fix(aws): final review wave (incomplete badge, removable bad connections, partition regions, format chars, store modify, docs)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -814,6 +814,12 @@ a project's Docker volumes are deliberately out of scope — this is not a proje
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inside a generic "settings replaced" summary. Read this as the standing example of the class of
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thing to keep checking for in this feature, not a one-off fixed bug — any other field that looks
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like config but is actually a live credential would have the same problem.
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- **AWS connection keys travel in `ExportedSecrets::aws_connection_keys`** (keyed by connection id),
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exported and restored like the marketplace tokens. `hosts` are **store-owned**: `update_settings`
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restores them via `restore_host_fields`, and `apply_settings_import` re-applies them through
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`StoreOwned`. `validate_imported_hosts` runs before any keychain write. The import preview
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discloses AWS connections, key counts, overwrites (naming the local connection), failed key
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checks and removals.
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- **Marketplace account tokens travel in `ExportedSecrets`, not in `AppSettings`.** `Token` and
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`GhContainer` accounts' tokens live in the keychain (`triple-c-marketplace-account-<id>`), so
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they follow the same "carve out of the keychain, restore before the settings replace, only
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use crate::aws::permissions::{check_permissions, PermissionReport, SdkPermission
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use crate::aws::policies::{policy_json, Tier};
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use crate::aws::{caller_identity, sdk_config, sdk_config_for_keys, AwsError, CallerIdentity};
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use crate::models::{
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validate_connection_name, validate_profile_name, validate_region, AppSettings, AwsAuth,
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validate_connection_name, validate_profile_name, validate_supported_region, AppSettings, AwsAuth,
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HostConnection, HostKind,
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};
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use crate::storage::secure::{self, AwsKeys};
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@@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ where
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if let Some(k) = &keys {
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store_keys(&conn.id, k).map_err(other)?;
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}
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// Read after the keychain step to keep the read-modify-write window short.
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let mut all = settings.get();
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all.hosts.push(conn.clone());
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if let Err(e) = settings.update(all) {
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if let Err(e) = settings.modify(|all| {
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all.hosts.push(conn.clone());
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Ok(())
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}) {
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if keys.is_some() {
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let _ = delete_keys(&conn.id);
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}
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@@ -78,6 +78,35 @@ where
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Ok(conn)
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}
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/// Removes the stored connection with this id, however malformed its other
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/// fields are (a broken entry must stay removable). Its keychain entry is
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/// deleted only for a `Keys` connection whose `keyring_ref` is its own valid id.
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pub(crate) fn remove_connection_with(
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id: &str,
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delete_keys: impl Fn(&str) -> Result<(), String>,
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settings: &SettingsStore,
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) -> Result<AppSettings, String> {
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check_id(id)?;
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let existing = settings
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.get()
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.hosts
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.into_iter()
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.find(|h| h.id == id)
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.ok_or_else(|| "Connection not found".to_string())?;
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let HostKind::Aws { auth, .. } = &existing.kind;
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if let AwsAuth::Keys { keyring_ref } = auth {
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if keyring_ref == id && secure::is_valid_connection_id(keyring_ref) {
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delete_keys(keyring_ref)?;
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}
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}
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settings
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.modify(|s| {
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s.hosts.retain(|h| h.id != id);
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Ok(())
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})
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.map(|(saved, ())| saved)
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}
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async fn real_identity(c: Credentials) -> Result<CallerIdentity, AwsError> {
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let cfg = match c {
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Credentials::Profile(conn) => {
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@@ -100,7 +129,7 @@ fn aws_conn(id: &str, settings: &AppSettings) -> Result<HostConnection, String>
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// Defense in depth: stored values are re-checked before they reach the
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// keychain, the SDK or a subprocess.
