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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 3741e0fef5 Number releases by the highest one already published, not by drift
The Linux release upload failed with a bare "exitcode '1'" and no output.
The cause was not the upload: compute-version handed it a version that
had already been released three days earlier.

The patch number was `git rev-list --count <highest tag>..HEAD` — how far
HEAD has drifted from whichever tag sorts highest, which resets to zero
every time a tag is cut. It is not a counter, and the published history
is what the old formula returned at each point:

  v0.4.0 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3    looked fine
  v0.4.3 -> 4 commits -> v0.4.4    fine by luck, 4 > 3
  v0.4.4 -> 2 commits -> v0.4.2    went backwards
  v0.4.4 -> 6 commits -> v0.4.6    jumped, skipping .5
  v0.4.6 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3    already taken

So the line published 0.4.0, 0.4.3, 0.4.4, 0.4.2, 0.4.6 in that order,
never used 0.4.1 or 0.4.5, and then came back round to 0.4.3.

The patch is now one past the highest already used. Suffixed tags count
towards that: create-tag is skipped whenever a platform job fails, so a
run can publish v0.4.7-mac and never create the plain v0.4.7, and reading
only unsuffixed tags would hand the same number out twice. A commit that
is already tagged reuses its own tag, so re-running a build does not mint
a version.

Reusing a number was doing real damage, not just failing. macOS and
Windows delete-then-upload each asset, so they took the duplicate in
their stride and rewrote v0.4.3-mac and v0.4.3-win — public since
Aug 11 — with today's binaries. Linux is the only platform that failed,
and failing was the correct outcome; its v0.4.3 assets are the only ones
still original.

Linux also gets the idempotent get-or-create the other two already had,
plus `set -euo pipefail` and `-fsS`. Its `curl -s` with no `-f` is why a
409 produced no diagnostic at all: the HTTP error was swallowed, the id
grep came back empty, and the step died without ever printing why.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 22:57:36 -07:00
8 changed files with 99 additions and 288 deletions
+98 -14
View File
@@ -39,13 +39,48 @@ jobs:
MAJOR_MINOR=$(cat VERSION | tr -d '[:space:]')
echo "Major.Minor: ${MAJOR_MINOR}"
# Find the latest tag matching v{MAJOR_MINOR}.N (exclude -mac, -win suffixes)
# `|| true` so an empty grep result doesn't fail the step under pipefail.
LATEST_TAG=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" --sort=-v:refname | grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" | head -1 || true)
# The patch number is **one past the highest patch already used**, and
# never a distance.
#
# It used to be `git rev-list --count <highest tag>..HEAD`, which is
# not a counter at all: it measures how far HEAD has drifted from
# whichever tag sorts highest, and that resets to zero every time a
# tag is cut. The published history is the proof — each of these is
# exactly what the old formula returned at the time:
#
# v0.4.0 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3 looked fine
# v0.4.3 -> 4 commits -> v0.4.4 fine by luck, 4 > 3
# v0.4.4 -> 2 commits -> v0.4.2 went backwards
# v0.4.4 -> 6 commits -> v0.4.6 jumped, skipping .5
# v0.4.6 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3 already taken; the upload failed
#
# Reusing a version is worse than failing to publish one: the macOS
# and Windows steps replace assets in place, so a duplicate silently
# rewrote a release that had been public for three days. Monotonic
# numbering is what stops that at the source.
#
# Suffixed tags count too. `create-tag` is skipped when any platform
# job fails, so a run can publish v0.4.7-mac and never create the
# plain v0.4.7 — reading only unsuffixed tags would then hand the
# same number out twice.
HIGHEST=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" \
| grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+(-mac|-win)?$" \
| sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+).*/\1/" \
| sort -n | tail -1 || true)
if [ -n "$LATEST_TAG" ]; then
echo "Latest matching tag: ${LATEST_TAG}"
PATCH=$(git rev-list --count "${LATEST_TAG}..HEAD")
