fix(aws): EC2-safe SG descriptions, deny other EFS principals, format-check the record

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-11-14 21:08:32 -08:00
1 parent f061ddb9a4
commit 31c0a918e6
3 files changed
+162 -5

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+128 -3
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@@ -912,7 +912,28 @@ fn the_users_file_system_admits_only_their_task_role_through_an_access_point() {
);
assert_eq!(allows[0]["Resource"], fs_arn);
assert!(allows[0].get("Condition").is_none() || allows[0]["Condition"].is_null());
assert_eq!(stmts.len(), 3, "{stmts:?}");
let deny_others = stmts
.iter()
.find(|s| s["Sid"] == "DenyAllButOwnersTaskRole")
.expect("a deny for every principal but the task role");
assert_eq!(
deny_others,
&json!({
"Sid": "DenyAllButOwnersTaskRole",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": { "AWS": "*" },
"Action": [
"elasticfilesystem:ClientMount",
"elasticfilesystem:ClientWrite",
"elasticfilesystem:ClientRootAccess",
],
"Resource": fs_arn,
"Condition": {
"ArnNotEquals": { "aws:PrincipalArn": "${aws_iam_role.task.arn}" }
},
})
);
assert_eq!(stmts.len(), 4, "{stmts:?}");
// The task role may mount this file system and no other.
let efs: Vec<_> = role_policies(&body, "task")
@@ -990,8 +1011,8 @@ fn the_environment_security_group_gains_no_ingress() {
assert_eq!(text.matches("local.env.security_group_id").count(), 1);
assert_eq!(
text.matches("security_group_id").count(),
2,
"the rule and the efs group output"
4,
"the rule, the record check and its message, and the efs group output"
);
}
@@ -1203,3 +1224,107 @@ fn boundary_vars_carry_the_shipped_boundary() {
Some(&Expression::String("boundary".into()))
);
}
/// EC2 accepts only these characters in a security group's or rule's
/// description; the provider checks only the length, so a stray apostrophe
/// passes `tofu validate` and fails `CreateSecurityGroup`.
fn is_ec2_description(text: &str) -> bool {
text.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || " ._-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*".contains(c))
}
#[test]
fn security_group_descriptions_use_only_ec2_characters() {
assert!(is_ec2_description(
"Triple-C ${var.environment_name}: NFS (tcp)"
));
assert!(!is_ec2_description("the environment's tasks"));
for kind in [ModuleKind::Environment, ModuleKind::UserOnboard] {
let body = parsed(kind);
let mut seen = 0;
for ty in [
"aws_security_group",
"aws_security_group_rule",
"aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule",
"aws_vpc_security_group_egress_rule",
] {
for res in resources(&body, ty) {
let mut bodies = vec![&res.body];
bodies.extend(
res.body
.blocks()
.filter(|b| matches!(b.identifier.as_str(), "ingress" | "egress"))
.map(|b| &b.body),
);
for b in bodies {
if let Some(d) = attr(b, "description") {
let text = template_text(d);
assert!(
is_ec2_description(&text),
"{kind:?} {:?}: description {text:?} has characters EC2 rejects",
res.labels
);
seen += 1;
}
}
}
}
assert!(seen >= 2, "{kind:?}: only {seen} descriptions checked");
}
}
#[test]
fn the_record_is_format_checked_before_use() {
let body = parsed(ModuleKind::UserOnboard);
let param = top_blocks(&body, "data")
.find(|b| label(b, 0) == Some("aws_ssm_parameter"))
.unwrap();
let lifecycle = top_blocks(&param.body, "lifecycle")
.next()
.expect("lifecycle");
let conditions: String = top_blocks(&lifecycle.body, "postcondition")
.map(|p| render(attr(&p.body, "condition").expect("condition")))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
for needle in [
"jsondecode(self.insecure_value).schema == 1",
"jsondecode(self.insecure_value).name == var.environment_name",
"jsondecode(self.insecure_value).tenancy == \"strict\"",
"length(jsondecode(self.insecure_value).subnet_ids) == 2",
"\"^arn:aws[a-z-]*:kms:${var.region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:key/[0-9a-f-]+$\"",
"jsondecode(self.insecure_value).kms_key_arn",
"jsondecode(self.insecure_value).log_group == \"/triple-c/${var.environment_name}\"",
"\"^sg-[0-9a-f]{8,17}$\"",
"jsondecode(self.insecure_value).security_group_id",
"\"^subnet-[0-9a-f]{8,17}$\"",
// Every subnet, not just the first.
