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Author SHA1 Message Date
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 d260f2c7c3 Let a project's container run a VPN client
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m37s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 7m45s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Failing after 13m30s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Skipped
A VPN client installed in a container today starts, runs, and then hangs
until its connection times out. Nothing reports an error: a default
container has no /dev/net/tun to open and no CAP_NET_ADMIN to add an
interface or a route with, and clients surface that as a generic timeout
rather than a permissions failure.

Add an opt-in per-project "VPN support" switch granting the three things
a tunnel needs. They are useless individually, which is why
vpn_host_config() defines the set in one place and the tests assert all
of it:

  * CAP_NET_ADMIN — Docker's default bounding set has net_raw but not
    net_admin, so a client can ping but never connect.
  * /dev/net/tun — passed through from the host so the kernel's tun
    module backs it, rather than mknod-ed inside.
  * net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark — WireGuard's wg-quick sets this and
    cannot from inside a container, /proc/sys being read-only, so its
    handshakes are dropped by reverse-path filtering.

Off by default and deliberately opt-in: NET_ADMIN lets anything in the
container reconfigure that container's network stack. It is namespaced —
no authority over the host's interfaces or any other container.

Capabilities and devices are fixed when a container is created, so this
is container state and takes the label-and-compare treatment.
triple-c.vpn-support is written unconditionally, false included, for the
usual docker commit reason: a true stamped once would ride the snapshot
image into every future container and make the switch impossible to turn
back off. A missing label reads as false and off is byte-identical to
today, so no existing project is churned.

Requesting the device fails at creation when the host kernel has no tun
module, which would otherwise surface as a project that simply refuses to
start. explain_create_failure() rewrites that one error to name the
switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-versus-your-machine distinction, and
leaves every other failure untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 07:52:39 -07:00
175 changed files with 2033 additions and 35464 deletions
+17 -126
View File
@@ -43,18 +43,7 @@ name: Build App (Preview)
# prunes previous previews itself, keeping the newest few. Bundles are ~130 MB a
# release; the point of a preview is the build you are testing now.
#
# A preview release is not meant to reach GitHub. `build-app.yml`'s inline
# mirror never sees one (it only runs for its own `push`-triggered release),
# but `backfill-releases.yml` pulls every Gitea release unfiltered and would
# faithfully forward a preview's `prerelease: true` if it were ever dispatched
# while one existed — so `GitHubRelease::prerelease` in `update_commands.rs`
# is real defence, not a no-op, even though the `preview-<sha>` tag shape
# (never valid semver) already blocks it independently. (The previous
# mechanism here, `sync-release.yml`, was `workflow_dispatch`-only and read
# `gitea.event.release.*` fields that are only ever populated by a `release`
# trigger, so it could never have actually run; deleted rather than fixed,
# since build-app.yml's inline mirror already does what it was meant to do
# for real releases. See triple-c#32.)
# `sync-release.yml` is workflow_dispatch-only, so nothing here reaches GitHub.
env:
GITEA_URL: ${{ gitea.server_url }}
@@ -81,23 +70,12 @@ jobs:
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.version.outputs.VERSION }}
sha: ${{ steps.version.outputs.SHA }}
# Everything after the first `-` in VERSION (e.g. `preview.a1b2c3d`).
# The bundle version fields never see this — see "Set app version" in
# each build job — but it is baked into the binary as
# `TRIPLE_C_BUILD_SUFFIX` so `get_app_version()` can still report it.
# An installed preview otherwise reports the same bare number a
# production build would, indistinguishable in the About panel and to
# `check_for_updates`. See triple-c#32.
suffix: ${{ steps.version.outputs.SUFFIX }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Fetch all tags
run: git fetch --tags
- name: Compute preview version
id: version
run: |
@@ -108,60 +86,21 @@ jobs:
# is testing and not something to hang a tag on.
echo "SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
# The patch number must be the same "one past the highest patch
# already used" build-app.yml computes for a real release — not a
# distance from the latest tag. It used to be
# `git rev-list --count <latest tag>..HEAD`, which build-app.yml's
# own history section documents as broken for exactly this reason:
# it resets to zero on every tag cut, so previews went *backwards*
# (0.4.62 -> 0.4.0) the moment a release landed, and nothing stopped
# a preview number from later colliding with a real release's.
#
# Reading the same `v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*` tags (including the `-mac`
# / `-win` suffixed ones a partially-published release can leave
# behind) means a preview built right before a release computes the
# exact number that release is about to take — e.g. `0.4.13` for
# both. That makes the two numerically *equal*, not "preview less
# than release" — plain semver ordering does not make a
# `-preview.<sha>` suffix sort lower on its own here, because
# `check_for_updates` compares against the bare, stripped
# `CARGO_PKG_VERSION`, never the suffixed display string. What
# closes the loop is `update_commands.rs`'s `is_preview_build`
# check, which relaxes that one comparison to `>=` specifically so
# "a release exists at my own number" reads as an update. See
# triple-c#32.
HIGHEST=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" \
| grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+(-mac|-win)?$" \
| sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+).*/\1/" \
| sort -n | tail -1 || true)
# Mirrors build-app.yml's own `EXISTING` guard: this workflow is
# also `workflow_dispatch`-able on `main`, not just PR-triggered, so
# HEAD can be a commit a release was already cut from. Without this,
# dispatching a preview there would compute `HIGHEST + 1` — one past
# that release — and produce exactly the "preview outranks
# production" failure triple-c#32 was filed over, just reintroduced
# through the manual-dispatch door instead of the automatic one.
EXISTING=$(git tag --points-at HEAD \
| grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" \
| sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+)$/\1/" \
| sort -n | tail -1 || true)
if [ -n "$EXISTING" ]; then
echo "HEAD is already tagged v${MAJOR_MINOR}.${EXISTING} — matching it"
PATCH="${EXISTING}"
elif [ -n "$HIGHEST" ]; then
echo "Highest patch already used on this line: ${HIGHEST}"
PATCH=$((HIGHEST + 1))
# The patch number is computed exactly as build-app.yml does it, so a
# preview is labelled with the version the release it previews would
# carry. This used to be hard-coded `.0`, which made every preview
# installer claim to be x.y.0 no matter what it contained.
LATEST_TAG=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" --sort=-v:refname | grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" | head -1 || true)
if [ -n "$LATEST_TAG" ]; then
PATCH=$(git rev-list --count "${LATEST_TAG}..HEAD")
echo "Latest matching tag: ${LATEST_TAG} (+${PATCH} commits)"
else
echo "No v${MAJOR_MINOR}.* tag yet — starting this line at .0"
PATCH=0
fi
SUFFIX="preview.${SHORT_SHA}"
VERSION="${MAJOR_MINOR}.${PATCH}-${SUFFIX}"
VERSION="${MAJOR_MINOR}.${PATCH}-preview.${SHORT_SHA}"
echo "VERSION=${VERSION}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "SUFFIX=${SUFFIX}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Computed preview version: ${VERSION}"
# One release, created once. The three build jobs run concurrently, so
@@ -299,34 +238,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Install frontend dependencies
working-directory: ./app
run: |
# `npm ci` — from the lockfile, never resolving afresh.
#
# This used to be `rm -rf node_modules package-lock.json && npm
# install`, which deleted the lockfile "to ensure correct
# platform-specific bindings" (2d4fce9). That made every build
# re-resolve the whole tree against the registry, so a dependency
# publishing a new version could break CI with no change to this
# repo — and one did. Deleting the lockfile then hit a null
# dereference in npm 10.9.8's arborist peer-set resolver:
#
# npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut')
# at #loadPeerSet (.../build-ideal-tree.js:1289:38)
#
# reached through vite → @vitejs/devtools → @vitejs/devtools-vitest
# → vitest@* → @vitest/browser-playwright → jsdom@* → canvas.
# Reproduced exactly by removing the lockfile locally on the same
# Node 22.23.2 the runner installs.
#
# The binding worry is obsolete: the committed lockfile records 25
# rollup platform variants, and `npm ci` on Linux installs precisely
# rollup-linux-x64-{gnu,musl} and @esbuild/linux-x64. Verified, along
# with a clean tsc, a successful build and 752 passing tests from the
# resulting tree.
#
# Do not "fix" a future dependency error by deleting the lockfile
# again. If `npm ci` refuses, package.json and the lockfile have
# genuinely diverged, and the fix is to commit an updated lockfile.
npm ci
rm -rf node_modules package-lock.json
npm install
- name: Install Tauri CLI
working-directory: ./app
@@ -336,31 +249,16 @@ jobs:
- name: Build Tauri app
working-directory: ./app
env:
# Baked into the binary via `option_env!` in `get_app_version()` —
# the bundle version above stays bare (WiX/MSI's ProductVersion has
# no room for a suffix), so this is the only place a preview build
# can still tell itself apart from a production one. See
# triple-c#32.
TRIPLE_C_BUILD_SUFFIX: ${{ needs.compute-version.outputs.suffix }}
run: |
export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
# AppImage only: the .deb and .rpm were dropped in favour of the one
# artifact that runs everywhere, and building them is pure cost.
# Left as "all" in tauri.conf.json so macOS and Windows are unaffected.
npx tauri build --bundles appimage
# linuxdeploy bundles a libwayland-client.so.0 that shadows the host's
# and breaks Mesa's EGL on systems newer than the build runner, so the
# window comes up blank. It has to come from the host; see the script
# header for the evidence and the trade.
- name: Finalize the AppImage
run: bash scripts/finalize-appimage.sh app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage
npx tauri build
- name: Collect artifacts
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts
cp app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage/*.AppImage artifacts/ 2>/dev/null || true
cp app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/deb/*.deb artifacts/ 2>/dev/null || true
cp app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/rpm/*.rpm artifacts/ 2>/dev/null || true
ls -la artifacts/
# Assets, not workflow artifacts — see the note at the top of this file.
@@ -452,10 +350,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Install frontend dependencies
working-directory: ./app
run: |
# `npm ci` here too, so all three platforms install identically and
# none of them can re-resolve the tree mid-release. Windows already
# did. See the Linux job for what a fresh resolution cost us.
npm ci
rm -rf node_modules
npm install
- name: Install Tauri CLI
working-directory: ./app
@@ -465,9 +361,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Build Tauri app (universal)
working-directory: ./app
env:
# See the matching comment on the Linux job's "Build Tauri app" step.
TRIPLE_C_BUILD_SUFFIX: ${{ needs.compute-version.outputs.suffix }}
run: |
export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
npx tauri build --target universal-apple-darwin
@@ -596,8 +489,6 @@ jobs:
working-directory: ./app
env:
TAURI_CONFIG: "{\"build\":{\"beforeBuildCommand\":\"\"}}"
# See the matching comment on the Linux job's "Build Tauri app" step.
TRIPLE_C_BUILD_SUFFIX: ${{ needs.compute-version.outputs.suffix }}
run: |
set "PATH=%USERPROFILE%\.cargo\bin;C:\Program Files\nodejs;%PATH%"
cargo tauri build
+21 -168
View File
@@ -39,48 +39,13 @@ jobs:
MAJOR_MINOR=$(cat VERSION | tr -d '[:space:]')
echo "Major.Minor: ${MAJOR_MINOR}"
# The patch number is **one past the highest patch already used**, and
# never a distance.
#
# It used to be `git rev-list --count <highest tag>..HEAD`, which is
# not a counter at all: it measures how far HEAD has drifted from
# whichever tag sorts highest, and that resets to zero every time a
# tag is cut. The published history is the proof — each of these is
# exactly what the old formula returned at the time:
#
# v0.4.0 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3 looked fine
# v0.4.3 -> 4 commits -> v0.4.4 fine by luck, 4 > 3
# v0.4.4 -> 2 commits -> v0.4.2 went backwards
# v0.4.4 -> 6 commits -> v0.4.6 jumped, skipping .5
# v0.4.6 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3 already taken; the upload failed
#
# Reusing a version is worse than failing to publish one: the macOS
# and Windows steps replace assets in place, so a duplicate silently
# rewrote a release that had been public for three days. Monotonic
# numbering is what stops that at the source.
#
# Suffixed tags count too. `create-tag` is skipped when any platform
# job fails, so a run can publish v0.4.7-mac and never create the
# plain v0.4.7 — reading only unsuffixed tags would then hand the
# same number out twice.
HIGHEST=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" \
| grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+(-mac|-win)?$" \
| sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+).*/\1/" \
| sort -n | tail -1 || true)
# Find the latest tag matching v{MAJOR_MINOR}.N (exclude -mac, -win suffixes)
# `|| true` so an empty grep result doesn't fail the step under pipefail.
LATEST_TAG=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" --sort=-v:refname | grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" | head -1 || true)
# A re-run of a commit that already released must not mint a new
# version just because its own tag now exists.
EXISTING=$(git tag --points-at HEAD \
| grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" \
| sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+)$/\1/" \
| sort -n | tail -1 || true)
if [ -n "$EXISTING" ]; then
echo "HEAD is already tagged v${MAJOR_MINOR}.${EXISTING} — reusing it"
PATCH="${EXISTING}"
elif [ -n "$HIGHEST" ]; then
echo "Highest patch already used on this line: ${HIGHEST}"
PATCH=$((HIGHEST + 1))
if [ -n "$LATEST_TAG" ]; then
echo "Latest matching tag: ${LATEST_TAG}"
PATCH=$(git rev-list --count "${LATEST_TAG}..HEAD")
else
# A minor line nobody has tagged yet is a *new* line, and a new line
# starts at .0 — that is what "we are moving to 0.4.x" means. The
@@ -172,34 +137,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Install frontend dependencies
working-directory: ./app
run: |
# `npm ci` — from the lockfile, never resolving afresh.
#
# This used to be `rm -rf node_modules package-lock.json && npm
# install`, which deleted the lockfile "to ensure correct
# platform-specific bindings" (2d4fce9). That made every build
# re-resolve the whole tree against the registry, so a dependency
# publishing a new version could break CI with no change to this
# repo — and one did. Deleting the lockfile then hit a null
# dereference in npm 10.9.8's arborist peer-set resolver:
#
# npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut')
# at #loadPeerSet (.../build-ideal-tree.js:1289:38)
#
# reached through vite → @vitejs/devtools → @vitejs/devtools-vitest
# → vitest@* → @vitest/browser-playwright → jsdom@* → canvas.
# Reproduced exactly by removing the lockfile locally on the same
# Node 22.23.2 the runner installs.
#
# The binding worry is obsolete: the committed lockfile records 25
# rollup platform variants, and `npm ci` on Linux installs precisely
# rollup-linux-x64-{gnu,musl} and @esbuild/linux-x64. Verified, along
# with a clean tsc, a successful build and 752 passing tests from the
# resulting tree.
#
# Do not "fix" a future dependency error by deleting the lockfile
# again. If `npm ci` refuses, package.json and the lockfile have
# genuinely diverged, and the fix is to commit an updated lockfile.
npm ci
rm -rf node_modules package-lock.json
npm install
- name: Install Tauri CLI
working-directory: ./app
@@ -211,126 +150,42 @@ jobs:
working-directory: ./app
run: |
export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
# AppImage only: the .deb and .rpm were dropped in favour of the one
# artifact that runs everywhere, and building them is pure cost.
# Left as "all" in tauri.conf.json so macOS and Windows are unaffected.
npx tauri build --bundles appimage
# linuxdeploy bundles a libwayland-client.so.0 that shadows the host's
# and breaks Mesa's EGL on systems newer than the build runner, so the
# window comes up blank. It has to come from the host; see the script
# header for the evidence and the trade.
- name: Finalize the AppImage
run: bash scripts/finalize-appimage.sh app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage
npx tauri build
- name: Collect artifacts
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts
# The versioned AppImage only. The update channel's copy lives in
# bundle/appimage/update-channel/ precisely so this glob cannot pick
# it up and publish an 80 MB duplicate under a second name.
cp app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage/*.AppImage artifacts/ 2>/dev/null || true
cp app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/deb/*.deb artifacts/ 2>/dev/null || true
cp app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/rpm/*.rpm artifacts/ 2>/dev/null || true
ls -la artifacts/
# A green job that published nothing is the worst outcome available:
# the release exists, carries no AppImage, and nobody is told. The
# `|| true` above is there so a missing bundle does not mask the real
# error, which makes this check the thing that catches it.
shopt -s nullglob
collected=(artifacts/*)
if [ ${#collected[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
echo "No artifacts collected — the bundler produced nothing." >&2
exit 1
fi
- name: Upload to Gitea release
if: gitea.event_name == 'push'
env:
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
TAG="v${{ needs.compute-version.outputs.version }}"
# Idempotent get-or-create, matching build-macos. This step used to
# POST /releases unconditionally: against a tag that already existed
# Gitea answered 409, the grep below found no id, and the run died
# with a bare "exitcode '1'" and not one line of output explaining
# it — `curl -s` with no `-f` swallows the HTTP error, so nothing
# ever said "409" or "duplicate tag". Hence -fsS throughout, and
# pipefail so a failure cannot be stepped over.
HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sS -o release.json -w '%{http_code}' \
# Create release
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${TAG}")
case "${HTTP_CODE}" in
200)
echo "Release ${TAG} already exists, reusing"
;;
404)
echo "Creating release ${TAG}"
curl -fsS -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"tag_name\": \"${TAG}\", \"name\": \"Triple-C ${TAG} (Linux)\", \"body\": \"Automated build from commit ${{ gitea.sha }}\"}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases" > release.json
;;
*)
echo "Unexpected ${HTTP_CODE} looking up release ${TAG}:" >&2
cat release.json >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
RELEASE_ID=$(python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(open('release.json')).get('id',''))")
if [ -z "${RELEASE_ID}" ]; then
echo "No release id for ${TAG}; refusing to upload into nothing:" >&2
cat release.json >&2
exit 1
fi
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"tag_name\": \"${TAG}\", \"name\": \"Triple-C ${TAG} (Linux)\", \"body\": \"Automated build from commit ${{ gitea.sha }}\"}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases" > release.json
RELEASE_ID=$(cat release.json | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | grep -o '[0-9]*')
echo "Release ID: ${RELEASE_ID}"
# Replace-not-conflict, so a retry after a partial upload succeeds.
# Versions are monotonic now (see compute-version), so this can only
# ever be replacing an asset from a failed run of this same commit —
# never one belonging to an already-published version.
# Upload each artifact
for file in artifacts/*; do
[ -f "$file" ] || continue
filename=$(basename "$file")
EXISTING_ID=$(curl -sS \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}/assets" \
| python3 -c "import json,sys; t=sys.argv[1]; print(next((a['id'] for a in json.load(sys.stdin) if a.get('name')==t), ''))" "${filename}" || true)
if [ -n "${EXISTING_ID}" ]; then
echo "Deleting existing asset ${filename} (id ${EXISTING_ID})"
curl -fsS -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}/assets/${EXISTING_ID}"
fi
echo "Uploading ${filename}..."
curl -fsS --http1.1 \
--retry 5 --retry-all-errors --retry-delay 5 \
--max-time 600 \
-X POST \
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
--data-binary "@${file}" \
"${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}/assets?name=${filename}"
done
# The fixed tag every installed AppImage checks for updates. Separate
# from the versioned release above because the updater's URL must never
# move, and `releases/latest` does.
- name: Publish the Linux update channel
if: gitea.event_name == 'push'
env:
GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
GITEA_SHA: ${{ gitea.sha }}
run: |
bash scripts/publish-update-channel.sh \
app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage/update-channel
build-macos:
runs-on: macos-latest
needs: [compute-version]
@@ -386,10 +241,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Install frontend dependencies
working-directory: ./app
run: |
# `npm ci` here too, so all three platforms install identically and
# none of them can re-resolve the tree mid-release. Windows already
# did. See the Linux job for what a fresh resolution cost us.
npm ci
rm -rf node_modules
npm install
- name: Install Tauri CLI
working-directory: ./app
+1 -38
View File
@@ -28,27 +28,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
with:
# Put BuildKit in the host's network namespace so it can reach
# act_runner's cache service.
#
# The `docker-container` driver — which the multi-arch build below
# requires, since the plain `docker` driver cannot do
# linux/amd64+linux/arm64 — runs BuildKit in its *own* container on
# Docker's default bridge. act_runner advertises ACTIONS_CACHE_URL as
# an address the *job* container can reach, and nothing teaches the
# BuildKit container about it: the job could reach
# 192.168.1.126:40649 while the container actually making the request
# could not, and the build died with `no route to host`.
#
# `no route to host` is EHOSTUNREACH — a firewall rejecting, not a
# missing route (a wrong address times out instead) — which is what a
# default firewalld zone does to traffic arriving from the docker
# bridge. Sharing the host's namespace sidesteps the question
# entirely: the cache address becomes local to BuildKit.
#
# No effect on runners where this already worked.
driver-opts: network=host
- name: Login to Gitea Container Registry
uses: docker/login-action@v3
@@ -76,21 +55,5 @@ jobs:
${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:${{ gitea.sha }}
ghcr.io/shadowdao/triple-c-sandbox:latest
ghcr.io/shadowdao/triple-c-sandbox:${{ gitea.sha }}
# `ignore-error` is what stops a cache failure failing a build that
# already succeeded. act_runner emulates the GitHub Actions cache
# service on the runner host's LAN address, and the `docker-container`
# builder `setup-buildx-action` creates could not route to it —
# every layer of both arches built, then the job died on
# `GetCacheEntryDownloadURL: no route to host` while exporting.
#
# On a pull_request `push:` above is false, so this job pushes
# nothing and the cache is its only output: failing it discarded a
# complete, successful validation of the Dockerfile for both
# architectures. A cache is an optimisation and must degrade to
# "slow", never to "red".
#
# The import is already non-fatal — the build ran all 37 layers after
# warning that it could not read the cache — so only the exporter
# needs the flag.
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,ignore-error=true
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
name: Secret Scan
# **No `paths:` filter, deliberately.** The credential this exists for lived in
# `app/src-tauri/src/docker/container.rs`, which `build.yml` would have skipped —
# that workflow only runs for `container/**`. A scan that can be avoided by
# touching the wrong directory is not a scan.
#
# This is the half of the check that nobody can bypass. The pre-commit hook in
# `.githooks/` is faster and friendlier, but it is opt-in per clone and
# `--no-verify` skips it; both are true of every git hook and neither is fixable
# from inside a repository.
on:
push:
branches: ["**"]
pull_request:
branches: ["**"]
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
# The whole tracked tree, not just the diff. Scanning a range is cheaper
# but depends on getting the range right across pushes, force-pushes,
# merges and PR events — and a wrong range fails *open*. The full scan
# takes under half a second on this repository and cannot be evaded by
# arranging for the interesting commit to sit outside the window.
- name: Scan tracked files for credentials
run: sh scripts/scan-secrets.sh --tracked
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
name: Sync Release to GitHub
on:
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
sync-release:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Mirror release to GitHub
env:
GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
GITHUB_REPO: shadowdao/triple-c
RELEASE_TAG: ${{ gitea.event.release.tag_name }}
RELEASE_NAME: ${{ gitea.event.release.name }}
RELEASE_BODY: ${{ gitea.event.release.body }}
IS_PRERELEASE: ${{ gitea.event.release.prerelease }}
IS_DRAFT: ${{ gitea.event.release.draft }}
run: |
set -e
echo "==> Creating release $RELEASE_TAG on GitHub..."
RESPONSE=$(curl -sf -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $GH_PAT" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
https://api.github.com/repos/$GITHUB_REPO/releases \
-d "{
\"tag_name\": \"$RELEASE_TAG\",
\"name\": \"$RELEASE_NAME\",
\"body\": $(echo "$RELEASE_BODY" | jq -Rs .),
\"draft\": $IS_DRAFT,
\"prerelease\": $IS_PRERELEASE
}")
UPLOAD_URL=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.upload_url' | sed 's/{?name,label}//')
echo "Release created. Upload URL: $UPLOAD_URL"
echo '${{ toJSON(gitea.event.release.assets) }}' | jq -c '.[]' | while read asset; do
ASSET_NAME=$(echo "$asset" | jq -r '.name')
ASSET_URL=$(echo "$asset" | jq -r '.browser_download_url')
echo "==> Downloading asset: $ASSET_NAME"
curl -sfL -o "/tmp/$ASSET_NAME" "$ASSET_URL"
echo "==> Uploading $ASSET_NAME to GitHub..."
ENCODED_NAME=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse, sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))" "$ASSET_NAME")
curl -sf -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $GH_PAT" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
--data-binary "@/tmp/$ASSET_NAME" \
"$UPLOAD_URL?name=$ENCODED_NAME"
echo " Uploaded: $ASSET_NAME"
done
echo "==> Release sync complete."
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Refuse a commit that adds something shaped like a live credential.
#
# Installed by pointing git at this directory:
#
# git config core.hooksPath .githooks
#
# which `npm run hooks` in app/ does for you. It is per-clone — git will not let
# a repository configure its own hooks path, for the obvious reason that cloning
# a repo would then be enough to run its code. So this is opt-in on every
# machine, `--no-verify` skips it, and neither of those is a flaw to fix here:
# the CI job in `.gitea/workflows/build.yml` is the half nobody can bypass. The
# hook exists to tell you in one second rather than in five minutes.
exec "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/scripts/scan-secrets.sh" --staged
-10
View File
@@ -3,13 +3,3 @@ app/dist/
app/src-tauri/target/
Screenshot*.png
code-review.md
# Windows NTFS alternate-data-stream artifacts, created when files arrive
# through the WSL/host bind mount.
*:Zone.Identifier
# Local bug-report screenshots, same spirit as Screenshot*.png above.
screenshot_for_fix/
# Package files pulled in by ad-hoc verification runs.
*.deb
+6 -389
View File
@@ -79,62 +79,7 @@ docker exec stdout → tokio task → emit("terminal-output-{sessionId}") → li
- **`components/projects/home/`** — **Project Home**, the main-area view for a project:
Overview / Sessions / Automation / Config / Files. Per-project configuration lives here, not in
modals — see "UI conventions" below.
- **The Files pane's host transfers open their dialog from Rust, and that is the whole
design — do not move it back into the webview.** The tab browses, views (text and image),
renames and creates folders inside the container (`list_container_files`,
`read_container_file`, `rename_container_path`, `create_container_directory`), and it
copies single files in and out (`upload_files_to_container`, `download_container_file`).
The second pair call `pick_files_to_upload` / `pick_save_path`, which drive
`tauri-plugin-dialog` from the *backend*: the webview can ask for a picker and that is the
entirety of its influence — it cannot name a host path as an *input*. The claim stops
there and should not be widened: host paths still travel outward in error text, canonical
ones included. What is closed is the direction that produced the criticals.
That shape is not decoration. Four successive audits found that host filesystem paths
crossing IPC were where the criticals lived — a caller-named host destination for
container-controlled bytes, an arbitrary host source read into the container, a `link(2)`
upload reservation that succeeded against a directory and failed forever on any filesystem
without hard links. The feature was removed rather than fixed a fifth time, and it came
back only in the shape that removes the class: a frontend-driven dialog handing Rust a
string is the exact thing that failed, so re-introducing `open()`/`save()` in `FilesTab`
would undo the whole point while looking like a simplification.
None of the reservation machinery came back with it. There is no destination reservation,
no placeholder rollback and no collision marker — the OS save dialog already asks about
overwriting, and Docker's archive extractor overwrites on upload the way `cp` does.
- **Drag-and-drop is still not it.** There is no drop-into-the-Files-pane and no OS
drag-out; the buttons are the gesture. A file also gets *in* by being dropped on the
Terminal, and a whole tree comes *out* through "Back up container" — those two predate the
Files work and their hardening is not to be weakened. `TerminalView`'s `onDragDropEvent`
is Tauri's native drop event (window-wide, so routed by `lib/dropTarget.ts` — geometry for
*whose* drop it is, a document-wide `dropIsBlocked` for whether the app should accept one
at all; keep both halves and keep `PaneVisibility`). Backup is
`file_commands::download_container_backup`.
- **`resolve_host_path` applies the full lexical predicate twice — as written, and again
after canonicalisation.** That includes the general hidden-component rule, which
deliberately over-catches: a path resolving through `node_modules/.pnpm`, `~/.cache` or
`~/.local/share` is refused. Do not narrow it back to a list of "credential" directories.
That was tried, and allow-by-omission let `~/.local/bin` (write there and you own the
user's next shell command), `~/.password-store`, browser profiles and `~/.pki/nssdb`
through a planted symlink with a perfectly visible name. Over-refusing is the cheaper
mistake. Note the cost is real and has grown: of the four callers, the Files pane's two
are routine, and their path comes from a dialog — so an over-catch refuses a destination a
person actually chose (`~/.config` is the common one). Accepted, and not a reason to
narrow the rule, because the terminal drop and `download_container_backup` still take
their host path over IPC and this predicate is their only boundary.
- **OS drag-out is not here.** `tauri-plugin-drag`, `stage_container_file_for_drag` and its
host staging directory were held back for separate hardening and live on
`hold/disk-and-dragout`. Do not re-add `drag:allow-start-drag` or a staging command
without taking that work back whole: the plugin has no scope mechanism, so the grant lets
a compromised webview start a drag on *any* host path the user can read, and the staging
directory is a host-temp disk leak with a gesture attached unless its exit-clear and
startup-reap come back with it.
- **`components/settings/`** — Host-level settings: Docker, AWS, Web Terminal, STT, shared auth.
There is deliberately **no Disk panel** here. The disk survey and its reclaim / destroy /
compaction surface were held back for separate hardening and live on `hold/disk-and-dragout`;
one of their IPC commands was a verified arbitrary-DELETE primitive, so if that work returns it
returns whole, `generate_handler!` entries and typed confirmations included. The *prevention*
half stayed and is not disk-panel code: the pre-commit scrub in `docker/container.rs`, capped
container logs, the `triple-c.base` / `triple-c.managed` labels, `sweep_orphaned_snapshots` and
the startup housekeeping in `lib.rs`, the migration reapers, and `project_lock.rs`.
- **`components/settings/`** — Host-level settings: Docker, AWS, Web Terminal, STT, shared auth
- **`components/ui/`** — Shared primitives. **Use these; do not hand-roll replacements.**
`Modal` (the only correct way to build a dialog — it supplies `role="dialog"`, `aria-modal`,
focus trap and restore), `Button`, `Toggle`, `Field`, `SegmentedControl`, `StatusIndicator`,
@@ -258,8 +203,7 @@ docker exec stdout → tokio task → emit("terminal-output-{sessionId}") → li
### Container (`container/`)
- **`Dockerfile`** — Ubuntu 24.04 base with Claude Code, Node.js 22, Python 3.12, Rust, Docker CLI, git, gh, AWS CLI v2, ripgrep, pnpm, uv, ruff pre-installed, plus the shared
libraries a browser links against (see below) and the VPN tooling the `vpn_support_enabled`
toggle grants capability for (`iproute2`, `wireguard-tools`, `iptables`)
libraries a browser links against (see below)
- **Browser runtime libraries are baked in; browser *binaries* are not.** A layer runs
`npx --yes playwright@latest install-deps chromium` as root, so Playwright names its own
dependencies and the list cannot rot against Ubuntu 24.04's `t64` renames or a new Chromium
@@ -343,95 +287,15 @@ container is created once by a very long function where a dropped capability is
Any two without the third still presents as a connection that hangs to a timeout, which is why
the tests assert the whole set.
- **The device is passed through from the host, never `mknod`-ed inside.** The kernel's `tun`
module has to back it.
- **A missing device fails at `start`, not `create` — verified against Docker 29.7.** `docker
create --device /dev/does-not-exist` succeeds and prints an id; runc resolves the device (and
validates sysctls) only when it builds the container. So the guard belongs on the start path:
`explain_container_failure()` covers both and is called from `start_container`, where it has a
container id and no project — which is why it keys off the error naming `/dev/net/tun` rather
than off `vpn_support_enabled`. Nothing else in Triple-C requests a device, so that is
unambiguous. A version of this check wired to `create` alone is dead code that looks correct.
- **`NET_ADMIN` here is not user-namespaced.** Docker does not enable userns remapping by default,
so only the *network* namespace confines it: no reach onto host interfaces, but promiscuous
mode, arbitrary addresses/routes/NAT on the shared `docker0` segment (sibling containers, the
LiteLLM gateway among them, are ARP-spoofable), netlink-triggered host module auto-load, and
enough authority to flush in-container netfilter rules that sandbox mode may rely on. Keep the
code comments honest about this — an earlier draft claimed it "confers no authority" outside the
container, which is too strong.
module has to back it. When the host has no such device the failure lands at *creation* — the
project simply won't start — so `explain_create_failure()` rewrites that one error to name the
switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-vs-your-machine distinction. Do not let it degrade to a raw
bollard string.
- **`triple-c.vpn-support` is written unconditionally, including `false`.** The usual
`docker commit` reason: a `true` stamped once would ride the snapshot image into every future
container and make the switch impossible to turn off.
- Off is byte-identical to a container created before the feature existed, and a missing label
reads as `false`, so no existing project is churned.
- **The toggle grants capability and stops there — it routes nothing.** `vpn_host_config()` returns
a cap, a device and a sysctl; no client is installed, no route is touched, no tunnel is started
or restored. Users read the name as "turn the VPN on" and report the default network not routing
through it as a bug. It isn't, and the docs say so explicitly; keep it that way.
- **The tooling is baked, not installed at runtime.** `iproute2` and `wireguard-tools` are in
`container/Dockerfile` because a runtime install lands in the writable layer and is lost on
base-image migration — leaving a project holding the capability with nothing able to exercise it,
and no error that points at why. `iptables` is included and `nftables` deliberately is not; see
the Dockerfile comment for why that way round.
- **Anything built on this fails open.** The network namespace is rebuilt on every start and no
service manager runs inside, so a tunnel never survives stop/start or recreation — while leftover
`/run` state makes it look as though it did. Note the two different mechanisms: `/run` is in the
writable layer, so on a stop/start it is simply the same container's files, and on a recreation
`docker commit` has carried it into the snapshot. Traffic silently reverts to the real address.
Any future autostart or killswitch work starts here.
- **`/run` riding the snapshot means a VPN client's key material can end up in an image.** Verified:
a fresh container off the whp snapshot already contained the `wg.priv` a previous tunnel left in
`/run`. Anything writing key material there inherits the problem — the same `docker commit`
hazard as `triple-c.git-token-hash` and the custom-env fingerprint, in a directory that looks
ephemeral and is not. A VPN client that does this should delete its key on teardown.
- **`iptables` is baked, and picking `nftables` instead would have been wrong.** `Recommends:
nftables | iptables` is stripped by `--no-install-recommends`, and `wg-quick` needs a backend for
any `AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0`. `nftables` is the tempting choice — preferred by `wg-quick`, half
the size — but `wg-quick` picks nft *unconditionally* when present, and its nft ruleset needs
`nft_fib_ipv4`, which LinuxKit (Docker Desktop for Mac) does not build while it *does* build
`xt_CONNMARK`. Shipping nftables would therefore have forfeited Mac. See the Dockerfile comment;
the kernel-config evidence is quoted there.
- **Two `wg-quick` failures remain, and only one is ours to fix.** Full tunnels still need
`xt_CONNMARK`, which WSL2 before 6.6 lacks — nothing installable changes that. And every
provider's stock config carries a `DNS =` line that fails in `set_dns()` before any routing, so it
breaks split tunnels too; `openresolv` has no candidate on noble and `resolvconf` drags in
systemd-resolved, so that one is documented rather than fixed. Driving `wg` and `ip route`
directly avoids both, which is what the skill does.
- **The `pia-vpn` skill is installed *and removed* from `VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED`.** `container/skills/`
is baked to `/opt/triple-c-skills` and `install_feature_skill()` in `entrypoint.sh` copies it into
`~/.claude/skills/` on every start — refreshed each time, so a fix reaches any project whose base
image has the source, and `rm -rf`'d first, so files dropped from a later version do not linger.
The removal branch matters as much as the install: `~/.claude` is a persisted volume, so a skill
left behind after the toggle goes off would keep instructing an agent to use a capability the
container no longer has. Which is also why the variable is sent as `0` rather than omitted (see
`vpn_env_var`, tested), and why it is in `RESERVED_ENV_EXACT` — a custom env var of that name
could otherwise claim the skill without the capability behind it.
