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Add Project Home, Auth Bridge, shared auth token, and Tier-1 polish

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Project Home (DESIGN-REVIEW §B2): the project is promoted from a 280px
sidebar card to a first-class main-area view. ProjectCard.tsx (1,257
lines) is replaced by a select-only ProjectRow plus tabs for Overview,
Sessions, Automation, Config and Files. The PortMappings, FileManager
and ContainerProgress modals are absorbed rather than reimplemented.
Config gains a Saved/Saving/Failed indicator — save-on-blur failures
previously reached only console.error.

Tier-1 polish (DESIGN-REVIEW §A): new elevation, muted-accent, disabled
and focus-ring tokens; a global :focus-visible ring with every
focus:outline-none removed; filled buttons moved to --accent-emphasis
and white-on-success toggles retired, fixing three WCAG AA failures
(2.1:1, 2.5:1, 2.4:1); a shared Modal primitive with role="dialog",
focus trap and restore, adopted by all remaining modals; status
indicators that carry a glyph and word rather than colour alone.

Ctrl+Shift+W closes a tab, deliberately not Ctrl+W — that is readline's
kill-word, used constantly in the terminal this app is built around.

Auth Bridge: a general loopback-callback bridge so browser logins run
inside a container (aws sso login, Concourse fly login, claude login)
can complete against the host browser. Listeners are discovered from
/proc/net/tcp{,6} — ss/netstat/lsof are absent from the image — bound on
host 127.0.0.1 only, and tunnelled in over the Docker API via socat,
which keeps working on Docker Desktop where container IPs are not
routable. Falls back to [::1] because Node resolves localhost to IPv6
first, so claude login often binds ::1 alone. Opt-in per project.

This extracts create_attached_exec() and moves the existing terminal
session path onto it, so there is one attached-exec implementation
rather than two.

Shared auth token: `claude setup-token` is run in a container, the token
is stored in the OS keychain and injected as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
into Anthropic-backend projects. Contrary to the initial design note,
setup-token uses an Anthropic-hosted redirect and blocks on a stdin
paste prompt rather than a loopback callback, so a stdin command is
required for the flow to complete.

The token is never logged, never returned to the frontend, and is
redacted from the streamed output with a stateful matcher that withholds
any tail that could still grow into a secret. Change detection uses a
random rotation id rather than a hash, since a hash in a docker-inspect
readable label would be an offline verification oracle.