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let HostKind::Aws { auth, default_region } = &conn.kind;
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validate_region(default_region)?;
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validate_supported_region(default_region)?;
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match auth {
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AwsAuth::Profile { name } => {
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validate_profile_name(name)?;
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@@ -116,7 +145,7 @@ fn aws_conn(id: &str, settings: &AppSettings) -> Result<HostConnection, String>
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fn validated(name: &str, region: &str) -> Result<(String, String), AwsError> {
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Ok((
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validate_connection_name(name).map_err(other)?,
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validate_region(region).map_err(other)?,
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validate_supported_region(region).map_err(other)?,
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))
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}
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@@ -187,14 +216,17 @@ pub async fn update_aws_connection(
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state: State<'_, AppState>,
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) -> Result<HostConnection, AwsError> {
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let (name, region) = validated(&name, &default_region)?;
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let mut settings = state.settings_store.get();
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aws_conn(&id, &settings).map_err(other)?;
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let conn = settings.hosts.iter_mut().find(|h| h.id == id).expect("checked above");
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conn.name = name;
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let HostKind::Aws { default_region, .. } = &mut conn.kind;
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*default_region = region;
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let updated = conn.clone();
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state.settings_store.update(settings).map_err(other)?;
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let (_, updated) = state
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.settings_store
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.modify(|settings| {
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aws_conn(&id, settings)?;
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let conn = settings.hosts.iter_mut().find(|h| h.id == id).expect("checked above");
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conn.name = name;
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let HostKind::Aws { default_region, .. } = &mut conn.kind;
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*default_region = region;
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Ok(conn.clone())
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})
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.map_err(other)?;
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Ok(updated)
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}
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@@ -203,14 +235,7 @@ pub async fn remove_host_connection(
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id: String,
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state: State<'_, AppState>,
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) -> Result<AppSettings, String> {
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let conn = aws_conn(&id, &state.settings_store.get())?;
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let HostKind::Aws { auth, .. } = &conn.kind;
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if let AwsAuth::Keys { keyring_ref } = auth {
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secure::delete_aws_keys(keyring_ref)?;
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}
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let mut settings = state.settings_store.get();
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settings.hosts.retain(|h| h.id != id);
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state.settings_store.update(settings)
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remove_connection_with(&id, secure::delete_aws_keys, &state.settings_store)
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}
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#[tauri::command]
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@@ -247,7 +272,7 @@ pub async fn check_aws_permissions(
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let conn = aws_conn(&id, &state.settings_store.get()).map_err(other)?;
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let HostKind::Aws { default_region, .. } = &conn.kind;
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let region = match region {
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Some(r) => validate_region(&r).map_err(other)?,
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Some(r) => validate_supported_region(&r).map_err(other)?,
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None => default_region.clone(),
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};
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let cfg = sdk_config(&conn, ®ion).await?;
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@@ -450,4 +475,51 @@ mod tests {
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assert!(aws_conn("c1", &with("dev", "not a region")).is_err());
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assert!(aws_conn("c1", &with("a b", "us-west-2")).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn a_connection_with_an_invalid_stored_region_can_still_be_removed() {
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let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
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let settings = store_in(&dir);
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let mut c = keys_conn();
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c.kind = HostKind::Aws {
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auth: AwsAuth::Keys { keyring_ref: "c2".into() },
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default_region: "not a region".into(),
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};
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settings.update(AppSettings { hosts: vec![c, profile_conn()], ..AppSettings::default() }).unwrap();
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let deleted = RefCell::new(Vec::<String>::new());
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let after = remove_connection_with(
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"c2",
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|id| { deleted.borrow_mut().push(id.to_string()); Ok(()) },
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&settings,
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)
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.unwrap();
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assert_eq!(after.hosts, vec![profile_conn()]);
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assert_eq!(settings.get().hosts, vec![profile_conn()]);
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assert_eq!(*deleted.borrow(), vec!["c2".to_string()]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn removal_leaves_the_keychain_alone_when_keyring_ref_is_not_the_id() {
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let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
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let settings = store_in(&dir);