- **Both halves of that live in the base image, so neither reaches an existing project.** A
recreation builds from the project's *own snapshot*, which has no `/opt/triple-c-skills` and no
updated `entrypoint.sh`; only a migration or a Reset delivers them. The install path says so out
loud rather than returning silently, and `/opt/triple-c-skills` is in `FEATURE_PROBES` so the
migration pre-flight lists it as missing. Worth knowing before adding anything else behind an
existing toggle: the label fingerprints *the setting*, not the set of things the setting drives,
so a project already at `true` gets no recreation at all on upgrade.
### Keeping Claude Code current
`claude update` runs in **two** places, and both are needed:
- `container/entrypoint.sh` runs it once per container start, before any session exists.
- `commands/terminal_commands.rs` (and its twin in `web_terminal/ws_handler.rs`) prepend it to the
command every Claude session launches with, because containers use a stop/start model and a
long-lived one would otherwise never re-check.
Both are `timeout`-bounded and `|| echo`'d, so an offline or slow network delays a tab rather than
failing it, and **both take the same `flock` on `/tmp/.triple-c-claude-update.lock`**. That lock is
not tidiness: the entrypoint prints "container ready" only after its own update finishes, so
starting a project and immediately opening a tab — or opening two tabs at once — otherwise runs two
updaters against the same `~/.claude/bin`, and `|| echo` would hide a half-written install behind a
friendly message one line before `exec claude` ran it. `-E 0` makes losing the race a success,
because the holder just did the work. The per-session copy is what forced the non-Bedrock path from a bare `["claude", ...]`
argv into a `bash -c` wrapper — the flags and the session name are interpolated into a shell
string now, so **anything added there must go through `shell_quote_arg`**. Bash sessions are
deliberately untouched.
### Container Lifecycle
@@ -456,63 +320,6 @@ security update. Migration is the non-destructive way out; Reset is the destruct
bump: churn on the old base, and it would consume the "you should migrate" signal without
migrating. `get_container_staleness` surfaces it; `migrate_project_to_base` acts on it.
- **A missing lineage label means "unknown, probe instead", never "stale".**
- **The snapshot image is not a checkpoint — never read its absence as "nothing to inspect".**
`commit_container_snapshot` runs only before a container is destroyed (a config-change recreate)
or inside a migration. **Never on stop.** So a project in daily use for a year can legitimately
have no `triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest` at all, and one that has is stale by everything installed
since. `pick_probe_source` therefore reads a *stopped* container directly — commit its writable
layer to a unique `triple-c-probe-*` image, probe that, drop it — and ranks it **above** the snapshot,
for the same reason a running container already outranked it. Assuming a snapshot existed is what
made a stopped, never-recreated project report "no container or snapshot image yet" with its
container sitting right there, and left Update disabled on the projects furthest behind.
- **`bollard` never gives you the image id back from a commit.** Its `Commit` response model
deserialises `"ID"`; the daemon sends `"Id"`, so `commit_container` returns `id: None` every time
(verified: bollard 0.18.1, Engine 29.6). Neither long-standing commit site notices because both
discard the response — but it means any commit you need a *reference* to has to be **tagged**.
- **A tagged leftover is the one orphan no sweep can reach, so the probe image has its own reaper.**
`sweep_orphaned_snapshots` collects `dangling` + `triple-c.managed=true`; `reap_stale_migration_pins`
and `scrub_secrets_from_snapshots` both filter `triple-c-snapshot-*`. A `triple-c-probe-*` image is
tagged and so matches none of them, which would make a crashed probe a permanent multi-gigabyte
leak with no UI to find it. `reap_probe_images` runs at startup beside `reap_probe_containers` and
is **load-bearing, not tidying** — it is also what makes the probe image's unscrubbed writable
layer acceptable. Two rules it earned the hard way:
- **Age-gate it** (`PROBE_REAP_MIN_AGE_SECS`, same as the container reaper). `reference=` is
daemon-wide, so a second copy of the app has live probe images matching the glob.
- **Remove by tag, never by image id.** A `force` removal by id untags an image *everywhere*; a
fixture that tagged `alpine:latest` into this namespace deleted the user's alpine that way.
- **Probe image names are unique per call, and must stay that way.** A stable per-container name was
tried: container ids do not survive a recreate, so most leftovers were stranded permanently, and
two concurrent probes fought over one tag — whichever finished first force-removed the image the
other was still reading, reporting a bogus `probe_error` on a healthy project. `get_container_staleness`
takes no `project_lock` claim (the migration banner needs it to answer *during* a migration), so
uniqueness is what makes overlapping probes safe.
- **The stopped-container probe is cached per stop, and that is not an optimisation you may drop.**
`getContainerStaleness` is called from a `useEffect` that fires whenever the container settles, so
merely opening a stopped project's Overview probes it. Uncached that is a `docker commit` of the
whole writable layer per visit — measured at 44 s on a real project, against ~3 s for the snapshot
probe it replaced. `STOPPED_MANIFEST_CACHE` is keyed on the container's `FinishedAt`, which is
exact rather than merely plausible: nothing can write to a stopped container's writable layer, and
`FinishedAt` moves on every stop. A live test asserts the restart case, because a cache that
failed to invalidate would plan a migration against a filesystem the project no longer has.
- **Do not "skip the probe when the project is not stale" to save that cost.** It was tried. The
deltas would be empty while `probeSettled` (`!probing && staleness && !probe_error`) stayed *true*,
which leaves the migrate action in the project menu enabled — that action is not gated on the
banner — so the pre-flight would report nothing to copy while the backend was told to copy
nothing. That is the exact hazard `ProjectHome.tsx`'s `canMigrate` comment already warns about.
- **A failed stopped-container probe falls back to the snapshot whenever one exists.** Before this
feature a stopped project read its snapshot directly, so surfacing a commit failure where the
snapshot could have answered would make the banner *worse* than it was — and the failure modes are
exactly the ones where the fallback earns its keep: a full disk (the commit allocates the whole
writable layer; the snapshot probe allocates nothing) and a 409 from a concurrent claim.
- **`get_container_staleness` never commits while the project is claimed.** It takes no
`project_lock` claim itself, deliberately — the banner has to answer *during* a migration — so it
reads `project_lock::held` instead and probes the snapshot rather than the container. The
collision is not symmetric: the probe losing is a retryable `probe_error`, but
`start_project_container` removes the old container with a hard `?`, so a remove that raced a
commit would fail the user's Start with an opaque error.
- **An image's `Created` is the image's own, not its tag's.** Tagging an existing image gives you
that image's age; BuildKit stamps `docker build` output with a fixed epoch. Only `docker commit`
stamps *now* — which is what real probe images do, and what any fixture for them must do.
- **`:latest` keeps pointing at the old lineage until the final commit.** That is what makes every
crash before that point self-heal — `start_project_container` just recreates from the old
snapshot. After the container swap, the new container's `triple-c.migration-state=in-progress`
@@ -602,196 +409,6 @@ Anthropic and Bedrock deliberately keep Claude Code's own defaults.
`models/project.rs` for anything that should default to true.
- Cross-platform paths: Docker socket is `/var/run/docker.sock` on Linux/macOS, `//./pipe/docker_engine` on Windows
## Secrets
**`scripts/scan-secrets.sh` refuses a commit that adds something shaped like a live
credential.** Enable the hook once per clone with `npm run hooks` (from `app/`), which sets
`core.hooksPath` to `.githooks`. A repository cannot configure its own hooks path — cloning it
would then be enough to run its code — so this is opt-in everywhere, and `--no-verify` skips it.
The `Secret Scan` workflow is the half nobody can bypass; it carries **no `paths:` filter**, on
purpose, because the incident that prompted all this lived in `app/**` and `build.yml` only runs
for `container/**`.
Three rules, and the second half of the third is what keeps it usable: vendor-prefixed tokens
(`ghp_`, `sk-`, `AKIA`, `xox`, …), `BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY` blocks, and an opaque literal assigned to
a secret-shaped name. That last one needs **both** halves — the identifier must read as a
credential *and* the whole literal must be hex or base64 with no word structure. Name-proximity
alone flags `secure::get_project_secret(&id, "aws-secret-access-key")`, which is a keychain key
name; the literal test is what excludes it. Measured against the tree: 0 false positives, and it
catches the real incident (`9b2f4fe`) when replayed.
A line ending `pragma: allowlist secret` is skipped. Make a fixture obviously fake before reaching
for it.
**Why this exists:** `the_custom_env_fingerprint_never_carries_the_value` used the maintainer's
real Gitea **site-admin** token as its fixture — a test about secrets not escaping, leaking one. It
survived 92 commits and fourteen days in the public GitHub mirror, past five audit rounds and two
independent reviews, because every one of them read the code under change and this sat in a test
nobody had reason to open. Fixtures are never live values; there is no case where they need to be.
## Settings export/import
`commands::settings_export_commands`, `storage::settings_crypto`, `models::settings_export`
(triple-c#35). Exports the *host* environment — global `AppSettings` plus the global secrets that
live in the OS keychain instead: the shared Claude Code OAuth login and the model gateway's two
keys. Per-project settings, per-project secrets, and anything in a project's Docker volumes are
deliberately out of scope — this is not a project backup.
- **`AppSettings` is not entirely the non-secret shape it looks like, and a review of this feature
caught the one place that isn't.** `WebTerminalSettings::access_token` is a live bearer
credential for a server that binds every interface — exporting `AppSettings` wholesale would
have carried it along as if it were as inert as a port number, and importing it would have
applied `web_terminal.enabled` and the token together with no more warning than any other
setting, letting a crafted export silently stand up a LAN-listening terminal on the next launch.
`export_settings`/`apply_settings_import` carve this one field out into `ExportedSecrets`
instead, with the same "only overwrite what the import actually has" treatment as the other
three secrets — except "leave it alone" has to be done by hand in `apply_settings_import`, since
unlike the keychain secrets this one lives inside the `AppSettings` blob that gets replaced
wholesale. `SettingsImportPreview::enables_web_terminal` also exists because of this: `enabled`
and the token are independent fields, and "this turns on a listening service" must not hide
inside a generic "settings replaced" summary. Read this as the standing example of the class of
thing to keep checking for in this feature, not a one-off fixed bug — any other field that looks
like config but is actually a live credential would have the same problem.
- **Encrypted because it can carry live credentials, not for appearance's sake.** Argon2id derives
a 256-bit key from the user's password (memory-hard — meaningfully resistant to GPU/ASIC
brute-forcing, unlike PBKDF2 at any reasonable iteration count), AES-256-GCM does the actual
encryption. A wrong password fails GCM's authentication tag rather than producing silent
garbage. The salt and nonce are not secret and are written in the clear in the file's own
header — the salt's job is only to make two exports of the same password derive different keys,
and the nonce's only requirement is per-encryption uniqueness, which a fresh random draw on
every export already gives it.
- **The save/open dialogs are opened from Rust**, the same boundary `file_commands.rs`'s
`pick_save_path`/`pick_files_to_upload` draw and document at length: a frontend-driven dialog
handing Rust a host path string is the exact shape of bug that produced this app's past
criticals. `preview_settings_import` resolves the chosen path itself and remembers it
(`AppState::pending_settings_import`) so `apply_settings_import` re-reads the same file without
a path ever crossing back over IPC. It also pins a hash of the file's ciphertext next to that
path, and `apply_settings_import` refuses to proceed if the file on disk no longer matches it —
otherwise confirming a preview would not actually be binding on what gets applied, which matters
given this feature's own threat model: a file shared between people may sit in a synced or
otherwise shared directory that changes between the two calls.
- **The decrypted payload is not cached between preview and apply — only the password is reused.**
The frontend holds the password in React state and passes it to both calls; nothing in Rust
holds decrypted plaintext — secrets included — in memory for longer than one command's
execution, so `apply_settings_import` always re-decrypts rather than reusing anything
`preview_settings_import` computed. `preview_settings_import` returns counts and presence flags
only (`SettingsImportPreview`), never a secret value, so it's safe to hand to the frontend and
render directly.
- **Import replaces settings wholesale, but only writes secrets actually present in the file.**
An import is "restore this environment," so the settings half is a full replace, not a
field-by-field merge. Secrets are different on purpose: an absent secret in the export means
"the source machine never had this configured," not "delete this on import" — a user who wants
to clear a secret already has dedicated UI for that (signing out of shared auth, clearing the
gateway key). Secrets are restored *before* the settings replace runs, not after — replacing
settings is what triggers `reconcile_gateway`, and restoring the other way round leaves a real
window where a gateway recreation happens against the destination's old keys.
- **A restored gateway secret nudges a running gateway container to recreate itself, even when
nothing about the gateway's *shape* changed.** `reconcile_gateway`'s `gateway_shape_changed` only
compares port/provider/base URL/models — deliberately, since that's what's rendered into the
container's config — so a secret-only change (same shape, new key) is invisible to it. Left
alone, a running container would keep serving the old key material indefinitely after an import
that restored a new one. `apply_settings_import` tracks whether either gateway secret was
actually written and, if the gateway is enabled and its container both exists and is running,
calls `docker::gateway::ensure_gateway_running` directly afterward — its own fingerprint already
includes the secret rotation id (`storage::secure::get_gateway_secret_version`), so it recreates
exactly when it should and no more.
- **A keychain write failing during import is reported back, not only logged.** Each of the three
`secure::store_*` calls collects its error into `SettingsImportOutcome::secret_restore_warnings`
in addition to logging it — an import that silently restores two of three secrets but not the
third must not read as unqualified success just because the settings half of the import (which
runs after, and is validated before any of this) went through. `apply_settings_import` returns
`SettingsImportOutcome { settings, secret_restore_warnings }` rather than bare `AppSettings` for
this reason; `ImportSettingsModal` shows any warnings alongside the "Settings imported" message.
- **The imported settings are validated *before* any secret is written, not just before the
settings replace.** `apply_settings_import` calls
`settings_commands::validate_settings_update(&current, &settings)` — the same checks
`update_settings` runs internally, pulled out into its own function specifically so this caller
can run them first — and only proceeds to the three keychain writes if that passes. A review
caught the earlier ordering: writing secrets first meant a rejected import (a bad env var name, a
disallowed host path) still left the keychain overwritten with the file's secrets while the
settings themselves stayed unchanged, a silently half-applied state the error message gave no
hint of.
- **`read_and_decrypt` checks `format_version` before attempting to parse the full payload, not
after.** A version bump that isn't deserialize-compatible is exactly the case that check exists
for, and parsing the full struct first would fail on the shape mismatch before the version check
ever ran. Neither error path interpolates what `serde_json` actually says into the message
shown to the user — its type-mismatch errors quote the offending value inline, and the plaintext
here can hold a live credential.
- **The 8-character password minimum is enforced in `export_settings` itself, not only in the
export modal.** The frontend minimum is a UX nudge; the Rust command is the actual boundary a
weak password has to cross, and Argon2id's memory-hardness buys little against an attacker who
can just try a short password directly. Measured with `.chars().count()` (Unicode scalar values)
rather than `.len()` (bytes), to stay as close as this pair of languages allows to the frontend's
`.length` check (UTF-16 code units) — the two only diverge on astral-plane characters. The
derived key and both plaintext buffers — the payload built for export, and whatever `decrypt`
recovers on import — are wrapped in `zeroize::Zeroizing` for the same reason every other secret
in this codebase gets handled carefully — cheap insurance (`zeroize` is already pulled in
transitively via `aes-gcm`) for material that exists only to hold or produce live credentials.
- **The preview also discloses non-blank custom base URLs** (`global_ollama`, `global_llamacpp`,
`global_openai_compatible`, `gateway.api_base`) so an import that would redirect model traffic to
a different server is visible in the confirmation dialog rather than discovered later — these are
endpoints, not secrets, so `SettingsImportPreview` carries and `describeImport` renders the actual
URL rather than just a presence flag. `describeImportWarnings` additionally calls out a web
terminal token that arrives with the terminal left *off*: `start_web_terminal` only mints a fresh
token when none is already set, so a planted token would otherwise activate silently the next
time someone turns the terminal on, with no import-time signal that it wasn't freshly generated.
- **The preview also discloses a custom Docker image, and warns on one every time — not just on
change.** `custom_image_name`/`image_source` weren't in scope for the base-URL disclosure above,
but a review pointed out they're a sharper version of the same problem: this is the image *every*
project container is created from (`models::container_config::resolve_image_name`), so a crafted
export pointing it at an attacker-controlled image is a path to running arbitrary code with
whatever a project's containers are allowed to reach, not merely a redirected API endpoint.
`describeImportWarnings` fires on `image_source == Custom` unconditionally rather than only when
it differs from the destination's current value, since re-importing the same risky configuration
is still worth surfacing every time a user confirms an import.
- **Every free-form string a preview surfaces is sanitized and length-capped before it's built.**
`SettingsImportPreview::from_payload`'s `sanitize_for_preview` strips control characters and caps
at 100 characters (`MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN`) for every base URL and the custom image name — a
review noted that, unlike the count- and boolean-derived fields the preview started with, these
are verbatim strings from a not-yet-trusted decrypted payload rendered directly into the
confirmation dialog. Unbounded, a single pathological value (very long, or holding embedded
newlines) could push the security warnings above the scroll fold in the dialog that exists
specifically to make them unmissable — the frontend's `<li>`/warning boxes also get `break-all`
as a second layer against the same failure mode.
## Packaging
Linux ships as **AppImage only**, built by `build-app.yml` (releases) and
`build-app-preview.yml` (the PR check). The `.deb` and `.rpm` were dropped: two more artifacts to
build and publish for an audience the AppImage already serves, and neither could self-update. The
Linux job passes `--bundles appimage`; `tauri.conf.json` still says `"targets": "all"` so macOS and
Windows are untouched.
`scripts/finalize-appimage.sh` post-processes every AppImage, and both things it does are
load-bearing. **It demotes the bundled `libwayland-client.so.0`** off the loader path, keeping it as
a fallback for a host that has none: `libEGL_mesa.so.0` has a hard `DT_NEEDED` on that library, so a
bundled copy older than the host's Mesa stops the EGL driver loading at all and the window comes up
blank — measured on wayland 1.26 / Mesa 26.2.1 against a 22.04-built image. Do not "fix" this by
bundling a newer wayland: the floor is set by the user's Mesa, which moves independently of our
releases, so this is a host-coupled library like libGL and libdrm. **It also embeds AppStream
metadata and update information**, without which an AppImage manager can adopt the app but never
update it. The update URL points at a fixed `linux-latest` tag on the GitHub mirror
(`scripts/publish-update-channel.sh`), never `releases/latest` — that follows whichever release is
newest, and the backfill creates a GitHub release per Gitea tag including the `-win` and `-mac` ones
that carry no AppImage. The script's post-repack assertions are the only test any of this has.
**There is deliberately no Arch package.** A
`triple-c-bin` `PKGBUILD` and a `publish-arch-package.yml` existed and were removed; they live on
`hold/arch-packaging`. Do not re-add them without the piece that was always missing: the package
was never on the AUR, so it was a manual `pacman -U` of a downloaded file — the same gesture as
the AppImage, for a second artifact to keep working. Being `workflow_dispatch`-only it also
reached 1 release in 28, while `HOW-TO-USE.md` told Arch users to download it from every release.
An AUR account and its SSH key as a repo secret are what would make it worth having; until then
the AppImage is the Arch story.
`scripts/install-appimage.sh` is the desktop-integration half, and it exists because an AppImage
has no installer: it extracts the bundled icons into `~/.local/share/icons/hicolor` and writes a
`.desktop` entry. It **rewrites** the `Exec` line rather than copying the bundled entry — the
bundled one is `Exec=triple-c`, which resolves only inside the AppImage's own mount, so a
verbatim copy yields a launcher entry that starts nothing. It keeps `StartupWMClass` exactly as
the bundle sets it, which is what lets the shell match the window to the entry. Extraction uses
`--appimage-extract`, which needs no FUSE, so the script works before `fuse2` is installed.
## Testing
Frontend tests use Vitest with jsdom environment and React Testing Library. Setup file at `src/test/setup.ts`. Run a single test file:
+37 -283
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ Triple-C (Claude-Code-Container) is a desktop application that runs Claude Code
## Table of Contents
- [Installation](#installation)
- [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
- [First Launch](#first-launch)
- [The Interface](#the-interface)
@@ -33,65 +32,6 @@ Triple-C (Claude-Code-Container) is a desktop application that runs Claude Code
---
## Installation
Download the build for your platform from [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/shadowdao/triple-c/releases/latest).
| Platform | File | Install |
|----------|------|---------|
| **Windows** | `Triple-C_<version>_x64-setup.exe` or `.msi` | Run the installer. |
| **macOS** | `Triple-C_<version>_universal.dmg` | Open the `.dmg` and drag Triple-C to Applications. |
| **Linux (all distributions)** | `Triple-C_<version>_amd64.AppImage` | `chmod +x` it, then run it directly. See the AppImage notes below. |
> **macOS note:** The app is not signed or notarized. On first launch, macOS Gatekeeper may block it — right-click the app and select "Open" to bypass, or remove the quarantine attribute: `xattr -cr /Applications/Triple-C.app`.
> **AppImage note:** Two things are worth knowing. Running an AppImage needs FUSE 2, which Arch and CachyOS do not install by default — `sudo pacman -S fuse2` once, or run it with `--appimage-extract-and-run` to sidestep FUSE entirely. And an AppImage is just an executable file: nothing registers it with the desktop, so it will not appear in your app launcher on its own. Run [`scripts/install-appimage.sh`](scripts/install-appimage.sh) to add a launcher entry and icons — see [Adding an AppImage to the app launcher](#adding-an-appimage-to-the-app-launcher).
> **Linux is AppImage only.** The `.deb` and `.rpm` were dropped. They were a second and third artifact to build, test and publish for an audience already served by the one file that runs on every distribution — and unlike the AppImage they could not be kept up to date automatically. Older releases still carry them if you need one.
> **Updates.** The AppImage carries update information, so an AppImage manager (Gear Lever, AppImageLauncher and similar) can adopt it and update it in place — pulling only the changed blocks rather than re-downloading 85 MB. It reads a fixed `linux-latest` tag on GitHub, so the URL never moves between versions.
> **No Arch package.** There was a `triple-c-bin` `.pkg.tar.zst` attached to some releases, built by a maintainer-triggered workflow. It was never on the AUR, so installing it meant downloading a file and running `pacman -U` — no better than the AppImage — and being manual-only it reached 1 release in 28, which made the promise of it worse than not making it. The `PKGBUILD` and its workflow are preserved on the `hold/arch-packaging` branch if an AUR package is ever worth doing properly.
### Adding an AppImage to the app launcher
An AppImage is a single executable file and nothing else. It carries a `.desktop`
entry and icons *inside* itself, but nothing on your system ever reads them,
because nothing installed it — so it will not show up in your app launcher, and
running it from a file manager gives you a generic icon in the taskbar.
Put the AppImage somewhere stable first — `~/Apps` or `~/.local/bin`, not
`~/Downloads` — because the launcher entry points at wherever the file is:
```bash
mkdir -p ~/Apps
mv ~/Downloads/Triple-C_*_amd64.AppImage ~/Apps/
./scripts/install-appimage.sh ~/Apps/Triple-C_0.4.17_amd64.AppImage
```
That copies the bundled icons into `~/.local/share/icons/hicolor` and writes
`~/.local/share/applications/triple-c.desktop` pointing at the file you named.
No sudo, nothing outside your home directory, and the AppImage itself is never
copied or moved. To remove the entry again:
```bash
./scripts/install-appimage.sh --uninstall
```
The script rewrites the `Exec` line rather than reusing the bundled `.desktop`
verbatim: the bundled one says `Exec=triple-c`, which resolves only inside the
running AppImage's own mount, so a launcher entry copied straight out of the
bundle would appear in the menu and then fail to start anything.
Two follow-ups worth knowing:
- **Upgrading.** The entry names one specific file. If you replace the AppImage
with a newer version under a different filename, re-run the script against the
new one. Keeping a stable name (`~/Apps/Triple-C.AppImage`) avoids this.
- **The icon may not appear until you log out.** That is the desktop shell's
icon cache, not a failed install — see
[App Icon Missing After Installing (Linux)](#app-icon-missing-after-installing-linux).
## Prerequisites
### Docker
@@ -188,11 +128,8 @@ Anthropic-backend project uses that token without its own login. See
2. Claude prints an OAuth URL. Triple-C detects long URLs and shows a clickable toast at the top of the terminal — click **Open** to open it in your browser.
3. Complete the login in your browser. The token is saved and persists across container stops, starts and recreations. A **Reset** deletes it — see below.
> If the login hangs after the browser step, the callback could not reach the container. Either
> click **In container** on the toast instead of **Open** — the callback then never has to leave the
> container at all — or turn on the
> [Auth Bridge](#browser-logins-inside-the-container-auth-bridge) in the project's
> **Config → Runtime** section.
> If the login hangs after the browser step, the callback could not reach the container. Enable the
> [Auth Bridge](#browser-logins-inside-the-container-auth-bridge) for that project.
**AWS Bedrock:**
@@ -243,7 +180,7 @@ Anthropic-backend project uses that token without its own login. See
│ │ │ │ │
│ │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
├─────────────┴────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2 project(s) · 1 running · 2 terminal(s) Notes
│ 2 project(s) · 1 running · 2 terminal(s) Jump to Current ↓
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
@@ -268,8 +205,8 @@ Anthropic-backend project uses that token without its own login. See
- **Main area** — Shows the active tab: a Project Home view or an xterm.js terminal. With no tabs
open you get a welcome screen with Docker/image/project readiness checks.
- **StatusBar** — Counts of total projects, running containers and open terminal sessions; the
**🖱 Mouse captured — release** button while a program in the terminal is holding the mouse; the
**Notes** toggle; and the microphone button when speech-to-text is enabled.
**Jump to Current ↓** button when a terminal is scrolled up; and the microphone button when
speech-to-text is enabled.
---
@@ -288,7 +225,7 @@ buttons. Below that are six tabs:
| **Sessions** | Past Claude Code conversations stored on this project's config volume, each with a **Resume** button |
| **Automation** | The scheduled tasks running inside this container — see [Automation & Scheduled Tasks](#automation--scheduled-tasks) |
| **Config** | All per-project configuration — see [Project Configuration](#project-configuration) |
| **Files** | Browse, view and rename files inside the container, and move files between it and your own machine — see [Files](#files) |
| **Files** | Browse, download and upload files inside the container |
| **Browser** | Watch — and take over — the browser Claude is driving with Playwright, see [The Browser Tab](#the-browser-tab) |
### Sessions
@@ -411,7 +348,7 @@ it. The sidebar row carries only the two hover controls.
| **Force stop** | Project Home header | Starting / Stopping | Interrupts a transition that is stuck |
| **Open Claude Terminal** | Project Home header; sidebar hover control; `Ctrl+T` | Running | Opens a new Claude Code terminal tab |
| **Shell** | Project Home header | Running | Opens a bash login shell tab in the container (no Claude Code) |
| **Files** | Project Home header, and the **Files** tab | Running | Switches to the Files tab to browse, view and rename files inside the container, upload files into it and save one back out |
| **Files** | Project Home header, and the **Files** tab | Running | Switches to the Files tab to browse, download and upload files |
| **Config** | The **Config** tab | Always | Per-project configuration (most fields need the container stopped) |
| **Back up container** | **⋯** overflow menu | A container exists | Saves a `.tar.gz` archive of the container to a location you choose |
| **Reset container…** | **⋯** overflow menu | Stopped or Error | Destroys the container, snapshot image and both volumes, then recreates from the base image (wipes `~/.claude`) — asks first |
@@ -540,82 +477,21 @@ When enabled, the container is given the three things a VPN client needs to buil
the `NET_ADMIN` capability, the `/dev/net/tun` device, and the `net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark`
sysctl that WireGuard requires. This is **off by default**.
The `ip`, `wg` and `iptables` commands ship in the container image so there is something able to use
them. If your project's container was created from an older base image it will not have them, and
`wg` will simply not be found — **migrating the project onto the current base image** is what picks
them up. `sudo apt install iproute2 wireguard-tools iptables` works in the meantime, but lives in
the writable layer, so it is undone by a **Reset** and by a migration.
**This setting makes a tunnel possible; it does not make one.** Nothing is connected, no traffic is
redirected, and no tunnel is configured or started on your behalf. Enabling it and expecting the
container's traffic to start leaving through a VPN is the most common misreading of what it does —
configuring a tunnel and routing traffic into it remains yours to do.
To make that second half easier, enabling this also installs a **`pia-vpn` skill** into the
container's `~/.claude/skills/`, so Claude Code can bring up a Private Internet Access tunnel over
WireGuard for you — ask it to connect the VPN and it will. The skill carries the parts that are
easy to get wrong (see the DNS note below), and it is removed again when you turn the setting off.
It needs your PIA credentials in `~/pia-creds`, two lines, username then password. If you use a
different provider, ignore it and set up your own client; nothing else depends on it.
Like the VPN tooling above, the skill ships in the container image, so a project whose container
predates it will not get one by toggling the setting — **migrate the project** and it appears; the
migration pre-flight lists it among what you would gain.
With the setting **off**, a client such as PIA or OpenVPN installs and its daemon starts normally,
but the connection attempt **hangs until it times out** — a default container has no tun device to open
and no permission to add an interface or a route, and most clients report that as a generic timeout
rather than a permissions error.
Without it, a client such as PIA, WireGuard, OpenVPN or Tailscale installs and its daemon starts
normally, but the connection attempt **hangs until it times out** — a default container has no tun
device to open and no permission to add an interface or a route, and most clients report that as a
generic timeout rather than a permissions error.
Things worth knowing:
- Tailscale is the exception: in its `--tun=userspace-networking` mode it needs neither the
capability nor the device, so leave this off if that is all you want.
- `NET_ADMIN` applies to the container's **own** network namespace — it cannot touch the host's
interfaces. It is not nothing, though: within that namespace anything in the container can set
promiscuous mode and add arbitrary addresses, routes and firewall rules on the Docker bridge it
shares with your other containers, and it can flush firewall rules that sandbox mode relies on.
Grant it per project, to projects that need it.
- `NET_ADMIN` applies to the container's **own** network namespace. It confers no authority over
the host's interfaces or over any other container. It does mean anything running in the
container can reconfigure that namespace, which is why it is opt-in.
- The **Docker host's** kernel must have the `tun` module available. With Docker Desktop that is
the Linux VM, not your own machine. If it is missing, the container is created but fails to
**start**, with an error naming `/dev/net/tun` and pointing back at this setting.
the Linux VM, not your own machine. If it is missing, the container fails to create with an
error naming `/dev/net/tun` and pointing back at this setting.
- A VPN client's kill switch applies to everything in the container, Claude Code included. If the
tunnel drops, expect API calls to fail until it reconnects or the kill switch is turned off.
- **No tunnel survives a restart.** The network namespace is built fresh every time the container
starts, and there is no service manager inside to reconnect anything. Leftover state under `/run`
makes it *look* like the tunnel is still configured — that directory is in the container's
writable layer, so it is simply still there after a stop/start, and `docker commit` carries it
into the snapshot that a recreation is built from. Either way the interface and its routes are
gone and traffic goes out your real address again, with no error and nothing visibly different.
Re-establish it after every start, and check rather than assume.
- **A full tunnel breaks DNS unless the client is told to leave private ranges alone.** Your
resolver is whatever `/etc/resolv.conf` says, and if that address is outside the container's own
subnet then a default route of `0.0.0.0/0` — or a `0.0.0.0/1` plus `128.0.0.0/1` pair — captures
it and sends every lookup into a tunnel that cannot carry it. Under Docker Desktop it is
`192.168.65.7`, which is exactly that case; on a user-defined Docker network it is `127.0.0.11`,
which is loopback and unaffected. Check yours rather than assuming. The symptom when it bites is
total: Claude Code reports it cannot connect, because it cannot resolve `api.anthropic.com`.
Route `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` and `169.254.0.0/16` via the original
gateway — and give the tunnel a resolver it can actually reach, normally the VPN provider's own,
or you have a tunnel that leaks every DNS query outside itself. Also pin the VPN endpoint's own
address via the original gateway, or the tunnel's encrypted packets try to route through the
tunnel. Note that a health check which fetches an IP literal such as `1.1.1.1` passes cleanly
while DNS is broken — resolve a name instead.
- **Delete a client's key material when you tear a tunnel down.** Anything written under `/run` is
in the container's writable layer, and recreating or migrating the project runs `docker commit`
over it — so a WireGuard private key left there gets baked into the project's snapshot image and
copied forward from then on. This is not hypothetical; it has already happened here.
- **Strip the `DNS =` line from a provider's `.conf` before `wg-quick up`.** Every commercial
provider ships one, and `wg-quick` hands it to `resolvconf`, which is not installed — so it fails
at `resolvconf: command not found` and deletes the interface again. This happens before any
routing, so it takes **split tunnels down too**. Set the resolver another way instead, or drive
`wg` and `ip route` directly rather than going through `wg-quick`.
- **`wg-quick` full tunnels additionally need `xt_CONNMARK` from the host kernel.** WSL2 kernels
before 6.6 do not have it and a container cannot load one — on Windows, `wsl --update` moves you
to a current kernel, which does. Failing that, add the routes yourself with `ip route`, which
needs no firewall backend on any platform. Note this is the *second* hurdle: clear the `DNS =`
one above first, or you will not reach this.
> This setting can only be changed when the container is stopped. Capabilities and devices are
> fixed when a container is created, so toggling it recreates the container on the next start.
@@ -675,27 +551,18 @@ The **Claude Code settings** editor, also at the bottom of the Config tab, confi
| Setting | What It Does |
|---------|-------------|
| **TUI Mode** | **Automatic** lets Claude Code choose; **Classic** pins the main-screen renderer; **Fullscreen** pins the flicker-free alt-screen one |
| **Effort Level** | Reasoning depth: **Low**, **Medium**, **High**, **Extra high** |
| **Focus Mode** | Summarises tool *calls* to one line each, showing the last prompt and the final response. **Needs the fullscreen renderer** — set TUI Mode to Fullscreen or this does nothing |
| **Thinking Summaries** | Shows Claude's thinking as summaries rather than a collapsed stub |
| **Session Recap** | A one-line recap when you return to the terminal after a few minutes away. **On by default** — the switch is how you turn it off |
| **Auto-Scroll** | Follows new output to the bottom in fullscreen rendering. On by default |
| **TUI Mode** | Set to **Fullscreen** for flicker-free alt-screen rendering (uses `CLAUDE_CODE_NO_FLICKER=1`) |
| **Effort Level** | Controls reasoning depth: **Low** (fast, less thorough), **Medium**, **High** (deep reasoning) |
| **Focus Mode** | Collapses tool output to one-line summaries, showing only the prompt and final response |
| **Thinking Summaries** | Shows Claude's thinking process as summaries during responses |
| **Session Recap** | Provides context when returning to a session after being away |
| **Auto-Scroll Disabled** | Disables auto-scroll when in fullscreen TUI mode |
| **Env Scrub** | Strips credentials from subprocess environments for security |
| **Prompt Caching (1h)** | Requests a 1-hour prompt cache TTL instead of the default 5 minutes |
| **Prompt Caching (1h)** | Enables 1-hour prompt cache TTL instead of the default 5 minutes |
Each switch has three states on a project: **Global** (follow Settings), **On**, and **Off**. Off is a
real choice — it overrides a global On, which a project could not previously do.
Per-project settings override global defaults set in Settings. If all settings are at their defaults, no configuration is injected.
> These map to Claude Code environment variables and `~/.claude/settings.json` keys, and are applied
> when the container starts. Changing one stops and recreates the container.
>
> **Two caveats on an existing project.** Changing any of these recreates the container, and a
> recreation commits a new image layer — so flipping switches repeatedly costs disk. And
> **TUI Mode, Effort Level, Focus Mode and Session Recap cannot be returned to Global** until the
> project's base image is updated: those four are cleared by *removing* a key, and an older image's
> startup script ignores the instruction to remove it. Update the base image from the project's
> Overview tab first. The other switches work on any image.
> These settings map to Claude Code environment variables and `~/.claude/settings.json` entries. Changes require stopping and restarting the container to take effect.
### MCP Servers
@@ -861,19 +728,6 @@ web server they started on `localhost`. `claude login`, `aws sso login` and Conc
The **Auth Bridge** fixes this. It is **opt-in per project** and **off by default**.