# A re-run of a commit that already released must not mint a new
# version just because its own tag now exists.
EXISTING=$(git tag --points-at HEAD \
| grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" \
| sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+)$/\1/" \
| sort -n | tail -1 || true)
if [ -n "$EXISTING" ]; then
echo "HEAD is already tagged v${MAJOR_MINOR}.${EXISTING} — reusing it"
PATCH="${EXISTING}"
elif [ -n "$HIGHEST" ]; then
echo "Highest patch already used on this line: ${HIGHEST}"
PATCH=$((HIGHEST + 1))
else
# A minor line nobody has tagged yet is a *new* line, and a new line
# starts at .0 — that is what "we are moving to 0.4.x" means. The
@@ -165,21 +200,70 @@ jobs:
env:
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
TAG="v${{ needs.compute-version.outputs.version }}"
# Create release
curl -s -X POST \
# Idempotent get-or-create, matching build-macos. This step used to
# POST /releases unconditionally: against a tag that already existed
# Gitea answered 409, the grep below found no id, and the run died
# with a bare "exitcode '1'" and not one line of output explaining
# it — `curl -s` with no `-f` swallows the HTTP error, so nothing
# ever said "409" or "duplicate tag". Hence -fsS throughout, and
# pipefail so a failure cannot be stepped over.
HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sS -o release.json -w '%{http_code}' \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"tag_name\": \"${TAG}\", \"name\": \"Triple-C ${TAG} (Linux)\", \"body\": \"Automated build from commit ${{ gitea.sha }}\"}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases" > release.json
RELEASE_ID=$(cat release.json | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | grep -o '[0-9]*')
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${TAG}")
case "${HTTP_CODE}" in
200)
echo "Release ${TAG} already exists, reusing"
;;
404)
echo "Creating release ${TAG}"
curl -fsS -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"tag_name\": \"${TAG}\", \"name\": \"Triple-C ${TAG} (Linux)\", \"body\": \"Automated build from commit ${{ gitea.sha }}\"}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases" > release.json
;;
*)
echo "Unexpected ${HTTP_CODE} looking up release ${TAG}:" >&2
cat release.json >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
RELEASE_ID=$(python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(open('release.json')).get('id',''))")
if [ -z "${RELEASE_ID}" ]; then
echo "No release id for ${TAG}; refusing to upload into nothing:" >&2
cat release.json >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Release ID: ${RELEASE_ID}"
# Upload each artifact
# Replace-not-conflict, so a retry after a partial upload succeeds.
# Versions are monotonic now (see compute-version), so this can only
# ever be replacing an asset from a failed run of this same commit —
# never one belonging to an already-published version.
for file in artifacts/*; do
[ -f "$file" ] || continue
filename=$(basename "$file")
EXISTING_ID=$(curl -sS \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}/assets" \
| python3 -c "import json,sys; t=sys.argv[1]; print(next((a['id'] for a in json.load(sys.stdin) if a.get('name')==t), ''))" "${filename}" || true)
if [ -n "${EXISTING_ID}" ]; then
echo "Deleting existing asset ${filename} (id ${EXISTING_ID})"
curl -fsS -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}/assets/${EXISTING_ID}"
fi
echo "Uploading ${filename}..."
curl -s -X POST \
curl -fsS --http1.1 \
--retry 5 --retry-all-errors --retry-delay 5 \
--max-time 600 \
-X POST \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
--data-binary "@${file}" \
-24
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@@ -273,30 +273,6 @@ migration and Reset. Four things here are not obvious:
actively **removes** `triple-c-*.crt` when the setting is cleared — `/usr/local/share` rides the
project's snapshot image, so turning the feature off has to undo, not merely stop.
### VPN support (`vpn_support_enabled`, `docker/container.rs`)
An opt-in per-project switch granting the container what a VPN client needs to build a tunnel.