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let mut c = keys_conn();
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c.kind = HostKind::Aws {
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auth: AwsAuth::Keys { keyring_ref: "someone-else".into() },
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default_region: "us-west-2".into(),
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};
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settings.update(AppSettings { hosts: vec![c], ..AppSettings::default() }).unwrap();
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remove_connection_with("c2", |_| panic!("must not touch the keychain"), &settings).unwrap();
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assert!(settings.get().hosts.is_empty());
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assert!(remove_connection_with("c2", |_| Ok(()), &settings).is_err());
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assert!(remove_connection_with("bad id!", |_| Ok(()), &settings).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn china_and_govcloud_regions_are_refused_for_connections() {
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for r in ["cn-north-1", "us-gov-west-1"] {
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let e = validated("Prod", r).unwrap_err();
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assert!(matches!(&e, AwsError::Other { message } if message == "China and GovCloud regions aren't supported yet."), "{e:?}");
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}
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assert!(validated("Prod", "eu-west-1").is_ok());
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}
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}
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@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ fn validate_imported_hosts(
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keys: &BTreeMap<String, String>,
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) -> Result<(), String> {
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use crate::models::host_connection::{
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validate_connection_name, validate_profile_name, validate_region,
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validate_connection_name, validate_profile_name, validate_supported_region,
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};
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let wrap = |e: String| format!("The file's host connections were refused: {e}");
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@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ fn validate_imported_hosts(
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}
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h.name = validate_connection_name(&h.name).map_err(wrap)?;
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let HostKind::Aws { auth, default_region } = &h.kind;
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validate_region(default_region).map_err(wrap)?;
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validate_supported_region(default_region).map_err(wrap)?;
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match auth {
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AwsAuth::Profile { name } => {
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validate_profile_name(name).map_err(wrap)?;
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@@ -1043,6 +1043,14 @@ mod tests {
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};
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assert!(check(vec![bad_region], none.clone()).is_err());
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let mut cn = profile_host("p1");
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cn.kind = HostKind::Aws {
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auth: AwsAuth::Profile { name: "default".into() },
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default_region: "cn-north-1".into(),
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};
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let err = check(vec![cn], none.clone()).unwrap_err();
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assert!(err.contains("China and GovCloud regions aren't supported yet."), "{err}");
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let mut bad_profile = profile_host("p1");
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bad_profile.kind = HostKind::Aws {
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auth: AwsAuth::Profile { name: "a b".into() },
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@@ -25,15 +25,24 @@ pub enum AwsAuth {
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Keys { keyring_ref: String },
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}
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/// Trimmed, 1..=64 characters, no control characters.
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/// Unicode format characters (category Cf): invisible, but able to reorder or
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/// hide text (bidi overrides, zero-width spaces). `char::is_control` is Cc only.
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fn is_format_char(c: char) -> bool {
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matches!(c as u32,
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0x00AD | 0x0600..=0x0605 | 0x061C | 0x06DD | 0x070F | 0x180E
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| 0x200B..=0x200F | 0x202A..=0x202E | 0x2060..=0x2064 | 0x2066..=0x206F
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| 0xFEFF | 0xFFF9..=0xFFFB | 0xE0001 | 0xE0020..=0xE007F)
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}
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/// Trimmed, 1..=64 characters, no control or invisible format characters.
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pub fn validate_connection_name(name: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
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let name = name.trim();
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let len = name.chars().count();
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if len == 0 || len > 64 {
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return Err("Connection name must be 1 to 64 characters".into());
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}
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if name.chars().any(char::is_control) {
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return Err("Connection name must not contain control characters".into());
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if name.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || is_format_char(c)) {
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return Err("Connection name must not contain control or invisible formatting characters".into());
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}
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Ok(name.to_string())
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}
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@@ -68,6 +77,21 @@ pub fn validate_region(region: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
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}
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}
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/// A region Triple-C's policies and checks can work with. Every policy and check
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/// template hard-codes the `aws` partition (`arn:aws:`), so China, GovCloud and
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/// the isolated partitions would always check as Insufficient. `validate_region`
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/// stays general (it only checks the shape); connection add/update/import use this.