### Where the switch is
Project Home → **Config****Runtime****Auth bridge**.
Unlike the rest of that tab, it is **not** greyed out while the container is running — it is a
host-side feature that recreates nothing, and the moment you want it is usually the moment a login
is already hanging in a running container. Switch it on, then retry the login.
Beside the switch is its live state: **Off**, **Watching** (on, nothing to bridge yet — normal,
there is only something to bridge while a login is waiting), **Bridging *n* ports**, **IPv4 only**,
or **Port conflict** with the port and the reason. A conflict means the host port was already taken
and the callback will not arrive; free the port, or use **In container** instead.
### What it does
- Every couple of seconds it looks inside the container for programs listening on the container's
@@ -1224,89 +1078,20 @@ Programs inside the container can copy text to your host clipboard. When a conta
You can paste images from your clipboard into the terminal (Ctrl+V / Cmd+V). The image is uploaded to the container as `/tmp/clipboard_<timestamp>.png` and the file path is injected into the terminal input so Claude Code can reference it. A toast notification confirms the upload.
### Scrolling
### Jump to Current
Scrolling is the terminal's own: scroll up to read back and it holds position, scroll to the
bottom and it follows new output again. There is no follow toggle — an earlier **Following /
Paused** control and a **Jump to Current** button were retired once they stopped doing anything
useful, because Claude Code draws its interface on the alternate screen, which has no scrollback
for them to act on.
### When the mouse stops working
Some programs ask the terminal for the mouse, so that clicks and drags go to the program instead
of selecting text. If one of them exits without handing the mouse back, the terminal looks stuck:
you cannot select text, and stray characters can appear as you move the pointer.
A **🖱 Mouse captured — release** button appears in the status bar whenever a program holds the
mouse. Click it, or press **Ctrl+Shift+X**, to take the mouse back. Nothing is sent into the
container — only the terminal's own state is reset.
Note that holding the mouse is normal for programs like `htop`, `vim` and Claude Code itself, so
the button is showing most of the time you are in one. It is there for when a program exits
without handing the mouse back and the terminal is left stuck; releasing while a program is still
running just takes the mouse away from that program.
To select text *without* taking the mouse back, hold **Shift** while dragging — or **Option** on
macOS.
When you scroll up in the terminal to review previous output, a **Jump to Current** button appears in the bottom-right corner. Click it to scroll back to the latest output.
### Files
The **Files** tab of Project Home browses inside a running container, and moves files between it
and your own machine. You can:
The **Files** tab of Project Home browses inside a running container. You can:
- **Browse** the container filesystem, starting at `/workspace`, with breadcrumb navigation.
Double-click a folder to open it, or the `..` row to go up; the arrow keys, Home and End move
between rows and Enter opens the selected one
- **View** a file — double-click it, or press Enter. Text files and images render in a read-only
viewer
- **Rename** an entry, from the row's Rename button or by pressing `F2`. A rename never moves a
file between folders
- **New folder** in the directory on screen
- **Upload…**, from the toolbar, to copy files from your machine into the directory on screen
- **Save to host…**, from a file's own row, to write that one file out to your machine
- **Browse** the container filesystem, starting at `/workspace`, with breadcrumb navigation
- **Download** any file to your host machine via the **Download** button on each file entry
- **Upload file** from your host into the current container directory
- **Refresh** the directory listing at any time
The listing shows file names, sizes, and modification dates, and marks symbolic links.
#### Getting files in and out
**Upload…** opens a file dialog on your machine, and whatever you choose is copied into the
directory currently on screen. Uploaded files arrive owned by you inside the container, not by
root. You can pick several files in one dialog; each is handled on its own, so if a folder or an
over-sized file is among them, it is named in the message and the rest still arrive. Uploads are
capped at **256 MB per file** — for anything larger, mount the folder into the project instead and
skip the copying altogether.
**Save to host…** does the reverse, for one file: a save dialog opens, you choose where the file
goes, and it is written there. The button sits on the file's own row, and only on files. For a
whole directory, use **Back up container** in Project Home's **⋯** overflow menu, which writes a
`.tar.gz` of the workspace and the container's `~/.claude` config to a location you choose — that
is still the right tool for a tree.
Dragging a file from your desktop and **dropping it onto the Terminal tab** works too, and is often
the quickest way in when you are already typing: the file is copied into the container and its path
is typed into the terminal for you, ready to hand to Claude Code. (The whole terminal pane is a
drop target, including its *Following* toggle.) The Files pane itself is not a drop target.
Both dialogs are opened by Triple-C itself rather than by the page you are looking at. The page
cannot name a place on your machine — it can only ask for a dialog — and nothing is read or written
until you pick somewhere in it. Closing a dialog without choosing is not an error: nothing happens,
and nothing is said about it.
Every one of these routes refuses a location whose path passes through a hidden *folder* — anything
with a component beginning with `.`, such as `~/.ssh`, `~/.cache` or `~/.local/share` — or a system
location, and it checks both the path as written and where it points after any symbolic links. That
rule catches more than it strictly needs to, so now and then it will refuse a place you genuinely
meant, `~/.config` among them. The refusal is a plain sentence saying so; choose a visible location
such as `~/Documents` or `~/Downloads`.
The *file's own name* is a different matter, and dotfiles are fine: `.env`, `.gitignore` and the
rest save normally, since you chose the name in the save dialog yourself. Only the folders on the
way are judged.
If you already keep the project in a folder mounted into the container, the simplest answer is
usually none of the above: edit the file on your host and it is already inside.
The listing shows file names, sizes, and modification dates.
### Terminal Rendering
@@ -1352,14 +1137,10 @@ change. Remember that a headless run cannot answer a permission prompt, so in an
**Bypass** a task may stop early when Claude Code asks for approval; the run log records the mode
that was used.
### Creating Tasks
### Creating Tasks (In the Container)
The quickest route is the **New task** button on a project's **Automation** tab, which gives you a
form for the name, the schedule and the prompt.
You can also create tasks from a terminal in the container — type the commands yourself in a
**Shell** session, or just ask Claude to do it. That is the better route when you want Claude to
work out the schedule or the prompt for you, and it is what the rest of this section covers.
There is no "add task" form in the app. Create tasks from a terminal in the container — either type
the commands yourself in a **Shell** session, or just ask Claude to do it.
### Create a Recurring Task
@@ -1451,19 +1232,9 @@ triple-c-scheduler add --name "test" --schedule "0 */6 * * *" --prompt "Run test
| **Ctrl+Shift+V** | Paste |
| **Ctrl+V** | Paste an image from the clipboard into the container |
| **Ctrl+Shift+M** | Toggle speech-to-text recording (when enabled) |
| **Shift+Enter** | Insert a newline in Claude Code's prompt instead of submitting it |
| **Alt+Enter** | The same thing, and it has always worked — it was simply never written down |
Everything else goes straight through to the program running in the container.
> **Shift+Enter** sends `ESC` + `CR`, the same bytes Claude Code's own `/terminal-setup` installs
> for VS Code, Cursor, Alacritty and Zed — so there is nothing to run and no tip to follow. It is
> bound in **Claude** tabs only: in a **bash** tab that sequence means nothing to readline, and
> Shift+Enter there submits the line as it always has.
>
> In the [Web Terminal](#web-terminal-remote-access) the same chord works, and there is an **↵+**
> key beside **Enter** on the mobile key row for devices with no Shift.
---
## What's Inside the Container
@@ -1480,7 +1251,6 @@ The sandbox container (Ubuntu 24.04) comes pre-installed with:
| ruff | Latest | Python linter/formatter |
| Rust | Stable | Rust development (via rustup) |
| Docker CLI | Latest | Container management (when spawning is enabled) |
| iproute2, WireGuard tools, iptables | Latest | Building a tunnel (when VPN Support is enabled) |
| git | Latest | Version control |
| GitHub CLI (gh) | Latest | GitHub integration |
| AWS CLI | v2 | AWS services and Bedrock |
@@ -1570,18 +1340,8 @@ your machine (anything that isn't `http`/`https`).
You opened the URL, signed in successfully, and the CLI in the terminal is still waiting. The
callback from your browser is landing on your host's `localhost` while the CLI is listening on the
*container's*.
Two ways out, in order of least effort:
1. Dismiss and re-trigger the login, then click **In container** on the toast rather than **Open**.
The page opens in a browser *inside* the container, so the callback never has to cross to the
host. This needs no auth bridge — only a running container with Playwright installed (Project
Home → **Browser**). For a recognised Anthropic sign-in link this is already the default button.
2. Turn on the [Auth Bridge](#browser-logins-inside-the-container-auth-bridge) — Project Home →
**Config****Runtime****Auth bridge** — and try again. It can be switched on while the
container is running. Check the indicator beside it: **Port conflict** means the host port was
already taken and the callback still will not arrive.
*container's*. Enable the
[Auth Bridge](#browser-logins-inside-the-container-auth-bridge) for that project and try again.
For Claude specifically, the simpler answer is usually
[Shared Claude Authentication](#shared-claude-authentication), which finishes on an Anthropic-hosted
@@ -1618,9 +1378,3 @@ cp ~/.claude.json ~/.claude.json.bak && jq 'with_entries(select(.key | startswit
```
This backs up your config and removes the corrupted marketplace entries. Claude Code will re-download them cleanly on the next startup.
### App Icon Missing After Installing (Linux)
If Triple-C's icon shows as generic or blank right after installing — in the app menu, taskbar, and window titlebar alike — **log out and back in.**
Desktop shells (GNOME Shell, KDE Plasma) cache the list of installed apps and their resolved icons in memory when the shell starts, for performance. A freshly installed package's icon files land on disk correctly and its install hooks do rebuild the on-disk icon cache, but an already-running shell doesn't always notice — on X11 there used to be a way to soft-restart just the shell (GNOME's Alt+F2 → `r`) to force a reload, but under Wayland the shell *is* the compositor, so restarting it means ending the session. Logging out and back in starts a fresh shell that reads the current on-disk state, which picks the icon up.
+10 -56
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ This file is the architectural tour: what each subsystem is and why it works the
- [Permission Modes](#permission-modes)
- [Containers](#containers) — lifecycle, base-image migration, mounts, CA certificates, sibling containers
- [Models and Authentication](#models-and-authentication) — backends, model aliases, gateway, shared token
- [Bridges to the Host](#bridges-to-the-host) — URL relay, auth bridge, browser view, host file transfers
- [Bridges to the Host](#bridges-to-the-host) — URL relay, auth bridge, browser view
- [Inside a Project](#inside-a-project) — capability tiles, Mission Control, web terminal, speech-to-text
- [Key Files](#key-files) · [CSS / Styling Notes](#css--styling-notes) · [Container Image](#container-image)
@@ -76,21 +76,8 @@ Implemented in `hooks/useKeyboardShortcuts.ts` (document-level, capture phase):
`Ctrl+W` is deliberately **not** bound: it is readline's `kill-word`, used constantly in the
terminal this app is built around. Plain `Ctrl+←/→` is readline's word-wise cursor motion, which is
why moving a tab takes Shift as well.
Terminal-scoped keys are handled in `TerminalView.tsx`:
| Shortcut | Action |
|---|---|
| `Ctrl+Shift+C` / `Ctrl+Shift+Alt+C` | Copy the selection, trimmed / exactly as-is |
| `Ctrl+Shift+M` | Toggle speech-to-text recording |
| `Shift+Enter` | Insert a newline in Claude Code's prompt instead of submitting |
| `Alt+Enter` | The same thing — xterm.js already ESC-prefixes on Alt, so this has always worked |
`Shift+Enter` sends `ESC` + `CR`, which is what Claude Code's own `/terminal-setup` installs for
VS Code, Cursor, Alacritty and Zed. It is bound in Claude sessions only: in a bash tab those bytes
are unbound in readline. The web terminal does the same, and adds an `↵+` key beside Enter for
devices with no Shift.
why moving a tab takes Shift as well. Terminal-scoped keys (`Ctrl+Shift+C`, `Ctrl+Shift+Alt+C`,
`Ctrl+Shift+M`) are handled in `TerminalView.tsx`.
### Project Home
@@ -105,7 +92,7 @@ configuration. Per-project configuration lives in the Config tab rather than in
| **Sessions** | Past Claude Code conversations read from the config volume, with **Resume** |
| **Automation** | The container's `triple-c-scheduler` tasks — create, edit, enable/disable, run now, read logs, remove, and completion notifications |
| **Config** | Workspace (name, folders), Model (backend), Access (SSH, git, env vars, port mappings), Runtime (permission mode, sandbox, Docker access, Mission Control, instructions, Claude Code settings) |
| **Files** | Browse, view, rename and create folders inside the container, upload host files into the directory on screen, and save one file back out to the host — see [Host File Transfers](#host-file-transfers). A whole tree still comes out through **Back up container** |
| **Files** | Browse, download and upload files inside the container |
| **Browser** | Watch and take over the Playwright browser inside the container — see [Browser View](#browser-view) |
Container start/stop progress is reported inline (on the sidebar row and in the Project Home
@@ -442,39 +429,6 @@ per project.
binds, but never `@playwright/cli`, which is the viewer. It is what binds sessions automatically
once Playwright is present — not a setup route.
### Host File Transfers
Four routes move files across the boundary: **Upload…** and the per-row **Save to host…** in the
Files tab, a file dropped onto the Terminal tab, and **Back up container**. All four share one path
policy in `commands/file_commands.rs`.
- **The OS dialogs are opened by Rust, not by the webview.** `upload_files_to_container` and
`download_container_file` drive `tauri-plugin-dialog` themselves and take nothing but a project
id and a container-side path; `FilesTab.tsx` imports no dialog plugin and `useFileManager`'s
`uploadFiles` takes no argument at all. The web UI can ask for a dialog, and that is the whole of
its influence over where a file comes from or goes — it cannot name a host path as an *input*.
This is a boundary rather than a convention: a dialog the page itself opens is only as trustworthy
as the page. Be precise about the limit, though — host paths still travel *outward* in error text,
canonical ones included, so this closes the inbound direction and not both.
- **The dialog's pre-filled name is sanitized, because a container authored it.** On Windows the
save dialog parses its name box as a path, and a container can name a file
`..\..\Users\you\…\Word\STARTUP\x.dotm` — one POSIX segment, so nothing upstream objects.
`suggested_save_name` replaces every separator and every character NTFS refuses, so the string
cannot be a path on any platform this ships to.
- **One policy for every host path.** A source or destination whose path passes through a hidden
folder (`~/.ssh`, `~/.cache`, `~/.local/share`, anything dot-prefixed) or a system location is
refused, and the check is applied both to the path as written and to what it resolves to after
symlinks. It over-catches deliberately, so it will occasionally refuse somewhere a person
genuinely meant — `~/.config`, say — and the refusal is a sentence naming the folder that tripped
it, not an errno.
- **Uploads are capped at 256 MB per file**; past that the answer is a mount, not a copy. One
dialog's selection is handled file by file, so a folder or an oversized file among the selection
is reported by name and does not stop the others. Uploaded files land owned by the container user,
not root. A cancelled dialog is silent — `Ok(None)`, not an error.
- **`download_container_file` is one file and files only** — no button on a folder row. A directory
is what `download_container_backup` is for. There is no drop target on the Files pane; the
Terminal tab keeps the one it has.
## Inside a Project
### Container Introspection (Capability Tiles)
@@ -528,7 +482,7 @@ Triple-C includes optional speech-to-text powered by [Faster Whisper](https://gi
| `app/src/components/layout/TopBar.tsx` | Hosts MainTabs + Docker/Image status indicators + Help |
| `app/src/components/layout/MainTabs.tsx` | The single main-area tab strip (Project Home + terminal tabs), pointer-event drag reordering |
| `app/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx` | Responsive sidebar (25% width, min 224px, max 320px), collapsible to an icon rail |
| `app/src/components/layout/StatusBar.tsx` | Project/terminal counts, Notes toggle, STT mic |
| `app/src/components/layout/StatusBar.tsx` | Project/terminal counts, Jump to Current, STT mic |
| `app/src/components/projects/ProjectRow.tsx` | Select-only sidebar row; opens Project Home, with hover start/stop and terminal controls |
| `app/src/components/projects/ProjectList.tsx` | Project list in sidebar |
| `app/src/components/projects/PermissionModeControl.tsx` | Plan / Default / Accept Edits / Bypass segmented control |
@@ -546,12 +500,12 @@ Triple-C includes optional speech-to-text powered by [Faster Whisper](https://gi
| `app/src/components/projects/home/AutomationTab.tsx` | Scheduler tasks: create, toggle, run now, logs, remove, notifications |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/TaskEditorModal.tsx` | Create/edit a scheduled task; `taskValidation.ts` holds the cron and schedule rules |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/ConfigTab.tsx` | Config sections (Workspace, Model, Access, Runtime) |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/FilesTab.tsx` | Container-side file browser (navigate, view, rename, new folder) plus **Upload…** and per-row **Save to host…**; imports no dialog plugin — the dialogs are Rust's |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/FilesTab.tsx` | File browser (browse, download, upload) |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/BrowserTab.tsx` | Browser view pane: detect, install, watch, take over, pop out |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/OpenPageDialog.tsx` | Open a URL in the container's browser at a chosen viewport |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/ContainerMigrationBanner.tsx` | Base-image staleness banner, migration progress, resume/rollback |
| `app/src/components/projects/home/CapabilityTiles.tsx` | Read-only skills/agents/commands/hooks/plugins/MCP counts |
| `app/src/components/projects/ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor.tsx` | Claude Code CLI settings `tui`, `effortLevel`, `viewMode`, `autoScrollEnabled`, `showThinkingSummaries`, `awaySummaryEnabled`, plus the env-var flags (scrub, 1h caching). Every managed key is re-emitted on each start, `null` meaning "delete". |
| `app/src/components/projects/ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor.tsx` | Claude Code CLI settings (TUI mode, effort, focus, caching) |
### Frontend — settings, terminal and hooks
@@ -569,7 +523,7 @@ Triple-C includes optional speech-to-text powered by [Faster Whisper](https://gi
| `app/src/hooks/useTerminal.ts` | Terminal session management (claude and bash modes) |
| `app/src/hooks/useProjectActions.ts` | Start/stop/reset/backup and terminal-opening helpers |
| `app/src/hooks/useContainerMigration.ts` | Staleness polling, migration run, resume and rollback |
| `app/src/hooks/useFileManager.ts` | File browser operations (list, navigate, rename, mkdir) and the host transfers (upload, save one file out); never handles a host path |
| `app/src/hooks/useFileManager.ts` | File manager operations (list, download, upload) |
| `app/src/hooks/useClaudeAuth.ts` | Shared-token status and acquisition |
| `app/src/hooks/useSTT.ts` | Speech-to-text recording, transcription, and container management |
| `app/src/lib/urlRelay.ts` | Host-side relay validation: OSC 7777 parsing, http/https allowlist, rate limiting |
@@ -580,7 +534,7 @@ Triple-C includes optional speech-to-text powered by [Faster Whisper](https://gi
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `app/src-tauri/src/docker/container.rs` | Container creation, mounts, env vars, labels, recreation checks, `remove_project_volumes` |
| `app/src-tauri/src/docker/exec.rs` | `create_attached_exec()` — the single attached-exec path; one-shot execs and single-file tar building |
| `app/src-tauri/src/docker/exec.rs` | `create_attached_exec()` — the single attached-exec path; file upload/download via tar |
| `app/src-tauri/src/docker/image.rs` | Image building/pulling |
| `app/src-tauri/src/docker/migration.rs` | Base-image migration: manifest capture, delta computation, crash-recovery state machine |
| `app/src-tauri/src/docker/ca_certs.rs` | CA certificate discovery, `.crt` renaming, fingerprinting |
@@ -594,7 +548,7 @@ Triple-C includes optional speech-to-text powered by [Faster Whisper](https://gi
| `app/src-tauri/src/commands/inspect_commands.rs` | Read-only container views: sessions, capabilities, scheduler tasks |
| `app/src-tauri/src/commands/auth_token_commands.rs` | `claude setup-token` flow, redaction, keychain storage |
| `app/src-tauri/src/commands/auth_bridge_commands.rs` | Auth bridge enable/status commands |
| `app/src-tauri/src/commands/file_commands.rs` | Container-side file commands (list, read, rename, mkdir), the host transfers `upload_files_to_container` and `download_container_file` — each opening its own OS dialog here in Rust — plus `download_container_backup`, and the hidden-folder path policy all of them share |
| `app/src-tauri/src/commands/file_commands.rs` | File manager Tauri commands (list, download, upload) |
| `app/src-tauri/src/commands/stt_commands.rs` | STT start/stop/transcribe Tauri commands |
| `app/src-tauri/src/commands/web_terminal_commands.rs` | Web terminal start/stop/status Tauri commands |
| `app/src-tauri/src/models/project.rs` | Project struct (backend, `PermissionMode`, Docker access, Claude Code settings, Mission Control, auth bridge, browser view, CA path, shared-token opt-out) |
+8 -23
View File
@@ -26,39 +26,24 @@ scheduler, and the fleet view across many projects.
## Current coverage (v0.3.0)
Triple-C sets exactly six `settings.json` keys, plus a sandbox block:
Triple-C sets exactly five `settings.json` keys, plus a sandbox block:
| Key | Surfaced as |
|---|---|
| `tui` | TUI mode select — unset (Claude Code chooses), `default` (classic renderer), `fullscreen` (flicker-free alt-screen). Three distinct states, not two. |
| `effortLevel` | Effort level select (`low`/`medium`/`high`/`xhigh`) |
| `viewMode` | Focus mode toggle, written as `"focus"`. Unset means the user's own `verbose` setting and sticky `/focus` choice still apply. |
| `autoScrollEnabled` | Auto-scroll toggle. Claude Code's default is `true`, so it is the *off* state that writes `false`. |
| `showThinkingSummaries` | Thinking summaries toggle (Claude Code default `false`) |
| `awaySummaryEnabled` | Session recap toggle. Claude Code's recap is **on** by default, so again it is the off state that writes `false`. |
| `tui` | TUI Mode select (`fullscreen`) |
| `effort` | Effort Level select (`low`/`medium`/`high`) |
| `autoScrollEnabled` | Auto-Scroll Disabled toggle |
| `focusMode` | Focus Mode toggle |
| `showThinkingSummaries` | Thinking Summaries toggle |
| `sandbox.*` | Sandbox toggle (`enabled`, `enableWeakerNestedSandbox`, `allowUnsandboxedCommands`) |
Every one of those keys is emitted on **every** start, with a JSON `null` standing for
"delete this key". `~/.claude/settings.json` sits on the config volume and the entrypoint
merges into it, so a key merely omitted when its control goes off left the previous
on-value in place forever.
Plus four env feature flags — `CLAUDE_CODE_NO_FLICKER`, `CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY`,
`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB`, `ENABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_1H` — and arbitrary user-set
`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vars via the Env Vars modal. The four are written on every container
create *including* their off value, because `docker commit` bakes a container's env into
the snapshot image: a value written once would otherwise ride that snapshot into every
future container. That also makes them Triple-C's to own, so all four are reserved names
— hand-setting one in the Env Vars modal is skipped with a warning, the same as any other
`triple-c.*`-managed variable. `CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY` is what actually enforces
the recap choice — it takes precedence over `awaySummaryEnabled` *and* over the
in-container `/config` toggle, so turning the control off sends `0` while leaving it on
sends an empty value rather than `1`: Triple-C's default must not overrule a `/config`
choice it never asked about.
`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vars via the Env Vars modal.
Also covered: per-project auth backends (Anthropic OAuth, Bedrock incl. SSO refresh,
Ollama, OpenAI-compatible), user-level `CLAUDE.md` composition, `claude update` on every
container start *and* before every Claude session launches, terminal ergonomics (OAuth URL detection, OSC 52 clipboard, image paste,
container start, terminal ergonomics (OAuth URL detection, OSC 52 clipboard, image paste,
file drag-drop, STT), the web terminal, and workspace backup.
---
+13 -15
View File
@@ -62,13 +62,10 @@ Tauri uses a Rust backend paired with a web-based frontend rendered by the OS-na
Implementation gotchas for the terminal view and its global controls (merged in PR #7, `terminal-layout-statusbar`):
- **xterm padding lives on a wrapper, never the host.** FitAddon measures the same element that `term.open()` mounts into, so any padding on that host element makes the grid overhang and clip its rightmost column / bottom row. Padding must live on a **wrapper `div`**; the xterm host fills it with no padding of its own. Do not reintroduce padding on the host element in `TerminalView.tsx`.
- **The STT mic lives in the global `StatusBar`, not a per-terminal overlay.** There is a single `useSTT` instance in `App.tsx` bound to the active session. `Ctrl+Shift+M` routes through the Zustand store (`sttToggle`).
- **STT mic and "Jump to Current" live in the global `StatusBar`, not per-terminal overlays.** There is a single `useSTT` instance in `App.tsx` bound to the active session. `Ctrl+Shift+M` routes through the Zustand store (`sttToggle`).
- **Recording is pinned to where it started.** The STT transcript targets `recordingSessionIdRef` (the session recording began in), **not** the live active session — switching tabs mid-recording must not misroute the transcript.
- **Scrolling is left to xterm, and the "Following" / "Jump to Current" controls that used to drive it are gone.** They were built for the normal buffer. Claude Code draws on the *alternate* screen, which has no scrollback, so in a Claude tab `viewportY` always equalled `baseY`, `isAtBottom` was permanently true and neither control could ever do anything — which is what made them look broken. **They did still work in `bash` tabs**, which run `bash -l` on the normal buffer; removing them is a real behaviour change there, and the justification is that xterm's native follow already covers it, not that nothing was lost. The manual `scrollToBottom()` on every write went with them — it fought that native behaviour, which follows the tail while the viewport is at the bottom and holds position while you read further up. `scrollToBottom()` remains only on activate and after a refit, and **both sample `viewportY >= baseY` before the `fit()`** so they re-anchor only a viewport that was already on the tail: the ResizeObserver fires for the Notes dock, the sidebar drag and any window resize, none of which are a reason to yank a reader to the bottom.
- **A program that grabs the mouse and dies must be escapable without closing the tab.** A TUI sets DECSET `?1000`/`?1002`/`?1003` and, if it exits without resetting them, xterm keeps routing clicks, drags and (under `?1003`) every pointer *move* to the PTY — text selection dies and escape bytes flood the prompt. `TerminalView` reconciles a badge against `term.modes.mouseTrackingMode` **in the `term.write()` callback**: the mode only changes because the container printed a sequence, so one check per write catches every transition with no polling. Releasing writes the resets through `term.write`, **never `sendInput`** — the reset belongs to xterm's parser and must not reach the container, or a still-live TUI would simply re-grab the mouse on its next repaint. Bound to the control and to `Ctrl+Shift+X`, because the failure being recovered from is the pointer not working.
- **The release control lives in the `StatusBar`, not over the terminal.** Mouse tracking is the *normal* steady state of every mouse-driven TUI — htop, vim, lazygit and Claude Code all set `?1000`/`?1002` — so a badge painted at `absolute top-2 right-4 z-50` would be on screen for the entire life of those programs and would swallow clicks aimed at that program's own top-right corner, silently killing its mouse with no undo. The active `TerminalView` publishes `terminalMouseCaptured` and `releaseActiveMouse` through the store instead, the same way `terminalHasSelection` and `sttToggle` already do.
- **`macOptionClickForcesSelection: true` is set, and without it macOS has no force-select at all.** `SelectionService.shouldForceSelection` is `isMac ? altKey && macOptionClickForcesSelection : shiftKey`, and the option defaults to `false` — so the "hold Shift to select while a program holds the mouse" escape hatch is Shift everywhere else and **Option** on macOS, and existed on macOS only once this was turned on.
- **Set store function values via object-merge, not the updater form** — `set({ fn: value })`, not `set(state => ...)` — when publishing action callbacks (like `sttToggle`) into the Zustand store.
- **"Jump to Current" state is written only by the active terminal.** The active `TerminalView` surfaces `terminalAtBottom` and `scrollActiveToBottom` through the store; only the active terminal writes them, and they are cleared on its unmount.
- **Set store function values via object-merge, not the updater form** — `set({ fn: value })`, not `set(state => ...)` — when publishing action callbacks (like `scrollActiveToBottom`) into the Zustand store.
### bollard (Docker API)
@@ -415,12 +412,13 @@ triple-c/
├── .gitea/
│ └── workflows/
│ ├── build-app.yml # Build Tauri app (Linux/macOS/Windows); mirrors releases to GitHub inline
│ ├── build-app-preview.yml # Preview builds
│ ├── build.yml # Build container image (multi-arch)
│ ├── build-stt.yml # Build the STT image
│ ├── backfill-releases.yml # Bulk copy releases to GitHub
│ ├── cleanup-releases.yml # Prune old releases
│ ├── build-app.yml # Build Tauri app (Linux/macOS/Windows)
│ ├── build-app-preview.yml # Preview builds
│ ├── build.yml # Build container image (multi-arch)
│ ├── build-stt.yml # Build the STT image
│ ├── sync-release.yml # Mirror releases to GitHub
│ ├── backfill-releases.yml # Bulk copy releases to GitHub
│ └── cleanup-releases.yml # Prune old releases
└── app/ # Tauri v2 desktop application
├── package.json # React, xterm.js, zustand, tailwindcss
@@ -438,7 +436,7 @@ triple-c/
│ │ ├── useClaudeAuth.ts # Shared token status + acquisition
│ │ ├── useContainerProgress.ts # container-progress events → inline progress
│ │ ├── useDocker.ts # Docker status, image build/pull
│ │ ├── useFileManager.ts # File browser operations + host transfers
│ │ ├── useFileManager.ts # File browser operations
│ │ ├── useInstallHelper.ts # Guided Docker installation
│ │ ├── useKeyboardShortcuts.ts # Ctrl+T / Ctrl+Shift+W / Ctrl+Tab / Ctrl+1..9
│ │ ├── useProjectActions.ts # Start/stop/reset/backup, open terminals
@@ -466,7 +464,7 @@ triple-c/
│ │ │ ├── SessionsTab.tsx # Past Claude sessions + Resume
│ │ │ ├── AutomationTab.tsx # Scheduler tasks + notifications
│ │ │ ├── ConfigTab.tsx # Config section host
│ │ │ ├── FilesTab.tsx # In-container file browser, upload / save to host
│ │ │ ├── FilesTab.tsx # In-container file browser
│ │ │ ├── CapabilityTiles.tsx # Read-only capability counts
│ │ │ ├── format.ts # Age / size / uptime formatting
│ │ │ └── config/ # WorkspaceSection, ModelSection,
@@ -506,7 +504,7 @@ triple-c/
│ ├── auth_token_commands.rs # claude setup-token flow, redaction, keychain
│ ├── aws_commands.rs # AWS profile/region discovery
│ ├── docker_commands.rs # Docker status, image ops
│ ├── file_commands.rs # File browser + host transfers (Rust-opened dialogs)
│ ├── file_commands.rs # File browser (list/download/upload)
│ ├── help_commands.rs # Serves HOW-TO-USE.md to the Help dialog
│ ├── inspect_commands.rs # Sessions, capabilities, scheduler tasks
│ ├── install_helper_commands.rs # Guided Docker installation
+10
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
"@tauri-apps/api": "^2",
"@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog": "^2.7.0",
"@tauri-apps/plugin-opener": "^2.5.3",
"@tauri-apps/plugin-store": "^2",
"@xterm/addon-fit": "^0.10",
"@xterm/addon-web-links": "^0.12.0",
"@xterm/addon-webgl": "^0.18",
@@ -2000,6 +2001,15 @@
"@tauri-apps/api": "^2.8.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@tauri-apps/plugin-store": {
"version": "2.4.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@tauri-apps/plugin-store/-/plugin-store-2.4.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-0ClHS50Oq9HEvLPhNzTNFxbWVOqoAp3dRvtewQBeqfIQ0z5m3JRnOISIn2ZVPCrQC0MyGyhTS9DWhHjpigQE7A==",
"license": "MIT OR Apache-2.0",
"dependencies": {
"@tauri-apps/api": "^2.8.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@testing-library/dom": {
"version": "10.4.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@testing-library/dom/-/dom-10.4.1.tgz",
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
"preview": "vite preview",
"tauri": "tauri",
"test": "vitest run",
"test:watch": "vitest",
"hooks": "git -C .. config core.hooksPath .githooks && echo \"pre-commit secret scan enabled\""
"test:watch": "vitest"
},
"dependencies": {
"@tauri-apps/api": "^2",
"@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog": "^2.7.0",
"@tauri-apps/plugin-opener": "^2.5.3",
"@tauri-apps/plugin-store": "^2",
"@xterm/addon-fit": "^0.10",
"@xterm/addon-web-links": "^0.12.0",
"@xterm/addon-webgl": "^0.18",
+22 -149
View File
@@ -8,41 +8,6 @@ version = "2.0.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "320119579fcad9c21884f5c4861d16174d0e06250625266f50fe6898340abefa"
[[package]]
name = "aead"
version = "0.5.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d122413f284cf2d62fb1b7db97e02edb8cda96d769b16e443a4f6195e35662b0"
dependencies = [
"crypto-common",
"generic-array",
]
[[package]]
name = "aes"
version = "0.8.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b169f7a6d4742236a0a00c541b845991d0ac43e546831af1249753ab4c3aa3a0"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"cipher",
"cpufeatures",
]
[[package]]
name = "aes-gcm"
version = "0.10.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "831010a0f742e1209b3bcea8fab6a8e149051ba6099432c8cb2cc117dec3ead1"
dependencies = [
"aead",
"aes",
"cipher",
"ctr",
"ghash",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "aho-corasick"
version = "1.1.4"
@@ -82,18 +47,6 @@ version = "1.0.102"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7f202df86484c868dbad7eaa557ef785d5c66295e41b460ef922eca0723b842c"
[[package]]
name = "argon2"
version = "0.5.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3c3610892ee6e0cbce8ae2700349fcf8f98adb0dbfbee85aec3c9179d29cc072"
dependencies = [
"base64ct",
"blake2",
"cpufeatures",
"password-hash",
]
[[package]]
name = "async-broadcast"
version = "0.7.2"
@@ -327,12 +280,6 @@ version = "0.22.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6"
[[package]]
name = "base64ct"
version = "1.8.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2af50177e190e07a26ab74f8b1efbfe2ef87da2116221318cb1c2e82baf7de06"
[[package]]
name = "bit-set"
version = "0.8.0"
@@ -363,15 +310,6 @@ dependencies = [
"serde_core",
]
[[package]]
name = "blake2"
version = "0.10.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "46502ad458c9a52b69d4d4d32775c788b7a1b85e8bc9d482d92250fc0e3f8efe"
dependencies = [
"digest",
]
[[package]]
name = "block-buffer"
version = "0.10.4"
@@ -631,16 +569,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-link 0.2.1",
]
[[package]]
name = "cipher"
version = "0.4.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "773f3b9af64447d2ce9850330c473515014aa235e6a783b02db81ff39e4a3dad"
dependencies = [
"crypto-common",
"inout",
]
[[package]]
name = "combine"
version = "4.6.7"
@@ -766,7 +694,6 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "78c8292055d1c1df0cce5d180393dc8cce0abec0a7102adb6c7b1eef6016d60a"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"typenum",
]
@@ -826,15 +753,6 @@ version = "0.0.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "52560adf09603e58c9a7ee1fe1dcb95a16927b17c127f0ac02d6e768a0e25bc1"
[[package]]
name = "ctr"
version = "0.9.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0369ee1ad671834580515889b80f2ea915f23b8be8d0daa4bbaf2ac5c7590835"
dependencies = [
"cipher",
]
[[package]]
name = "darling"
version = "0.20.11"
@@ -1005,7 +923,6 @@ checksum = "9ed9a281f7bc9b7576e61468ba615a66a5c8cfdff42420a70aa82701a3b1e292"
dependencies = [
"block-buffer",
"crypto-common",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1218,7 +1135,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
dependencies = [
"libc",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
[[package]]
@@ -1633,16 +1550,6 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ghash"
version = "0.5.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f0d8a4362ccb29cb0b265253fb0a2728f592895ee6854fd9bc13f2ffda266ff1"
dependencies = [
"opaque-debug",
"polyval",
]
[[package]]
name = "gio"
version = "0.18.4"
@@ -2207,15 +2114,6 @@ dependencies = [
"cfb",
]
[[package]]
name = "inout"
version = "0.1.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "879f10e63c20629ecabbb64a8010319738c66a5cd0c29b02d63d272b03751d01"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
]
[[package]]
name = "ipnet"
version = "2.11.0"
@@ -2933,12 +2831,6 @@ version = "1.21.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "42f5e15c9953c5e4ccceeb2e7382a716482c34515315f7b03532b8b4e8393d2d"
[[package]]
name = "opaque-debug"
version = "0.3.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"
[[package]]
name = "open"
version = "5.3.3"
@@ -3021,17 +2913,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-link 0.2.1",
]
[[package]]
name = "password-hash"
version = "0.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "346f04948ba92c43e8469c1ee6736c7563d71012b17d40745260fe106aac2166"
dependencies = [
"base64ct",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "pathdiff"
version = "0.2.3"
@@ -3313,18 +3194,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "polyval"
version = "0.6.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9d1fe60d06143b2430aa532c94cfe9e29783047f06c0d7fd359a9a51b729fa25"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"cpufeatures",
"opaque-debug",
"universal-hash",
]
[[package]]
name = "potential_utf"
version = "0.1.4"
@@ -3525,7 +3394,7 @@ dependencies = [
"once_cell",
"socket2",
"tracing",
"windows-sys 0.60.2",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
[[package]]
@@ -3874,7 +3743,7 @@ dependencies = [
"errno",
"libc",
"linux-raw-sys",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
[[package]]
@@ -4785,6 +4654,22 @@ dependencies = [
"zbus",
]
[[package]]
name = "tauri-plugin-store"
version = "2.4.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "5ca1a8ff83c269b115e98726ffc13f9e548a10161544a92ad121d6d0a96e16ea"
dependencies = [
"dunce",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"tauri",
"tauri-plugin",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",
"tracing",
]
[[package]]
name = "tauri-runtime"
version = "2.11.0"
@@ -4897,7 +4782,7 @@ dependencies = [
"getrandom 0.4.1",
"once_cell",
"rustix",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
[[package]]
@@ -5280,8 +5165,6 @@ dependencies = [
name = "triple-c"
version = "0.4.0"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"argon2",
"axum",
"base64 0.22.1",
"bollard",
@@ -5304,10 +5187,10 @@ dependencies = [
"tauri-build",
"tauri-plugin-dialog",
"tauri-plugin-opener",
"tauri-plugin-store",
"tokio",
"tower-http",
"uuid",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
@@ -5421,16 +5304,6 @@ version = "0.2.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ebc1c04c71510c7f702b52b7c350734c9ff1295c464a03335b00bb84fc54f853"
[[package]]
name = "universal-hash"
version = "0.5.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "fc1de2c688dc15305988b563c3854064043356019f97a4b46276fe734c4f07ea"
dependencies = [
"crypto-common",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "untrusted"
version = "0.9.0"
@@ -5816,7 +5689,7 @@ version = "0.1.11"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22"
dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
[[package]]
+1 -3
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
[dependencies]
tauri = { version = "2", features = ["image-png", "image-ico"] }
tauri-plugin-store = "2"
tauri-plugin-dialog = "2"
tauri-plugin-opener = "2"
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
@@ -36,9 +37,6 @@ tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors"] }
base64 = "0.22"
rand = "0.9"
local-ip-address = "0.6"
argon2 = "0.5"
aes-gcm = "0.10"
zeroize = "1"
[dev-dependencies]
# `test-util` (not part of tokio's `full`) lets the auto-start retry tests run
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -2473,6 +2473,180 @@
"type": "string",
"const": "opener:deny-reveal-item-in-dir",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the reveal_item_in_dir command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "This permission set configures what kind of\noperations are available from the store plugin.\n\n#### Granted Permissions\n\nAll operations are enabled by default.\n\n\n#### This default permission set includes:\n\n- `allow-load`\n- `allow-get-store`\n- `allow-set`\n- `allow-get`\n- `allow-has`\n- `allow-delete`\n- `allow-clear`\n- `allow-reset`\n- `allow-keys`\n- `allow-values`\n- `allow-entries`\n- `allow-length`\n- `allow-reload`\n- `allow-save`",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:default",
"markdownDescription": "This permission set configures what kind of\noperations are available from the store plugin.\n\n#### Granted Permissions\n\nAll operations are enabled by default.\n\n\n#### This default permission set includes:\n\n- `allow-load`\n- `allow-get-store`\n- `allow-set`\n- `allow-get`\n- `allow-has`\n- `allow-delete`\n- `allow-clear`\n- `allow-reset`\n- `allow-keys`\n- `allow-values`\n- `allow-entries`\n- `allow-length`\n- `allow-reload`\n- `allow-save`"
},
{
"description": "Enables the clear command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-clear",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the clear command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the delete command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-delete",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the delete command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the entries command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-entries",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the entries command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the get command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-get",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the get command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the get_store command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-get-store",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the get_store command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the has command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-has",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the has command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the keys command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-keys",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the keys command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the length command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-length",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the length command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the load command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-load",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the load command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the reload command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-reload",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the reload command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the reset command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-reset",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the reset command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the save command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-save",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the save command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the set command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-set",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the set command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the values command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-values",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the values command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the clear command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-clear",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the clear command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the delete command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-delete",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the delete command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the entries command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-entries",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the entries command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the get command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-get",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the get command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the get_store command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-get-store",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the get_store command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the has command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-has",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the has command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the keys command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-keys",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the keys command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the length command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-length",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the length command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the load command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-load",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the load command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the reload command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-reload",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the reload command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the reset command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-reset",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the reset command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the save command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-save",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the save command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the set command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-set",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the set command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the values command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-values",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the values command without any pre-configured scope."