`vpn_host_config()` is the single definition of what that means, and it is unit-tested because a
container is created once by a very long function where a dropped capability is invisible.
- **All three pieces or none.** `CAP_NET_ADMIN` (Docker's default set has `net_raw` but *not*
`net_admin`, so a client can ping but never connect), the `/dev/net/tun` device (absent
entirely from a default container — nothing to open even with the capability), and
`net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark=1` (WireGuard's `wg-quick` sets it and cannot from inside a
container, since `/proc/sys` is read-only, so handshake packets die to reverse-path filtering).
Any two without the third still presents as a connection that hangs to a timeout, which is why
the tests assert the whole set.
- **The device is passed through from the host, never `mknod`-ed inside.** The kernel's `tun`
module has to back it. When the host has no such device the failure lands at *creation* — the
project simply won't start — so `explain_create_failure()` rewrites that one error to name the
switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-vs-your-machine distinction. Do not let it degrade to a raw
bollard string.
- **`triple-c.vpn-support` is written unconditionally, including `false`.** The usual
`docker commit` reason: a `true` stamped once would ride the snapshot image into every future
container and make the switch impossible to turn off.
- Off is byte-identical to a container created before the feature existed, and a missing label
reads as `false`, so no existing project is churned.
### Container Lifecycle
Containers use a **stop/start** model (not create/destroy). Installed packages persist across stops. The `.claude` config dir uses a named Docker volume (`triple-c-claude-config-{projectId}`), nested inside the home volume (`triple-c-home-{projectId}`), so OAuth tokens and Claude Code config survive container stop/start *and* container recreation.
-26
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@@ -471,32 +471,6 @@ When enabled, the host Docker socket is mounted into the container so Claude Cod
> Toggling this requires stopping and restarting the container to take effect.
### VPN Support
When enabled, the container is given the three things a VPN client needs to build a tunnel:
the `NET_ADMIN` capability, the `/dev/net/tun` device, and the `net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark`
sysctl that WireGuard requires. This is **off by default**.
Without it, a client such as PIA, WireGuard, OpenVPN or Tailscale installs and its daemon starts
normally, but the connection attempt **hangs until it times out** — a default container has no tun
device to open and no permission to add an interface or a route, and most clients report that as a
generic timeout rather than a permissions error.
Things worth knowing:
- `NET_ADMIN` applies to the container's **own** network namespace. It confers no authority over
the host's interfaces or over any other container. It does mean anything running in the
container can reconfigure that namespace, which is why it is opt-in.
- The **Docker host's** kernel must have the `tun` module available. With Docker Desktop that is
the Linux VM, not your own machine. If it is missing, the container fails to create with an
error naming `/dev/net/tun` and pointing back at this setting.
- A VPN client's kill switch applies to everything in the container, Claude Code included. If the
tunnel drops, expect API calls to fail until it reconnects or the kill switch is turned off.
> This setting can only be changed when the container is stopped. Capabilities and devices are
> fixed when a container is created, so toggling it recreates the container on the next start.
> Recreation preserves the home and `.claude` volumes — it is not a Reset.
### Mission Control
Toggle **Mission Control** to integrate Flight Control — an AI-first development methodology bundled with Triple-C — into the project. When enabled:
+1 -182
View File
@@ -798,92 +798,6 @@ async fn resolve_base_image_id(image_name: &str, base_image_name: &str) -> Strin
.unwrap_or_default()
}
/// The `/dev/net/tun` character device, as it is named on both sides.
const TUN_DEVICE: &str = "/dev/net/tun";
/// The `HostConfig` fields "VPN support" contributes: `CapAdd`, `Devices`,
/// `Sysctls` — in that order.
type VpnHostConfigParts = (
Option<Vec<String>>,
Option<Vec<bollard::models::DeviceMapping>>,
Option<HashMap<String, String>>,
);
/// The three host-config pieces a VPN client needs, or all-`None` when the
/// project has not opted in.