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pub fn validate_supported_region(region: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
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let region = validate_region(region)?;
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if ["cn-", "us-gov-", "us-iso-", "us-isob-", "eu-isoe-", "us-isof-"]
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.iter()
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.any(|p| region.starts_with(p))
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{
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return Err("China and GovCloud regions aren't supported yet.".into());
|
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}
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Ok(region)
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}
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/// Non-empty, at most 128 characters of `[A-Za-z0-9_.@+=,-]`.
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pub fn validate_profile_name(name: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
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if name.is_empty() || name.len() > 128 {
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@@ -116,6 +140,16 @@ mod tests {
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for ok in ["us-west-2", "eu-central-1", "cn-north-1", "us-gov-west-1"] {
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assert_eq!(validate_region(ok).unwrap(), ok);
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}
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for ok in ["us-west-2", "eu-central-1", "ap-southeast-4"] {
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assert_eq!(validate_supported_region(ok).unwrap(), ok);
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}
|
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for other in ["cn-north-1", "cn-northwest-1", "us-gov-west-1", "us-gov-east-1"] {
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assert_eq!(
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validate_supported_region(other).unwrap_err(),
|
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"China and GovCloud regions aren't supported yet."
|
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);
|
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}
|
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assert!(validate_supported_region("nope").unwrap_err().contains("not a valid"));
|
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for bad in ["", "US-WEST-2", "us-west", "us-west-2; rm"] {
|
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assert!(validate_region(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?}");
|
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}
|
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@@ -138,6 +172,10 @@ mod tests {
|
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assert_eq!(validate_connection_name(" Prod ").unwrap(), "Prod");
|
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assert!(validate_connection_name(" ").is_err());
|
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assert!(validate_connection_name("a\tb").is_err());
|
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for c in ['\u{202E}', '\u{200B}', '\u{2066}', '\u{2069}', '\u{FEFF}'] {
|
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assert!(validate_connection_name(&format!("ab{c}cd")).is_err(), "{c:?}");
|
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}
|
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assert!(validate_connection_name("Prod é 日本").is_ok());
|
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assert!(validate_connection_name(&"a".repeat(65)).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
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@@ -80,4 +80,72 @@ impl SettingsStore {
|
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*settings = new_settings.clone();
|
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Ok(new_settings)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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/// Read-modify-save under the store's lock, so concurrent callers cannot
|
||||
/// lose each other's updates. `f` edits a copy; if it fails, or the save
|
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/// fails, memory and disk are unchanged. Returns the saved settings and
|
||||
/// whatever `f` returned.
|
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pub fn modify<R, F>(&self, f: F) -> Result<(AppSettings, R), String>
|
