Add Project Home, Auth Bridge, shared auth token, and Tier-1 polish

Project Home (DESIGN-REVIEW §B2): the project is promoted from a 280px
sidebar card to a first-class main-area view. ProjectCard.tsx (1,257
lines) is replaced by a select-only ProjectRow plus tabs for Overview,
Sessions, Automation, Config and Files. The PortMappings, FileManager
and ContainerProgress modals are absorbed rather than reimplemented.
Config gains a Saved/Saving/Failed indicator — save-on-blur failures
previously reached only console.error.

Tier-1 polish (DESIGN-REVIEW §A): new elevation, muted-accent, disabled
and focus-ring tokens; a global :focus-visible ring with every
focus:outline-none removed; filled buttons moved to --accent-emphasis
and white-on-success toggles retired, fixing three WCAG AA failures
(2.1:1, 2.5:1, 2.4:1); a shared Modal primitive with role="dialog",
focus trap and restore, adopted by all remaining modals; status
indicators that carry a glyph and word rather than colour alone.

Ctrl+Shift+W closes a tab, deliberately not Ctrl+W — that is readline's
kill-word, used constantly in the terminal this app is built around.

Auth Bridge: a general loopback-callback bridge so browser logins run
inside a container (aws sso login, Concourse fly login, claude login)
can complete against the host browser. Listeners are discovered from
/proc/net/tcp{,6} — ss/netstat/lsof are absent from the image — bound on
host 127.0.0.1 only, and tunnelled in over the Docker API via socat,
which keeps working on Docker Desktop where container IPs are not
routable. Falls back to [::1] because Node resolves localhost to IPv6
first, so claude login often binds ::1 alone. Opt-in per project.

This extracts create_attached_exec() and moves the existing terminal
session path onto it, so there is one attached-exec implementation
rather than two.

Shared auth token: `claude setup-token` is run in a container, the token
is stored in the OS keychain and injected as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
into Anthropic-backend projects. Contrary to the initial design note,
setup-token uses an Anthropic-hosted redirect and blocks on a stdin
paste prompt rather than a loopback callback, so a stdin command is
required for the flow to complete.

The token is never logged, never returned to the frontend, and is
redacted from the streamed output with a stateful matcher that withholds
any tail that could still grow into a secret. Change detection uses a
random rotation id rather than a hash, since a hash in a docker-inspect
readable label would be an offline verification oracle.

Frontend 33 -> 51 tests; Rust 34 tests. Both builds clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-09 11:35:42 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent f68d10d5c2
commit 01a2f6aec8
83 changed files with 8042 additions and 3064 deletions
+105 -67
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,78 @@
use bollard::container::UploadToContainerOptions;
use bollard::container::{LogOutput, UploadToContainerOptions};
use bollard::exec::{CreateExecOptions, ResizeExecOptions, StartExecResults};
use futures_util::StreamExt;
use futures_util::{Stream, StreamExt};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
use tokio::io::{AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, Mutex};
use super::client::get_docker;
/// A `docker exec` that has been created and started with stdin/stdout/stderr
/// attached — the raw duplex halves, before any policy about what to do with
/// them.
///
/// This is the single place in the codebase that knows how to open an attached
/// exec. Both consumers are built on it:
/// * [`ExecSessionManager`] — interactive terminals and the audio bridge,
/// which pump bytes through mpsc channels and a callback.
/// * `auth_bridge` — per-connection `socat` tunnels, which pump bytes
/// straight between a host TCP socket and these halves.
///
/// With `tty = false` the output stream is demultiplexed by Docker, so the
/// consumer can tell [`LogOutput::StdOut`] from [`LogOutput::StdErr`]. That
/// distinction matters for the auth bridge: `socat`'s diagnostics must not be
/// spliced into the proxied byte stream.
pub struct AttachedExec {
pub exec_id: String,
pub output: Pin<Box<dyn Stream<Item = Result<LogOutput, bollard::errors::Error>> + Send>>,
pub input: Pin<Box<dyn AsyncWrite + Send>>,
}
/// Create and start an exec with stdin + stdout + stderr attached, returning the
/// raw duplex halves. Runs as `claude` in `/workspace`, like every other exec
/// this app opens.
pub async fn create_attached_exec(
container_id: &str,
cmd: Vec<String>,
tty: bool,
) -> Result<AttachedExec, String> {
let docker = get_docker()?;
let exec = docker
.create_exec(
container_id,
CreateExecOptions {
attach_stdin: Some(true),
attach_stdout: Some(true),
attach_stderr: Some(true),
tty: Some(tty),
cmd: Some(cmd),
user: Some("claude".to_string()),
working_dir: Some("/workspace".to_string()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?;
let exec_id = exec.id.clone();
match docker
.start_exec(&exec_id, None)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?
{
StartExecResults::Attached { output, input } => Ok(AttachedExec {
exec_id,
output,
input,
}),
StartExecResults::Detached => Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()),
}
}
pub struct ExecSession {
pub exec_id: String,
pub container_id: String,
@@ -80,82 +145,55 @@ impl ExecSessionManager {
where
F: Fn(Vec<u8>) + Send + 'static,
{
let docker = get_docker()?;
let exec = docker
.create_exec(
container_id,
CreateExecOptions {
attach_stdin: Some(true),
attach_stdout: Some(true),
attach_stderr: Some(true),
tty: Some(tty),
cmd: Some(cmd),
user: Some("claude".to_string()),
working_dir: Some("/workspace".to_string()),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?;
let exec_id = exec.id.clone();
let result = docker
.start_exec(&exec_id, None)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?;
let AttachedExec {
exec_id,
mut output,
mut input,
} = create_attached_exec(container_id, cmd, tty).await?;
let (input_tx, mut input_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::<Vec<u8>>();
let (shutdown_tx, mut shutdown_rx) = mpsc::channel::<()>(1);
match result {
StartExecResults::Attached { mut output, mut input } => {
// Output reader task
let session_id_clone = session_id.to_string();
let shutdown_tx_clone = shutdown_tx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
tokio::select! {
msg = output.next() => {
match msg {
Some(Ok(output)) => {
on_output(output.into_bytes().to_vec());
}
Some(Err(e)) => {
log::error!("Exec output error for {}: {}", session_id_clone, e);
break;
}
None => {
log::info!("Exec output stream ended for {}", session_id_clone);
break;
}
}
// Output reader task
let session_id_clone = session_id.to_string();
let shutdown_tx_clone = shutdown_tx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
tokio::select! {
msg = output.next() => {
match msg {
Some(Ok(output)) => {
on_output(output.into_bytes().to_vec());
}
_ = shutdown_rx.recv() => {
log::info!("Exec session {} shutting down", session_id_clone);
Some(Err(e)) => {
log::error!("Exec output error for {}: {}", session_id_clone, e);
break;
}
None => {
log::info!("Exec output stream ended for {}", session_id_clone);
break;
}
}
}
on_exit();
let _ = shutdown_tx_clone;
});
// Input writer task
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(data) = input_rx.recv().await {
if let Err(e) = input.write_all(&data).await {
log::error!("Failed to write to exec stdin: {}", e);
break;
}
_ = shutdown_rx.recv() => {
log::info!("Exec session {} shutting down", session_id_clone);
break;
}
});
}
}
StartExecResults::Detached => {
return Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string());
on_exit();
let _ = shutdown_tx_clone;
});
// Input writer task
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(data) = input_rx.recv().await {
if let Err(e) = input.write_all(&data).await {
log::error!("Failed to write to exec stdin: {}", e);
break;
}
}
}
});
let session = ExecSession {
exec_id,