Frontend 33 -> 51 tests; Rust 34 tests. Both builds clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
shadow-test
2026-08-09 11:35:42 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent f68d10d5c2
commit 01a2f6aec8
83 changed files with 8042 additions and 3064 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
app/src-tauri/src/docker/container.rs
+111 -20
View File
@@ -171,23 +171,45 @@ fn build_claude_instructions(
combined
}
/// The env var Claude Code reads a long-lived `claude setup-token` credential
/// from. Named once so injection, the reserved-name blocklist, and the
/// stale-value neutralization pass can never disagree about the spelling.
pub const CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENV: &str = "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN";
/// Env var name prefixes Triple-C manages itself; users cannot set these by hand.
const RESERVED_ENV_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["ANTHROPIC_", "AWS_", "GIT_", "HOST_", "TRIPLE_C_"];
/// Exact env var names Triple-C manages itself. Not covered by
/// [`RESERVED_ENV_PREFIXES`] because they don't share those prefixes.
///
/// `MCP_SERVERS_JSON` is reserved for legacy reasons: the built-in MCP feature
/// was removed, but the name stays blocked so users cannot hand-set it.
/// `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is reserved because Triple-C owns it — a hand-set
/// value would silently outrank the keychain-held shared token and be invisible
/// to the auth UI.
const RESERVED_ENV_EXACT: &[&str] = &[
"CLAUDE_INSTRUCTIONS",
"MCP_SERVERS_JSON",
"CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_JSON",
"MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED",
"TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE",
CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENV,
];
/// Whether `key` is an env var name Triple-C reserves for itself.
fn is_reserved_env_key(key: &str) -> bool {
let upper = key.to_uppercase();
RESERVED_ENV_PREFIXES.iter().any(|p| upper.starts_with(p))
|| RESERVED_ENV_EXACT.iter().any(|e| upper == *e)
}
/// Compute a fingerprint string for the custom environment variables.
/// Sorted alphabetically so order changes do not cause spurious recreation.
fn compute_env_fingerprint(custom_env_vars: &[EnvVar]) -> String {
let reserved_prefixes = ["ANTHROPIC_", "AWS_", "GIT_", "HOST_", "TRIPLE_C_"];
// MCP_SERVERS_JSON is reserved for legacy reasons: the built-in MCP feature was
// removed, but the name stays blocked so users cannot hand-set it.
let reserved_exact = ["CLAUDE_INSTRUCTIONS", "MCP_SERVERS_JSON", "CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_JSON", "MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED", "TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE"];
let mut parts: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
for env_var in custom_env_vars {
let key = env_var.key.trim();
if key.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let upper = key.to_uppercase();
let is_reserved = reserved_prefixes.iter().any(|p| upper.starts_with(p))
|| reserved_exact.iter().any(|e| upper == *e);
if is_reserved {
if key.is_empty() || is_reserved_env_key(key) {
continue;
}
parts.push(format!("{}={}", key, env_var.value));
@@ -196,6 +218,45 @@ fn compute_env_fingerprint(custom_env_vars: &[EnvVar]) -> String {
parts.join(",")
}
/// The shared Claude Code OAuth token to inject for this project, paired with
/// its rotation id.
///
/// `None` unless *all* of: the backend is Anthropic (the token is meaningless
/// to Bedrock/Ollama/OpenAI-compatible), the project has not opted out, and a
/// non-blank token is actually in the keychain. Read here rather than passed in
/// because the token is global, not part of the per-project record.
///
/// The returned token is never logged and never leaves this module except as
/// the env var value handed to Docker.
fn shared_claude_auth(project: &Project) -> Option<(String, String)> {
if project.backend != Backend::Anthropic || !project.use_shared_auth_token {
return None;
}
let token = crate::storage::secure::get_claude_oauth_token()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
log::warn!("Could not read the shared Claude token from the keychain: {}", e);
None
})
.filter(|t| !t.trim().is_empty())?;
// A token with no rotation id predates versioning (or the id write failed).
// A constant stand-in still differs from the empty "no token" label, so
// presence changes are caught; only rotations could be missed.
let version = crate::storage::secure::get_claude_oauth_token_version()
.unwrap_or(None)
.unwrap_or_else(|| "unversioned".to_string());
Some((token, version))
}
/// Label value tracking which shared Claude token (if any) a container was
/// created with. Empty means "none injected". See
/// [`crate::storage::secure`] for why this is a random rotation id rather than
/// a hash of the token.
fn claude_token_label(project: &Project) -> String {
shared_claude_auth(project)
.map(|(_, version)| version)
.unwrap_or_default()
}
/// Merge global and per-project custom environment variables.
/// Per-project variables override global variables with the same key.