///
/// Returned as a triple rather than set inline so the exact shape is unit
/// testable — a container is created once, by a very long async function, and a
/// silently-dropped capability looks identical to a VPN server that is simply
/// unreachable.
///
/// All three are required together and each fails differently on its own:
/// * **`CAP_NET_ADMIN`** — without it the client cannot create an interface or
/// write a route. Docker's default bounding set grants `net_raw` but not
/// `net_admin`, which is why a client can ping but never connect.
/// * **`/dev/net/tun`** — the device is absent from a default container, so
/// there is nothing to open even with the capability. It is passed through
/// from the host rather than `mknod`-ed inside, so the kernel's `tun` module
/// backs it.
/// * **`net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark`** — WireGuard's own `wg-quick` sets
/// this, and cannot from inside a container (`/proc/sys` is read-only), so
/// its handshake packets are dropped by reverse-path filtering. Harmless for
/// OpenVPN-based clients, so it is set unconditionally with the rest.
///
/// This is namespaced to the container's own network stack: `NET_ADMIN` confers
/// no authority over the host's interfaces or over any other container.
fn vpn_host_config(enabled: bool) -> VpnHostConfigParts {
if !enabled {
return (None, None, None);
}
let devices = vec![bollard::models::DeviceMapping {
path_on_host: Some(TUN_DEVICE.to_string()),
path_in_container: Some(TUN_DEVICE.to_string()),
cgroup_permissions: Some("rwm".to_string()),
}];
let sysctls = HashMap::from([(
"net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark".to_string(),
"1".to_string(),
)]);
(
Some(vec!["NET_ADMIN".to_string()]),
Some(devices),
Some(sysctls),
)
}
/// Turn the daemon's device-passthrough failure into an explanation.
///
/// Requesting `/dev/net/tun` fails at *creation* when the host kernel has no
/// `tun` module — and the raw bollard error names a path the user will look for
/// on the wrong machine, since with Docker Desktop the relevant host is the
/// Linux VM rather than their own. Left unmapped this surfaces as a project
/// that simply refuses to start, with nothing pointing back at the switch that
/// caused it.
fn explain_create_failure(err: &str, vpn_enabled: bool) -> String {
let device_missing = vpn_enabled
&& err.contains(TUN_DEVICE)
&& (err.contains("no such file or directory")
|| err.contains("No such file or directory")
|| err.contains("error gathering device information"));
if device_missing {
return format!(
"Failed to create container: the Docker host has no {} device, which \
\"VPN support\" requires. The host kernel needs the `tun` module \
loaded (on Docker Desktop that is the Linux VM, not your own \
machine). Turn VPN support off in Config → Runtime to start this \
project without it. Original error: {}",
TUN_DEVICE, err
);
}
format!("Failed to create container: {}", err)
}
pub async fn create_container(
project: &Project,
docker_socket_path: &str,
@@ -1461,13 +1375,6 @@ pub async fn create_container(
labels.insert("triple-c.image".to_string(), image_name.to_string());
labels.insert("triple-c.timezone".to_string(), timezone.unwrap_or("").to_string());
labels.insert("triple-c.mission-control".to_string(), project.mission_control_enabled.to_string());
// Capabilities, devices and sysctls are fixed at creation, so this is
// container state and gets the label-and-compare treatment. Written
// unconditionally (`false`, not omitted) because `docker commit` copies
// container labels onto the snapshot image: a `true` stamped once would
// otherwise ride that snapshot into every future container and make the
// switch impossible to turn back off.