}
]
},
+174
View File
@@ -2473,6 +2473,180 @@
"type": "string",
"const": "opener:deny-reveal-item-in-dir",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the reveal_item_in_dir command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "This permission set configures what kind of\noperations are available from the store plugin.\n\n#### Granted Permissions\n\nAll operations are enabled by default.\n\n\n#### This default permission set includes:\n\n- `allow-load`\n- `allow-get-store`\n- `allow-set`\n- `allow-get`\n- `allow-has`\n- `allow-delete`\n- `allow-clear`\n- `allow-reset`\n- `allow-keys`\n- `allow-values`\n- `allow-entries`\n- `allow-length`\n- `allow-reload`\n- `allow-save`",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:default",
"markdownDescription": "This permission set configures what kind of\noperations are available from the store plugin.\n\n#### Granted Permissions\n\nAll operations are enabled by default.\n\n\n#### This default permission set includes:\n\n- `allow-load`\n- `allow-get-store`\n- `allow-set`\n- `allow-get`\n- `allow-has`\n- `allow-delete`\n- `allow-clear`\n- `allow-reset`\n- `allow-keys`\n- `allow-values`\n- `allow-entries`\n- `allow-length`\n- `allow-reload`\n- `allow-save`"
},
{
"description": "Enables the clear command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-clear",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the clear command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the delete command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-delete",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the delete command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the entries command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-entries",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the entries command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the get command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-get",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the get command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the get_store command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-get-store",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the get_store command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the has command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-has",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the has command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the keys command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-keys",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the keys command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the length command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-length",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the length command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the load command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-load",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the load command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the reload command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-reload",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the reload command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the reset command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-reset",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the reset command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the save command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-save",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the save command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the set command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-set",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the set command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Enables the values command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:allow-values",
"markdownDescription": "Enables the values command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the clear command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-clear",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the clear command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the delete command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-delete",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the delete command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the entries command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-entries",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the entries command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the get command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-get",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the get command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the get_store command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-get-store",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the get_store command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the has command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-has",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the has command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the keys command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-keys",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the keys command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the length command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-length",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the length command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the load command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-load",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the load command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the reload command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-reload",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the reload command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the reset command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-reset",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the reset command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the save command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-save",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the save command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the set command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-set",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the set command without any pre-configured scope."
},
{
"description": "Denies the values command without any pre-configured scope.",
"type": "string",
"const": "store:deny-values",
"markdownDescription": "Denies the values command without any pre-configured scope."
}
]
},
+16 -182
View File
@@ -82,10 +82,6 @@ pub struct BridgedPort {
pub family: PortFamily,
/// RFC 3339 timestamp of when the host listener was bound.
pub bridged_at: String,
/// Set when only the IPv4 half of the host listener could be bound. The
/// port still works, but not for a client that insists on `::1` — see
/// [`tunnel::PortForward::ipv6_warning`].
pub ipv6_warning: Option<String>,
}
/// A loopback listener that was discovered but could not be bridged.
@@ -136,7 +132,6 @@ impl BridgeState {
port: f.port,
family: f.family,
bridged_at: f.bridged_at.clone(),
ipv6_warning: f.ipv6_warning.clone(),
})
.collect(),
conflicts: self
@@ -334,10 +329,7 @@ async fn poll_loop(
Ok(text) => {
exec_failures = 0;
let discovered = proc_net::parse_loopback_listeners(&text);
// Re-read every tick: a project can gain a port mapping and the
// gateway/STT/web-terminal ports can be re-pointed while the
// bridge is running, and a stale reservation set is a hole.
let skip = skipped_ports(&project, &store.list(), &app_settings(&app));
let skip = skipped_ports(&project);
if reconcile(&container_id, &discovered, &skip, &state).await {
emit_status(&app, &project_id, &state, true).await;
}
@@ -380,101 +372,24 @@ async fn poll_loop(
}
}
/// Every port this project's bridge must not take.
/// Ports Docker already handles for this project. A container port that is
/// explicitly published has a host-side path already, and the mapping's host
/// port is a binding we must not fight over.
///
/// The bridge's rule is "a container loopback listener on port N becomes an
/// **unauthenticated** host listener on port N". That is only safe for ports
/// nothing else on the host owns, so everything that *is* owned has to be
/// enumerated here. Four sources:
///
/// 1. **This project's own published ports** — a container port that Docker
/// already publishes has a host-side path, and the mapping's host port is a
/// binding we must not fight over.
/// 2. **Every other project's published host ports.** The container names the
/// *host* port, so project A's container listening on 8080 would otherwise
/// have the bridge bind host 8080 — the port project B publishes on. Only
/// the host end of another project's mapping is reserved: its container end
/// is a number inside a different network namespace and means nothing here.
/// 3. **This app's own host services** — the LiteLLM gateway, the STT sidecar
/// and the web terminal. All three are off by default and bind on demand, so
/// first-come would win: a container that binds container-loopback 4000
/// while the gateway is stopped gets host `127.0.0.1:4000` mirrored to it
/// within one [`POLL_INTERVAL`], after which the gateway cannot start and
/// anything on the host dialling 4000 — including *other project
/// containers*, which reach the gateway by host address — is talking to the
/// squatting container instead. The web terminal is the worst of the three,
/// because its access token travels in the URL query. Both the *configured*
/// port and the shipped default are reserved: the configured one is what the
/// service will bind next, and the default is what it falls back to for a
/// fresh profile or a settings file that failed to parse.
/// 4. [`RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS`] and [`RESERVED_HOST_PORTS`] — the
/// browser-view pane's two ends, which it exposes on its own authenticated
/// terms.
///
/// Pure on purpose: everything it needs is passed in, so the whole reservation
/// policy is unit-testable without a store, a container or an app handle.
fn skipped_ports(
project: &crate::models::Project,
all_projects: &[crate::models::Project],
settings: &crate::models::AppSettings,
) -> HashSet<u16> {
/// [`RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS`] is folded in as well: those are container
/// loopback listeners another feature owns and exposes on its own,
/// authenticated terms.
fn skipped_ports(project: &crate::models::Project) -> HashSet<u16> {
let mut skip: HashSet<u16> = project
.port_mappings
.iter()
.flat_map(|m| [m.container_port, m.host_port])
.collect();
// Other projects: host end only.
skip.extend(
all_projects
.iter()
.filter(|p| p.id != project.id)
.flat_map(|p| p.port_mappings.iter().map(|m| m.host_port)),
);
skip.extend(app_service_host_ports(settings));
skip.extend(RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.clone());
skip.extend(RESERVED_HOST_PORTS.clone());
skip
}
/// Current app settings, or defaults if the state is not reachable.
///
/// Falling back rather than unwrapping matters: the reservation set is a safety
/// rail, and a rail that panics the poller when it cannot read its input is
/// worse than one that falls back to the shipped port numbers — which are what
/// the services use anyway until someone changes them.
fn app_settings(app: &AppHandle) -> crate::models::AppSettings {
use tauri::Manager;
app.try_state::<crate::AppState>()
.map(|state| state.settings_store.get())
.unwrap_or_default()
}
/// Host ports this app's own sibling services bind, configured value and
/// shipped default alike.
///
/// Read off the settings models rather than restated as literals here: a
/// duplicated port number is exactly the kind of constant that drifts silently,
/// and the failure mode of drift is a reservation that no longer covers the
/// service it was written for.
fn app_service_host_ports(settings: &crate::models::AppSettings) -> Vec<u16> {
use crate::models::{SttSettings, WebTerminalSettings};
vec![
// LiteLLM gateway (`docker/gateway.rs`).
settings.gateway.port,
crate::models::default_gateway_port(),
// Speech-to-text sidecar (`docker/stt.rs`).
settings.stt.port,
SttSettings::default().port,
// Remote web terminal (`web_terminal/server.rs`) — binds 0.0.0.0, and
// its access token is in the URL query.
settings.web_terminal.port,
WebTerminalSettings::default().port,
]
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Reservations
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -671,7 +586,7 @@ async fn emit_status(
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::models::{AppSettings, PortMapping, Project, ProjectPath};
use crate::models::{PortMapping, Project, ProjectPath};
fn project_with_mappings(mappings: Vec<(u16, u16)>) -> Project {
let mut p = Project::new(
@@ -692,14 +607,9 @@ mod tests {
p
}
/// The common case: one project, no siblings, stock settings.
fn skip_for(project: &Project) -> HashSet<u16> {
skipped_ports(project, std::slice::from_ref(project), &AppSettings::default())
}
#[test]
fn ports_already_published_by_docker_are_skipped() {
let skip = skip_for(&project_with_mappings(vec![(3000, 3000), (8081, 8080)]));
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![(3000, 3000), (8081, 8080)]));
assert!(skip.contains(&3000));
// Both ends of an asymmetric mapping are off limits: the container port
// is already reachable, and the host port is Docker's binding.
@@ -709,96 +619,20 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn no_mappings_means_nothing_but_the_reservations_are_skipped() {
let settings = AppSettings::default();
let project = project_with_mappings(vec![]);
let skip = skip_for(&project);
let mut expected: HashSet<u16> = RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.collect();
expected.extend(RESERVED_HOST_PORTS);
expected.extend(app_service_host_ports(&settings));
assert_eq!(skip, expected);
// The ranges and the service ports are disjoint, so nothing above is
// accidentally counting the same port twice.
fn no_mappings_means_nothing_but_the_reserved_ranges_are_skipped() {
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
assert_eq!(
skip.len(),
RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.clone().count()
+ RESERVED_HOST_PORTS.clone().count()
+ 3
RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.clone().count() + RESERVED_HOST_PORTS.clone().count()
);
}
#[test]
fn this_apps_own_host_services_are_never_taken() {
// The bug this guards: the reserved set used to cover only the
// browser-view ranges and this project's own mappings, so a container
// binding container-loopback 4000 / 9876 / 7681 while the matching
// service was stopped had that port mirrored, unauthenticated, onto the
// host — taking the gateway's, the STT sidecar's or the web terminal's
// door before they could bind it.
let settings = AppSettings::default();
let skip = skip_for(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
assert!(skip.contains(&settings.gateway.port), "LiteLLM gateway port");
assert!(skip.contains(&settings.stt.port), "STT sidecar port");
assert!(skip.contains(&settings.web_terminal.port), "web terminal port");
// The shipped defaults, spelled out once so a change to any of them is
// a change to this assertion and not a silent narrowing.
assert!(skip.contains(&4000));
assert!(skip.contains(&9876));
assert!(skip.contains(&7681));
}
#[test]
fn a_reconfigured_service_port_is_reserved_alongside_its_default() {
let mut settings = AppSettings::default();
settings.gateway.port = 4321;
settings.stt.port = 9000;
settings.web_terminal.port = 8443;
let project = project_with_mappings(vec![]);
let skip = skipped_ports(&project, std::slice::from_ref(&project), &settings);
for port in [4321, 9000, 8443] {
assert!(skip.contains(&port), "configured port {} should be reserved", port);
}
// The default stays reserved too: it is what the service falls back to
// for a fresh profile or an unparseable settings file, so leaving it
// open is leaving the same squat available one restart later.
for port in [4000, 9876, 7681] {
assert!(skip.contains(&port), "default port {} should be reserved", port);
}
}
#[test]
fn another_projects_published_host_port_is_not_stolen() {
// The container names the *host* port. Without this, project A's
// container listening on 8080 takes the host 8080 that project B
// publishes on — the bridge wins the race whenever B's container is not
// running yet.
let mine = project_with_mappings(vec![]);
let mut theirs = project_with_mappings(vec![(8080, 3000)]);
theirs.id = format!("{}-other", mine.id);
let skip = skipped_ports(
&mine,
&[mine.clone(), theirs.clone()],
&AppSettings::default(),
);
assert!(skip.contains(&8080), "another project's host port");
// …but not the other project's *container* port: that number lives in a
// different network namespace and means nothing on this host, and
// reserving it would refuse a legitimate login callback for no reason.
assert!(!skip.contains(&3000));
}
#[test]
fn the_browser_views_host_ports_are_never_taken() {
// The bridge binds *host* ports chosen by the container, so without
// this it can take the port the browser-view proxy will want later —
// that pane binds on demand, so first-come would win.
let skip = skip_for(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
for port in RESERVED_HOST_PORTS {
assert!(skip.contains(&port), "host port {} should be reserved", port);
}
@@ -854,14 +688,14 @@ mod tests {
// Mirroring these would publish an ungated second door to the
// Playwright dashboard, which the pane deliberately keeps behind a
// token-checking listener.
let skip = skip_for(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
for port in RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS {
assert!(skip.contains(&port), "port {} should be reserved", port);
}
assert!(!skip.contains(&(RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.end() + 1)));
// Reservations coexist with Docker's own published ports.
let skip = skip_for(&project_with_mappings(vec![(3000, 3000)]));
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![(3000, 3000)]));
assert!(skip.contains(RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.start()));
assert!(skip.contains(&3000));
}
+21 -579
View File
@@ -13,48 +13,8 @@
//! The exec plumbing itself is *not* reimplemented here: it comes from
//! [`crate::docker::exec::create_attached_exec`], the same helper the
//! interactive terminal sessions are built on.
//!
//! ## What the host listener is, and is not
//!
//! The listener is **not authenticated**, and cannot be. The port number is
//! chosen by whatever CLI is logging in, the redirect URL is the provider's, and
//! nothing in that chain can be taught to present a token — so there is no path
//! token to add. Anything that can reach `127.0.0.1:<port>` on this host reaches
//! the container-side listener. That includes **any web page the user has open**,
//! which can port-scan loopback from script.
//!
//! Two things narrow that, and neither is a substitute for the other:
//!
//! * The whole feature is opt-in per project, off by default, and only mirrors
//! ports while its container is running.
//! * [`web_request_verdict`] refuses the one case that is unambiguously a web
//! page reaching in: a request whose fetch metadata says it is a cross-site
//! **sub-resource** (`fetch`, `XMLHttpRequest`, `<img>`, `<script src>`,
//! `<iframe>`). Cross-site *navigations* are allowed, because that is exactly
//! what an OAuth redirect is.
//!
//! The residual risk, stated plainly rather than papered over: a client that
//! sends no `Sec-Fetch-Site` header at all is not filtered — that is every
//! non-browser client (which is the point; `curl`, a CLI, the container's own
//! probe must all still work) but also any browser predating fetch metadata
//! (Chrome < 76, Firefox < 90, Safari < 16.4). A page can also still reach the
//! port with a top-level navigation it opens itself (`window.open`), which
//! carries `Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate` and is indistinguishable from the redirect
//! the bridge exists to deliver. And nothing here inspects *what* is behind the
//! port: if the container has something more interesting than a throwaway OAuth
//! listener on loopback, a same-machine caller reaches it.
//!
//! ## Bounds
//!
//! Every accepted connection costs a `docker exec`, and the number of
//! connections is decided by whoever can reach the port. So each forward caps
//! concurrent connections ([`MAX_CONNECTIONS`]), refuses a client that opens a
//! socket and then says nothing ([`FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT`], enforced *before* the
//! exec is created), and drops a connection the container has gone quiet on
//! ([`IDLE_TIMEOUT`]).
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::time::Duration;
use bollard::container::LogOutput;
use futures_util::StreamExt;
@@ -70,38 +30,6 @@ use super::proc_net::PortFamily;
/// only needs to not be pathological.
const PUMP_BUF: usize = 16 * 1024;
/// Concurrent connections one forwarded port will carry.
///
/// Each one is a `docker exec`, and the client side is anything on the host that
/// can dial loopback — including a web page in a loop. A login callback is one
/// connection, occasionally a handful; this is generous for that and still a
/// bound the engine will not notice.
const MAX_CONNECTIONS: usize = 16;
/// How long an accepted connection has to send its first byte before it is
/// dropped, *without* a `docker exec` ever being created for it.
///
/// This is a deliberate narrowing of what the bridge carries: a client that
/// connects and says nothing is not the HTTP OAuth callback this exists for, and
/// forwarding it costs a container exec for a socket that may never speak. A
/// server-speaks-first protocol behind a bridged port would be refused by this;
/// that is the trade, and it is the only protocol shape affected.
const FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
/// How long a live connection may go with nothing coming back from the container
/// before it is torn down. Generous, because a bridged port is not always a
/// short OAuth callback — but finite, so an abandoned connection cannot pin an
/// exec forever.
const IDLE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(600);
/// Ceiling on the request head buffered for [`web_request_verdict`]. Real heads
/// are well under 8 KiB; past this we stop looking and forward what we have.
const MAX_HEAD: usize = 32 * 1024;
/// How long the rest of a request head has, once the first line has identified
/// the connection as HTTP. Only a stalled or hostile client reaches it.
const HEAD_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
/// Aborts a task when dropped, so a cancelled parent can never leave a detached
/// child running.
struct AbortOnDrop(JoinHandle<()>);
@@ -124,15 +52,6 @@ pub struct PortForward {
pub port: u16,
pub family: PortFamily,
pub bridged_at: String,
/// Why `[::1]` could not be taken alongside `127.0.0.1`, if it could not.
///
/// A half-bound forward is the one failure mode that looks like a success:
/// the status says the port is bridged, and a browser that resolves
/// `localhost` to `::1` and does not fall back still gets a refused
/// connection. It is not a conflict — the IPv4 half really is carrying
/// traffic — so it rides along with the port it belongs to and the UI says
/// so, rather than being logged at debug where nobody sees it.
pub ipv6_warning: Option<String>,
task: JoinHandle<()>,
}
@@ -167,33 +86,18 @@ impl PortForward {
// first, so a v4-only host listener would miss those callbacks. This is
// best-effort: if ::1 is unavailable (no IPv6, or that half is taken)
// the v4 listener alone still works, so it is not treated as a conflict.
let (v6, ipv6_warning) =
match TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST, port))).await {
Ok(l) => (Some(l), None),
Err(e) => {
// Warn, not debug. Best-effort is about whether to *fail*,
// not about whether to say anything: on a host where
// `localhost` resolves to `::1` and the client does not
// fall back to IPv4, the callback is refused while the
// bridge reports itself healthy — a silent failure with no
// thread back to this line.
log::warn!(
"Auth bridge: bound 127.0.0.1:{} but not [::1]:{} ({}) — continuing with IPv4 only; \
a client that resolves localhost to ::1 without falling back will not reach it",
port,
port,
e
);
(
None,
Some(format!(
"IPv4 only — [::1]:{} could not be bound ({}). A browser that resolves \
localhost to ::1 without falling back will not reach this port.",
port, e
)),
)
}
};
let v6 = match TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST, port))).await {
Ok(l) => Some(l),
Err(e) => {
log::debug!(
"Auth bridge: bound 127.0.0.1:{} but not [::1]:{} ({}) — continuing with IPv4 only",
port,
port,
e
);
None
}
};
let target = family.socat_target(port);
let task = tokio::spawn(accept_loop(container_id, port, target, v4, v6));
@@ -202,7 +106,6 @@ impl PortForward {
port,
family,
bridged_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
ipv6_warning,
task,
})
}
@@ -239,22 +142,6 @@ async fn accept_loop(
match accepted {
Ok((stream, peer)) => {
// Reap first, so the cap counts *live* connections rather than
// every one this listener has ever accepted.
while conns.try_join_next().is_some() {}
if conns.len() >= MAX_CONNECTIONS {
// Dropping the stream closes it. Better than queueing: the
// client side is whatever can dial loopback, so a queue is
// just a slower way to run out of execs.
log::warn!(
"Auth bridge: refusing connection from {} to bridged port {} — \
{} concurrent connections already open on it",
peer,
port,
MAX_CONNECTIONS
);
continue;
}
log::debug!("Auth bridge: connection from {} to bridged port {}", peer, port);
let _ = stream.set_nodelay(true);
conns.spawn(tunnel_connection(
@@ -283,224 +170,9 @@ async fn accept_optional(
}
}
/// Carry one accepted host connection into the container over `socat`, after
/// deciding it is not a web page reaching into loopback.
///
/// Nothing is forwarded until that decision is made, so a refused request never
/// reaches the container at all — not even a `docker exec`.
async fn tunnel_connection(container_id: String, target: String, mut stream: TcpStream, port: u16) {
let head = match read_leading_bytes(&mut stream).await {
Ok(head) => head,
Err(e) => {
log::debug!(
"Auth bridge: dropping connection to bridged port {} before forwarding: {}",
port,
e
);
return;
}
};
if let LeadingBytes::HttpRequest { buffer, head_len } = &head {
// Authorize against the head slice only. Parsing past the blank line is
// how a request *body* gets read as headers — a cross-site `fetch` with
// a `text/plain` body is not preflighted, so it can put any line it
// likes in there.
let head_text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buffer[..*head_len]);
if web_request_verdict(&head_text) == Verdict::RefuseCrossSite {
log::warn!(
"Auth bridge: refused a cross-site sub-resource request to bridged port {} — \
a web page, not a login redirect",
port
);
let _ = refuse(&mut stream).await;
return;
}
}
// The bytes already off the socket go back on the wire first, byte-exact.
tunnel_connection_with_prelude(container_id, target, stream, port, head.into_buffer()).await
}
/// What the first bytes of an accepted connection turned out to be.
enum LeadingBytes {
/// An HTTP request whose head we have in full. `head_len` is one past the
/// blank line; `buffer` may hold pipelined body bytes beyond it.
HttpRequest { buffer: Vec<u8>, head_len: usize },
/// Not HTTP, or HTTP we gave up on reading. Forwarded verbatim, ungated.
Opaque(Vec<u8>),
}
impl LeadingBytes {
fn into_buffer(self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
LeadingBytes::HttpRequest { buffer, .. } => buffer,
LeadingBytes::Opaque(buffer) => buffer,
}
}
}
/// Read just enough of the connection to classify it, without consuming
/// anything the caller cannot replay.
///
/// Bails out to [`LeadingBytes::Opaque`] the moment the first line proves this
/// is not HTTP, so a non-HTTP protocol pays one line of latency and no more.
/// The only hard failure is silence: a client that sends nothing within
/// [`FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT`] is dropped before an exec is spent on it.
async fn read_leading_bytes(stream: &mut TcpStream) -> Result<LeadingBytes, String> {
let mut buf: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(1024);
let mut chunk = [0u8; 1024];
let mut deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT;
loop {
let n = match tokio::time::timeout_at(deadline, stream.read(&mut chunk)).await {
Ok(Ok(0)) if buf.is_empty() => {
return Err("closed before sending anything".to_string())
}
// A half-close after some bytes is legitimate; forward what we have.
Ok(Ok(0)) => return Ok(LeadingBytes::Opaque(buf)),
Ok(Ok(n)) => n,
Ok(Err(e)) => return Err(format!("read failed: {}", e)),
Err(_) if buf.is_empty() => {
return Err(format!(
"sent nothing within {}s",
FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT.as_secs()
))
}
// Bytes arrived but the head never finished. Fail open: this is a
// gate on top of the bridge, not the bridge's reason to exist.
Err(_) => return Ok(LeadingBytes::Opaque(buf)),
};
buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
// Once the first line is complete we know whether to keep reading.
if let Some(eol) = buf.iter().position(|b| *b == b'\n') {
if !is_http_request_line(&buf[..eol]) {
return Ok(LeadingBytes::Opaque(buf));
}
deadline = deadline.max(tokio::time::Instant::now() + HEAD_TIMEOUT);
} else if buf.len() > MAX_HEAD {
return Ok(LeadingBytes::Opaque(buf));
}
if let Some(head_len) = find_head_end(&buf) {
return Ok(LeadingBytes::HttpRequest {
buffer: buf,
head_len,
});
}
if buf.len() > MAX_HEAD {
return Ok(LeadingBytes::Opaque(buf));
}
}
}
/// Whether a first line looks like `METHOD target HTTP/1.x`.
fn is_http_request_line(line: &[u8]) -> bool {
let line = String::from_utf8_lossy(line);
let line = line.trim_end_matches(['\r', '\n']);
let mut parts = line.split(' ');
let (Some(method), Some(target), Some(version), None) =
(parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next())
else {
return false;
};
!method.is_empty()
&& method.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_uppercase())
&& !target.is_empty()
&& (version == "HTTP/1.1" || version == "HTTP/1.0")
}
/// Index just past the blank line terminating an HTTP head, if it has arrived.
/// Tolerates a bare-LF terminator, which some minimal clients still emit.
fn find_head_end(buf: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
buf.windows(4)
.position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n")
.map(|i| i + 4)
.or_else(|| buf.windows(2).position(|w| w == b"\n\n").map(|i| i + 2))
}
/// Tell a refused caller why, then close. Plain text and `Connection: close` —
/// there is no session here to keep alive.
async fn refuse(stream: &mut TcpStream) -> std::io::Result<()> {
const BODY: &str = "This port is bridged from a container by Triple-C for a sign-in \
callback. It is not an API for web pages to call.\n";
let response = format!(
"HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\r\n\
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\r\n\
Content-Length: {}\r\n\
Cache-Control: no-store\r\n\
Connection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
BODY.len(),
BODY
);
stream.write_all(response.as_bytes()).await?;
stream.shutdown().await
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// The gate — pure, so it can be tested without sockets
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum Verdict {
/// Forward it. Either it is not a browser, or the browser says this is a
/// navigation or a same-origin request.
Allow,
/// Fetch metadata says a document on another site pulled this in as a
/// sub-resource. No login flow looks like that.
RefuseCrossSite,
}
/// Decide whether an HTTP request head arriving on a bridged port may be
/// forwarded into the container.
///
/// Deliberately fail-open — see the module docs for exactly what that leaves
/// uncovered. The only refusal is the case with no innocent reading:
/// `Sec-Fetch-Site` says another site, and `Sec-Fetch-Mode` says this is not a
/// navigation. `Sec-Fetch-*` are forbidden header names, so page script cannot
/// set or clear them.
pub(crate) fn web_request_verdict(head: &str) -> Verdict {
let mut lines = head.split(['\r', '\n']).filter(|l| !l.is_empty());
// Skip the request line.
if lines.next().is_none() {
return Verdict::Allow;
}
let mut site: Option<&str> = None;
let mut mode: Option<&str> = None;
for line in lines {
let Some((name, value)) = line.split_once(':') else {
continue;
};
let value = value.trim();
match name.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
// A duplicate of either header is header smuggling, not a client.
// Refuse rather than pick a winner: last-occurrence-wins is what
// turns a smuggling primitive into a bypass.
"sec-fetch-site" if site.is_some() => return Verdict::RefuseCrossSite,
"sec-fetch-mode" if mode.is_some() => return Verdict::RefuseCrossSite,
"sec-fetch-site" => site = Some(value),
"sec-fetch-mode" => mode = Some(value),
_ => {}
}
}
let Some(site) = site else {
// No fetch metadata: a CLI, `curl`, or a browser old enough not to send
// it. Not something this gate can judge.
return Verdict::Allow;
};
if site.eq_ignore_ascii_case("same-origin") || site.eq_ignore_ascii_case("none") {
return Verdict::Allow;
}
// `navigate` is precisely the OAuth redirect: the provider sends the browser
// to `http://localhost:<port>/callback`, cross-site, as a document load.