fn merge_custom_env_vars(global: &[EnvVar], project: &[EnvVar]) -> Vec<EnvVar> {
@@ -680,6 +741,19 @@ pub async fn create_container(
}
}
// Shared Claude Code OAuth token (Anthropic backend only, opt-out per
// project). Injected *before* the neutralization pass below so that pass
// sees it as already-set; when it is absent the pass actively blanks the
// variable instead of leaving a stale one baked into the snapshot image.
let shared_claude = shared_claude_auth(project);
if let Some((ref token, _)) = shared_claude {
env_vars.push(format!("{}={}", CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENV, token));
log::info!(
"Injecting the shared Claude authentication token into the container for project {}",
project.id
);
}
// ── Neutralize stale backend auth env vars ──────────────────────────────
// When a project switches backends (e.g. Bedrock → Anthropic) the container
// is recreated *from a snapshot image* committed off the previous container.
@@ -704,6 +778,11 @@ pub async fn create_container(
"ANTHROPIC_MODEL",
"DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHING",
"ANTHROPIC_BEDROCK_SERVICE_TIER",
// Revoking the shared token, opting a project out, or switching away
// from the Anthropic backend must *clear* this, not merely stop setting
// it — otherwise the value committed into the snapshot image keeps
// authenticating the container with a credential the user removed.
CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENV,
];
let already_set: std::collections::HashSet<String> = env_vars
.iter()
@@ -717,19 +796,12 @@ pub async fn create_container(
// Custom environment variables (global + per-project, project overrides global for same key)
let merged_env = merge_custom_env_vars(global_custom_env_vars, &project.custom_env_vars);
let reserved_prefixes = ["ANTHROPIC_", "AWS_", "GIT_", "HOST_", "TRIPLE_C_"];
// MCP_SERVERS_JSON is reserved for legacy reasons: the built-in MCP feature was
// removed, but the name stays blocked so users cannot hand-set it.
let reserved_exact = ["CLAUDE_INSTRUCTIONS", "MCP_SERVERS_JSON", "CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_JSON", "MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED", "TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE"];
for env_var in &merged_env {
let key = env_var.key.trim();
if key.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let upper = key.to_uppercase();
let is_reserved = reserved_prefixes.iter().any(|p| upper.starts_with(p))
|| reserved_exact.iter().any(|e| upper == *e);
if is_reserved {
if is_reserved_env_key(key) {
log::warn!("Skipping reserved env var: {}", key);
continue;
}
@@ -948,6 +1020,10 @@ pub async fn create_container(
labels.insert("triple-c.git-user-email".to_string(), effective_git_email.unwrap_or_default().to_string());
labels.insert("triple-c.git-token-hash".to_string(),
project.git_token.as_ref().map(|t| sha256_hex(t)).unwrap_or_default());
// Rotation id, NOT the token and NOT a hash of it — labels are readable by
// anything on the host via `docker inspect`.
labels.insert("triple-c.claude-token-version".to_string(),
shared_claude.as_ref().map(|(_, v)| v.clone()).unwrap_or_default());
let host_config = HostConfig {
mounts: Some(mounts),
@@ -1144,7 +1220,8 @@ chmod 600 "$HOME/.aws/credentials""#;
/// NOTE: `docker commit` always bakes the *running container's* full ENV into
/// the resulting image — passing an empty Config here does NOT strip it, and
/// the commit API gives no way to remove env vars. As a result auth vars (e.g.
/// CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK, AWS_*) are present in this snapshot image's ENV.
/// CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK, AWS_*, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) are present in this
/// snapshot image's ENV — this image is local and per-project, never pushed.
/// `create_container` defends against that by explicitly overriding every
/// managed auth key for the active backend (see MANAGED_AUTH_KEYS), so a
/// backend switch does not inherit the previous backend's stale credentials.
@@ -1390,6 +1467,20 @@ pub async fn container_needs_recreation(
return Ok(true);
}
// ── Shared Claude Code OAuth token ───────────────────────────────────
// Compares rotation ids, so this fires when the token is first acquired,
// re-acquired (rotated), revoked, or opted out of. Both "" means no token
// is in play, which is also what a container predating this feature reports
// — so existing installs are not recreated until a token actually exists.
// Recreation is the only way to change container env, and it is also what
// makes MANAGED_AUTH_KEYS blank a revoked token out of the snapshot image.
let expected_claude_token = claude_token_label(project);
let container_claude_token = get_label("triple-c.claude-token-version").unwrap_or_default();
if container_claude_token != expected_claude_token {
log::info!("Shared Claude authentication token mismatch — recreating container");
return Ok(true);
}
// ── Custom environment variables (label-based fingerprint) ──────────
let merged_env = merge_custom_env_vars(global_custom_env_vars, &project.custom_env_vars);
let expected_fingerprint = compute_env_fingerprint(&merged_env);
app/src-tauri/src/docker/exec.rs