labels.insert("triple-c.vpn-support".to_string(), project.vpn_support_enabled.to_string());
labels.insert("triple-c.permission-mode".to_string(),
project.effective_permission_mode().as_env_value().to_string());
labels.insert("triple-c.custom-env-fingerprint".to_string(), custom_env_fingerprint.clone());
@@ -1536,15 +1443,10 @@ pub async fn create_container(
labels.insert((*key).to_string(), (*value).to_string());
}
let (cap_add, devices, sysctls) = vpn_host_config(project.vpn_support_enabled);
let host_config = HostConfig {
mounts: Some(mounts),
port_bindings: if port_bindings.is_empty() { None } else { Some(port_bindings) },
init: Some(true),
cap_add,
devices,
sysctls,
..Default::default()
};
@@ -1574,7 +1476,7 @@ pub async fn create_container(
let response = docker
.create_container(Some(options), config)
.await
.map_err(|e| explain_create_failure(&e.to_string(), project.vpn_support_enabled))?;
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create container: {}", e))?;
Ok(response.id)
}
@@ -2465,19 +2367,6 @@ pub async fn container_needs_recreation(
return Ok(true);
}
// ── VPN support (NET_ADMIN + /dev/net/tun + sysctl) ───────────────────
// A container's capabilities, devices and sysctls are set at creation and
// cannot be changed on a running or stopped container, so recreation is the
// only way a toggle here takes effect. A missing label means the container
// predates the feature, which is the same thing as having it off — so
// existing projects are not churned until someone actually turns it on.
let expected_vpn = project.vpn_support_enabled.to_string();
let container_vpn = get_label("triple-c.vpn-support").unwrap_or_else(|| "false".to_string());
if container_vpn != expected_vpn {
log::info!("VPN support mismatch (container={:?}, expected={:?})", container_vpn, expected_vpn);
return Ok(true);
}
// ── Permission mode ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// The mode is injected as the TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE env var, and
// container env can only change by recreating the container. A missing
@@ -2727,76 +2616,6 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(fp, "");
}
#[test]
fn vpn_support_off_touches_nothing_in_the_host_config() {
// The default must stay byte-identical to a container created before the
// feature existed, or every project recreates on the next start.
let (cap_add, devices, sysctls) = vpn_host_config(false);
assert_eq!(cap_add, None);
assert_eq!(devices, None);
assert_eq!(sysctls, None);
}
#[test]
fn vpn_support_on_grants_all_three_pieces() {
// Each is useless without the others — a client with the capability but
// no device, or the device but no capability, still times out — so this
// asserts the whole set rather than any one of them.
let (cap_add, devices, sysctls) = vpn_host_config(true);
assert_eq!(cap_add, Some(vec!["NET_ADMIN".to_string()]));
let devices = devices.expect("the tun device must be passed through");
assert_eq!(devices.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(devices[0].path_on_host.as_deref(), Some(TUN_DEVICE));
assert_eq!(devices[0].path_in_container.as_deref(), Some(TUN_DEVICE));
assert_eq!(devices[0].cgroup_permissions.as_deref(), Some("rwm"));
assert_eq!(
sysctls
.expect("wireguard needs src_valid_mark")
.get("net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark")
.map(String::as_str),
Some("1")
);
}
#[test]
fn vpn_support_never_grants_more_than_net_admin() {
// NET_ADMIN is already a step out of the sandbox. Anything else added
// here (SYS_ADMIN, or a blanket privileged flag) would be a much larger
// one, so pin the set.
let (cap_add, _, _) = vpn_host_config(true);
assert_eq!(cap_add.unwrap(), vec!["NET_ADMIN"]);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_tun_device_is_explained_rather_than_echoed() {
let raw = "error gathering device information while adding custom device \
\"/dev/net/tun\": no such file or directory";
let msg = explain_create_failure(raw, true);
assert!(msg.contains("VPN support"), "should name the switch: {}", msg);
assert!(msg.contains("tun` module"), "should name the cause: {}", msg);
assert!(msg.contains(raw), "should keep the original error: {}", msg);
}
#[test]
fn unrelated_failures_are_left_alone() {
// Including a tun error on a project that never asked for VPN support —
// that came from somewhere else and must not be misattributed.