// Refusing it would refuse the feature.
if mode.is_none_or(|m| m.eq_ignore_ascii_case("navigate")) {
return Verdict::Allow;
}
Verdict::RefuseCrossSite
/// Carry one accepted host connection into the container over `socat`.
async fn tunnel_connection(container_id: String, target: String, stream: TcpStream, port: u16) {
tunnel_connection_with_prelude(container_id, target, stream, port, Vec::new()).await
}
/// As [`tunnel_connection`], but `prelude` is written into the container first,
@@ -553,36 +225,21 @@ pub async fn tunnel_connection_with_prelude(
}
let mut buf = vec![0u8; PUMP_BUF];
loop {
// Idle-bounded. Without this a client that connects, sends a
// request and then never speaks or closes holds the exec open for
// as long as the container runs.
match tokio::time::timeout(IDLE_TIMEOUT, host_rx.read(&mut buf)).await {
Ok(Ok(0)) | Err(_) => break,
Ok(Ok(n)) => {
match host_rx.read(&mut buf).await {
Ok(0) => break,
Ok(n) => {
if input.write_all(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() || input.flush().await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Ok(Err(_)) => break,
Err(_) => break,
}
}
}));
// Container → host. This direction is authoritative: when the exec's output
// stream ends, socat has exited and the connection is over. It is also the
// one that decides the connection is dead: nothing back from the container
// for `IDLE_TIMEOUT` tears the whole thing down, exec included.
while let Some(chunk) = match tokio::time::timeout(IDLE_TIMEOUT, output.next()).await {
Ok(chunk) => chunk,
Err(_) => {
log::debug!(
"Auth bridge: bridged port {} idle for {}s — closing the tunnel",
port,
IDLE_TIMEOUT.as_secs()
);
None
}
} {
// stream ends, socat has exited and the connection is over.
while let Some(chunk) = output.next().await {
match chunk {
// Only stdout is payload. The exec is created with tty = false
// precisely so Docker demultiplexes these, keeping socat's stderr
@@ -611,218 +268,3 @@ pub async fn tunnel_connection_with_prelude(
// Explicit: stop reading from the host now that the container side is gone.
drop(upstream);
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn head(lines: &[&str]) -> String {
format!("{}\r\n\r\n", lines.join("\r\n"))
}
#[test]
fn a_cli_callback_with_no_fetch_metadata_is_forwarded() {
// The overwhelmingly common case, and the reason the gate fails open:
// `curl`, a CLI's own probe, and anything not a browser send none of
// these headers, and none of them can be judged from the wire.
let verdict = web_request_verdict(&head(&[
"GET /callback?code=abc HTTP/1.1",
"Host: localhost:41733",
"User-Agent: curl/8.5.0",
]));
assert_eq!(verdict, Verdict::Allow);
}
#[test]
fn the_oauth_redirect_is_forwarded_even_though_it_is_cross_site() {
// This is the feature. The provider bounces the browser to
// `http://localhost:<port>/callback`, which is cross-site and a
// navigation. Refusing it would refuse every login the bridge exists
// for.
for site in ["cross-site", "same-site"] {
let verdict = web_request_verdict(&head(&[
"GET /callback?code=abc&state=xyz HTTP/1.1",
"Host: localhost:41733",
&format!("Sec-Fetch-Site: {}", site),
"Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate",
"Sec-Fetch-Dest: document",
]));
assert_eq!(verdict, Verdict::Allow, "site={}", site);
}
}
#[test]
fn a_form_post_callback_is_forwarded() {
// `response_mode=form_post` providers POST the callback as a
// navigation. Still a navigation, still allowed.
let verdict = web_request_verdict(&head(&[
"POST /callback HTTP/1.1",
"Host: localhost:41733",
"Origin: https://login.microsoftonline.com",
"Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site",
"Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate",
]));
assert_eq!(verdict, Verdict::Allow);
}
#[test]
fn a_cross_site_subresource_from_a_web_page_is_refused() {
// The case the gate exists for: a page the user happens to have open
// scanning loopback and poking whatever answers.
for mode in ["cors", "no-cors", "same-origin", "websocket"] {
let verdict = web_request_verdict(&head(&[
"GET /admin HTTP/1.1",
"Host: 127.0.0.1:41733",
"Origin: https://evil.example",
"Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site",
&format!("Sec-Fetch-Mode: {}", mode),
]));
assert_eq!(verdict, Verdict::RefuseCrossSite, "mode={}", mode);
}
}
#[test]
fn the_containers_own_same_origin_requests_are_forwarded() {
let verdict = web_request_verdict(&head(&[
"GET /style.css HTTP/1.1",
"Host: localhost:41733",
"Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin",
"Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors",
]));
assert_eq!(verdict, Verdict::Allow);
// `none` is a user-initiated load — typed URL, bookmark.
let verdict = web_request_verdict(&head(&[
"GET / HTTP/1.1",
"Host: localhost:41733",
"Sec-Fetch-Site: none",
"Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate",
]));
assert_eq!(verdict, Verdict::Allow);
}
#[test]
fn duplicated_fetch_metadata_is_refused_rather_than_resolved() {
// Last-occurrence-wins is what turns any header-smuggling primitive
// into a bypass, and no real client sends two.
let verdict = web_request_verdict(&head(&[
"GET /x HTTP/1.1",
"Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site",
"Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors",
"Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin",
]));
assert_eq!(verdict, Verdict::RefuseCrossSite);
}
#[test]
fn only_the_head_is_ever_judged() {
// A cross-site `text/plain` POST is not preflighted, so its *body* is
// fully attacker-chosen. `tunnel_connection` slices at the blank line
// before calling in; this pins that the slice is what gets judged.
let raw = "POST /x HTTP/1.1\r\n\
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site\r\n\
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors\r\n\
Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n\
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\r\n";
let head_len = find_head_end(raw.as_bytes()).expect("head terminator");
let head = &raw[..head_len];
assert!(!head.contains("same-origin"), "the forged line must be past the slice");
assert_eq!(web_request_verdict(head), Verdict::RefuseCrossSite);
// And if the slice were ever got wrong, the duplicate rule is the
// backstop: a forged `Sec-Fetch-*` line is by construction a second
// copy of one the browser already sent, which is refused outright
// rather than resolved in the forgery's favour.
assert_eq!(web_request_verdict(raw), Verdict::RefuseCrossSite);
}
#[test]
fn a_non_http_first_line_is_never_treated_as_a_request() {
// Bridged ports are not all HTTP. Anything whose first line is not a
// request line is forwarded verbatim rather than parsed.
assert!(!is_http_request_line(b"\x16\x03\x01\x02\x00\x01"));
assert!(!is_http_request_line(b"*1\r"));
assert!(!is_http_request_line(b"SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6"));
assert!(!is_http_request_line(b"GET /x HTTP/2.0"));
assert!(!is_http_request_line(b"get /x HTTP/1.1"));
assert!(is_http_request_line(b"GET /x HTTP/1.1\r"));
assert!(is_http_request_line(b"POST /callback?code=a%20b HTTP/1.0"));
}
#[test]
fn head_end_is_found_for_both_terminators() {
assert_eq!(find_head_end(b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\nBODY"), Some(18));
assert_eq!(find_head_end(b"GET / HTTP/1.1\n\nBODY"), Some(16));
assert_eq!(find_head_end(b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n"), None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_client_that_says_nothing_never_costs_a_container_exec() {
// Every accepted connection would otherwise spawn a `docker exec`
// immediately, so silence was free for the caller and expensive here.
let listener = TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)))
.await
.expect("bind");
let addr = listener.local_addr().expect("addr");
let accept = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
read_leading_bytes(&mut stream).await
});
let _client = TcpStream::connect(addr).await.expect("connect");
let started = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let result = accept.await.expect("join");
assert!(result.is_err(), "silence should not be forwarded");
assert!(
started.elapsed() >= FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT,
"should have waited out the first-byte grace period"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_non_http_client_is_classified_from_its_first_line_alone() {
let listener = TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)))
.await
.expect("bind");
let addr = listener.local_addr().expect("addr");
let accept = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
read_leading_bytes(&mut stream).await
});
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(addr).await.expect("connect");
client.write_all(b"SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6\r\n").await.expect("write");
let result = accept.await.expect("join").expect("classified");
// Verbatim, and without waiting for a head terminator that will never
// come — the whole buffer is replayed into the tunnel.
assert!(matches!(result, LeadingBytes::Opaque(_)));
assert_eq!(result.into_buffer(), b"SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6\r\n");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_http_head_is_read_whole_and_replayed_whole() {
let listener = TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)))
.await
.expect("bind");
let addr = listener.local_addr().expect("addr");
let accept = tokio::spawn(async move {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
read_leading_bytes(&mut stream).await
});
let raw = b"POST /callback HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nContent-Length: 4\r\n\r\ncode";
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(addr).await.expect("connect");
client.write_all(raw).await.expect("write");
let result = accept.await.expect("join").expect("classified");
match &result {
LeadingBytes::HttpRequest { buffer, head_len } => {
assert_eq!(&buffer[*head_len..], b"code", "body must survive the peek");
assert!(!buffer[..*head_len].ends_with(b"code"));
}
LeadingBytes::Opaque(_) => panic!("should have been recognised as HTTP"),
}
assert_eq!(result.into_buffer(), raw.to_vec());
}
}
+19 -84
View File
@@ -304,7 +304,21 @@ impl BrowserViewManager {
// a container with no dashboard makes this a no-op.
let _ = kill_dashboard(&container_id, &cli_entry).await;
let (container_port, entry_path) = start_viewer(&container_id, &cli_entry).await?;
let container_port = pick_viewer_port(&container_id).await?;
launch_viewer(&container_id, &cli_entry, container_port).await?;
// Wait for it to actually answer, and learn the entry URL while we're
// there — see `probe_entry_path` for why that matters. This, not the
// launcher's stdout, is the readiness signal: verified that the
// "Listening on …" line is printed only on the very first start.
let entry_path = match wait_until_ready(&container_id, container_port).await {
Ok(path) => path,
Err(e) => {
let log = read_viewer_log(&container_id).await;
let _ = kill_dashboard(&container_id, &cli_entry).await;
return Err(explain_start_failure(&e, &log));
}
};
let token = generate_token();
// `--host 127.0.0.1` is ours to set, so the family is known and there is
@@ -587,91 +601,12 @@ async fn read_viewer_log(container_id: &str) -> String {
// Readiness, ports, URLs
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// How many free ports a start will try before giving up.
///
/// More than one because port choice is a check-then-bind: the free list comes
/// from a snapshot of the container's `/proc/net/tcp`, and anything in the
/// container may bind the port we picked before the dashboard gets to it. One
/// retry per lost race is the recovery; the cap is what stops a container that
/// binds every candidate from holding a start open for
/// `MAX_PORT_ATTEMPTS × READY_TIMEOUT`.
const MAX_PORT_ATTEMPTS: usize = 3;
/// Get a viewer listening inside the container and return the port it is on
/// plus the path the pane should load.
///
/// ## The check/bind race
///
/// [`pick_viewer_port`] reads a *snapshot* of container listeners; the dashboard
/// binds some milliseconds later. Nothing here can make that atomic — the bind
/// happens in another process, in another namespace, and `playwright-cli show`
/// reports the port it actually took only on a first-ever start (see
/// [`wait_until_ready`]). What is possible is to stop treating the first
/// candidate as the only one: if the port we picked does not come up, walk to
/// the next free candidate rather than failing the whole start.
///
/// Residual, stated rather than glossed: a container-side process that binds the
/// candidate port *and answers HTTP* is indistinguishable from the dashboard at
/// this layer, and the pane would then front it. What contains that is
/// downstream — the host proxy is loopback-only and token-gated, and the pane's
/// iframe is sandboxed — not this function.
async fn start_viewer(container_id: &str, cli_entry: &str) -> Result<(u16, String), String> {
let mut tried: Vec<u16> = Vec::new();
let mut last: Option<String> = None;
for _ in 0..MAX_PORT_ATTEMPTS {
// Re-read the listener snapshot each attempt: the port that was free a
// moment ago is exactly the one we may have just lost.
let port = match pick_viewer_port(container_id, &tried).await {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(e) => {
// Report why the *attempts* failed, not just "nothing free":
// the exhausted range is the symptom, the last start failure is
// the thing the user can act on.
return Err(match last {
Some(prev) => format!("{} ({})", e, prev),
None => e,
});
}
};
tried.push(port);
launch_viewer(container_id, cli_entry, port).await?;
// Wait for it to actually answer, and learn the entry URL while we're
// there — see `probe_entry_path` for why that matters. This, not the
// launcher's stdout, is the readiness signal: verified that the
// "Listening on …" line is printed only on the very first start.
match wait_until_ready(container_id, port).await {
Ok(path) => return Ok((port, path)),
Err(e) => {
let log = read_viewer_log(container_id).await;
// Always kill before retrying: the dashboard is a singleton, so
// a launcher that came up on some *other* port would otherwise
// make every further attempt a no-op that silently ignores the
// port we asked for.
let _ = kill_dashboard(container_id, cli_entry).await;
last = Some(explain_start_failure(&e, &log));
}
}
}
Err(last.unwrap_or_else(|| "The Playwright viewer did not start.".to_string()))
}
/// First port in [`VIEWER_PORTS`] that nothing in the container is listening on
/// and that this start has not already tried.
async fn pick_viewer_port(container_id: &str, tried: &[u16]) -> Result<u16, String> {
/// First port in [`VIEWER_PORTS`] that nothing in the container is listening on.
async fn pick_viewer_port(container_id: &str) -> Result<u16, String> {
let text = exec_oneshot(
container_id,
vec![
// Absolute path, deliberately, for the same reason the auth bridge
// uses one: `container/Dockerfile` puts a container-writable
// directory first on `PATH`, so a bare `cat` is a name the container
// can rebind to a shim. A shimmed listener list is a shimmed answer
// to "which port is free" — i.e. the container choosing which port
// the viewer, and therefore the host-side proxy, ends up on.
"/usr/bin/cat".to_string(),
"cat".to_string(),
"/proc/net/tcp".to_string(),
"/proc/net/tcp6".to_string(),
],
@@ -681,7 +616,7 @@ async fn pick_viewer_port(container_id: &str, tried: &[u16]) -> Result<u16, Stri
let taken = proc_net::parse_loopback_listeners(&text);
VIEWER_PORTS
.clone()
.find(|p| !taken.contains_key(p) && !tried.contains(p))
.find(|p| !taken.contains_key(p))
.ok_or_else(|| {
format!(
"No free port in {}{} inside the container for the Playwright viewer.",
+30 -497
View File
@@ -1188,53 +1188,16 @@ pub async fn has_claude_token() -> Result<bool, String> {
Ok(secure::has_claude_oauth_token())
}
/// The tail of every refusal [`crate::project_lock::try_acquire`] produces.
///
/// [`crate::docker::container::scrub_secrets_from_snapshots`] folds two very
/// different things into one `failed` list: an image that genuinely could not
/// be rewritten, and one that was never *attempted* because another operation
/// held the project. Only the second is retryable, and only the second should
/// be described to the user as "come back in a minute" rather than "reset this
/// project". Splitting them needs a discriminator, and the refusal string is
/// the only one that crosses the module boundary — `try_acquire` returns
/// `Result<ProjectGuard, String>`, and `container.rs` pushes that `String`
/// through unchanged.
///
/// Matching on prose is normally a mistake, so this is pinned by
/// [`tests::a_real_lock_refusal_is_recognised_as_retryable`], which builds a
/// refusal by actually taking a guard rather than by copying the wording. If
/// `project_lock` ever rephrases, that test fails instead of this silently
/// misclassifying a credential that was left in place.
const PROJECT_BUSY_MARKER: &str = "Wait for it to finish before ";
/// Whether a scrub failure means "somebody else has this project right now",
/// which is transient, rather than "this image cannot be rewritten", which is
/// not. Nothing bollard returns contains [`PROJECT_BUSY_MARKER`].
fn is_project_busy_refusal(reason: &str) -> bool {
reason.contains(PROJECT_BUSY_MARKER)
}
/// What a cleanup managed to reach. Every field is about copies of the token
/// that live *outside* the keychain — snapshot images — so the same shape
/// serves [`clear_claude_token`], where the keychain entry is already gone by
/// the time this is returned, and [`sweep_claude_token_snapshots`], where the
/// keychain was never touched.
///
/// Three lists rather than one, because "we rewrote it", "we could not rewrite
/// it" and "we did not try" are three different things to tell somebody who
/// just revoked a credential, and only the last one is fixed by waiting.
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize)]
/// What [`clear_claude_token`] managed to reach. The keychain entry is always
/// gone by the time this is returned — the rest is about copies of the token
/// that live outside it.
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Serialize)]
pub struct ClearTokenOutcome {
/// Snapshot images that were holding the token and have been rewritten.
pub snapshots_scrubbed: Vec<String>,
/// Images still holding it, with the reason each could not be rewritten.
/// Non-empty means the revocation is **incomplete** and the UI must say so.
pub snapshots_failed: Vec<String>,
/// Images still holding it that were **not attempted**, because another
/// operation held the project (a start, a compaction, a migration). Also an
/// incomplete revocation — but a retryable one, and the UI must not offer
/// "Reset the project" as the remedy for it.
pub snapshots_skipped: Vec<String>,
/// Rewritten, but the pre-rewrite image object could not be deleted because
/// a container is still running off it. Worth mentioning, not worth
/// alarming about — see `SnapshotScrubReport::superseded_retained`.
@@ -1244,130 +1207,7 @@ pub struct ClearTokenOutcome {
pub docker_unavailable: Option<String>,
}
impl ClearTokenOutcome {
/// Whether a copy of the credential is known — or suspected — to still be
/// reachable, so the caller should offer to run the sweep again.
///
/// `snapshots_superseded` is deliberately not counted: that image is
/// untagged, nothing new is built from it, and it goes away on the next
/// restart. Re-running would report it forever and train the user to
/// ignore the warning.
pub fn needs_another_pass(&self) -> bool {
!self.snapshots_failed.is_empty()
|| !self.snapshots_skipped.is_empty()
|| self.docker_unavailable.is_some()
}
}
/// Fold a scrub report into the IPC shape, splitting the busy projects out of
/// the failures. Separate from the command so it can be tested without Docker.
fn summarise_scrub(report: crate::docker::container::SnapshotScrubReport) -> ClearTokenOutcome {
let mut outcome = ClearTokenOutcome {
snapshots_scrubbed: report.scrubbed,
snapshots_superseded: report.superseded_retained,
docker_unavailable: report.unavailable,
..Default::default()
};
for (image, reason) in report.failed {
let line = format!("{}: {}", image, reason);
if is_project_busy_refusal(&reason) {
outcome.snapshots_skipped.push(line);
} else {
outcome.snapshots_failed.push(line);
}
}
outcome
}
/// Which halves of a cleanup to run.
///
/// The distinction has to exist **on the wire**, not in a toast string. The UI
/// offers a "Retry snapshot cleanup" button after an incomplete revocation, and
/// while [`clear_claude_token`] was the only command behind it that button was
/// a *second revoke* wearing a retry's label: it deleted the keychain entry
/// unconditionally, with no confirmation, in a panel that survived the user
/// re-authenticating from the button directly above it. Pressing it then threw
/// away the token they had just acquired and said only that some images had
/// been checked.
///
/// [`Cleanup::ImagesOnly`] is the honest primitive the retry actually wanted:
/// the images are the durable record of what is left to do, so re-deriving the
/// work from Docker needs no keychain entry and must not consume one.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum Cleanup {
/// Delete the keychain entry, then rewrite the images. What "Revoke" does,
/// behind its confirmation modal.
KeychainThenImages,
/// Rewrite the images and leave the keychain entirely alone. What "Retry
/// snapshot cleanup" and "Check snapshot images" do.
ImagesOnly,
}
/// The body of both cleanup commands, with its two halves injected so the
/// *order* — and the fact that [`Cleanup::ImagesOnly`] never reaches the
/// keychain at all — can be tested without a keychain or a Docker daemon.
async fn run_cleanup<K, S, F>(
what: Cleanup,
delete_keychain: K,
sweep: S,
) -> Result<ClearTokenOutcome, String>
where
K: FnOnce() -> Result<(), String>,
S: FnOnce() -> F,
F: std::future::Future<Output = crate::docker::container::SnapshotScrubReport>,
{
let revoking = what == Cleanup::KeychainThenImages;
if revoking {
// First, and before anything slow — see "Why the keychain goes first".
// Nothing has been touched if this fails, so the error is the whole
// answer: the caller still has its Revoke button, and the standalone
// sweep is available for the images regardless.
if let Err(e) = delete_keychain() {
log::error!(
"Could not delete the shared Claude token from the keychain; no snapshot image \
was touched: {}",
e
);
return Err(e);
}
log::info!("Cleared the shared Claude authentication token from the keychain");
}
let report = sweep().await;
let swept_clean = !report.left_something_behind();
let outcome = summarise_scrub(report);
let lead = if revoking {
"Revoked the shared Claude token but"
} else {
"Swept the snapshot images but"
};
for image in &outcome.snapshots_failed {
log::warn!("{} could not clear it from {}", lead, image);
}
for image in &outcome.snapshots_skipped {
log::warn!(
"{} left it in {} — the project was busy; running the snapshot sweep again will retry",
lead,
image
);
}
if let Some(ref reason) = outcome.docker_unavailable {
log::warn!("{} checked no snapshot image at all: {}", lead, reason);
}
if swept_clean && !outcome.needs_another_pass() {
log::info!(
"No snapshot image is still holding the shared Claude token ({} rewritten)",
outcome.snapshots_scrubbed.len()
);
}
Ok(outcome)
}
/// Forget the shared Claude token, and remove the copies of it that outlive the
/// keychain entry.
/// Forget the shared Claude token.
///
/// Deleting the keychain entry is the easy half. The token also exists in two
/// other places, and a "Revoke" button that leaves either of them behind is
@@ -1383,81 +1223,34 @@ where
/// as long as the image exists. New commits no longer bake it in (see
/// [`crate::docker::container::commit_container_snapshot`]), but images
/// committed by earlier builds have to be rewritten, which is what
/// [`crate::docker::container::scrub_secrets_from_snapshots`] does here.
/// [`scrub_secrets_from_snapshots`] does here.
///
/// ## Why the keychain goes first
///
/// The sweep is not quick. It lists every `triple-c-snapshot-*` image and then
/// inspects, creates, commits and removes *per image*, over bollard's Docker
/// socket with its 120-second-per-request default. Deferring the keychain
/// delete behind all of that leaves the credential live for the whole window
/// while the UI says "Revoking…", and two separate things go wrong in it:
///
/// * A quit, a crash or a kill mid-sweep and the entry was never deleted at
/// all. The token the user believes they revoked is still in the keychain,
/// still ~1-year valid, and still injected into every container start.
/// * [`has_claude_token`] stays true throughout, and
/// [`crate::docker::container::create_container`] reads the keychain at
/// container-**create** time rather than at app start. The per-project
/// [`crate::project_lock::ProjectOp::SecretScrub`] guard is released as soon
/// as that one project's image has been rewritten — so a project scrubbed
/// early in the sweep can be started again later in the *same* sweep and be
/// handed a fresh copy of the credential in its env. The images end up clean
/// and the running fleet does not.
///
/// An earlier version ran the sweep first, on the argument that a crash
/// mid-sweep would otherwise leave the token in an image with the keychain
/// entry — and therefore the Revoke button — already gone. That argument was
/// about *recoverability*, and [`sweep_claude_token_snapshots`] answers it
/// directly: the images are the durable record, so the retry needs no keychain
/// entry to exist and no persisted to-do list. The comment that ordering
/// carried ("no window in which a scrubbed image is re-poisoned") was true of
/// images and silent about containers, which is where the leak was, and silent
/// about the minutes the token stayed live.
///
/// The keychain deletion is never rolled back if the scrub then fails; a
/// partially completed revocation is still better than none, and the outcome is
/// reported so the UI can be explicit about what is left.
/// The keychain deletion is never rolled back if the scrub fails; a partially
/// completed revocation is still better than none, and the outcome is reported
/// so the UI can be explicit about what is left.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn clear_claude_token() -> Result<ClearTokenOutcome, String> {
run_cleanup(
Cleanup::KeychainThenImages,
secure::delete_claude_oauth_token,
crate::docker::container::scrub_secrets_from_snapshots,
)
.await
}
secure::delete_claude_oauth_token()?;
log::info!("Cleared the shared Claude authentication token");
/// Rewrite every snapshot image that still carries a credential, **without
/// touching the keychain**.
///
/// This is the retry, and it is its own command because the retry is its own
/// act. `docker commit` copied the token into each project's snapshot image;
/// rewriting those images is a cleanup that has nothing to do with whether a
/// token is stored today, and folding it into [`clear_claude_token`] made every
/// press of "Retry snapshot cleanup" an unconfirmed credential deletion.
///
/// Safe to call at any time and in any state:
///
/// * with a token stored — a snapshot committed by an older build carries the
/// *current* token, and clearing it out of the image does not stop the
/// keychain entry being injected on the next container start;
/// * with nothing stored — images committed by earlier builds still carry
/// whatever token was live when they were committed, which is exactly the
/// case the old sweep-first ordering could strand;
/// * repeatedly — the work is re-derived from Docker each time, so an image
/// whose project was busy on the last pass is simply picked up on this one.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn sweep_claude_token_snapshots() -> Result<ClearTokenOutcome, String> {
run_cleanup(
Cleanup::ImagesOnly,
// Never called; the `ImagesOnly` branch is the entire point of this
// command, and a change that made it reachable must fail loudly rather
// than delete a credential quietly.
|| -> Result<(), String> { unreachable!("an images-only sweep must never touch the keychain") },
crate::docker::container::scrub_secrets_from_snapshots,
)
.await
let report = crate::docker::container::scrub_secrets_from_snapshots().await;
if report.left_something_behind() {
log::warn!(
"Revoked the shared Claude token but {} snapshot image(s) may still contain it",
report.failed.len()
);
}
Ok(ClearTokenOutcome {
snapshots_scrubbed: report.scrubbed,
snapshots_failed: report
.failed
.into_iter()
.map(|(image, reason)| format!("{}: {}", image, reason))
.collect(),
snapshots_superseded: report.superseded_retained,
docker_unavailable: report.unavailable,
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -1968,265 +1761,5 @@ mod tests {
seen.push_str(&s.push(format!("\nYour token: {}\n", tok).as_bytes()));
assert_eq!(parse_setup_token(&seen), Some(tok));
}
// ── Revocation: what the sweep leaves behind, and how it is described ──
use crate::docker::container::SnapshotScrubReport;
use crate::project_lock::{try_acquire, ProjectOp};
/// The classifier is a substring match on a message another module owns,
/// which is only safe if something notices when that module rephrases. So
/// build the refusal the way production does — by actually losing the
/// race — rather than by pasting the wording in here.
#[test]
fn a_real_lock_refusal_is_recognised_as_retryable() {
let project = "auth-token-test-busy-project";
let _held = try_acquire(project, ProjectOp::Compaction).expect("first claim");
let refusal = try_acquire(project, ProjectOp::SecretScrub)
.expect_err("a second claim on the same project must be refused");
assert!(
is_project_busy_refusal(&refusal),
"project_lock's refusal is no longer recognised as retryable: {:?}",
refusal
);
}
#[test]
fn a_docker_failure_is_not_mistaken_for_a_busy_project() {
for reason in [
"could not inspect: error trying to connect: No such file or directory",
"could not create a scratch container: conflict: name already in use",
"an untagged snapshot image holds a credential and cannot be rewritten",
] {
assert!(
!is_project_busy_refusal(reason),
"{:?} was misclassified as a transient lock refusal",
reason
);
}
}
#[test]
fn summarise_scrub_separates_a_busy_project_from_a_broken_image() {
let project = "auth-token-test-summarise-busy";
let _held = try_acquire(project, ProjectOp::Recreate).expect("first claim");
let refusal = try_acquire(project, ProjectOp::SecretScrub).expect_err("refused");
let outcome = summarise_scrub(SnapshotScrubReport {
scrubbed: vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest".into()],
failed: vec![
("triple-c-snapshot-b:latest".into(), refusal),
(
"triple-c-snapshot-c:latest".into(),
"could not create a scratch container: no such image".into(),
),
],
superseded_retained: vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest".into()],
unavailable: None,
});
assert_eq!(outcome.snapshots_scrubbed, vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest"]);
assert_eq!(outcome.snapshots_skipped.len(), 1, "{:?}", outcome);
assert!(outcome.snapshots_skipped[0].starts_with("triple-c-snapshot-b:latest: "));
assert_eq!(outcome.snapshots_failed.len(), 1, "{:?}", outcome);
assert!(outcome.snapshots_failed[0].starts_with("triple-c-snapshot-c:latest: "));
// The whole point: a skipped image is never folded into the scrubbed
// list, which is what "success" is rendered from.
assert!(!outcome.snapshots_scrubbed.iter().any(|s| s.contains("snapshot-b")));
}
#[test]
fn a_clean_sweep_needs_no_second_pass() {
let outcome = summarise_scrub(SnapshotScrubReport {
scrubbed: vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest".into()],
..Default::default()
});
assert!(!outcome.needs_another_pass());
}
#[test]
fn a_retained_superseded_image_alone_does_not_ask_for_a_second_pass() {
// The tag is clean; what is left is untagged and dies with the running
// container. Asking the user to sweep again would never stop.
let outcome = summarise_scrub(SnapshotScrubReport {
scrubbed: vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest".into()],
superseded_retained: vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest".into()],
..Default::default()
});
assert!(!outcome.needs_another_pass());
}
#[test]
fn anything_still_holding_the_credential_asks_for_a_second_pass() {
let skipped = summarise_scrub(SnapshotScrubReport {
failed: vec![(
"triple-c-snapshot-b:latest".into(),
format!("This project is being reset. {}resetting it.", PROJECT_BUSY_MARKER),
)],
..Default::default()
});
assert!(skipped.needs_another_pass());
assert_eq!(skipped.snapshots_skipped.len(), 1);
let failed = summarise_scrub(SnapshotScrubReport {
failed: vec![("triple-c-snapshot-c:latest".into(), "could not inspect: boom".into())],
..Default::default()
});
assert!(failed.needs_another_pass());
let blind = summarise_scrub(SnapshotScrubReport {
unavailable: Some("Docker is not running".into()),
..Default::default()
});
assert!(blind.needs_another_pass());
assert!(blind.snapshots_scrubbed.is_empty());
}
/// The IPC contract the frontend reads. A field renamed on this side and
/// not on that one is a silent "nothing was skipped".
#[test]
fn the_outcome_serialises_under_the_names_the_frontend_reads() {
let json = serde_json::to_value(ClearTokenOutcome::default()).expect("serialise");
let object = json.as_object().expect("an object");
for key in [
"snapshots_scrubbed",
"snapshots_failed",
"snapshots_skipped",
"snapshots_superseded",
"docker_unavailable",
] {
assert!(object.contains_key(key), "missing {} in {:?}", key, object);
}
}
// ── The order of a revocation, and what a retry may touch ─────────────
//
// `run_cleanup` takes both halves as arguments precisely so this can be
// asserted with no keychain and no Docker daemon: the recorded order *is*
// the subject. Sweep-first put a live ~1-year credential behind a
// per-image inspect/create/commit/rmi loop — minutes, at bollard's
// 120s-per-request default — during which `has_claude_token` stayed true
// and `create_container` kept handing the token to anything started.
/// Records which half ran, in order.
type Trace = std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<&'static str>>>;
fn trace() -> Trace {
std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()))
}
fn scrubbed_one() -> SnapshotScrubReport {
SnapshotScrubReport {
scrubbed: vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest".into()],
..Default::default()
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_keychain_entry_is_gone_before_the_first_image_is_touched() {
let t = trace();
let (tk, ts) = (t.clone(), t.clone());
let outcome = run_cleanup(
Cleanup::KeychainThenImages,
move || {
tk.lock().unwrap().push("keychain");
Ok(())
},
move || async move {
ts.lock().unwrap().push("sweep");
scrubbed_one()
},
)
.await
.expect("a cleanup whose halves both succeed is not an error");
assert_eq!(
*t.lock().unwrap(),
["keychain", "sweep"],
"the token stayed in the keychain — and therefore in every container created — \
for the whole length of the image sweep"
);
assert_eq!(outcome.snapshots_scrubbed, vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest"]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_keychain_failure_leaves_the_images_untouched_and_is_reported() {
let t = trace();
let ts = t.clone();
let err = run_cleanup(
Cleanup::KeychainThenImages,
|| Err("the keychain is locked".to_string()),
move || async move {
ts.lock().unwrap().push("sweep");
SnapshotScrubReport::default()
},
)
.await
.expect_err("a keychain that refused the delete must be reported, not swallowed");
assert_eq!(err, "the keychain is locked");
assert!(
t.lock().unwrap().is_empty(),
"images were rewritten for a revocation that never happened; the report is then \
discarded with the error and the user is told nothing they can act on"
);
}
/// The bug the images-only primitive exists to close: the "Retry snapshot
/// cleanup" button used to run `clear_claude_token`, so pressing it after
/// re-authenticating deleted the brand-new token with no confirmation.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_images_only_cleanup_never_reaches_the_keychain() {
let t = trace();
let (tk, ts) = (t.clone(), t.clone());
let outcome = run_cleanup(
Cleanup::ImagesOnly,
move || {
tk.lock().unwrap().push("keychain");
Ok(())
},
move || async move {
ts.lock().unwrap().push("sweep");
scrubbed_one()
},
)
.await
.expect("a sweep-only cleanup is not an error");
assert_eq!(
*t.lock().unwrap(),
["sweep"],
"the retry deleted a credential nobody confirmed deleting"
);
assert_eq!(outcome.snapshots_scrubbed, vec!["triple-c-snapshot-a:latest"]);
}
/// …and it still has to report what it could not finish, because "run it
/// again once that project is idle" is the whole affordance.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_images_only_cleanup_still_reports_what_it_could_not_finish() {
let outcome = run_cleanup(
Cleanup::ImagesOnly,
|| -> Result<(), String> { unreachable!("images only") },
|| async {
SnapshotScrubReport {
failed: vec![(
"triple-c-snapshot-b:latest".into(),
format!("This project is being started. {}removing a credential from its snapshot.", PROJECT_BUSY_MARKER),
)],
..Default::default()
}
},
)
.await
.expect("an image left for the next pass is not a command failure");
assert!(outcome.needs_another_pass());
assert_eq!(outcome.snapshots_skipped.len(), 1, "{:?}", outcome);
assert!(outcome.snapshots_failed.is_empty(), "{:?}", outcome);
}
}
@@ -37,3 +37,20 @@ pub async fn get_container_info(
docker::get_container_info(&project).await
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn list_sibling_containers() -> Result<Vec<serde_json::Value>, String> {
let containers = docker::list_sibling_containers().await?;
let result: Vec<serde_json::Value> = containers
.into_iter()
.map(|c| {
serde_json::json!({
"id": c.id,
"names": c.names,
"image": c.image,
"state": c.state,
"status": c.status,
})
})
.collect();
Ok(result)
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1200,14 +1200,9 @@ pub async fn add_scheduled_task(
/// * **In that order**, so a rejected `add` leaves the original untouched
/// rather than deleting a prompt the user cannot get back. The cost is a
/// sub-second window in which both tasks are in the crontab.
/// * The task therefore gets a **new id**, and its old log directory
/// (`~/.claude/scheduler/logs/<old-id>/`) goes with the removal — the
/// scheduler reaps a task's logs when the task stops existing, because
/// nothing can name that id again afterwards. The UI warns before saving.
/// (A project still running an older base image carries the older
/// `/usr/local/bin/triple-c-scheduler`, which left the directory behind;
/// `/usr/local/bin` only changes on a base-image migration or a Reset. The
/// copy is deliberately written for the case that loses data.)
/// * The task therefore gets a **new id**. Its old log directory
/// (`~/.claude/scheduler/logs/<old-id>/`) stays behind under the old id; the
/// UI warns about this before saving.
/// * `enabled` is carried over explicitly, because `add` always creates an
/// enabled task and silently re-enabling a task the user had switched off
/// would schedule a run they did not ask for.
+75 -749
View File
@@ -92,111 +92,8 @@ fn pick_recorded_lineage(
.or_else(|| from_snapshot.filter(|v| !v.is_empty()))
}
/// Reported as `probe_error` when there is genuinely nothing to read: no
/// container, stopped or otherwise, and no snapshot image.
///
/// It used to be reported for a *stopped* container too, which was simply
/// untrue — the container was sitting right there — and it disabled Update on
/// exactly the long-lived projects that had never been recreated and so had no
/// snapshot to fall back on.
const NOTHING_TO_PROBE: &str = "This project has no container or snapshot image yet, so there is nothing to compare against the base image.";
/// Where [`get_container_staleness`] reads the project's *current* filesystem
/// from, in descending order of how current the answer is.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum ProbeSource {
/// `docker exec` into the live container. The only source that includes
/// everything installed since the last commit *in this session*.
RunningContainer,
/// Commit the stopped container's writable layer to a throwaway image and
/// probe that. Exactly as current as the container, which is what makes it
/// preferable to the snapshot — see below.
StoppedContainer,
/// A throwaway container from `triple-c-snapshot-<id>:latest`.
Snapshot,
/// Nothing to read: no container, no snapshot.
Nothing,
}
/// Pick the probe source. `container_running` is `None` when the project has no
/// container at all, `Some(false)` when it has a stopped one.
///
/// **A stopped container outranks the snapshot.** The snapshot image is not a
/// checkpoint — `commit_container_snapshot` runs only before a removal (a
/// config-change recreate) or inside a migration, so a project that has never
/// hit either has *no snapshot at all*, however long it has been in use, and
/// one that has is stale by everything installed since. The container's
/// writable layer is the truth in both cases. This is the same argument
/// [`mig::manifest_from_container`] already makes for the running case; it does
/// not stop applying when the container is stopped.
///
/// Getting this wrong is what made a stopped, never-recreated project report
/// "no container or snapshot image yet" — with its container sitting right
/// there — and left Update disabled on the projects that most needed it.
fn pick_probe_source(container_running: Option<bool>, snapshot_exists: bool) -> ProbeSource {
match (container_running, snapshot_exists) {
(Some(true), _) => ProbeSource::RunningContainer,
(Some(false), _) => ProbeSource::StoppedContainer,
(None, true) => ProbeSource::Snapshot,
(None, false) => ProbeSource::Nothing,
}
}
/// Reported as `probe_error` when another operation owns the project and there
/// is no snapshot image to read instead. Deliberately not a claim about the
/// container: nothing is wrong with it, the answer is simply not safe to take
/// right now. See [`stopped_probe_policy`].
const PROJECT_BUSY: &str = "Another operation is running on this project, so its contents could not be inspected. Try again once it finishes.";
/// What to do about a stopped container, whose probe is the expensive one: it
/// commits the writable layer before it can read anything.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum StoppedProbe {
/// Commit and probe. The current answer, and the default.
Commit,
/// Probe the snapshot image instead. Less current — it lags the container by
/// everything installed since the last commit — but it allocates nothing and
/// touches nothing, which is what makes it the right answer while another
/// operation owns the container.
SnapshotInstead,
/// Report rather than guess.
Defer,
}
/// Pick what to do about a stopped container.
///
/// **Never commits while the project is claimed.** `get_container_staleness`
/// takes no [`crate::project_lock`] claim of its own, by design, so a commit
/// here can overlap a Recreate or Reset — and the collision is not symmetric.
/// The probe losing is harmless: a surfaced `probe_error` the user retries. The
/// *recreate* losing is not, because `start_project_container` removes the old
/// container with a hard `?`, so a non-404 from a remove that raced this commit
/// fails the whole Start with an opaque "Failed to remove container". Reading
/// the claim costs nothing and takes that failure off the table.
fn stopped_probe_policy(project_is_busy: bool, snapshot_exists: bool) -> StoppedProbe {
match (project_is_busy, snapshot_exists) {
(false, _) => StoppedProbe::Commit,
(true, true) => StoppedProbe::SnapshotInstead,
(true, false) => StoppedProbe::Defer,
}
}
/// Runs two filesystem probes (~3 s each) and is therefore meant to be called
/// on demand, not polled.
