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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Claude	ae3ca8cda4	Fix root scrub deleting host files through symlinked parents (C1) ... SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS is expanded by /bin/sh inside the container as root. For an entry ending `/*` the parent is a path *component*, resolved by both the glob expansion and the `rm -rf`. The agent has passwordless sudo, so `ln -s /workspace/myproject /var/log/apt` turned the next commit into a recursive delete of the user's real files on the host — reproduced end to end against a live container. snapshot_scrub_script now routes every deletion through one `scrub_in` function that validates the parent before touching anything inside it: `cd -P` for a TOCTOU-free handle, `pwd -P` equality to reject a symlinked component, a hardcoded containment allowlist that is deliberately not derived from the path list, and an st_dev comparison against `/` so a bind mount or a volume is refused even though it is not a symlink. It fails closed when `stat` is missing. Also: - /tmp/triple-c-drops/* and /tmp/clipboard_*.png are age-limited to 14 days instead of scrubbed unconditionally. They hold the user's own files, and scrubbing them meant "drop a file, change a setting, lose it silently"; removing them from the list would restore unbounded growth instead. - M11: scrub_writable_layer returns a ScrubOutcome and skips cleanly when the container is not running, so a migration no longer logs "could not run … committing anyway" on every run. - M12: the scrub exec is bounded by a 120s timeout; on expiry it logs and lets the commit proceed. - The script is now fold-safe (self-terminating lines, no `#` comments). disk.rs folds it onto one `RUN` line and the previous form was a `"do" unexpected` syntax error there, so compaction had been scrubbing nothing at all. Tests: the substring check on the script text is replaced by a behavioural test that runs the real generated script with a real symlink planted in a throwaway tree, plus structural tests over each containment construct and a `sh -n` check of the folded form. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 11:11:57 -07:00
Claude	7a5823cb2b	Inject the corporate CA certificate into containers ... Behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy every HTTPS call inside a container fails — npm, pip, git, curl, the browser-view pane, and Claude Code's own API requests. There was no mechanism at all: installing the certificate by hand inside a container is lost on Reset and had to be repeated per project. A global CA path in AppSettings with a per-project override on Project, taking either a single certificate file or a directory. It is bind-mounted read-only at /tmp/.host-ca (mirroring /tmp/.host-ssh and /tmp/.host-aws) and applied by entrypoint.sh on every start, so it survives recreation, migration and Reset. Four things this gets right that are easy to get wrong: * update-ca-certificates globs *.crt case-sensitively, so a .pem that is merely copied in is ignored in silence. Certificates are renamed, by container_cert_name() in Rust and a mirrored few lines of shell. * The system store only serves curl/git/apt. Node — and so Claude Code itself — needs NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, Python needs REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE/SSL_CERT_FILE, and Chromium reads neither: it wants ~/.pki/nssdb, seeded with certutil (libnss3-tools, added to the image). * Those vars are set from Rust at creation, never exported by the entrypoint — a terminal is a docker exec and sees nothing the entrypoint exported. They are emitted empty when no CA is configured, since docker commit bakes env into the snapshot image. * triple-c.ca-fingerprint hashes the certificate bytes as well as the path, so a CA rotated in at the same location still forces a recreation. Verified end to end against a real container and a self-signed CA: curl, node, python and git all complete a TLS handshake against a server signed by it and all three fail in the same container without it; the env vars are visible from a docker exec session; the store is cleaned when the setting is cleared. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 10:40:21 -07:00