Triple-C/ROADMAP.md

# Triple-C Roadmap — Claude Code Feature Parity

**Date:** 2026-08-09 · **Baseline:** v0.3.0 · **Claude Code reference:** 2.1.226

Companion to [DESIGN-REVIEW.md](DESIGN-REVIEW.md), which covers visual design and
information architecture. This document covers *which Claude Code capabilities Triple-C
should surface, and why.*

---

## Guiding principle

> **Triple-C shows state and launches things. Claude Code edits its own config.**

Triple-C's built-in MCP server management was removed in this cycle because Claude Code
absorbed the capability natively (`claude mcp add/list/remove`, `.mcp.json`, `/mcp`).
Hooks, skills, agents, plugins, output styles, and statusline are the same species: files
under `.claude/` with first-class Claude Code TUIs. Building GUI form editors for them
means losing the same race again.

What Claude Code cannot do is what Triple-C uniquely owns: **the container boundary and
what persists behind it** — the config volume, workspace mounts, lifecycle, the bundled
scheduler, and the fleet view across many projects.

---

## Current coverage (v0.3.0)

Triple-C sets exactly five `settings.json` keys, plus a sandbox block:

| Key | Surfaced as |
|---|---|
| `tui` | TUI Mode select (`fullscreen`) |
| `effort` | Effort Level select (`low`/`medium`/`high`) |
| `autoScrollEnabled` | Auto-Scroll Disabled toggle |
| `focusMode` | Focus Mode toggle |
| `showThinkingSummaries` | Thinking Summaries toggle |
| `sandbox.*` | Sandbox toggle (`enabled`, `enableWeakerNestedSandbox`, `allowUnsandboxedCommands`) |

Plus four env feature flags — `CLAUDE_CODE_NO_FLICKER`, `CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY`,
`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB`, `ENABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_1H` — and arbitrary user-set
`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vars via the Env Vars modal.

Also covered: per-project auth backends (Anthropic OAuth, Bedrock incl. SSO refresh,
Ollama, OpenAI-compatible), user-level `CLAUDE.md` composition, `claude update` on every
container start, terminal ergonomics (OAuth URL detection, OSC 52 clipboard, image paste,
file drag-drop, STT), the web terminal, and workspace backup.

---

## Gap analysis

### Committed for this cycle

| # | Gap | Today | Plan |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Permission modes** | one boolean → `--dangerously-skip-permissions` | Four-state control (Plan / Default / Accept Edits / Bypass) → `--permission-mode`. Verified choices on 2.1.226: `acceptEdits`, `auto`, `bypassPermissions`, `manual`, `dontAsk`, `plan`. |
| 2 | **Session resume** | none | List sessions from the config volume; `[Resume]` opens a terminal on `claude --resume <id>`. |
| 3 | **Capability inventory** | none | Read-only counts + names for skills / agents / hooks / plugins / commands / native MCP servers. Deep-link to the terminal to manage. |
| 4 | **Automation** | `triple-c-scheduler` ships in every container with *zero* UI | Task list, cron editor, run-now, logs, notification badges. |
| 5 | **Container auth handoff** | manual code paste | See "Authentication handoff" below — design decision pending. |

### Deliberately skipped

Status line builder · output-styles editor · hook *editors* · checkpoint/rewind browser ·
plugin marketplace browser. Each is niche, natively handled by Claude Code's own TUI, or a
settings-editor trap. Surface counts and deep-link instead.

### Not yet scheduled

- Granular `permissions.allow` / `ask` / `deny` rules and `additionalDirectories`
- Sandbox detail settings (`filesystem.allowRead/allowWrite`, `allowedDomains`,
  `excludedCommands`) — currently documented for hand-editing via `SANDBOX_INSTRUCTIONS`
- Project-level `.claude/settings.json` vs user-level settings hierarchy
- A model picker. **Note:** the only model strings in the app today are stale placeholders
  (`anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-20250514-v1:0` in `AwsSettings.tsx` and `ProjectCard.tsx`,
  `qwen3.5:27b`, `gpt-4o / gemini-pro / etc.`). These are free-text placeholders, not
  dropdowns, but they should be refreshed to current model identifiers regardless.
- The container's settings.json merge is **shallow** (`jq -s '.[0] * .[1]'`), so a
  user-authored nested block such as `sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite` is replaced wholesale
  on every container start. Worth deepening to `*` recursive merge.

---

## Authentication handoff

**Goal:** stop making users hand-copy an auth code into every container.

**Constraint discovered during research:** `claude login`'s callback server uses an
**ephemeral port** and its redirect URI is **not configurable** for the main login flow
(`--callback-port` and `oauth.callbackPort` apply to *MCP server* OAuth only). So a design
that pre-assigns each container a fixed callback port and routes to it cannot work as
stated — there is no fixed port to route.