///
/// **Not read-only, despite only reporting.** The stopped-container path commits
/// a throwaway image and force-removes it, which makes this a writer of a
/// `triple-c-probe-*` image and puts it in the class of thing
/// [`crate::project_lock`] exists for — and it takes no claim. That is
/// deliberate: this is what the migration banner calls to decide whether to
/// offer an update, including while a migration is in flight, so refusing it
/// under a claim would blank the banner exactly when it has the most to say.
/// The exposure is bounded to a surfaced error — a concurrent Recreate, Reset or
/// migration can remove the container out from under the commit, and the result
/// is a `probe_error` the user can retry, never a damaged container or a
/// mislabelled image. Two overlapping probes cannot collide either, because
/// probe image names are unique per call; see
/// [`crate::docker::container::get_probe_image_name`].
/// Read-only. Runs two filesystem probes (~3 s each) and is therefore meant to
/// be called on demand, not polled.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn get_container_staleness(
project_id: String,
@@ -248,62 +145,16 @@ pub async fn get_container_staleness(
};
// ── Probes ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let container_running = match &container_id {
Some(id) => Some(docker::is_container_running(id).await.unwrap_or(false)),
None => None,
let running = match &container_id {
Some(id) => docker::is_container_running(id).await.unwrap_or(false),
None => false,
};
let snapshot_exists = docker::image_exists(&snapshot_image).await.unwrap_or(false);
let from_manifest = match (
pick_probe_source(container_running, snapshot_exists),
&container_id,
) {
(ProbeSource::RunningContainer, Some(id)) => mig::manifest_from_container(id).await,
(ProbeSource::StoppedContainer, Some(id)) => {
let busy = crate::project_lock::held(&project_id).is_some();
match stopped_probe_policy(busy, snapshot_exists) {
StoppedProbe::Commit => {
match mig::manifest_from_stopped_container_cached(id).await {
Ok(m) => Ok(m),
// **Never let a failed commit cost an answer the
// snapshot could have given.** Before stopped
// containers were readable at all, a stopped project
// fell straight through to its snapshot, so surfacing
// this error where the snapshot exists would make the
// banner *worse* than it was — and the ways this fails
// are the ones where the fallback matters most: a full
// disk (the commit has to allocate the whole writable
// layer; the snapshot probe allocates nothing) and a
// 409 from an operation that claimed the project after
// the check above.
Err(e) if snapshot_exists => {
log::warn!(
"Probing the stopped container for project {} failed ({}) — \
falling back to its snapshot image, which may lag it",
project_id,
e
);
mig::manifest_from_image(&snapshot_image).await
}
Err(e) => Err(e),
}
}
StoppedProbe::SnapshotInstead => {
log::info!(
"Project {} is claimed by another operation — probing its snapshot image \
rather than committing the container",
project_id
);
mig::manifest_from_image(&snapshot_image).await
}
StoppedProbe::Defer => Err(PROJECT_BUSY.to_string()),
}
}
(ProbeSource::Snapshot, _) => mig::manifest_from_image(&snapshot_image).await,
// `container_running` is `Some` exactly when `container_id` is, so the
// two arms above are the only ones those variants can reach. This arm
// is `ProbeSource::Nothing` — and now *only* that: it used to also
// swallow every stopped container, which is the bug.
(_, _) => Err(NOTHING_TO_PROBE.to_string()),
let from_manifest = if running {
mig::manifest_from_container(container_id.as_ref().unwrap()).await
} else if docker::image_exists(&snapshot_image).await.unwrap_or(false) {
mig::manifest_from_image(&snapshot_image).await
} else {
Err("This project has no container or snapshot image yet, so there is nothing to compare against the base image.".to_string())
};
let (from_manifest, base_manifest) = match from_manifest {
@@ -376,62 +227,58 @@ async fn container_label(container_id: &str, label: &str) -> Option<String> {
// Migrate
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Project ids with a migration running **in this process right now**.
///
/// Two things need it. `reconcile_project_statuses` is callable from the
/// frontend at any time, not only at startup, and a live migration looks
/// exactly like a crashed one from the outside (state file says `in-progress`,
/// container carries the label) — without this guard a reconcile mid-run would
/// rewrite the phase to `interrupted` underneath a migration that is fine.
/// It also makes a second concurrent `migrate_project_to_base` for the same
/// project impossible.
static ACTIVE_MIGRATIONS: std::sync::OnceLock<
std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<String>>,
> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
fn active_migrations() -> &'static std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<String>> {
ACTIVE_MIGRATIONS.get_or_init(|| std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()))
}
/// Whether a migration for this project is running **in this process right
/// now**. Every command that stops, removes or recreates the project's
/// container has to consult it: the window between `remove_container` and the
/// create that follows looks exactly like "no container", and an ordinary
/// Start landing in it creates a second container under the same name.
///
/// **This is now a view onto [`crate::project_lock`], not a set of its own.**
/// It used to be the app's only mutual-exclusion primitive, and it was one-way:
/// a migration claimed a project, everything else merely polled this once at
/// entry and never claimed anything. Two non-migration writers of
/// `triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest` — a compaction and a recreate — could not
/// see each other at all. Folding the set into the shared registry means there
/// is exactly one answer to "is something happening to this project", and this
/// function is the specialisation of it that reconcile still needs: a *live*
/// migration is indistinguishable from a crashed one from the outside, and only
/// this process knows which it is looking at.
///
/// No production caller on this branch: the Disk panel's survey was the last
/// one, and it went to `hold/disk-and-dragout`. Kept — and still exercised by
/// `a_live_migration_is_distinguishable_from_a_crashed_one` — because it is the
/// one named answer to that question and re-inventing it is how the two
/// disagreeing answers happened the first time.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) fn is_migrating(project_id: &str) -> bool {
crate::project_lock::is_held_by(project_id, crate::project_lock::ProjectOp::Migration)
active_migrations()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.contains(project_id)
}
/// RAII marker: releases the project's [`crate::project_lock`] claim however
/// the migration ends, including an early `?`.
///
/// Kept as a named type rather than using [`crate::project_lock::ProjectGuard`]
/// directly so the migration path keeps reading as "take the migration guard",
/// and so the one place that decides what a migration's claim *is* stays here.
struct ActiveGuard(#[allow(dead_code)] crate::project_lock::ProjectGuard);
/// RAII marker: removes the project from [`ACTIVE_MIGRATIONS`] however the
/// migration ends, including an early `?`.
struct ActiveGuard(String);
impl ActiveGuard {
/// `Err` with the registry's own refusal when a migration — **or anything
/// else** — already holds this project.
///
/// The error string is the point. This returned `Option`, and all three
/// callers replaced the discarded reason with a sentence about a migration
/// — so a user blocked by a *compaction*, a reset or a cache clear was told
/// to wait for a base update that was not running, with nothing in the UI
/// that could ever name what actually held the project.
/// `project_lock::try_acquire` already composes "what holds it" with "what
/// you were trying to do"; there is nothing to add to it here.
///
/// The tail it composes is `ProjectOp::Migration`'s — "…before starting a
/// base update" — for confirm and rollback as well as for the migration
/// itself. That is the class all three belong to, and splitting it would
/// mean a `ProjectOp` variant per command: the wrong place to encode a
/// verb, for a phrase that is at worst imprecise where the old one was
/// simply wrong.
fn acquire(project_id: &str) -> Result<Self, String> {
crate::project_lock::try_acquire(project_id, crate::project_lock::ProjectOp::Migration)
.map(Self)
/// `None` when a migration is already running for this project.
fn acquire(project_id: &str) -> Option<Self> {
let mut set = active_migrations()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
if !set.insert(project_id.to_string()) {
return None;
}
Some(Self(project_id.to_string()))
}
}
impl Drop for ActiveGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
active_migrations()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.remove(&self.0);
}
}
@@ -447,9 +294,10 @@ pub async fn migrate_project_to_base(
app_handle: tauri::AppHandle,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<MigrationReport, String> {
let _guard = match ActiveGuard::acquire(&project_id) {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(busy) => return Ok(MigrationReport::failed_preflight(&busy)),
let Some(_guard) = ActiveGuard::acquire(&project_id) else {
return Ok(MigrationReport::failed_preflight(
"A migration is already running for this project.",
));
};
let existing = migration_store::load(&project_id)?;
@@ -612,33 +460,6 @@ async fn fresh_migration(
}
}
// Scrub *before* the stop, not inside the commit below. `scrub_writable_layer`
// is a `docker exec`, which only works on a running container — and the
// pre-swap commit is the single largest snapshot Triple-C ever takes, so
// letting this one path commit unscrubbed is what the scrub exists to
// prevent. Failure is swallowed inside; it must never block a migration.
//
// The outcome is logged rather than discarded: this is the one scrub whose
// silence would be expensive, because the layer it declined to clean is
// about to be committed into a snapshot that outlives the migration.
//
// H2: **bind it first.** `ScrubOutcome` is `#[must_use]`, and the way that
// was satisfied here was by folding the awaited call into `log::info!`'s
// argument list. `log::info!` expands to
// `if Info <= max_level() { … }` — so the arguments, this data-integrity
// step among them, live inside the level check and do not run at all when
// the global filter is `Off`. That is reachable: `logging::init` tolerates
// `dispatch.apply()` failing, and fern returns *before* `set_max_level` on
// error, so a process that failed to install a logger sits at `Off` with
// every `log::` argument list silently dead. The scrub would then never
// run, and the unscrubbed layer would be committed into the longest-lived
// snapshot the app takes. `commit_container_snapshot` gets this right for
// the same reason; nothing may put an effect inside a log macro's
// arguments. (`logging::init` now also restores the level on failure, but
// the call site is not allowed to depend on that.)
let scrub = docker::scrub_writable_layer(&container_id).await;
log::info!("Pre-migration scrub of {}{}", container_id, scrub.commit_log_suffix());
emit_progress(&app_handle, &project_id, "Stopping the container...");
let _ = state
.projects_store
@@ -1007,7 +828,12 @@ pub async fn confirm_migration(
let _ = &state;
// Confirming drops the only way back. Doing that underneath a running
// migration would delete the pin it is relying on mid-flight.
let _guard = ActiveGuard::acquire(&project_id)?;
let Some(_guard) = ActiveGuard::acquire(&project_id) else {
return Err(
"A container base update is running for this project right now. Wait for it to finish."
.to_string(),
);
};
let Some(mstate) = migration_store::load(&project_id)? else {
return Ok(());
};
@@ -1037,7 +863,7 @@ pub async fn confirm_migration(
// waiting for the project's next recreation would leave it lying around
// indefinitely.
tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async {
crate::docker::sweep_orphaned_snapshots_logged("after migration confirmed").await;
crate::docker::sweep_orphaned_snapshots().await;
});
Ok(())
@@ -1054,7 +880,12 @@ pub async fn rollback_migration(
app_handle: tauri::AppHandle,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let _guard = ActiveGuard::acquire(&project_id)?;
let Some(_guard) = ActiveGuard::acquire(&project_id) else {
return Err(
"A container base update is running for this project right now. Wait for it to finish."
.to_string(),
);
};
let mut project = state
.projects_store
@@ -1126,16 +957,6 @@ pub async fn rollback_migration(
let _ = mig::untag_image(&rollback_ref).await;
migration_store::clear_staging(&project_id)?;
migration_store::clear(&project_id)?;
// Retagging above moved `:latest` off the *migrated* snapshot, and the
// container that was built from it was removed a few lines up — so a
// multi-gigabyte image is sitting there untagged and unreferenced with
// nothing else in the app that would ever look at it again. The confirm
// path sweeps for exactly this reason; rolling back orphans just as much
// and did not.
tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async {
crate::docker::sweep_orphaned_snapshots_logged("after migration rollback").await;
});
emit_progress(
&app_handle,
&project_id,
@@ -1167,203 +988,9 @@ pub async fn get_migration_state(
pub async fn reconcile_migration(project: &Project, app_handle: &tauri::AppHandle) {
// A migration running right now is indistinguishable from a crashed one
// from the outside; only this process knows the difference.
//
// **Any holder, not just a migration.** This asked `is_migrating`, which is
// `held() == Some(Migration)` — so a compaction, a reset or a destroy
// holding the project made this fall straight through and start rewriting
// the migration record's phase and untagging its rollback image underneath
// whatever was running. `reconcile_project_statuses` is a command, not just
// a startup step, so "nothing else can be running yet" is not available as
// an argument.
//
// Yielding is right; yielding *forever* was not. The only caller fires once
// per "Docker became available", so a project that happened to be held at
// that instant was never looked at again for the rest of the session: its
// phase stayed un-normalised, no resume or rollback was ever offered, and
// its `:pre-migration-*` pin stayed `Claimed`. So the visit is deferred
// rather than dropped — see [`defer_migration_reconcile`].
if let Some(holder) = crate::project_lock::held(&project.id) {
log::debug!(
"Deferring migration reconcile for '{}' ({}): {}",
project.name,
project.id,
holder.describe()
);
defer_migration_reconcile(project, app_handle);
if is_migrating(&project.id) {
return;
}
reconcile_migration_now(project, app_handle).await;
}
/// How long [`defer_migration_reconcile`] waits between looks, and how many
/// times it looks.
///
/// The operations it is waiting behind are minutes long — a Reset recreates a
/// container from a base image, a compaction rebuilds a multi-gigabyte
/// snapshot — so the interval is coarse on purpose: this is a `held()` read
/// against an in-process map, but every wakeup is a task and the point is to
/// catch the release, not to catch it promptly. Twenty seconds × ninety is
/// thirty minutes, comfortably past the longest measured compaction, after
/// which the project is left for the next `reconcile_project_statuses`.
const RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(20);
const RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS: usize = 90;
/// Project ids with a deferred reconcile already waiting.
///
/// `reconcile_project_statuses` is a command the frontend can call more than
/// once — every "Docker became available" — and each call walks every project.
/// Without this, a project held for a few minutes would accumulate one waiting
/// task per call, all of which would then reconcile the same record in a row.
fn reconcile_retries() -> &'static std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<String>> {
static RETRIES: std::sync::OnceLock<std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<String>>> =
std::sync::OnceLock::new();
RETRIES.get_or_init(|| std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()))
}
/// One project's place in [`reconcile_retries`], handed back on drop.
///
/// RAII for the reason [`crate::project_lock::ProjectGuard`] sets out, and this
/// claim is the case that proves the rule: the release used to be a trailing
/// statement at the bottom of the spawned task in
/// [`defer_migration_reconcile`], sitting after an `.await` on
/// [`reconcile_migration_now`]. A panic in there — or the future simply being
/// dropped, which is what happens to every in-flight task at shutdown — skips
/// the statement, and nothing else ever removes an id from that set. The
/// project is then fenced off from *every* later deferral for the rest of the
/// process: each `reconcile_project_statuses` pass finds it held, fails to
/// claim, and returns, so the phase stays un-normalised, no resume or rollback
/// is offered, and the `:pre-migration-*` pin stays `Claimed`. That is the
/// session-long silence deferring was written to end, reintroduced one panic
/// later and lasting until the app is restarted.
///
/// Dropping this hands the claim straight back, so a caller that discards the
/// value has claimed nothing while reading as though it had; `#[must_use]`
/// makes that a compile warning rather than a second waiter on one record.
#[must_use = "the claim is handed back the moment this guard drops; bind it inside the waiting task, for the whole task"]
struct ReconcileRetryClaim {
project_id: String,
}
impl Drop for ReconcileRetryClaim {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// `into_inner` past poisoning, as in `project_lock`: the only thing
// ever done while holding this mutex is a single `HashSet` insert or
// remove, so a panic on another thread cannot have left it half
// written — and declining to release here would strand the project
// permanently, which is the exact failure the guard exists to stop.
reconcile_retries()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.remove(&self.project_id);
}
}
/// Claim the right to be the one deferred reconcile for `project_id`.
/// `None` means somebody else already is.
fn claim_reconcile_retry(project_id: &str) -> Option<ReconcileRetryClaim> {
reconcile_retries()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.insert(project_id.to_string())
.then(|| ReconcileRetryClaim {
project_id: project_id.to_string(),
})
}
/// Come back to a project that was held when [`reconcile_migration`] reached it.
///
/// Only for projects that have a record on disk: [`migration_store::has_record`]
/// is filesystem presence, so it costs nothing and is deliberately the *cheap*
/// question — every project is walked on every reconcile and almost none of
/// them have a migration in flight. A record that exists but cannot be parsed
/// answers `true` here and is handled, conservatively, by `load` when the
/// retry lands.
///
/// The wait is a poll rather than a notification because `project_lock` has no
/// release hook and giving it one would mean a guard's `Drop` waking tasks
/// while it still holds the map's mutex. A read of an in-process `HashMap`
/// every twenty seconds, for as long as one operation is running on one
/// project, is not worth a condvar.
fn defer_migration_reconcile(project: &Project, app_handle: &tauri::AppHandle) {
// No record means nothing to come back for. An unreadable migrations
// directory answers "maybe", and maybe is worth a look.
if !migration_store::has_record(&project.id).unwrap_or(true) {
return;
}
let Some(claim) = claim_reconcile_retry(&project.id) else {
return;
};
let project = project.clone();
let app_handle = app_handle.clone();
tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async move {
// Moved in and bound for the whole body, rather than released by a
// statement at the bottom: everything below this line can panic or be
// dropped mid-await, and a claim that only comes back on the happy path
// is a claim that eventually does not come back at all. See
// [`ReconcileRetryClaim`].
let _claim = claim;
let released =
await_release(&project.id, RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL, RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS).await;
if released {
// Whatever was holding it may have finished the migration itself or
// cleared the record — `reconcile_migration_now` loads the record
// first and returns on `None`, so that is a no-op rather than a
// special case here.
reconcile_migration_now(&project, &app_handle).await;
} else {
log::warn!(
"Gave up waiting to reconcile the migration record for '{}' ({}): it has been \
held for {} minutes. Its phase is unchanged and its rollback pin is still \
claimed; the next reconcile pass will try again.",
project.name,
project.id,
RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL.as_secs() as usize * RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS / 60
);
}
});
}
/// Wait for `project_id` to stop being held: `attempts` looks, the first
/// immediate and the rest `interval` apart. `true` means it was released,
/// `false` that the budget ran out with it still held.
///
/// Split out of [`defer_migration_reconcile`] so the waiting can be tested
/// against a real [`crate::project_lock`] guard on a paused clock — the parts
/// that are easy to get wrong are "gives up while still holding the claim",
/// "never looks again", and the ordering of the look against the sleep, none of
/// which is visible from the constants.
async fn await_release(
project_id: &str,
interval: std::time::Duration,
attempts: usize,
) -> bool {
for attempt in 0..attempts {
// Look first, sleep second. Sleeping first charged every deferral a
// full interval before anyone read the map even once, and the common
// case is a holder that has already let go: `held()` is sampled in
// `reconcile_migration`, a task is spawned, and by the time it is first
// polled the Reset that was on its last step is frequently finished.
// That bought nothing and cost twenty seconds of a startup pass waiting
// on a lock nobody holds, in front of a check that is one `HashMap`
// lookup.
if crate::project_lock::held(project_id).is_none() {
return true;
}
// And no sleep after the final look: nothing reads the map again
// afterwards, so it is twenty seconds of delay in front of a `false`
// that has already been decided. The budget is still `attempts` looks,
// which is what the constants above are chosen against.
if attempt + 1 < attempts {
tokio::time::sleep(interval).await;
}
}
false
}
/// [`reconcile_migration`] with the "is anything holding this project" question
/// already answered.
async fn reconcile_migration_now(project: &Project, app_handle: &tauri::AppHandle) {
let state = match migration_store::load(&project.id) {
Ok(Some(s)) => s,
Ok(None) => return,
@@ -1519,23 +1146,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn purge_migration_artifacts(project_id: &str) {
}
}
}
Ok(None) => {
// **`Ok(None)` is not the same as "no file".** `migration_store::load`
// now reports an *unparseable* record as absent while deliberately
// leaving it on disk, so that `has_record` goes on protecting the
// rollback pin it describes. Returning here on that would leave the
// file — and therefore a permanently "claimed" pin — behind a Reset
// that has just deleted the snapshot and both volumes the record
// could possibly refer to.
if !migration_store::has_record(project_id).unwrap_or(false) {
return;
}
log::warn!(
"Project {} has a migration record that could not be read; removing it anyway \
because a Reset supersedes it",
project_id
);
}
Ok(None) => return,
Err(e) => log::warn!(
"Could not read the migration record for {} while cleaning up: {}",
project_id,
@@ -1544,10 +1155,6 @@ pub(crate) async fn purge_migration_artifacts(project_id: &str) {
}
let _ = migration_store::clear_staging(project_id);
let _ = migration_store::clear(project_id);
// The pins this project had are gone with the snapshot; their grace clocks
// are meaningless and would otherwise sit in the migrations directory
// forever.
migration_store::clear_ownerless_for_project(project_id);
}
fn default_docker_socket() -> String {
@@ -2113,59 +1720,6 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(pick_recorded_lineage(some(""), None), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_stopped_container_is_probed_rather_than_reported_missing() {
// The regression: a container that exists but is stopped, with no
// snapshot ever taken, read as "nothing to compare against".
assert_eq!(
pick_probe_source(Some(false), false),
ProbeSource::StoppedContainer
);
}
#[test]
fn the_container_outranks_the_snapshot_whether_or_not_it_is_running() {
// The snapshot lags the container by everything installed since the
// last commit, in both states.
assert_eq!(
pick_probe_source(Some(true), true),
ProbeSource::RunningContainer
);
assert_eq!(
pick_probe_source(Some(false), true),
ProbeSource::StoppedContainer
);
}
#[test]
fn the_snapshot_is_the_fallback_only_once_the_container_is_gone() {
assert_eq!(pick_probe_source(None, true), ProbeSource::Snapshot);
}
#[test]
fn nothing_to_probe_is_reserved_for_no_container_and_no_snapshot() {
// The one case the "no container or snapshot image yet" message may
// still describe.
assert_eq!(pick_probe_source(None, false), ProbeSource::Nothing);
}
#[test]
fn a_stopped_container_is_committed_only_when_nothing_else_owns_the_project() {
assert_eq!(stopped_probe_policy(false, false), StoppedProbe::Commit);
assert_eq!(stopped_probe_policy(false, true), StoppedProbe::Commit);
}
#[test]
fn a_busy_project_falls_back_rather_than_racing_a_recreate() {
// The snapshot lags, but a stale answer beats failing someone's Start.
assert_eq!(
stopped_probe_policy(true, true),
StoppedProbe::SnapshotInstead
);
// Nothing to fall back to: say so instead of committing anyway.
assert_eq!(stopped_probe_policy(true, false), StoppedProbe::Defer);
}
#[test]
fn byte_sizes_read_the_way_a_disk_warning_should() {
assert_eq!(human_bytes(512), "512 B");
@@ -2324,23 +1878,16 @@ mod tests {
{
let g = ActiveGuard::acquire(id).expect("first acquire must succeed");
assert!(is_migrating(id));
let refused = ActiveGuard::acquire(id)
.err()
.expect("a second concurrent migration must be refused");
// The refusal has to say what is holding the project, not what the
// caller happens to be — the three commands used to substitute
// their own sentence for this and lost the distinction.
assert!(
refused.contains("base update"),
"the refusal must name the holder: {}",
refused
ActiveGuard::acquire(id).is_none(),
"a second concurrent migration must be refused"
);
drop(g);
}
assert!(!is_migrating(id), "the guard must release on drop");
// …including when the migration bailed out through an early return.
fn early_return(id: &str) -> Option<()> {
let _g = ActiveGuard::acquire(id).ok()?;
let _g = ActiveGuard::acquire(id)?;
None
}
assert!(early_return(id).is_none());
@@ -2354,225 +1901,4 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!r.rollback_available);
assert!(r.packages_requested.is_empty());
}
/// No `await` may sit inside a `log::*!` argument list — H2, generalised.
///
/// `log::info!(a, b)` expands to `if Info <= max_level() { … a … b … }`, so
/// an argument is only evaluated while the level admits the record. Folding
/// `scrub_writable_layer(&id).await.commit_log_suffix()` into the arguments
/// here — done to satisfy `#[must_use]` on `ScrubOutcome` — therefore made
/// the pre-migration scrub conditional on the log level, and
/// `logging::init` deliberately tolerates failing to install a logger,
/// which leaves `max_level()` at `Off`. A scrub that never runs before the
/// largest snapshot the app takes is not something a log level may decide.
///
/// Scanned over the source rather than asserted at one call site: the bug
/// is a shape, and it is reintroduced by whoever next has a `#[must_use]`
/// value they only want to log.
#[test]
fn nothing_awaits_inside_a_log_macros_arguments() {
let sources: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
("commands/migration_commands.rs", include_str!("migration_commands.rs")),
("docker/container.rs", include_str!("../docker/container.rs")),
("docker/migration.rs", include_str!("../docker/migration.rs")),
("logging.rs", include_str!("../logging.rs")),
];
let macros = ["log::error!(", "log::warn!(", "log::info!(", "log::debug!(", "log::trace!("];
let mut scanned = 0usize;
for (name, src) in sources {
for mac in macros {
let mut from = 0usize;
while let Some(at) = src[from..].find(mac) {
let start = from + at + mac.len();
// Balance the macro's own parentheses. String literals in
// these call sites never contain an unbalanced one, and a
// `(` inside a format string would only ever widen the
// slice, i.e. fail safe.
let mut depth = 1usize;
let mut end = start;
for (i, c) in src[start..].char_indices() {
match c {
'(' => depth += 1,
')' => {
depth -= 1;
if depth == 0 {
end = start + i;
break;
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
let args = &src[start..end];
// This test's own name mentions the thing it forbids.
assert!(
!args.contains(".await"),
"{}: an `.await` inside a `{}` argument list stops happening whenever the \
log level does not admit the record:\n{}",
name,
mac.trim_end_matches('('),
args
);
scanned += 1;
from = end.max(start);
}
}
}
// A scanner that matched nothing would pass silently forever.
assert!(scanned > 80, "only {} log call sites were scanned", scanned);
}
/// MEDIUM: a project held when the reconcile pass reached it must be
/// revisited, not dropped for the session.
///
/// `reconcile_project_statuses` fires once per "Docker became available",
/// so the old `return` meant a project that happened to be mid-Reset at
/// that instant never had its migration phase normalised, was never offered
/// resume or rollback, and kept its `:pre-migration-*` pin `Claimed` — for
/// the rest of the session. On a paused clock, so the thirty-minute budget
/// costs nothing.
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn a_held_project_is_revisited_once_the_holder_lets_go() {
let id = format!("await-release-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let guard = crate::project_lock::try_acquire(&id, crate::project_lock::ProjectOp::Reset)
.expect("a fresh project id is not held");
let waiting = {
let id = id.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
await_release(&id, RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL, RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS).await
})
};
// Long enough that several looks have already happened and found it
// held, so this cannot pass by the waiter never having polled.
tokio::time::sleep(RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL * 3).await;
assert!(!waiting.is_finished(), "the waiter returned while the project was held");
drop(guard);
assert!(
waiting.await.expect("the waiter task"),
"the holder let go and the reconcile never came back"
);
}
/// And the budget is finite: a project held indefinitely does not leave a
/// task waiting on it forever, and the claim is handed back either way.
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn waiting_for_a_holder_gives_up_eventually() {
let id = format!("await-release-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let _guard =
crate::project_lock::try_acquire(&id, crate::project_lock::ProjectOp::Migration)
.expect("a fresh project id is not held");
assert!(!await_release(&id, RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL, RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS).await);
// Thirty minutes: past the longest measured compaction, and the thing
// being waited on is always a bounded, user-initiated operation.
assert!(RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS > 0, "deferring would be a no-op");
let budget = RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL * RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS as u32;
assert!(budget >= std::time::Duration::from_secs(15 * 60), "{:?}", budget);
}
/// MEDIUM: an unheld project is reconciled now, not in twenty seconds.
///
/// The wait slept before its first look, so a holder that let go between
/// `reconcile_migration` sampling `held()` and this task being polled — the
/// *common* case, since a deferral is only taken when something was on its
/// way out — still cost a full `RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL` of a startup pass
/// waiting on a lock nobody held. On a paused clock the assertion is exact:
/// the fixed shape returns without the clock moving at all, the sleep-first
/// shape cannot return before it has advanced one interval.
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn an_unheld_project_is_seen_without_waiting_out_an_interval() {
let id = format!("await-release-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
assert!(
crate::project_lock::held(&id).is_none(),
"a fresh uuid is not held"
);
let before = tokio::time::Instant::now();
assert!(await_release(&id, RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL, RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS).await);
let waited = tokio::time::Instant::now() - before;
assert_eq!(
waited,
std::time::Duration::ZERO,
"an already-released project cost {:?} before anyone looked",
waited
);
}
#[test]
fn only_one_deferred_reconcile_waits_per_project() {
// Every "Docker became available" walks every project, so without the
// claim a project held for a few minutes accumulates one waiting task
// per call — all of which then reconcile the same record in a row.
let id = format!("retry-claim-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let other = format!("retry-claim-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let first = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("a fresh project id is unclaimed");
assert!(
claim_reconcile_retry(&id).is_none(),
"a second waiter was allowed in"
);
let other_claim =
claim_reconcile_retry(&other).expect("the claim is not per-project");
drop(first);
// Bound rather than discarded: the guard releases on drop, so
// `claim_reconcile_retry(&id);` as a bare statement would test nothing
// — which is what `#[must_use]` is there to catch in real callers.
let retaken = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("the claim was never handed back");
drop(retaken);
drop(other_claim);
// And the other project's claim was never the same claim.
drop(claim_reconcile_retry(&other).expect("released independently"));
}
/// MEDIUM: the claim survives the task that holds it dying badly.
///
/// The release used to be a trailing statement after
/// `reconcile_migration_now(...).await` at the bottom of the spawned task,
/// so a panic anywhere in that call — or the future being dropped at
/// shutdown — skipped it and left the id in the set with no task behind it.
/// Nothing removes it afterwards, so that project could never be deferred
/// again for the rest of the process: exactly the state deferring was added
/// to prevent, now permanent instead of one pass long. Fails against the
/// trailing-statement shape, which is the point.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_panicking_deferred_reconcile_hands_its_claim_back() {
let id = format!("retry-claim-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let claimed = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("a fresh project id is unclaimed");
// Spawned, not just called: the real claim is held across an await
// inside a `tauri::async_runtime::spawn`, and a task panic is caught by
// the runtime rather than unwinding the caller.
let task = {
let id = id.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _claim = claimed;
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
panic!("reconcile_migration_now blew up on '{}'", id);
})
};
assert!(task.await.is_err(), "the task was supposed to panic");
let after = claim_reconcile_retry(&id);
assert!(
after.is_some(),
"a panicking reconcile stranded the claim — this project can never be \
deferred again for the rest of the process"
);
drop(after);
// The other half of the same failure: a task that is simply dropped
// mid-flight, which is every in-flight task at shutdown.
let claimed = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("released above");
let never_finishes = tokio::spawn(async move {
let _claim = claimed;
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
});
never_finishes.abort();
let _ = never_finishes.await;
assert!(
claim_reconcile_retry(&id).is_some(),
"a dropped task stranded the claim"
);
}
}
-2
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,8 @@ pub mod help_commands;
pub mod inspect_commands;
pub mod install_helper_commands;
pub mod migration_commands;
pub mod notes_commands;
pub mod project_commands;
pub mod settings_commands;
pub mod settings_export_commands;
pub mod stt_commands;
pub mod terminal_commands;
pub mod update_commands;
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
use crate::models::Note;
use crate::storage::notes_store;
/// Every project's notes, oldest concept first: pinned notes, then most
/// recently edited.
///
/// Sorted here rather than in the webview so the dock and the tab — two views
/// of the same list — cannot drift into two different orders.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn list_notes(project_id: String) -> Result<Vec<Note>, String> {
let mut notes = notes_store::load(&project_id)?;
notes.sort_by(|a, b| {
b.pinned
.cmp(&a.pinned)
.then_with(|| b.updated_at.cmp(&a.updated_at))
});
Ok(notes)
}
/// Insert or replace one note.
///
/// There is deliberately no whole-list setter. A bulk write is exactly the
/// clobbering this store's per-project file exists to avoid, and every caller
/// here is editing one note.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn save_note(project_id: String, note: Note) -> Result<Note, String> {
notes_store::upsert(&project_id, note)
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn delete_note(project_id: String, note_id: String) -> Result<(), String> {
notes_store::delete(&project_id, &note_id)
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -10,72 +10,12 @@ pub async fn get_settings(state: State<'_, AppState>) -> Result<AppSettings, Str
Ok(state.settings_store.get())
}
/// Everything `update_settings` refuses a save over, run against the store's
/// *current* value and the incoming one.
///
/// Pulled out so a caller that does other, harder-to-undo work alongside a
/// settings save — `settings_export_commands::apply_settings_import`
/// restores three keychain secrets in the same command — can run this
/// *first* and bail before touching anything, rather than discovering the
/// rejection only when `update_settings` itself runs partway through.
pub fn validate_settings_update(
before: &AppSettings,
incoming: &AppSettings,
) -> Result<(), String> {
// The global half of the same rule the project half gets in
// `update_project`: a global custom env var is merged into every project's
// container environment, so an unchecked name here reaches all of them.
crate::models::validate_env_vars_update(
&before.global_custom_env_vars,
&incoming.global_custom_env_vars,
)?;
// The same for the two host paths this struct owns. `update_project`
// validated its per-project overrides and this side validated nothing,
// which left the wider hole of the two: `default_ssh_key_path` is the
// fallback for **every** project without an override
// (`container.rs`'s `create_container`), so `/` here read-only bind-mounts
// the whole host at `/tmp/.host-ssh` for all of them — and `entrypoint.sh`
// then does `cp -a /tmp/.host-ssh ~/.ssh`, recursively copying it into the
// home volume this release exists to bound.
//
// Grandfathered the same way project paths are: a value carried over
// unchanged still saves, so a store written before this check cannot lock
// the user out of their own settings.
crate::commands::project_commands::validate_mounted_host_path(
"SSH key path",
before.default_ssh_key_path.as_deref(),
incoming.default_ssh_key_path.as_deref(),
)?;
crate::commands::project_commands::validate_mounted_host_path(
"CA certificate path",
before.ca_cert_path.as_deref(),
incoming.ca_cert_path.as_deref(),
)?;
// Third host path this struct owns, same reasoning: any project with
// `allow_docker_access` bind-mounts this path in as the Docker socket
// (`project_commands.rs`'s container creation), so an unchecked value
// here is a read-write bind mount of whatever it names into every such
// project's container.
crate::commands::project_commands::validate_mounted_host_path(
"Docker socket path",
before.docker_socket_path.as_deref(),
incoming.docker_socket_path.as_deref(),
)?;
Ok(())
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn update_settings(
settings: AppSettings,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<AppSettings, String> {
let before = state.settings_store.get();
validate_settings_update(&before, &settings)?;
let saved = state.settings_store.update(settings)?;
// Persisting a setting is not the same as applying it. The gateway is the
@@ -150,10 +90,7 @@ async fn reconcile_gateway(before: &GatewaySettings, after: &GatewaySettings) {
GatewayAction::StopIfRunning => {
log::info!("Model gateway disabled in settings — stopping the container");
if let Err(e) = docker::gateway::stop_gateway_container().await {
log::error!(
"Failed to stop the model gateway after it was disabled: {}",
e
);
log::error!("Failed to stop the model gateway after it was disabled: {}", e);
}
}
GatewayAction::RestartIfRunning => {
@@ -169,7 +106,10 @@ async fn reconcile_gateway(before: &GatewaySettings, after: &GatewaySettings) {
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn pull_image(image_name: String, app_handle: tauri::AppHandle) -> Result<(), String> {
pub async fn pull_image(
image_name: String,
app_handle: tauri::AppHandle,
) -> Result<(), String> {
use tauri::Emitter;
docker::pull_image(&image_name, move |msg| {
let _ = app_handle.emit("image-pull-progress", msg);
@@ -362,10 +302,7 @@ mod tests {
let before = enabled_gateway();
let mut after = before.clone();
after.enabled = false;
assert_eq!(
gateway_action(&before, &after),
GatewayAction::StopIfRunning
);
assert_eq!(gateway_action(&before, &after), GatewayAction::StopIfRunning);
// Still true when it was already off — a stray running container is
// still a container that shouldn't be up.
assert_eq!(gateway_action(&after, &after), GatewayAction::StopIfRunning);
@@ -1,654 +0,0 @@
//! Settings export/import — see triple-c#35.