||||
where
|
||||
F: FnOnce(&mut AppSettings) -> Result<R, String>,
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut settings = self.lock();
|
||||
let mut copy = settings.clone();
|
||||
let out = f(&mut copy)?;
|
||||
self.save(©)?;
|
||||
*settings = copy.clone();
|
||||
Ok((copy, out))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn modify_saves_and_returns_the_closure_result() {
|
||||
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||||
let store = SettingsStore::at_path(dir.path().join("settings.json"));
|
||||
let (saved, n) = store
|
||||
.modify(|s| {
|
||||
s.hosts.clear();
|
||||
Ok(7)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(n, 7);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
serde_json::to_value(&saved).unwrap(),
|
||||
serde_json::to_value(store.get()).unwrap()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(dir.path().join("settings.json").exists());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn modify_does_not_change_memory_when_save_fails() {
|
||||
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||||
let store = SettingsStore::at_path(dir.path().join("missing/settings.json"));
|
||||
let before = serde_json::to_value(store.get()).unwrap();
|
||||
let err = store.modify(|s| {
|
||||
s.hosts.push(crate::models::HostConnection {
|
||||
id: "x".into(),
|
||||
name: "x".into(),
|
||||
kind: crate::models::HostKind::Aws {
|
||||
auth: crate::models::AwsAuth::Profile { name: "p".into() },
|
||||
default_region: "us-west-2".into(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert!(err.is_err());
|
||||
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(store.get()).unwrap(), before);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn modify_does_not_save_when_the_closure_fails() {
|
||||
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||||
let store = SettingsStore::at_path(dir.path().join("settings.json"));
|
||||
let err = store.modify(|_| -> Result<(), String> { Err("no".into()) }).unwrap_err();
|
||||
assert_eq!(err, "no");
|
||||
assert!(!dir.path().join("settings.json").exists());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -160,6 +160,26 @@ describe("HostsSettings", () => {
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Copy admin policy" })).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("shows a neutral Incomplete badge when the only blockers are failed checks", async () => {
|
||||
invoke.mockImplementation(async (cmd: string) => {
|
||||
if (cmd === "list_aws_profiles") return [];
|
||||
if (cmd === "check_aws_permissions")
|
||||
return report({
|
||||
tiers: [
|
||||
{ tier: "workspace_user", results: [{ action: "ecs:RunTask", verdict: "unverified", note: "throttled" }] },
|
||||
{ tier: "environment_admin", results: [] },
|
||||
],
|
||||
});
|
||||
throw new Error(`unexpected ${cmd}`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
render(<HostsSettings />);
|
||||
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Check Prod" }));
|
||||
const badge = await screen.findByText("Incomplete — check again");
|
||||
expect(badge.className).not.toContain("--error");
|
||||
expect(screen.queryByText("Insufficient")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
expect(screen.getByText(/Some checks couldn't complete/)).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("explains denied own-principal checks as the first thing to ask an admin for", async () => {
|
||||
invoke.mockImplementation(async (cmd: string) => {
|
||||
if (cmd === "list_aws_profiles") return [];
|
||||
@@ -192,7 +212,7 @@ describe("HostsSettings", () => {
|
||||
render(<HostsSettings />);
|
||||
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Check Prod" }));
|
||||
expect(await screen.findByText(/Throttling/)).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
expect(screen.getByText(/Check again/)).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
expect(screen.getAllByText(/Check again/).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("a probed check says writes are unverified", async () => {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -96,10 +96,22 @@ function ErrorLine({
|
||||
function PermissionReportView({ report }: { report: PermissionReport }) {
|
||||
const [copyNote, setCopyNote] = useState<string | null>(null);
|
||||
const probed = typeof report.method === "object";
|
||||
const badge =
|
||||
report.summary === "workspace_user" && probed
|
||||
// Insufficient only because checks couldn't complete (no denied row in the
|
||||
// workspace tier, only rows with a note): don't claim the permissions are missing.