+105 -67
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,78 @@
use bollard::container::UploadToContainerOptions;
use bollard::container::{LogOutput, UploadToContainerOptions};
use bollard::exec::{CreateExecOptions, ResizeExecOptions, StartExecResults};
use futures_util::StreamExt;
use futures_util::{Stream, StreamExt};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
use tokio::io::{AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, Mutex};
use super::client::get_docker;
/// A `docker exec` that has been created and started with stdin/stdout/stderr
/// attached — the raw duplex halves, before any policy about what to do with
/// them.
///
/// This is the single place in the codebase that knows how to open an attached
/// exec. Both consumers are built on it:
/// * [`ExecSessionManager`] — interactive terminals and the audio bridge,
/// which pump bytes through mpsc channels and a callback.
/// * `auth_bridge` — per-connection `socat` tunnels, which pump bytes
/// straight between a host TCP socket and these halves.
///
/// With `tty = false` the output stream is demultiplexed by Docker, so the
/// consumer can tell [`LogOutput::StdOut`] from [`LogOutput::StdErr`]. That
/// distinction matters for the auth bridge: `socat`'s diagnostics must not be
/// spliced into the proxied byte stream.
pub struct AttachedExec {
pub exec_id: String,
pub output: Pin<Box<dyn Stream<Item = Result<LogOutput, bollard::errors::Error>> + Send>>,
pub input: Pin<Box<dyn AsyncWrite + Send>>,
}
/// Create and start an exec with stdin + stdout + stderr attached, returning the
/// raw duplex halves. Runs as `claude` in `/workspace`, like every other exec
/// this app opens.
pub async fn create_attached_exec(
container_id: &str,
cmd: Vec<String>,
tty: bool,
) -> Result<AttachedExec, String> {
let docker = get_docker()?;
let exec = docker
.create_exec(
container_id,
CreateExecOptions {
attach_stdin: Some(true),
attach_stdout: Some(true),
attach_stderr: Some(true),
tty: Some(tty),
cmd: Some(cmd),
user: Some("claude".to_string()),
working_dir: Some("/workspace".to_string()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?;
let exec_id = exec.id.clone();
match docker
.start_exec(&exec_id, None)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?
{
StartExecResults::Attached { output, input } => Ok(AttachedExec {
exec_id,
output,
input,
}),
StartExecResults::Detached => Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()),
}
}
pub struct ExecSession {
pub exec_id: String,
pub container_id: String,
@@ -80,82 +145,55 @@ impl ExecSessionManager {
where
F: Fn(Vec<u8>) + Send + 'static,
{
let docker = get_docker()?;
let exec = docker
.create_exec(
container_id,
CreateExecOptions {
attach_stdin: Some(true),
attach_stdout: Some(true),
attach_stderr: Some(true),
tty: Some(tty),
cmd: Some(cmd),
user: Some("claude".to_string()),
working_dir: Some("/workspace".to_string()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?;
let exec_id = exec.id.clone();
let result = docker
.start_exec(&exec_id, None)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?;
let AttachedExec {
exec_id,
mut output,
mut input,
} = create_attached_exec(container_id, cmd, tty).await?;
let (input_tx, mut input_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::<Vec<u8>>();
let (shutdown_tx, mut shutdown_rx) = mpsc::channel::<()>(1);
match result {
StartExecResults::Attached { mut output, mut input } => {
// Output reader task
let session_id_clone = session_id.to_string();
let shutdown_tx_clone = shutdown_tx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
tokio::select! {
msg = output.next() => {
match msg {
Some(Ok(output)) => {
on_output(output.into_bytes().to_vec());
}
Some(Err(e)) => {
log::error!("Exec output error for {}: {}", session_id_clone, e);
break;
}
None => {
log::info!("Exec output stream ended for {}", session_id_clone);
break;
}
}
// Output reader task
let session_id_clone = session_id.to_string();
let shutdown_tx_clone = shutdown_tx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
tokio::select! {
msg = output.next() => {
match msg {
Some(Ok(output)) => {
on_output(output.into_bytes().to_vec());
}
_ = shutdown_rx.recv() => {
log::info!("Exec session {} shutting down", session_id_clone);
Some(Err(e)) => {
log::error!("Exec output error for {}: {}", session_id_clone, e);
break;
}
None => {
log::info!("Exec output stream ended for {}", session_id_clone);
break;
}
}
}
on_exit();
let _ = shutdown_tx_clone;
});
// Input writer task
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(data) = input_rx.recv().await {
if let Err(e) = input.write_all(&data).await {
log::error!("Failed to write to exec stdin: {}", e);
break;
}
_ = shutdown_rx.recv() => {
log::info!("Exec session {} shutting down", session_id_clone);
break;
}
});
}
}
StartExecResults::Detached => {
return Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string());
on_exit();
let _ = shutdown_tx_clone;
});
// Input writer task
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(data) = input_rx.recv().await {
if let Err(e) = input.write_all(&data).await {
log::error!("Failed to write to exec stdin: {}", e);
break;
}
}
}
});
let session = ExecSession {
exec_id,