There is also a known container gotcha: on Linux, Node resolves `localhost` to IPv6 first,
so the callback server may bind `[::1]:PORT` only and be unreachable over IPv4
([anthropics/claude-code#44844](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/44844)).

Two viable options:

### Option A — long-lived token injection (simple)

`claude setup-token` (verified present on 2.1.226: *"Set up a long-lived authentication
token (requires Claude subscription)"*) returns a ~1-year OAuth token. Triple-C runs it
once on the host, stores the token in the OS keychain via the existing `secure.rs`, and
injects `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` into every container that uses the Anthropic backend.

- No routing, no ports, no proxy.
- One auth event covers every project.
- Cost: small. Reuses existing keychain and env-injection plumbing.
- Limits: token is subscription-scoped and expires annually; per the docs a `setup-token`
  token cannot drive Remote Control sessions or claude.ai connector fetches.

### Option B — the Auth Bridge (general loopback-callback bridge)

Option A only solves Claude Code. The same problem affects every CLI that authenticates by
starting a temporary loopback listener and opening a browser at a URL that redirects back
to it — Concourse `fly login` (random loopback port serving `/auth/callback`),
`aws sso login`, and many others. Inside a container the host browser cannot reach that
listener, so login stalls.

Because the ports are ephemeral and unconfigurable, nothing can be pre-assigned. The bridge
**discovers** listeners instead:

1. While enabled for a running project, poll the container for loopback TCP listeners by
   reading `/proc/net/tcp` and `/proc/net/tcp6` over `docker exec` — no dependency on
   `ss`/`netstat`/`lsof`, which aren't guaranteed in the image.
2. For each newly-appeared loopback listener, bind **the same port on the host's
   `127.0.0.1`** (never `0.0.0.0` — that would expose container internals to the LAN).
3. Proxy each accepted connection into the container over the Docker API via
   `socat - TCP:127.0.0.1:<port>` (socat already ships in the image), reusing the existing
   attached-exec streaming in `docker/exec.rs`. Going through the Docker API rather than a
   container IP keeps this working on Docker Desktop, where container IPs are not routable
   from the host.
4. Fall back to `TCP6:[::1]:<port>` when the listener appeared only on IPv6 — on Linux,
   Node resolves `localhost` to IPv6 first, so `claude login` frequently binds `::1` only
   ([anthropics/claude-code#44844](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/44844)).
5. Tear down when the listener vanishes, the container stops, the bridge is disabled, or
   the app exits. Ports already covered by the project's explicit port mappings are skipped;
   host-side conflicts are reported rather than silently swallowed.

Opt-in per project (`auth_bridge_enabled`, default off), since it makes container-internal
loopback services reachable from the host.

**Plan:** ship **A** for Claude Code specifically — it removes the pain for the common case
at a fraction of the cost — and **B** as the general mechanism covering every other CLI.
They compose: A means most users never trigger a browser login at all; B catches AWS SSO,
Concourse, and anything else that needs a real callback.

---

## Sequencing

**Phase 0 — done.** Remove MCP (frontend, backend, entrypoint, docs) with a self-healing
migration for containers created against the old per-project Docker network.

**Phase 1 — foundations.** Permission modes end-to-end (including the scheduler bug fix
below). Read-only introspection backend: sessions, capabilities, scheduler.

**Phase 2 — Tier-1 polish.** Focus rings, contrast fixes, real buttons, inline start/stop
progress, status labels, onboarding welcome screen, shared accessible `<Modal>`.

**Phase 3 — Project Home.** Move project config out of the sidebar card into a tabbed
main-area view (Overview / Sessions / Automation / Config), dissolving the modal pile and
splitting the 1,257-line `ProjectCard`.

**Phase 4 — authentication handoff.** Option A, then evaluate B.

**Phase 5 — Library.** Global skills/agents/commands with per-project enable, synced into
the config volume by the entrypoint. Generalizes the pattern the MCP tab was reaching for.

---

## Bugs found during this review

1. **Scheduled tasks ignore the project's permission setting.**
   `container/triple-c-task-runner:69` runs
   `claude -p "$PROMPT" --dangerously-skip-permissions` unconditionally, regardless of the
   project's Full Permissions toggle. Being fixed as part of Phase 1.

2. **Docs claim Reset preserves credentials; it does not.**
   `rebuild_project_container` calls `remove_project_volumes`, which deletes both
   `triple-c-home-{id}` (holding `~/.claude.json`) and `triple-c-claude-config-{id}`
   (holding `~/.claude`). README.md, HOW-TO-USE.md, and CLAUDE.md all still state that
   OAuth tokens survive a Reset. Pre-existing; not yet corrected.

3. **Stale model placeholders** — see "Not yet scheduled" above.

4. **Silent save failures.** Project config saves on blur; failures go only to
   `console.error`. No user-visible indication. Addressed in Phase 3.