems,
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with you just being able to spoof any number,
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or clone any number,
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and pretend to be home ever else,
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with the stolen information you're running around with.
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So right now, if there's a second or a third,
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Ken Valley account that starts contacting me going,
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hey, I lost my password.
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Could you send me the password that I am about to send to you
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so that I can get access to my old account?
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You know how that stuff goes out there now with all these scams?
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How they do that?
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What is it, the TOTP codes?
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Well, it's not going to work here,
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because I actually have the original Ken saved,
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and I could just contact him, hey, Ken, did you lose your information?
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And are you trying, which I know he's not, you know?
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I know that would not happen to him anyway.
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I only talk to people who are involved in the Geeks fear,
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so it'll probably happen with, like, say, a niece
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and nephew or cousin of mine,
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where they'll probably sign up today,
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lose their credentials tomorrow,
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and have to create a new account,
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and then just say that they were hacked,
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and, you know, they just actually forgot everything.
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And this is the part of the episode,
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where if we had sponsors,
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you'd probably throw in a sponsor for a password manager,
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or something like that,
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but since we don't, you know, go figure it out.
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Plenty of episodes out there about them.
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Go check one of them out.
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But I mean, just stop and think about it for just a second.
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If we could actually improve our communication,
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where we no longer need cell phone numbers,
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but we actually had handles or IDs,
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and we could eliminate the whole spoofing
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and account copying that that currently happens
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with the cell phone numbers,
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and I give you the example by Facebook,
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so you can better understand,
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if you're not a complete, you know, hacker, tech junkie,
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whatever you want to call it,
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if you're just new to this,
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if you just found out about HBR yesterday,
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and you popped in and listened to this episode,
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that's why the Facebook reference was in there.
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For everybody else, you understand.
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You'd have far more security,
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just because you eliminate an old deprecated system
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that's closed source,
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and we don't even know if there's being new development on it.
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I don't know how our network systems work,
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but I can find out more about Matrix right now.
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You can hear what I mean.
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It's like right there.
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I can just go to it and start learning about it.
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I can find out who's working on it.
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I can contribute documentation.
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I can donate money to it.
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You get what I mean?
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So it's fantastic.
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Pro tip, that's how you become a super hacker.
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You find a project that you really like,
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contact somebody that works there, say,
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hey, I'll give you, you know,
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a hundred bucks right now,
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put my name on a wall somewhere,
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and say, I contribute it.
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Boom, look at that.
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All jokes, all jokes aside.
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But seriously, if we could have a more secure
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way of communicating with one another,
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I don't even phone call some of my friends anymore.
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The people that I actually talk to
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and hang out with outside,
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I don't even call them anymore.
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We chat on Discord,
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because I know better than to tell them about
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element and signing up for it.
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I know how that's going to end.
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Discord is easy for them to sign up for,
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unless you were invited to the server where we chat,
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you can't just really break in and,
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you know, listen to the conversation.
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And because most of them also understand
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the same way you don't just send,
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you know, private information
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through a text message,
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like you don't see any social security number
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or anything stupid like that,
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through a text message.
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So you also know better than to do it through Discord, right?
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But Discord is a more secure way to call each other to chat
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and speak with friends.
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It's also easier.
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You ever tried to do a three-way call?
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You know how three-way calls work,
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especially when one person has to leave
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for a moment or two,
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because they got a call,
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and then when they're done with their call,
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they call you back and say,
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hey, now put us back on three-way,
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so you have to do it.
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It's a hassle.
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With Discord,
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I just leave the chat,
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go ahead and do the phone call thing
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and then pop right back into the chat,
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because it's still established.
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You know what I mean?
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Super easy, super simple.
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Imagine if we could do that with regular cell phones,
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get rid of the cell phone number
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because the cell phone is actually just a computer.
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How about just use it more like a computer?
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All right, you know,
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almost say it's a word's there,
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but you know,
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just use it more like a computer.
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It'd be so much better if we could do that, right?
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It kind of reminds me before I get out of here,
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because I'm about to reach the 20-minute mark
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and for these kind of rambles,
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I want to keep them under 20 minutes.
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There was a guy talking about the calculator
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and how the old design of the calculator
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was just, you know,
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not, it's not modern
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and we shouldn't be using it.
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We should actually be using something
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that looks more like an IDE
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instead of the old school calculator.
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But I'm pretty sure what's it called?
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Texas Instruments would probably sue you
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into oblivion if you tried that.
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So, have a nice day, ladies and gentlemen.
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That'll be our next rep patents
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and, you know, coffee rights and all of that.
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We'll break out the tinfoil hat again for all of that.
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You guys take it easy?
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And thank you for listening to another episode
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of Hacker Public Radio.
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I'm your host, some guy on the internet.
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Now, it's safe for you to take off that hat, fold it up,
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put it somewhere safe for the next episode.
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You have been listening to Hacker Public Radio
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and Hacker Public Radio does work.
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Today's show was contributed
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by a HBO listener like yourself.
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If you ever thought of recording podcasts,
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then click on our contribute link
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to find out how easy it really is.
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Hosting for HBR has been kindly provided
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by an honesthost.com,
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the internet archive, and our sings.net.
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On this otherwise stated,
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today's show is released
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under Creative Commons,
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Attribution 4.0 International License.
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