|
||||
const workspaceTier = report.tiers.find((t) => t.tier === "workspace_user");
|
||||
const incomplete =
|
||||
report.summary === "insufficient" &&
|
||||
!!workspaceTier &&
|
||||
!workspaceTier.results.some((r) => r.verdict === "denied") &&
|
||||
workspaceTier.results.some((r) => r.note);
|
||||
const badge = incomplete
|
||||
? "Incomplete — check again"
|
||||
: report.summary === "workspace_user" && probed
|
||||
? "Workspace user (unverified)"
|
||||
: SUMMARY_LABEL[report.summary];
|
||||
const badgeStyle = incomplete
|
||||
? "text-[var(--text-secondary)] border-[var(--border-color)]"
|
||||
: SUMMARY_STYLE[report.summary];
|
||||
const flagged = report.tiers
|
||||
.map((t) => ({ ...t, results: t.results.filter((r) => r.verdict !== "allowed") }))
|
||||
.filter((t) => t.results.length > 0);
|
||||
@@ -122,7 +134,7 @@ function PermissionReportView({ report }: { report: PermissionReport }) {
|
||||
<div className="space-y-2 pt-2" data-testid="permission-report">
|
||||
<div className="flex items-center gap-2 flex-wrap">
|
||||
<span
|
||||
className={`px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium rounded-full border ${SUMMARY_STYLE[report.summary]}`}
|
||||
className={`px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium rounded-full border ${badgeStyle}`}
|
||||
>
|
||||
{badge}
|
||||
</span>
|
||||
@@ -130,6 +142,12 @@ function PermissionReportView({ report }: { report: PermissionReport }) {
|
||||
{report.identity.arn} · {report.region}
|
||||
</span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
{incomplete && (
|
||||
<p className="text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)] leading-snug">
|
||||
Some checks couldn't complete (for example because AWS throttled the requests), so the
|
||||
permissions couldn't be fully assessed. Check again in a moment.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
)}
|
||||
{typeof report.method === "object" && (
|
||||
<p className="text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)] leading-snug">
|
||||
{`Simulation not permitted (${report.method.probed.reason}). Read access was probed; write actions are unverified and will be confirmed on first use.`}
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-6
@@ -96,8 +96,9 @@ the role carries the `triple-c-permissions-boundary` managed policy as its permi
|
||||
- ECS Exec channels;
|
||||
- reading `triple-c/*` secrets;
|
||||
- decrypting only through Secrets Manager, and only with environment (component-tagged) keys;
|
||||
- mounting and writing only environment (component-tagged) file systems, with no root access,
|
||||
because access points fix the POSIX user;
|
||||
- mounting and writing only environment (component-tagged) file systems; whether that excludes
|
||||
root access depends on access points fixing the POSIX user and root directory, which is only
|
||||
true once phase 6 enforces them (see "Enforced access-point roots" under Phase 6 gaps);
|
||||
- `sts:GetCallerIdentity`;
|
||||
- invoking Bedrock models.
|
||||
- The boundary grants nothing in IAM.
|
||||
@@ -172,10 +173,11 @@ Create each file as a **customer managed policy** and attach it. In the console,
|
||||
**IAM → Policies → Create policy → JSON**, paste the file, and attach the policy to a user, group
|
||||
or role. Inline policies do not fit: a role's inline policies share 10,240 characters and an
|
||||
environment admin needs both tiers (about 11,500), and a user's share 2,048. A managed policy may
|
||||
hold 6,144 characters, not counting whitespace; the workspace policy is about 6,110, and a unit
|
||||
test (`every_policy_fits_a_managed_policy`) fails before it outgrows that. For IAM Identity
|
||||
Center, add the files as inline policies on the permission set (up to 32,768 characters) or
|
||||
reference the managed policies.
|
||||
hold 6,144 characters, not counting whitespace; the workspace policy is about 6,110 (roughly 30
|
||||
characters of headroom, so phase 4 must split `workspace-user.json` into two policies before
|
||||
adding anything to it), and a unit test (`every_policy_fits_a_managed_policy`) fails before it
|
||||
outgrows that. For IAM Identity Center, add the files as inline policies on the permission set
|
||||
(the "up to 32,768 characters" limit is unverified) or reference the managed policies.
|
||||
|
||||
With the CLI:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -208,6 +210,13 @@ aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name <user> \
|
||||
manages component-tagged secrets through the admin's credentials, that Deny will block
|
||||
`PutSecretValue`/`DeleteSecret` for them.
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 5**
|
||||
|
||||
- **No secrets in task definitions or `RunTask` overrides.** Nothing sensitive (the agent token,
|
||||
git credentials) may travel in task-definition environment variables or in `RunTask`
|
||||
`containerOverrides`: every workspace user can read them through `ecs:Describe*` on `*`. Use
|
||||
Secrets Manager (`triple-c/*`) references instead.
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 6**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Enforced access-point roots.** A workspace user creates their own access points. The
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user