let name_clash = "Conflict. The container name \"/triple-c-x\" is already in use";
assert_eq!(
explain_create_failure(name_clash, true),
format!("Failed to create container: {}", name_clash)
);
let tun_err = "no such file or directory: /dev/net/tun";
assert_eq!(
explain_create_failure(tun_err, false),
format!("Failed to create container: {}", tun_err)
);
}
#[test]
fn the_orphan_sweep_only_ever_looks_at_our_own_untagged_images() {
// Both conditions are load-bearing. Without `dangling` the sweep would
-16
View File
@@ -145,21 +145,6 @@ pub struct Project {
/// container-recreation label.
#[serde(default)]
pub browser_view_enabled: bool,
/// Grant the container what a VPN client needs to build a tunnel:
/// `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, the `/dev/net/tun` device, and the WireGuard
/// `src_valid_mark` sysctl. Without all three a client (PIA, WireGuard,
/// OpenVPN, Tailscale) installs and runs but its connection attempt hangs
/// until it times out, because it cannot create the tunnel interface or
/// touch the routing table.
///
/// Off by default and deliberately opt-in: `NET_ADMIN` lets anything in the
/// container reconfigure its own network stack, which is a meaningful step
/// out of the default sandbox. Unlike `auth_bridge_enabled` this *is*
/// container state, so it carries a `triple-c.vpn-support` label and is
/// compared in `container_needs_recreation` — capabilities and devices are
/// fixed at creation and can only change by recreating the container.
#[serde(default)]
pub vpn_support_enabled: bool,
/// Use the shared, long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (from
/// `claude setup-token`, held in the OS keychain) for this project instead
/// of requiring its own `claude login`. Only consulted when `backend` is
@@ -381,7 +366,6 @@ impl Project {
mission_control_enabled: false,
auth_bridge_enabled: false,
browser_view_enabled: false,
vpn_support_enabled: false,
use_shared_auth_token: default_use_shared_auth_token(),
full_permissions: false,
permission_mode: None,
@@ -120,15 +120,6 @@ export default function OverviewTab({
{project.mission_control_enabled ? "ON" : "OFF"}
</span>
</span>
{/* Only when granted. It is off for nearly every project and an
always-present "VPN OFF" would be noise, but where it *is* on the
container holds NET_ADMIN, which is worth seeing at a glance. */}
{project.vpn_support_enabled && (
<span className="text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
VPN support{" "}
<span className="text-[var(--text-primary)] font-medium">ON</span>
</span>
)}
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => onOpenTab("config")}
@@ -57,19 +57,6 @@ export default function RuntimeSection({
}
/>
<SwitchRow
label="VPN support"
hint="Grants NET_ADMIN and the /dev/net/tun device so a VPN client (PIA, WireGuard, OpenVPN, Tailscale) can build a tunnel inside the container. Without it a client installs and runs but its connection hangs until it times out. Anything in the container can then reconfigure the container's own network stack; the host's is untouched."
control={
<Toggle
label="VPN support"
checked={project.vpn_support_enabled}
disabled={disabled}
onChange={(v) => save({ vpn_support_enabled: v })}
/>
}
/>
<SwitchRow
label="Mission Control"
hint="A web dashboard for monitoring and managing Claude sessions remotely."
-4
View File
@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@ export interface Project {
auth_bridge_enabled: boolean;
/** Opt in to the browser-view pane. Host-side only, like `auth_bridge_enabled`. */
browser_view_enabled: boolean;
/** Grant NET_ADMIN, /dev/net/tun and the WireGuard `src_valid_mark` sysctl so
* a VPN client inside the container can build a tunnel. Unlike the two flags
* above this is container state — changing it recreates the container. */
vpn_support_enabled: boolean;
/** Use the shared long-lived Claude Code token (from `claude setup-token`,
* held in the OS keychain) instead of this project's own `claude login`.
* Defaults to true; only applies when `backend` is "anthropic" and a token