//!
//! Exports the *host* environment (global `AppSettings` plus the global
//! secrets kept in the OS keychain: the shared Claude Code OAuth login and
//! the model gateway's two keys), encrypted with a user-chosen password —
//! see `storage::settings_crypto` for the actual cryptography. Deliberately
//! out of scope: per-project settings, per-project secrets, and anything
//! living in a project's Docker volumes.
//!
//! **The save/open dialogs are opened from Rust**, the same pattern
//! `file_commands.rs`'s `pick_save_path`/`pick_files_to_upload` already
//! establish and document at length: a frontend-driven dialog handing Rust a
//! host path string is the exact shape of bug that produced this app's past
//! criticals, so the boundary here is drawn the same place. The frontend can
//! ask for a picker; it cannot name a host path as an *input*. `preview_
//! settings_import` resolves the chosen path itself and remembers it
//! (`AppState::pending_settings_import`) so `apply_settings_import` re-reads
//! the same file without the path ever crossing back over IPC.
//!
//! The *decrypted payload* is not cached between preview and apply — the
//! password the frontend passes to each call is what it already held for
//! the first, not a fresh secret extracted from the user, but nothing here
//! keeps the plaintext itself — export/import secrets included — around for
//! longer than one command's execution; `apply_settings_import` re-decrypts
//! the file rather than reusing anything `preview_settings_import` computed.
//!
//! **This is new attack surface**: a settings export is a file one person
//! can hand another and ask them to import, together with a password, and
//! `apply_settings_import` applies whatever `AppSettings` it decrypts to
//! wholesale — see the module doc on `models::settings_export` for the
//! `web_terminal.access_token` carve-out a review of this feature found,
//! and treat that as the standing example of the class of thing to keep
//! checking for here, not a one-off fixed bug.
#[cfg(test)]
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use tauri::State;
use tauri_plugin_dialog::DialogExt;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use crate::models::{
AppSettings, ExportedSecrets, SettingsExportPayload, SettingsImportOutcome,
SettingsImportPreview, SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION,
};
use crate::storage::{secure, settings_crypto};
use crate::AppState;
/// What `preview_settings_import` pins so `apply_settings_import` can tell
/// whether the file it's about to re-read is the same one the user actually
/// saw a preview of. Confirming a preview is only meaningful if it's binding
/// on what gets applied — without this, a file replaced on disk between the
/// two calls (this app's own stated threat model is a file shared between
/// people, which may sit in a synced or shared directory) would decrypt and
/// apply silently different content than what the confirmation dialog showed.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PendingSettingsImport {
path: PathBuf,
ciphertext_hash: [u8; 32],
}
fn hash_ciphertext(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
Sha256::digest(data).into()
}
const FILE_EXTENSION: &str = "triplec";
/// Enforced here, not only in the export modal: the frontend's minimum is a
/// UX nudge, but `export_settings` is the actual boundary a weak password
/// has to cross, and Argon2id's memory-hardness buys little against an
/// attacker who can just try a three-character password directly.
const MIN_PASSWORD_LEN: usize = 8;
fn suggested_export_name() -> String {
// Timestamped so exporting more than once doesn't silently overwrite an
// earlier file just because the save dialog defaults to the same name.
format!(
"triple-c-settings-{}.{}",
chrono::Utc::now().format("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S"),
FILE_EXTENSION
)
}
async fn pick_export_save_path(window: &tauri::Window, suggested: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
window
.dialog()
.file()
.set_parent(window)
.set_title("Export Triple-C settings")
.set_file_name(suggested)
.add_filter("Triple-C settings export", &[FILE_EXTENSION])
.save_file(move |picked| {
let _ = tx.send(picked);
});
rx.await.ok().flatten().and_then(|p| p.into_path().ok())
}
async fn pick_import_open_path(window: &tauri::Window) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
window
.dialog()
.file()
.set_parent(window)
.set_title("Import Triple-C settings")
.add_filter("Triple-C settings export", &[FILE_EXTENSION])
.pick_file(move |picked| {
let _ = tx.send(picked);
});
rx.await.ok().flatten().and_then(|p| p.into_path().ok())
}
/// Gather the current global secrets, and hand back the `AppSettings` to
/// export with the web-terminal token blanked out of it — see the module
/// doc comment on `models::settings_export` for why that field cannot
/// travel through `settings` like the rest of this struct.
///
/// A missing keychain secret reads as `None` — a keychain read failure is
/// treated as "nothing to export" for that one entry rather than aborting
/// the whole export, matching how the rest of this app degrades a keychain
/// error to "absent" (`has_claude_oauth_token`, `has_gateway_api_key`)
/// rather than surfacing it as a hard failure.
fn split_settings_and_secrets(current: AppSettings) -> (AppSettings, ExportedSecrets) {
let mut settings = current;
let web_terminal_access_token = settings.web_terminal.access_token.take();
let secrets = ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: secure::get_claude_oauth_token().unwrap_or_default(),
gateway_api_key: secure::get_gateway_api_key().unwrap_or_default(),
gateway_master_key: secure::get_gateway_master_key().unwrap_or_default(),
web_terminal_access_token,
};
(settings, secrets)
}
/// Export the current global settings and secrets to a password-encrypted
/// file. `Ok(false)` means the save dialog was dismissed — not an error, and
/// deliberately distinguishable from one so the frontend shows nothing
/// rather than a "failed" toast for a plain cancel.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn export_settings(
password: String,
window: tauri::Window,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<bool, String> {
// `.chars().count()` — Unicode scalar values, not bytes — to stay as
// close as this pair of languages allows to the frontend's `.length`
// check (UTF-16 code units); the two only diverge on astral-plane
// characters, which no reasonable password touches.
if password.chars().count() < MIN_PASSWORD_LEN {
return Err(format!(
"Use a password of at least {} characters.",
MIN_PASSWORD_LEN
));
}
let Some(dest) = pick_export_save_path(&window, &suggested_export_name()).await else {
return Ok(false);
};
let (settings, secrets) = split_settings_and_secrets(state.settings_store.get());
if secrets.is_empty() {
log::info!("Exporting settings with no global secrets configured on this machine");
}
let payload = SettingsExportPayload {
format_version: SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION,
exported_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
app_version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string(),
settings,
secrets,
};
let plaintext = Zeroizing::new(
serde_json::to_vec(&payload)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to prepare settings for export: {}", e))?,
);
let encrypted = settings_crypto::encrypt(&plaintext, &password)?;
std::fs::write(&dest, &encrypted).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write export file: {}", e))?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Open a file picker, decrypt the chosen file with `password`, and return a
/// preview (counts and presence flags only — never a secret value) for a
/// confirmation UI. `Ok(None)` means the picker was dismissed.
///
/// Remembers the resolved path *and a hash of the file's ciphertext* in
/// `AppState::pending_settings_import` for `apply_settings_import` to check
/// against — does **not** remember the decrypted payload itself, so the
/// password must be supplied again to actually apply it — seeing the preview
/// is not the same as committing to it. The hash exists so it also can't be
/// swapped out from under that commitment: `apply_settings_import` refuses to
/// proceed if the file on disk no longer matches what was just previewed.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn preview_settings_import(
password: String,
window: tauri::Window,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<Option<SettingsImportPreview>, String> {
if password.is_empty() {
return Err("A password is required to open a settings export.".to_string());
}
let Some(path) = pick_import_open_path(&window).await else {
return Ok(None);
};
let encrypted = std::fs::read(&path).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read export file: {}", e))?;
let payload = read_and_decrypt_bytes(&encrypted, &password)?;
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
*state.pending_settings_import.lock().await = Some(PendingSettingsImport {
path,
ciphertext_hash: hash_ciphertext(&encrypted),
});
Ok(Some(preview))
}
/// Apply the import a prior `preview_settings_import` call resolved a path
/// for. Fails if no preview is pending — this is not a general "decrypt and
/// apply this file" entry point, deliberately: seeing the preview first is
/// required, not just encouraged, since it is the only place a user is told
/// what an import is about to touch before it touches it. That requirement
/// is only real if the file can't change out from under it, so this also
/// refuses to proceed if the file's ciphertext no longer matches the hash
/// `preview_settings_import` pinned — a file replaced on disk between the
/// two calls (this feature's own threat model is a file shared between
/// people, which may sit in a synced or shared directory) must not be able
/// to apply silently different content than what the confirmation dialog
/// showed.
///
/// Global settings are replaced wholesale — an import is "restore this
/// environment," not a field-by-field merge. Global secrets are handled
/// differently and on purpose: **only secrets actually present in the
/// import are written**; a secret the export doesn't have is left alone on
/// this machine rather than cleared, because an absent secret in the export
/// means "the source machine never had this configured," not "delete this
/// on import." A user who wants to clear a secret already has dedicated UI
/// for that (signing out of shared auth, clearing the gateway key).
///
/// Order matters here, twice over.
///
/// First: the imported settings are **validated before any secret is
/// written**, using the same checks `update_settings` itself runs
/// (`settings_commands::validate_settings_update`). Restoring a secret is
/// hard to undo unnoticed — a stale env-var-name rejection or a disallowed
/// host path used to be caught only when `update_settings` ran, by which
/// point the three keychain secrets below were already overwritten with the
/// file's, each with a fresh rotation id, silently flagging every project
/// container for recreation — while the error the user saw talked only
/// about the rejected setting and said nothing about the credentials that
/// had already moved. Failing this check first makes a rejected import
/// leave nothing touched, matching what "the import failed" is supposed to
/// mean.
///
/// Second, among the things that *do* get written: secrets are restored
/// **before** the settings replace runs (which is what triggers
/// `reconcile_gateway`), so a gateway recreation that replace provokes sees
/// the final key material rather than racing it — restoring the other way
/// round left a real window where the running gateway and the keychain
/// briefly disagreed. A gateway *secret* alone (same shape, new key) is
/// invisible to `reconcile_gateway`'s shape comparison, so this additionally
/// nudges a running gateway container to recreate itself whenever a secret
/// this import carried was actually written — otherwise the running
/// container keeps serving the old key material indefinitely while every
/// project container is handed the new one.
///
/// A keychain write failing is reported back rather than only logged: an
/// import that silently restores two of three secrets but not the third
/// must not read as unqualified success.
///
/// The pending import is only cleared on success. A failure here (rejected
/// by the validation above, a stale-file mismatch, or some other error)
/// leaves it pending so the frontend can let the user retry `apply` without
/// making them pick the file and re-enter the password again — the
/// preview's job was confirming *what* to import, not spending the one
/// attempt at applying it.
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn apply_settings_import(
password: String,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<SettingsImportOutcome, String> {
if password.is_empty() {
return Err("A password is required to import settings.".to_string());
}
let pending = state
.pending_settings_import
.lock()
.await
.clone()
.ok_or_else(|| "No import is pending — choose a file first.".to_string())?;
let encrypted = std::fs::read(&pending.path)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read export file: {}", e))?;
if hash_ciphertext(&encrypted) != pending.ciphertext_hash {
return Err(
"This file changed since you reviewed it — choose it again to see an up-to-date preview."
.to_string(),
);
}
let payload = read_and_decrypt_bytes(&encrypted, &password)?;
let current = state.settings_store.get();
// The web-terminal token lives inside `AppSettings` itself rather than
// the keychain, so "leave an absent secret alone" has to be done by
// hand here: carry the destination's current token forward when the
// import doesn't have one, instead of letting the wholesale replace
// below blank it (every export writes `None` there — see
// `split_settings_and_secrets`).
let mut settings = payload.settings;
settings.web_terminal.access_token = non_blank(payload.secrets.web_terminal_access_token)
.or_else(|| current.web_terminal.access_token.clone());
crate::commands::settings_commands::validate_settings_update(&current, &settings)?;
let mut secret_restore_warnings = Vec::new();
let mut gateway_secret_changed = false;
if let Some(token) = non_blank(payload.secrets.claude_oauth_token) {
if let Err(e) = secure::store_claude_oauth_token(&token) {
log::warn!(
"Settings import: could not restore the shared Claude login: {}",
e
);
secret_restore_warnings
.push(format!("Could not restore your shared Claude login: {}", e));
}
}
if let Some(key) = non_blank(payload.secrets.gateway_api_key) {
match secure::store_gateway_api_key(&key) {
Ok(()) => gateway_secret_changed = true,
Err(e) => {
log::warn!(
"Settings import: could not restore the gateway provider API key: {}",
e
);
secret_restore_warnings.push(format!(
"Could not restore the gateway provider API key: {}",
e
));
}
}
}
if let Some(key) = non_blank(payload.secrets.gateway_master_key) {
match secure::store_gateway_master_key(&key) {
Ok(()) => gateway_secret_changed = true,
Err(e) => {
log::warn!(
"Settings import: could not restore the gateway master key: {}",
e
);
secret_restore_warnings
.push(format!("Could not restore the gateway master key: {}", e));
}
}
}
let saved =
crate::commands::settings_commands::update_settings(settings, state.clone()).await?;
// `reconcile_gateway` (inside `update_settings`) only reacts to a changed
// *shape* — port, provider, base URL, models — because that's what's
// rendered into the container's config. A secret changing with the shape
// held constant is invisible to it, so a running gateway container would
// otherwise keep serving the old key material forever after an import
// that restored a new one, while `docker::gateway`'s own fingerprint
// (which does include the secret rotation id) means the *next* unrelated
// settings save would suddenly and confusingly recreate it instead.
if gateway_secret_changed && saved.gateway.enabled {
match crate::docker::gateway::gateway_container_presence().await {
Ok((true, true)) => {
if let Err(e) = crate::docker::gateway::ensure_gateway_running(&saved.gateway).await
{
log::error!(
"Settings import: could not apply the restored gateway credentials to the running gateway container: {}",
e
);
}
}
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => log::debug!("Settings import: gateway reconcile skipped ({})", e),
}
}
state.pending_settings_import.lock().await.take();
Ok(SettingsImportOutcome {
settings: saved,
secret_restore_warnings,
})
}
fn non_blank(value: Option<String>) -> Option<String> {
value.filter(|v| !v.trim().is_empty())
}
/// Only the field `read_and_decrypt` needs before deciding whether the rest
/// of the payload is even worth attempting to parse.
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
struct FormatVersionProbe {
format_version: u32,
}
/// Read and decrypt an export file at `path`, then parse it — see
/// `read_and_decrypt_bytes` for why the format-version check runs before the
/// full parse. Every real caller already has the file's bytes in hand by the
/// time it needs this (`preview_settings_import`/`apply_settings_import`
/// both hash the ciphertext first) and calls `read_and_decrypt_bytes`
/// directly to avoid reading the file twice; this path-based wrapper only
/// exists now for tests that don't need that.
#[cfg(test)]
fn read_and_decrypt(path: &Path, password: &str) -> Result<SettingsExportPayload, String> {
let encrypted =
std::fs::read(path).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read export file: {}", e))?;
read_and_decrypt_bytes(&encrypted, password)
}
/// Decrypt and parse an already-read export file's bytes, checking the
/// format version **before** attempting to deserialize the full payload.
///
/// That ordering is not just tidiness: a version bump that isn't
/// deserialize-compatible (a field's type changes, not just a new
/// `#[serde(default)]`-covered one) is exactly the case this check exists
/// for, and parsing the full struct first would fail on the shape mismatch
/// before the version check ever ran, surfacing a raw parse error instead
/// of "update Triple-C" — and, more seriously, `serde_json`'s type-mismatch
/// errors quote the offending value inline. This file is not attacker
/// content in the usual sense (it must still decrypt under the right
/// password), but the plaintext it decrypts to can hold a live credential,
/// so neither error path below ever interpolates what `serde_json`
/// actually says — only a fixed, generic message.
fn read_and_decrypt_bytes(encrypted: &[u8], password: &str) -> Result<SettingsExportPayload, String> {
let plaintext = settings_crypto::decrypt(encrypted, password)?;
let probe: FormatVersionProbe = serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext)
.map_err(|_| "This file doesn't look like a valid settings export.".to_string())?;
if probe.format_version > SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION {
return Err(format!(
"This export was made by a newer version of Triple-C (format {}, this app supports up to {}). \
Update Triple-C before importing it.",
probe.format_version, SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION
));
}
serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext).map_err(|_| {
"This file doesn't look like a valid settings export (unexpected shape).".to_string()
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn non_blank_treats_whitespace_only_as_absent() {
assert_eq!(non_blank(Some(" ".to_string())), None);
assert_eq!(non_blank(Some("".to_string())), None);
assert_eq!(non_blank(None), None);
assert_eq!(non_blank(Some(" a ".to_string())), Some(" a ".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn ciphertext_hashing_is_deterministic_and_tamper_sensitive() {
// What `apply_settings_import` compares against the pinned hash from
// `preview_settings_import` to detect a file swapped out from under a
// pending import — this only defends anything if identical bytes
// always hash identically and any change to those bytes changes the
// hash.
let bytes = b"pretend this is an encrypted export file";
assert_eq!(hash_ciphertext(bytes), hash_ciphertext(bytes));
let mut tampered = bytes.to_vec();
tampered[0] ^= 0xFF;
assert_ne!(hash_ciphertext(bytes), hash_ciphertext(&tampered));
}
fn write_export(
dir: &std::path::Path,
name: &str,
payload: &SettingsExportPayload,
password: &str,
) -> PathBuf {
write_raw_export(dir, name, &serde_json::to_value(payload).unwrap(), password)
}
/// Like `write_export`, but takes an arbitrary `serde_json::Value` rather
/// than a real `SettingsExportPayload` — for fixtures that are
/// deliberately not shape-compatible, which the typed helper above can't
/// produce at all.
fn write_raw_export(
dir: &std::path::Path,
name: &str,
value: &serde_json::Value,
password: &str,
) -> PathBuf {
let plaintext = serde_json::to_vec(value).unwrap();
let encrypted = settings_crypto::encrypt(&plaintext, password).unwrap();
let path = dir.join(name);
std::fs::write(&path, &encrypted).unwrap();
path
}
#[test]
fn splitting_settings_moves_the_web_terminal_token_out_rather_than_copying_it() {
let mut settings = AppSettings::default();
settings.web_terminal.access_token = Some("super-secret-token".to_string());
let (settings, secrets) = split_settings_and_secrets(settings);
assert_eq!(settings.web_terminal.access_token, None);
assert_eq!(
secrets.web_terminal_access_token,
Some("super-secret-token".to_string())
);
}
#[test]
fn splitting_settings_with_no_token_leaves_it_absent_on_both_sides() {
let (settings, secrets) = split_settings_and_secrets(AppSettings::default());
assert_eq!(settings.web_terminal.access_token, None);
assert_eq!(secrets.web_terminal_access_token, None);
}
fn sample_payload(format_version: u32) -> SettingsExportPayload {
SettingsExportPayload {
format_version,
exported_at: "2026-08-27T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
app_version: "0.4.14".to_string(),
settings: AppSettings::default(),
secrets: ExportedSecrets::default(),
}
}
fn temp_dir(name: &str) -> PathBuf {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"triple-c-settings-export-test-{}-{}",
name,
uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
dir
}
#[test]
fn a_file_from_a_newer_format_is_refused_before_the_full_shape_is_parsed() {
// Shape-incompatible with the *current* `SettingsExportPayload` (a
// future version could easily have changed `settings` from an object
// to something else) as well as newer — so this only passes under
// the probe-first ordering. Parsing the full struct first (the old
// behavior) would fail on the shape mismatch and never reach the
// version check, producing the "unexpected shape" message instead of
// "newer version" / "Update Triple-C".
let dir = temp_dir("newer-format");
let path = write_raw_export(
&dir,
"export.triplec",
&serde_json::json!({
"format_version": SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION + 1,
"exported_at": "2026-08-27T00:00:00Z",
"app_version": "9.9.9",
"settings": "this-app-version-stores-settings-differently",
"secrets": {},
}),
"correct password",
);
let err = read_and_decrypt(&path, "correct password").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("newer version"), "unexpected message: {}", err);
assert!(err.contains("Update Triple-C"));
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn a_file_at_the_current_format_is_accepted() {
let dir = temp_dir("current-format");
let path = write_export(
&dir,
"export.triplec",
&sample_payload(SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION),
"correct password",
);
let payload = read_and_decrypt(&path, "correct password").unwrap();
assert_eq!(payload.format_version, SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn a_malformed_payload_produces_a_generic_error_not_a_raw_serde_message() {
// A `format_version` the probe accepts, but a `settings` field of
// the wrong *type* rather than just a missing field — this is what
// makes `serde_json` produce an "invalid type: string `...`, expected
// struct AppSettings" error that quotes the offending value
// verbatim. That value here stands in for plaintext that, in a real
// export, could be a live credential — the assertion below is only
// meaningful against a fixture that actually exercises serde's
// value-quoting behavior, which a merely-missing-field fixture does
// not.
let dir = temp_dir("malformed");
let path = write_raw_export(
&dir,
"export.triplec",
&serde_json::json!({
"format_version": SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION,
"exported_at": "2026-08-27T00:00:00Z",
"app_version": "0.4.14",
"settings": "NOT-A-REAL-CREDENTIAL-abc123",
"secrets": {},
}),
"correct password",
);
let err = read_and_decrypt(&path, "correct password").unwrap_err();
assert!(
!err.contains("NOT-A-REAL-CREDENTIAL-abc123"),
"leaked plaintext into the error: {}",
err
);
assert!(err.contains("doesn't look like a valid settings export"));
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn the_wrong_password_is_reported_without_a_version_check_ever_running() {
let dir = temp_dir("wrong-password");
let path = write_export(
&dir,
"export.triplec",
&sample_payload(SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION),
"correct password",
);
let err = read_and_decrypt(&path, "wrong password").unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.contains("Wrong password"),
"unexpected message: {}",
err
);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
}
+38 -271
View File
@@ -6,58 +6,10 @@ use crate::AppState;
/// Build the command to run in the container terminal.
///
/// Always a `bash -c` script, because every session runs [`UPDATE_PRELUDE`]
/// before `exec claude`. For Bedrock Profile projects the script additionally
/// validates the AWS session first, and runs `aws sso login` if it has expired
/// so the user can re-authenticate (the URL is clickable via xterm.js
/// WebLinksAddon).
/// For Bedrock Profile projects, wraps `claude` in a bash script that validates
/// the AWS session first. If the SSO session is expired, runs `aws sso login`
/// so the user can re-authenticate (the URL is clickable via xterm.js WebLinksAddon).
fn build_terminal_cmd(project: &Project, state: &AppState, session_name: Option<&str>) -> Vec<String> {
let settings = state.settings_store.get();
build_claude_terminal_cmd(
project,
settings.global_aws.aws_profile.as_deref(),
session_name,
)
}
/// Shell line run immediately before `exec claude` in every Claude terminal
/// session.
///
/// `container/entrypoint.sh` already runs `claude update` when the container
/// starts, but containers here use a stop/start (and often just keep running)
/// model, so a long-lived container's CLI goes stale between restarts. Running
/// it per session is what keeps a week-old container current.
///
/// Deliberately non-fatal and time-bounded: `|| echo` swallows a failure (no
/// network, npm registry down) so a session always opens, and `timeout 60`
/// bounds how long a user waits for a terminal.
///
/// **`flock` is load-bearing, not tidiness.** Nothing serialises this against
/// the entrypoint's own `claude update`, and the entrypoint prints "container
/// ready" only *after* its copy finishes — so "start the project, open a tab"
/// races two updaters against the same `~/.claude/bin` install, as does
/// opening two tabs at once. `|| echo` would then hide a half-written install
/// behind a friendly message and the very next line (`exec claude`) would run
/// it. `-w 90` gives the entrypoint's `timeout 120` copy room to finish rather
/// than failing the wait, and `-E 0` makes losing the race a success: the
/// other holder just updated, so there is nothing left to do.
pub(crate) const UPDATE_PRELUDE: &str = concat!(
"flock -w 90 -E 0 /tmp/.triple-c-claude-update.lock ",
r#"timeout 60 claude update 2>&1 || echo "(update skipped — continuing)""#,
);
/// Single-quote one argument for interpolation into a shell script string.
fn shell_quote_arg(arg: &str) -> String {
format!(" '{}'", arg.replace('\'', "'\\''"))
}
/// The testable core of [`build_terminal_cmd`], taking the resolved global AWS
/// profile rather than the whole [`AppState`].
fn build_claude_terminal_cmd(
project: &Project,
global_aws_profile: Option<&str>,
session_name: Option<&str>,
) -> Vec<String> {
let is_bedrock_profile = project.backend == Backend::Bedrock
&& project
.bedrock_config
@@ -67,27 +19,36 @@ fn build_claude_terminal_cmd(
let permission_args = project.effective_permission_mode().cli_args();
// The args are interpolated into a shell script string, so single-quote
// each one.
let name_flag = session_name
.filter(|n| !n.is_empty())
.map(|n| format!(" -n{}", shell_quote_arg(n)))
.unwrap_or_default();
let permission_flags: String = permission_args.iter().map(|a| shell_quote_arg(a)).collect();
let claude_cmd = format!("exec claude{}{}", permission_flags, name_flag);
if !is_bedrock_profile {
return vec![
"bash".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
format!("{}\n{}\n", UPDATE_PRELUDE, claude_cmd),
];
let mut cmd = vec!["claude".to_string()];
cmd.extend(permission_args);
if let Some(name) = session_name {
if !name.is_empty() {
cmd.push("-n".to_string());
cmd.push(name.to_string());
}
}
return cmd;
}
let profile = aws_commands::resolve_profile_for_project(project, global_aws_profile);
let profile = aws_commands::resolve_profile_for_project(
project,
state.settings_store.get().global_aws.aws_profile.as_deref(),
);
// Build a bash wrapper that validates credentials, re-auths if needed,
// then exec's into claude.
let name_flag = session_name
.filter(|n| !n.is_empty())
.map(|n| format!(" -n '{}'", n.replace('\'', "'\\''")))
.unwrap_or_default();
// The args are interpolated into a shell script string, so single-quote
// each one (same escaping style as name_flag above).
let permission_flags: String = permission_args
.iter()
.map(|a| format!(" '{}'", a.replace('\'', "'\\''")))
.collect();
let claude_cmd = format!("exec claude{}{}", permission_flags, name_flag);
let script = format!(
r#"
@@ -114,11 +75,9 @@ else
echo ""
fi
fi
{update_prelude}
{claude_cmd}
"#,
profile = profile,
update_prelude = UPDATE_PRELUDE,
claude_cmd = claude_cmd
);
@@ -237,64 +196,31 @@ pub async fn upload_host_file_to_terminal(
host_path: String,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<String, String> {
// The drop target is a host path chosen by the webview, not by the OS drag
// itself, so it goes through `file_commands`' host-read policy: absolute,
// no traversal, and nothing whose path passes through a hidden directory
// (`~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.local/bin`) or a system location — applied to
// the path with its symlinks already resolved, so a visible directory that
// *leads* to one of those is refused too. What comes back is that resolved
// path, and it is what gets opened. Four commands touch a host path now,
// but only two take it *over IPC*: this one and `download_container_backup`.
// The Files pane's `download_container_file` and `upload_files_to_container`
// open their dialog from Rust instead, so for them the policy above is
// defence in depth and for these two it is the boundary itself.
// The name is taken from the path the user actually dropped, *before*
// resolution. Deriving it from the resolved path renames the file behind
// the user's back: dropping `~/Downloads/latest.log`, where `latest.log` is
// a symlink, would land it in the container as `2026-08-23.log`.
let base = crate::commands::file_commands::host_upload_name(&host_path)?;
let host_path = crate::commands::file_commands::resolve_host_read_path(&host_path).await?;
let container_id = state.exec_manager.get_container_id(&session_id).await?;
let meta = tokio::fs::metadata(&host_path)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Cannot access {}: {}", host_path, e))?;
// `!is_file()`, not `!is_dir()`. A FIFO is neither a directory nor a
// regular file, reports `len() == 0`, and passes both the directory check
// and the size cap below — and `std::fs::File::open` on one blocks forever
// with no writer, with no timeout anywhere on this path. The upload then
// never returns, the toast sticks on "Adding N files…" for the session and
// the rest of the batch is abandoned. Sockets and device nodes are the same
// shape. This is one of two routes for getting a host file into a
// container (the Files pane's upload is the other), so it is the wrong
// place to be clever.
if !meta.is_file() {
return Err(if meta.is_dir() {
format!("{} is a directory — drop individual files", host_path)
} else {
format!(
"{} is not a regular file — only ordinary files can be dropped into a terminal",
host_path
)
});
if meta.is_dir() {
return Err(format!("{} is a directory — drop individual files", host_path));
}
// Guard against ballooning host RAM: the file is packed into an in-memory
// tar before upload, so cap the size of a dropped file. The ceiling lives
// with the code that does the reading, which re-applies it to the open
// descriptor — this check is here only so the refusal reads like a sentence
// instead of arriving after a 300 MB read.
use crate::docker::exec::MAX_DROP_BYTES;
// tar before upload, so cap the size of a dropped file.
const MAX_DROP_BYTES: u64 = 256 * 1024 * 1024; // 256 MiB
if meta.len() > MAX_DROP_BYTES {
return Err(format!(
"File too large to drop into the terminal ({:.0} MB; limit {} MB). Mount it into the project instead.",
"File too large to drop into the terminal ({:.0} MB; limit {} MB). Mount it into the project or use the Files panel instead.",
meta.len() as f64 / (1024.0 * 1024.0),
MAX_DROP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)
));
}
let base = std::path::Path::new(&host_path)
.file_name()
.map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "dropped-file".to_string());
// Ensure the destination directory exists rather than relying on Docker's
// archive extractor to create the parent for the uploaded tar entry.
@@ -305,13 +231,7 @@ pub async fn upload_host_file_to_terminal(
.await?;
let file_name = format!("triple-c-drops/{}", base);
crate::docker::exec::upload_host_file_to_container(
&container_id,
&host_path,
"/tmp",
&file_name,
)
.await
crate::docker::exec::upload_host_file_to_container(&container_id, &host_path, &file_name).await
}
#[tauri::command]
@@ -363,156 +283,3 @@ pub async fn stop_audio_bridge(
state.exec_manager.close_session(&audio_session_id).await;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{build_claude_terminal_cmd, UPDATE_PRELUDE};
use crate::models::Project;
/// A dropped file must be named the way the *user* named it.
///
/// The bug this pins: `upload_host_file_to_terminal` derived the tar entry
/// name from the path *after* symlink resolution, so dropping
/// `~/Downloads/latest.log` — where `latest.log` is a symlink to
/// `2026-08-23.log` — silently landed the file in the container under the
/// target's name. Nothing errored; the user just got a name they never
/// typed.
///
/// This asserts the shared helper's contract from the terminal side: the
/// answer comes from the spelling, and a path that does not name a file is
/// refused rather than silently substituted (it used to fall back to
/// `"dropped-file"`).
/// A `Project` with only the fields these tests care about set; the rest
/// come through serde so the test does not have to track every field.
fn project(backend: &str, bedrock_config: serde_json::Value) -> Project {
serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
"id": "p1",
"name": "Test",
"paths": [],
"container_id": null,
"status": "running",
"backend": backend,
"bedrock_config": bedrock_config,
"ollama_config": null,
"openai_compatible_config": null,
"allow_docker_access": false,
"full_permissions": false,
"ssh_key_path": null,
"git_user_name": null,
"git_user_email": null,
"created_at": "now",
"updated_at": "now"
}))
.expect("test project deserializes")
}
/// Every Claude session updates the CLI before launching it.
///
/// `container/entrypoint.sh` only updates at container *start*, and these
/// containers are long-lived, so a stale CLI is the normal case without
/// this. The plain (non-Bedrock) path therefore has to be a `bash -c`
/// wrapper rather than a bare `claude` argv.
#[test]
fn build_terminal_cmd_updates_before_launching_claude() {
let cmd = build_claude_terminal_cmd(&project("anthropic", serde_json::Value::Null), None, None);
assert_eq!(cmd[0], "bash");
assert_eq!(cmd[1], "-c");
assert!(
cmd[2].contains(UPDATE_PRELUDE),
"plain path must run the update prelude: {}",
cmd[2]
);
assert!(cmd[2].contains("exec claude"), "got: {}", cmd[2]);
// The update has to happen *before* the exec, which never returns.
assert!(
cmd[2].find(UPDATE_PRELUDE).unwrap() < cmd[2].find("exec claude").unwrap(),
"prelude must precede the exec: {}",
cmd[2]
);
assert!(
UPDATE_PRELUDE.contains("timeout 60") && UPDATE_PRELUDE.contains("||"),
"the update must stay time-bounded and non-fatal"
);
}
/// The session name is interpolated into a shell script, so a quote in it
/// must not break out of its single-quoted argument.
#[test]
fn build_terminal_cmd_escapes_a_quoted_session_name() {
let cmd = build_claude_terminal_cmd(
&project("anthropic", serde_json::Value::Null),
None,
Some("Bob's tab; rm -rf /"),
);
assert!(
cmd[2].contains(r#"exec claude -n 'Bob'\''s tab; rm -rf /'"#),
"session name must be single-quote escaped: {}",
cmd[2]
);
}
/// Permission flags travel the same escaped path, and an empty name adds
/// no `-n` at all.
#[test]
fn build_terminal_cmd_quotes_permission_flags_and_omits_an_empty_name() {
let mut p = project("anthropic", serde_json::Value::Null);
p.full_permissions = true;
let cmd = build_claude_terminal_cmd(&p, None, Some(""));
assert!(
cmd[2].contains("exec claude '--dangerously-skip-permissions'\n"),
"got: {}",
cmd[2]
);
assert!(!cmd[2].contains(" -n "), "empty name must add no flag: {}", cmd[2]);
}
/// The Bedrock-profile path keeps its AWS validation *and* gains the
/// prelude, immediately before the exec.
#[test]
fn build_terminal_cmd_bedrock_validates_aws_and_updates() {
let cmd = build_claude_terminal_cmd(
&project("bedrock", serde_json::json!({
"auth_method": "profile",
"aws_region": "us-east-1",
"aws_profile": "acme",
"model_id": null,
"disable_prompt_caching": false
})),
None,
Some("it's fine"),
);
assert_eq!(cmd[0], "bash");
let script = &cmd[2];
assert!(script.contains("aws sts get-caller-identity --profile 'acme'"), "got: {}", script);
assert!(script.contains("triple-c-sso-refresh"), "got: {}", script);
assert!(script.contains(UPDATE_PRELUDE), "got: {}", script);
assert!(script.contains(r#"exec claude -n 'it'\''s fine'"#), "got: {}", script);
assert!(
script.find(UPDATE_PRELUDE).unwrap() < script.find("exec claude").unwrap(),
"prelude must precede the exec: {}",
script
);
}
#[test]
fn a_dropped_file_keeps_the_name_the_user_dropped() {
use crate::commands::file_commands::host_upload_name;
assert_eq!(
host_upload_name("/home/u/Downloads/latest.log").unwrap(),
"latest.log"
);
assert!(
host_upload_name("/home/u/Downloads/").is_err(),
"a directory is not a file to drop"
);
assert!(
host_upload_name("/home/u/..").is_err(),
"the name becomes a tar entry, a container path and an argv element"
);
}
}
+24 -201
View File
@@ -16,37 +16,9 @@ const REGISTRY_API_BASE: &str =
const GHCR_TOKEN_URL: &str =
"https://ghcr.io/token?scope=repository:shadowdao/triple-c-sandbox:pull";
/// The build-time preview suffix, if one was baked in and isn't blank.
///
/// The bundle version itself (`tauri.conf.json`, `Cargo.toml`, `package.json`)
/// is never given a `-preview.<sha>` suffix — `build-app-preview.yml` strips
/// it before patching those files, because the Windows MSI's `ProductVersion`
/// is a fixed-width numeric field with no room for one, and nothing here can
/// verify a change to that without an actual Windows build. `TRIPLE_C_BUILD_SUFFIX`
/// is the workaround: set as a build-time env var in the preview workflow
/// only, so `option_env!` bakes it into the binary without the bundle version
/// ever seeing it. A production build sets nothing, so `option_env!` reads
/// `None` here — see triple-c#32.