"alltrue([for s in jsondecode(self.insecure_value).subnet_ids",
] {
assert!(
conditions.contains(needle),
"the record postconditions do not check {needle}:\n{conditions}"
);
}
// Every record field the module reads is one the postconditions check.
let text = tf_text(ModuleKind::UserOnboard);
let mut used = BTreeSet::new();
for (i, _) in text.match_indices("local.env.") {
let rest = &text[i + "local.env.".len()..];
let end = rest
.find(|c: char| !(c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_'))
.unwrap_or(rest.len());
used.insert(rest[..end].to_string());
}
assert!(
used.contains("kms_key_arn") && used.contains("subnet_ids"),
"{used:?}"
);
for field in &used {
assert!(
conditions.contains(&format!("jsondecode(self.insecure_value).{field}")),
"local.env.{field} is used but never checked"
);
}
}
+18 -2
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@@ -18,13 +18,15 @@ resource "aws_efs_file_system" "this" {
}
# Admits NFS from the environment's task group, which itself gains nothing.
# EC2 descriptions allow only a-zA-Z0-9, spaces and ._-:/()#,@[]+=&;{}!$*
# (no apostrophes); the provider does not check, CreateSecurityGroup does.
resource "aws_security_group" "efs" {
name = "${local.name}-efs"
description = "Triple-C ${var.environment_name}: NFS to one user's file system"
description = "Triple-C ${var.environment_name}: NFS to the file system of ${var.owner_key}"
vpc_id = data.aws_subnet.task[0].vpc_id
ingress {
description = "NFS from the environment's tasks"
description = "NFS from the environment task group"
from_port = 2049
to_port = 2049
protocol = "tcp"
@@ -79,6 +81,20 @@ resource "aws_efs_file_system_policy" "this" {
Resource = aws_efs_file_system.this.arn
Condition = { Null = { "elasticfilesystem:AccessPointArn" = "true" } }
},
{
# Same-account access needs an identity OR a resource policy, so the
# Allow below is not enough by itself: refuse every other principal.
Sid = "DenyAllButOwnersTaskRole"
Effect = "Deny"
Principal = { AWS = "*" }
Action = [
"elasticfilesystem:ClientMount",
"elasticfilesystem:ClientWrite",
"elasticfilesystem:ClientRootAccess",
]
Resource = aws_efs_file_system.this.arn
Condition = { ArnNotEquals = { "aws:PrincipalArn" = aws_iam_role.task.arn } }
},
{
Sid = "OwnersTaskRoleOnly"
Effect = "Allow"
+16
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@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ data "aws_ssm_parameter" "environment" {
name = "/triple-c/environments/${var.environment_name}"
with_decryption = false
# The record is untrusted input that feeds IAM policies and the network:
# every field this module uses is format-checked before anything is built.
lifecycle {
postcondition {
condition = try(
@@ -53,5 +55,19 @@ data "aws_ssm_parameter" "environment" {
)
error_message = "The environment record is missing or not a schema-1 strict-tenancy record with two subnets; deploy (or update) the environment first."
}
postcondition {
condition = try(
can(regex(
"^arn:aws[a-z-]*:kms:${var.region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:key/[0-9a-f-]+$",
jsondecode(self.insecure_value).kms_key_arn
))
&& jsondecode(self.insecure_value).log_group == "/triple-c/${var.environment_name}"
&& can(regex("^sg-[0-9a-f]{8,17}$", jsondecode(self.insecure_value).security_group_id))
&& alltrue([for s in jsondecode(self.insecure_value).subnet_ids : can(regex("^subnet-[0-9a-f]{8,17}$", s))]),
false
)
error_message = "The environment record has a malformed kms_key_arn (not a key in this region and account), log_group (not /triple-c/<environment>), security_group_id or subnet id."
}
}
}