///
/// The single source of truth for "is this a preview build": both
/// `get_app_version()` (what the About panel shows) and `check_for_updates()`
/// (whether a same-numbered release counts as an update — see `pick_update`)
/// read this rather than each calling `option_env!` themselves, so the two
/// can never silently disagree about which build this is.
fn preview_build_suffix() -> Option<&'static str> {
option_env!("TRIPLE_C_BUILD_SUFFIX").filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
}
fn format_app_version(base: &str, build_suffix: Option<&str>) -> String {
match build_suffix {
Some(suffix) if !suffix.is_empty() => format!("{}-{}", base, suffix),
_ => base.to_string(),
}
}
#[tauri::command]
pub fn get_app_version() -> String {
format_app_version(env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), preview_build_suffix())
env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string()
}
#[tauri::command]
@@ -79,20 +51,30 @@ pub async fn check_for_updates() -> Result<Option<UpdateInfo>, String> {
&[".AppImage", ".deb", ".rpm"]
};
// `current_version` above is always the bare, stripped `CARGO_PKG_VERSION`
// — the preview workflow patches `Cargo.toml` with that before compiling,
// never the `-preview.<sha>`-suffixed one `get_app_version()` reports —
// so a preview build and the release it precedes compile to the identical
// numeric tuple by construction (see `build-app-preview.yml`'s "highest
// tag used, +1" computation). A strict `>` therefore never fires for the
// one release a preview most needs to be offered. `is_preview_build`
// relaxes that one comparison to `>=` so "there is a real release at my
// own number" reads as an update, without touching the production case
// — see `pick_update`.
let is_preview_build = preview_build_suffix().is_some();
// Filter releases that have at least one asset matching the current platform
let platform_releases: Vec<&GitHubRelease> = releases
.iter()
.filter(|r| {
r.assets.iter().any(|a| {
platform_extensions.iter().any(|ext| a.name.ends_with(ext))
})
})
.collect();
match pick_update(&releases, current_semver, platform_extensions, is_preview_build) {
Some(release) => {
// Find the latest release with a higher semver version
let mut best: Option<(&GitHubRelease, (u32, u32, u32))> = None;
for release in &platform_releases {
if let Some(ver) = parse_semver_from_tag(&release.tag_name) {
if ver > current_semver {
if best.is_none() || ver > best.unwrap().1 {
best = Some((release, ver));
}
}
}
}
match best {
Some((release, _)) => {
// Only include assets matching the current platform
let assets = release
.assets
@@ -123,51 +105,6 @@ pub async fn check_for_updates() -> Result<Option<UpdateInfo>, String> {
}
}
/// Pick the newest available update out of a release list, or `None` if
/// nothing beats `current_semver`. Pure and synchronous — split out of
/// `check_for_updates` so the prerelease/platform/version filtering can be
/// tested without a live HTTP call.
///
/// Three filters, all of which must pass: not a prerelease (see the long
/// comment on `GitHubRelease::prerelease`), at least one asset for this
/// platform, and a tag that parses as semver *and* beats what is running. A
/// tag that does not parse — `preview-<sha>` (the shape
/// `build-app-preview.yml` actually creates release tags with), most
/// realistically — is skipped rather than erroring, the same as it always
/// has been; nothing here changes what an update tag is expected to look
/// like, only what channel it is allowed to come from.
///
/// `is_preview_build` relaxes "beats" from `>` to `>=`. A preview build's
/// `current_semver` is the bare number it was compiled with, which is by
/// construction identical to the release it precedes — see the comment at
/// `check_for_updates`'s call site — so a strict `>` would never fire for
/// exactly the release a preview install most needs to be told about.
fn pick_update<'a>(
releases: &'a [GitHubRelease],
current_semver: (u32, u32, u32),
platform_extensions: &[&str],
is_preview_build: bool,
) -> Option<&'a GitHubRelease> {
releases
.iter()
.filter(|r| !r.prerelease)
.filter(|r| {
r.assets
.iter()
.any(|a| platform_extensions.iter().any(|ext| a.name.ends_with(ext)))
})
.filter_map(|r| parse_semver_from_tag(&r.tag_name).map(|ver| (r, ver)))
.filter(|(_, ver)| {
if is_preview_build {
*ver >= current_semver
} else {
*ver > current_semver
}
})
.max_by_key(|(_, ver)| *ver)
.map(|(r, _)| r)
}
/// Parse a semver string like "0.2.5" -> (0, 2, 5)
fn parse_semver(version: &str) -> Option<(u32, u32, u32)> {
let clean = version.trim_start_matches('v');
@@ -194,120 +131,6 @@ fn extract_version_from_tag(tag: &str) -> Option<String> {
Some(format!("{}.{}.{}", major, minor, patch))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::models::GitHubAsset;
// ── format_app_version ──────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn a_production_build_reports_the_bare_version() {
assert_eq!(format_app_version("0.4.12", None), "0.4.12");
// An empty env var (set but blank) must not print a trailing dash.
assert_eq!(format_app_version("0.4.12", Some("")), "0.4.12");
}
#[test]
fn a_preview_build_reports_its_suffix() {
assert_eq!(
format_app_version("0.4.12", Some("preview.a1b2c3d")),
"0.4.12-preview.a1b2c3d"
);
}
// ── pick_update ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn release(tag: &str, prerelease: bool, asset_names: &[&str]) -> GitHubRelease {
GitHubRelease {
tag_name: tag.to_string(),
html_url: format!("https://example.invalid/{}", tag),
body: String::new(),
assets: asset_names
.iter()
.map(|name| GitHubAsset {
name: name.to_string(),
browser_download_url: String::new(),
size: 0,
})
.collect(),
published_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
prerelease,
}
}
const LINUX_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] = &[".AppImage", ".deb", ".rpm"];
#[test]
fn a_prerelease_is_never_offered_even_if_its_tag_would_otherwise_win() {
let releases = vec![release("v9.9.9", true, &["app-9.9.9.AppImage"])];
assert!(pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 10), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, false).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn a_release_with_no_asset_for_this_platform_is_skipped() {
let releases = vec![release("v0.4.12", false, &["app-0.4.12.msi"])];
assert!(pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 10), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, false).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn a_release_that_is_not_newer_is_not_offered() {
let releases = vec![release("v0.4.10", false, &["app.AppImage"])];
assert!(pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 10), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, false).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn an_untagged_or_unparseable_release_is_skipped_not_fatal() {
// A `-preview.<sha>` tag is exactly the shape this must not choke on
// or mistake for an update — it simply never parses as a bare semver.
let releases = vec![
release("preview-a1b2c3d", false, &["app.AppImage"]),
release("v0.4.12", false, &["app.AppImage"]),
];
let best = pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 10), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, false).unwrap();
assert_eq!(best.tag_name, "v0.4.12");
}
#[test]
fn the_highest_qualifying_version_wins_not_the_first_or_last_in_the_list() {
let releases = vec![
release("v0.4.11", false, &["app.AppImage"]),
release("v0.4.13", false, &["app.AppImage"]),
release("v0.4.12", false, &["app.AppImage"]),
];
let best = pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 10), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, false).unwrap();
assert_eq!(best.tag_name, "v0.4.13");
}
// ── is_preview_build (>= instead of >) ─────────────────────────────────
/// The exact scenario triple-c#32 was filed to fix: a preview compiled as
/// `0.4.12-preview.<sha>` (bare `CARGO_PKG_VERSION` "0.4.12") must be
/// offered the `v0.4.12` release that follows it, even though the two
/// compute to the identical numeric tuple.
#[test]
fn a_preview_build_is_offered_the_release_it_precedes() {
let releases = vec![release("v0.4.12", false, &["app.AppImage"])];
assert!(pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 12), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, false).is_none());
let best = pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 12), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(best.tag_name, "v0.4.12");
}
#[test]
fn a_preview_build_is_not_offered_an_older_release() {
let releases = vec![release("v0.4.11", false, &["app.AppImage"])];
assert!(pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 12), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, true).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn a_production_build_still_requires_strictly_newer() {
// A production build must never treat "equal" as an update — that
// would perpetually re-offer the version already running.
let releases = vec![release("v0.4.12", false, &["app.AppImage"])];
assert!(pick_update(&releases, (0, 4, 12), LINUX_EXTENSIONS, false).is_none());
}
}
/// Check whether a newer container image is available in the registry.
///
/// Compares the local image digest with the remote registry digest using the
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+78 -399
View File
@@ -301,10 +301,21 @@ impl ExecSessionManager {
) -> Result<String, String> {
let docker = get_docker()?;
// Owned by the container user, stamped now: a default tar header would
// land it as root:root/1970 and Claude Code could not rewrite it.
let (uid, gid) = container_user_ids(container_id).await;
let tar_buf = build_single_file_tar(file_name, data, 0o644, uid, gid, now_epoch_secs())?;
// Build a tar archive in memory containing the file
let mut tar_buf = Vec::new();
{
let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf);
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
header.set_size(data.len() as u64);
header.set_mode(0o644);
header.set_cksum();
builder
.append_data(&mut header, file_name, data)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?;
builder
.finish()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?;
}
docker
.upload_to_container(
@@ -322,85 +333,40 @@ impl ExecSessionManager {
}
}
/// Ceiling on one host file packed into a container upload.
///
/// The file goes through host RAM twice — once as bytes, once inside the tar —
/// so this is a memory bound, and it is checked against the *descriptor* that
/// was opened rather than a `metadata` call that described whatever the path
/// meant a moment earlier.
pub const MAX_DROP_BYTES: u64 = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Upload a host file into `dest_dir` under `dest_name`. The file is
/// Upload a host file into the container's `/tmp` under `dest_name`. The file is
/// read and packed into the tar inside a blocking task, so the synchronous IO
/// runs off the async worker. The tar's declared entry size is taken from the
/// bytes actually read (not a separate `stat`), so a file changing size between
/// a size check and the read can't desync the header and corrupt the archive.
/// Returns the in-container path (`<dest_dir>/<dest_name>`).
///
/// `dest_dir` must already exist and must already have been checked by the
/// caller — Docker's archive extractor writes wherever it is pointed. The two
/// callers both do that first, by different routes because they are answering
/// different questions: the terminal drop stages into a fixed `/tmp` path it
/// creates itself, and the Files pane passes the directory the user is looking
/// at, which `file_commands::resolve_container_dir` has already confirmed
/// resolves inside `CONTAINER_WRITE_ROOTS`.
/// Returns the in-container path (`/tmp/<dest_name>`).
pub async fn upload_host_file_to_container(
container_id: &str,
host_path: &str,
dest_dir: &str,
dest_name: &str,
) -> Result<String, String> {
let ids = container_user_ids(container_id).await;
upload_host_file_with_ids(container_id, host_path, dest_dir, dest_name, ids).await
}
/// [`upload_host_file_to_container`] for a caller that already knows the
/// container user's ids.
///
/// `container_user_ids` is a `docker exec`, and the Files pane's upload is a
/// *selection* — one dialog can hand back twenty files. Resolving the ids per
/// file made twenty extra round trips to answer the same `id -u` twenty times,
/// which is seconds of latency for a fact that cannot change inside one
/// container's lifetime. So the loop resolves once and passes the answer in.
/// The wrapper above keeps the single-file callers unchanged.
pub async fn upload_host_file_with_ids(
container_id: &str,
host_path: &str,
dest_dir: &str,
dest_name: &str,
(uid, gid): (u64, u64),
) -> Result<String, String> {
let host_path = host_path.to_string();
let dest_name = dest_name.to_string();
let dest_for_blk = dest_name.clone();
let mtime = now_epoch_secs();
let tar_buf = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
// The caller resolved this path (`resolve_host_read_path`); opening it
// is a second trip through the same directories, so the descriptor is
// checked against the path that was validated before its bytes are
// packed into anything. Two paths reach here: the terminal's drop
// target, and the Files pane's upload via `upload_host_file_with_ids`.
// Between them they are how host bytes enter a container.
let file = std::fs::File::open(&host_path)
let data = std::fs::read(&host_path)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read {}: {}", host_path, e))?;
crate::commands::file_commands::verify_opened_path(
&file,
std::path::Path::new(&host_path),
)?;
let mut data = Vec::new();
std::io::Read::read_to_end(
&mut std::io::Read::take(file, MAX_DROP_BYTES.saturating_add(1)),
&mut data,
)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read {}: {}", host_path, e))?;
if data.len() as u64 > MAX_DROP_BYTES {
return Err(format!(
"File too large to upload (limit {} MB)",
MAX_DROP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)
));
let mut tar_buf = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + 1024);
{
let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf);
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
// Size comes from the bytes in hand, so header and payload can't disagree.
header.set_size(data.len() as u64);
header.set_mode(0o644);
header.set_cksum();
builder
.append_data(&mut header, &dest_for_blk, &data[..])
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?;
builder
.finish()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?;
}
build_single_file_tar(&dest_for_blk, &data[..], 0o644, uid, gid, mtime)
Ok(tar_buf)
})
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Upload task panicked: {}", e))??;
@@ -410,7 +376,7 @@ pub async fn upload_host_file_with_ids(
.upload_to_container(
container_id,
Some(UploadToContainerOptions {
path: dest_dir.to_string(),
path: "/tmp".to_string(),
..Default::default()
}),
tar_buf.into(),
@@ -418,17 +384,7 @@ pub async fn upload_host_file_with_ids(
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to upload file to container: {}", e))?;
Ok(container_join(dest_dir, &dest_name))
}
/// Join a container directory to a name that may itself carry separators.
///
/// Only the *reported* path — the bytes have already landed by the time this is
/// called — but that path is what the terminal echoes and what the Files pane
/// puts in its toast, so `/tmp//x` reading back as a different file than `/tmp/x`
/// is worth the four lines. `"/"` trims to `""` and yields `/x`.
fn container_join(dir: &str, name: &str) -> String {
format!("{}/{}", dir.trim_end_matches('/'), name.trim_start_matches('/'))
Ok(format!("/tmp/{}", dest_name))
}
/// Write `data` into the container at `<dest_dir>/<file_name>` with `mode`.
@@ -446,10 +402,20 @@ pub async fn upload_bytes_to_container(
) -> Result<String, String> {
let docker = get_docker()?;
// Root-owned on purpose: the only caller is migration, whose `tar -T` list
// is read back as root. The mtime still gets stamped so the file doesn't
// read as 1970.
let tar_buf = build_single_file_tar(file_name, data, mode, 0, 0, now_epoch_secs())?;
let mut tar_buf = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + 1024);
{
let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf);
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
header.set_size(data.len() as u64);
header.set_mode(mode);
header.set_cksum();
builder
.append_data(&mut header, file_name, data)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?;
builder
.finish()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?;
}
docker
.upload_to_container(
@@ -466,74 +432,6 @@ pub async fn upload_bytes_to_container(
Ok(format!("{}/{}", dest_dir.trim_end_matches('/'), file_name))
}
/// Build an in-memory tar archive holding a single regular file.
///
/// The uid/gid/mtime arguments exist because `tar::Header::new_gnu()` zeroes
/// them and Docker's archive extractor honours the header verbatim: a header
/// left at the defaults lands the file inside the container as `root:root`
/// with a 1970-01-01 mtime — not writable by `claude`, and confusing in any
/// listing. Callers that upload on a user's behalf should pass the container
/// user's ids from [`container_user_ids`].
pub fn build_single_file_tar(
file_name: &str,
data: &[u8],
mode: u32,
uid: u64,
gid: u64,
mtime: u64,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let mut tar_buf = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + 1024);
{
let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf);
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
// Size comes from the bytes in hand, so header and payload can't disagree.
header.set_size(data.len() as u64);
header.set_mode(mode);
header.set_uid(uid);
header.set_gid(gid);
header.set_mtime(mtime);
header.set_cksum();
builder
.append_data(&mut header, file_name, data)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?;
builder
.finish()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?;
}
Ok(tar_buf)
}
/// Seconds since the Unix epoch, for a tar header mtime.
pub fn now_epoch_secs() -> u64 {
std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(0)
}
/// The numeric uid/gid of the container's `claude` user.
///
/// It is not a constant: `entrypoint.sh` remaps `claude` to the *host* user's
/// ids on Unix so bind-mounted project files stay writable, and deliberately
/// does not on Windows. So the only reliable answer comes from asking the
/// container. Falls back to 1000:1000 (the image's build-time ids) if the exec
/// fails, which is strictly better than the 0:0 a default tar header carries.
pub async fn container_user_ids(container_id: &str) -> (u64, u64) {
let out = exec_oneshot_limited(
container_id,
vec!["sh".to_string(), "-c".to_string(), "id -u; id -g".to_string()],
256,
)
.await
.unwrap_or_default();
let mut ids = out.lines().filter_map(|l| l.trim().parse::<u64>().ok());
match (ids.next(), ids.next()) {
(Some(uid), Some(gid)) => (uid, gid),
_ => (1000, 1000),
}
}
/// Ceiling on how much container output a one-shot exec will buffer into the
/// host process.
///
@@ -552,31 +450,14 @@ pub const MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT: usize = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
/// past anything genuine, far short of a problem.
pub const PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT: usize = 1024 * 1024;
/// Marker on the "that command printed more than this will buffer" refusal.
///
/// The byte count on its own is a fact about the transport, not about what the
/// user did — "Command output exceeded 8388608 bytes" is not a sentence anybody
/// can act on. A caller that knows what it was reading can recognise this and
/// say the useful thing instead; see `list_container_files`, where the real
/// cause is a directory with more entries than the panel can render.
pub const OUTPUT_LIMIT_MARKER: &str = "OUTPUT_LIMIT";
/// Append to `buf` while it stays inside `limit`, returning the range the chunk
/// now occupies. `None` once the limit is exceeded, at which point the caller
/// must stop reading — and nothing is appended, so a caller that ignored the
/// answer cannot parse a half-read document.
///
/// Bytes rather than `str` on purpose: Docker frames a stream wherever it
/// likes, so a chunk boundary can fall inside a UTF-8 sequence. Decoding each
/// chunk on its own turned that into two replacement characters in the middle
/// of a filename; the decode happens once, at the end, over the whole buffer.
fn push_capped(buf: &mut Vec<u8>, chunk: &[u8], limit: usize) -> Option<(usize, usize)> {
/// Append to `buf` while it stays inside `limit`. Returns `false` once the
/// limit is exceeded, at which point the caller must stop reading.
fn push_capped(buf: &mut String, chunk: &str, limit: usize) -> bool {
if buf.len() + chunk.len() > limit {
return None;
return false;
}
let start = buf.len();
buf.extend_from_slice(chunk);
Some((start, buf.len()))
buf.push_str(chunk);
true
}
/// Run a one-shot (non-interactive) exec command in a container and collect stdout.
@@ -640,65 +521,6 @@ pub async fn exec_oneshot_as(
exec_oneshot_inner(container_id, user, cmd, env, MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT).await
}
/// What a one-shot exec printed, with the two streams still tellable apart.
///
/// `combined` is stdout and stderr interleaved in arrival order — the shape
/// every existing caller reads, and the right one for surfacing "why did that
/// fail". `stdout_ranges` indexes the parts of it that came from stdout, so a
/// caller that is *parsing* output can have just that without the buffer being
/// held twice.
struct OneshotOutput {
combined: Vec<u8>,
stdout_ranges: Vec<(usize, usize)>,
exit_code: i64,
}
impl OneshotOutput {
/// Everything the command printed, in the order it printed it.
fn text(&self) -> String {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&self.combined).into_owned()
}
/// stdout alone — for callers that parse it, where a diagnostic spliced in
/// mid-record is a parse error at best.
fn stdout(&self) -> String {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(self.combined.len());
for (start, end) in &self.stdout_ranges {
out.extend_from_slice(&self.combined[*start..*end]);
}
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out).into_owned()
}
/// stderr alone — the complement of [`Self::stdout`], i.e. the diagnostics.
fn stderr(&self) -> String {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(self.combined.len());
let mut cursor = 0usize;
for (start, end) in &self.stdout_ranges {
out.extend_from_slice(&self.combined[cursor..*start]);
cursor = *end;
}
out.extend_from_slice(&self.combined[cursor..]);
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out).into_owned()
}
}
/// [`exec_oneshot_as`] with the two streams kept apart, for callers that parse
/// stdout.
///
/// `find`'s own diagnostics ("Permission denied") used to arrive inside the
/// records its `-printf` was emitting. GNU `find` escapes tabs and newlines in
/// those messages, so the listing parser held — but "the parser holds" is not
/// the same as "the input is trustworthy", and the fix costs one enum match.
pub async fn exec_oneshot_streams_as(
container_id: &str,
user: &str,
cmd: Vec<String>,
env: Vec<String>,
) -> Result<(String, String, i64), String> {
let out = exec_oneshot_raw(container_id, user, cmd, env, MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT).await?;
Ok((out.stdout(), out.stderr(), out.exit_code))
}
async fn exec_oneshot_inner(
container_id: &str,
user: &str,
@@ -706,17 +528,6 @@ async fn exec_oneshot_inner(
env: Vec<String>,
limit: usize,
) -> Result<(String, i64), String> {
let out = exec_oneshot_raw(container_id, user, cmd, env, limit).await?;
Ok((out.text(), out.exit_code))
}
async fn exec_oneshot_raw(
container_id: &str,
user: &str,
cmd: Vec<String>,
env: Vec<String>,
limit: usize,
) -> Result<OneshotOutput, String> {
let docker = get_docker()?;
let exec = docker
@@ -739,31 +550,22 @@ async fn exec_oneshot_raw(
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?;
let mut combined: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
let mut stdout_ranges: Vec<(usize, usize)> = Vec::new();
let mut combined = String::new();
match result {
StartExecResults::Attached { mut output, .. } => {
while let Some(msg) = output.next().await {
match msg {
Ok(data) => {
let from_stdout = matches!(data, LogOutput::StdOut { .. });
let bytes = data.into_bytes();
match push_capped(&mut combined, &bytes, limit) {
Some(range) => {
if from_stdout {
stdout_ranges.push(range);
}
}
let chunk = String::from_utf8_lossy(&data.into_bytes()).into_owned();
if !push_capped(&mut combined, &chunk, limit) {
// Stop reading rather than truncate silently: every
// caller parses this output, and a half-read
// manifest or JSON array is worse than an error.
// Dropping `output` kills the exec's stream.
None => {
return Err(format!(
"{}: Command output exceeded {} bytes and was abandoned",
OUTPUT_LIMIT_MARKER, limit
))
}
return Err(format!(
"Command output exceeded {} bytes and was abandoned",
limit
));
}
}
Err(e) => return Err(format!("Exec output error: {}", e)),
@@ -775,60 +577,23 @@ async fn exec_oneshot_raw(
// The output stream draining doesn't strictly guarantee inspect_exec has the
// final exit_code populated yet, so poll until the exec reports finished.
let exit_code = require_exit_code(wait_for_exec_exit(&exec.id).await)?;
let exit_code = wait_for_exec_exit(&exec.id).await.unwrap_or(0);
Ok(OneshotOutput {
combined,
stdout_ranges,
exit_code,
})
}
/// Turn "the exit code could not be determined" into an error rather than a 0.
///
/// `unwrap_or(0)` is how a rename that never happened reported success: callers
/// branch on `code != 0`, so an unreadable status silently became "it worked",
/// the UI closed its rename box and the file had not moved. An exec whose
/// outcome cannot be established has not been established to have succeeded —
/// fail closed and let the caller surface it.
///
/// The `test -e` probe in `rename_container_path` also fails closed under this:
/// it propagates the error instead of reading an undeterminable status as
/// "the destination does not exist".
fn require_exit_code(code: Option<i64>) -> Result<i64, String> {
code.ok_or_else(|| {
"Could not determine whether the command finished (Docker did not report an exit status)"
.to_string()
})
Ok((combined, exit_code))
}
/// Poll `inspect_exec` until the exec reports finished and return its exit code.
/// Returns `None` if the code can't be determined (inspect error, or the exec
/// doesn't report finished within ~5s — which shouldn't happen once its output
/// doesn't report finished within ~1s — which shouldn't happen once its output
/// stream has drained).
///
/// The window is generous because `None` is no longer a shrug: since
/// [`require_exit_code`], it fails the whole call. Waiting a few seconds longer
/// for a busy daemon to settle costs nothing in the normal case — the loop exits
/// on the first poll that reports finished — and it is the difference between a
/// spurious "the rename failed" and a real one.
pub async fn wait_for_exec_exit(exec_id: &str) -> Option<i64> {
let docker = get_docker().ok()?;
for _ in 0..200 {
for _ in 0..40 {
match docker.inspect_exec(exec_id).await {
Ok(info) => {
if info.running != Some(true) {
// Finished. `exit_code` rather than `unwrap_or(0)`: an exec
// that has stopped without a reported code is a status
// nobody can vouch for, and flattening it to *success* is
// the wrong default when a caller is deciding whether to
// rename a downloaded file over the user's own.
// `download_container_file` treats `None` as a failure
// precisely because it cannot tell that silence from a
// clean exit; an `unwrap_or` here made that check
// unreachable. Callers that only care about "did it fail
// loudly" use `is_some_and`, which reads `None` as before.
return info.exit_code;
// Finished: use the reported code (default 0 if somehow absent).
return Some(info.exit_code.unwrap_or(0));
}
}
Err(_) => return None,
@@ -842,96 +607,31 @@ pub async fn wait_for_exec_exit(exec_id: &str) -> Option<i64> {
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// The frames a demultiplexed exec hands back, as `(is_stdout, bytes)`.
fn collect(frames: &[(bool, &[u8])]) -> OneshotOutput {
let mut combined = Vec::new();
let mut stdout_ranges = Vec::new();
for (from_stdout, bytes) in frames {
let range = push_capped(&mut combined, bytes, usize::MAX).unwrap();
if *from_stdout {
stdout_ranges.push(range);
}
}
OneshotOutput {
combined,
stdout_ranges,
exit_code: 0,
}
}
#[test]
fn output_under_the_limit_is_buffered_whole() {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
assert_eq!(push_capped(&mut buf, b"hello ", 16), Some((0, 6)));
assert_eq!(push_capped(&mut buf, b"world", 16), Some((6, 11)));
assert_eq!(buf, b"hello world");
let mut buf = String::new();
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "hello ", 16));
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "world", 16));
assert_eq!(buf, "hello world");
}
#[test]
fn output_over_the_limit_is_refused_rather_than_truncated() {
// The abandoned chunk must not land in the buffer either: a caller that
// ignored the error would otherwise parse a half-read document.
let mut buf = Vec::new();
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, b"0123456789", 12).is_some());
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, b"0123456789", 12).is_none());
assert_eq!(buf, b"0123456789");
let mut buf = String::new();
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 12));
assert!(!push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 12));
assert_eq!(buf, "0123456789");
}
#[test]
fn a_single_oversized_chunk_is_refused() {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, b"0123456789", 4).is_none());
let mut buf = String::new();
assert!(!push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 4));
assert!(buf.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_character_split_across_two_frames_survives_the_decode() {
// Docker frames a stream wherever it likes, and a filename is where
// that shows: decoding each chunk on its own turned the two halves of
// `ü` into two replacement characters in the middle of a name.
let out = collect(&[(true, &[0xc3]), (true, &[0xbc, b'.', b't', b'x', b't'])]);
assert_eq!(out.stdout(), "ü.txt");
assert_eq!(out.text(), "ü.txt");
}
#[test]
fn a_diagnostic_never_lands_in_the_stream_a_caller_parses() {
// `find`'s "Permission denied" used to arrive inside the records its
// `-printf` was emitting. Arrival order is still available for the
// error message; the parser gets stdout alone.
let out = collect(&[
(true, b"first"),
(false, b"find: /x: Permission denied\n"),
(true, b"second"),
]);
assert_eq!(out.stdout(), "firstsecond");
assert_eq!(out.stderr(), "find: /x: Permission denied\n");
assert_eq!(out.text(), "firstfind: /x: Permission denied\nsecond");
}
#[test]
fn an_output_limit_refusal_is_marked_so_a_caller_can_reword_it() {
// "Command output exceeded 8388608 bytes" is a fact about a buffer.
// The marker is what lets `list_container_files` say "too many entries"
// instead, which is the thing that actually happened.
assert!(!OUTPUT_LIMIT_MARKER.is_empty());
let refusal = format!(
"{}: Command output exceeded {} bytes and was abandoned",
OUTPUT_LIMIT_MARKER, MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT
);
assert!(refusal.starts_with(OUTPUT_LIMIT_MARKER));
}
#[test]
fn an_undeterminable_exit_status_is_an_error_not_a_zero() {
// The bug this guards: `unwrap_or(0)` made every caller that branches on
// `code != 0` — rename, mkdir — report success for an exec whose outcome
// nobody could read.
assert_eq!(require_exit_code(Some(0)).unwrap(), 0);
assert_eq!(require_exit_code(Some(1)).unwrap(), 1);
assert!(require_exit_code(None).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn the_bridge_budget_is_far_smaller_than_the_general_one() {
// The auth bridge re-reads container-controlled procfs every 2s, so it
@@ -940,25 +640,4 @@ mod tests {
// …but still comfortably above a genuine /proc/net/tcp{,6} pair.
assert!(PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT > 100 * 150);
}
/// The reported path, which is what the terminal echoes back to Claude and
/// what the Files pane puts in its log line. `/tmp//x` and `/tmp/x` are the
/// same file to the kernel and different strings to a person reading either
/// of those.
#[test]
fn container_join_produces_one_separator() {
assert_eq!(container_join("/tmp", "a.txt"), "/tmp/a.txt");
// The terminal's drop passes a nested name; it must not gain a second
// slash at the seam.
assert_eq!(
container_join("/tmp", "triple-c-drops/a.txt"),
"/tmp/triple-c-drops/a.txt"
);
// A directory the user navigated to can carry a trailing slash, and the
// container root is the case where trimming it must not eat the only
// separator there is.
assert_eq!(container_join("/workspace/", "a.txt"), "/workspace/a.txt");
assert_eq!(container_join("/", "a.txt"), "/a.txt");
assert_eq!(container_join("/", "/a.txt"), "/a.txt");
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+4 -313
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ mod docker;
mod install_helper;
mod logging;
mod models;
mod project_lock;
mod storage;
pub mod web_terminal;
@@ -29,21 +28,6 @@ pub struct AppState {
pub auth_bridge: Arc<AuthBridgeManager>,
pub web_terminal_server: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<Option<WebTerminalServer>>>,
pub lifecycle: Arc<Lifecycle>,
/// The file `preview_settings_import` last decrypted successfully, held
/// so `apply_settings_import` can re-read and re-decrypt the same file
/// without the frontend ever passing a host path back to Rust as an
/// argument — see the doc comment on `commands::settings_export_commands`
/// for why that direction specifically is the one this app treats as
/// dangerous. Deliberately re-decrypted rather than cached in plaintext:
/// nothing here holds a decrypted secret in memory for longer than one
/// command's execution.
///
/// Also pins a hash of the file's ciphertext at preview time, so
/// `apply_settings_import` can refuse to proceed if the file on disk
/// changed underneath the pending import — otherwise confirming a
/// preview is not actually binding on what gets applied.
pub pending_settings_import:
Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<Option<commands::settings_export_commands::PendingSettingsImport>>>,
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -228,6 +212,7 @@ pub fn run() {
let lifecycle_setup = lifecycle.clone();
tauri::Builder::default()
.plugin(tauri_plugin_store::Builder::default().build())
.plugin(tauri_plugin_dialog::init())
.plugin(tauri_plugin_opener::init())
.manage(AppState {
@@ -237,7 +222,6 @@ pub fn run() {
auth_bridge,
web_terminal_server: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None)),
lifecycle,
pending_settings_import: Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None)),
})
.setup(move |app| {
match tauri::image::Image::from_bytes(include_bytes!("../icons/icon.png")) {
@@ -251,48 +235,6 @@ pub fn run() {
}
}
// ── Startup disk housekeeping ────────────────────────────────
// Until now the only sweep ran *after* a recreation, so a user who
// simply stopped launching a project kept its orphaned snapshot
// layers forever, and anything a crash left behind (a probe
// container pinning a base image, a rollback pin whose migration
// record is gone) had no path back at all. All of it is
// read-mostly and finishes in well under a second on an idle daemon,
// but they are detached anyway: housekeeping must never delay the
// window appearing, and a daemon that is not running yet is a
// logged warning rather than a failed start.
//
// Ordering matters. Probes are removed first because a probe holds
// an image open and the sweep will not force — both the probe
// containers and the probe images, the latter being the one orphan
// the sweep can never reach on its own; pins are untagged
// second so the images they were holding are dangling by the time
// the sweep lists them; the sweep runs last and collects both.
let projects_store_for_cleanup = projects_store_setup.clone();
tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async move {
crate::docker::reap_probe_containers().await;
// Probe *images* too, and for a sharper reason: a probe
// container merely pins an image the sweep then refuses to
// touch, whereas a leftover probe image is tagged and so
// nothing else in this app can ever collect it. See
// `reap_probe_images`.
crate::docker::reap_probe_images().await;
let reaped = crate::docker::reap_stale_migration_pins().await;
if reaped > 0 {
log::info!("Startup housekeeping dropped {} stale rollback pin(s)", reaped);
}
crate::docker::sweep_orphaned_snapshots_logged("startup").await;
// A container/image/volume `remove_project` could not delete
// is recorded rather than lost — see triple-c#31 — and this is
// the only place anything ever retries it. Takes the store so
// it can refuse to touch a project that turns out to still be
// live — see the long comment on the function itself.
crate::commands::project_commands::retry_pending_cleanup_logged(
&projects_store_for_cleanup,
)
.await;
});
// Auto-start web terminal server if enabled in settings
let settings = settings_store_setup.get();
if settings.web_terminal.enabled {
@@ -469,6 +411,7 @@ pub fn run() {
commands::docker_commands::check_image_exists,
commands::docker_commands::build_image,
commands::docker_commands::get_container_info,
commands::docker_commands::list_sibling_containers,
// Projects
commands::project_commands::list_projects,
commands::project_commands::add_project,
@@ -478,10 +421,6 @@ pub fn run() {
commands::project_commands::stop_project_container,
commands::project_commands::rebuild_project_container,
commands::project_commands::reconcile_project_statuses,
// Notes
commands::notes_commands::list_notes,
commands::notes_commands::save_note,
commands::notes_commands::delete_note,
// Container base-image migration
commands::migration_commands::get_container_staleness,
commands::migration_commands::migrate_project_to_base,
@@ -513,7 +452,6 @@ pub fn run() {
commands::auth_token_commands::cancel_claude_token,
commands::auth_token_commands::has_claude_token,
commands::auth_token_commands::clear_claude_token,
commands::auth_token_commands::sweep_claude_token_snapshots,
// Settings
commands::settings_commands::get_settings,
commands::settings_commands::update_settings,
@@ -522,10 +460,6 @@ pub fn run() {
commands::settings_commands::inspect_ca_cert_path,
commands::settings_commands::list_aws_profiles,
commands::settings_commands::detect_host_timezone,
// Settings export/import
commands::settings_export_commands::export_settings,
commands::settings_export_commands::preview_settings_import,
commands::settings_export_commands::apply_settings_import,
// Terminal
commands::terminal_commands::open_terminal_session,
commands::terminal_commands::terminal_input,
@@ -538,12 +472,9 @@ pub fn run() {
commands::terminal_commands::stop_audio_bridge,
// Files
commands::file_commands::list_container_files,
commands::file_commands::download_container_backup,
commands::file_commands::download_container_file,
commands::file_commands::upload_files_to_container,
commands::file_commands::read_container_file,
commands::file_commands::rename_container_path,
commands::file_commands::create_container_directory,
commands::file_commands::download_container_backup,
commands::file_commands::upload_file_to_container,
// AWS
commands::aws_commands::aws_sso_refresh,
// Updates
@@ -721,244 +652,4 @@ mod tests {
lifecycle.settle_startup_tasks().await;
assert!(started.elapsed() <= STARTUP_CANCEL_BUDGET + Duration::from_secs(1));
}
/// The capability file is the app's entire IPC attack surface, and it is
/// data — nothing in `cargo test` reads it, so a widened grant lands with a
/// green suite. This is what noticing looks like.
///
/// It exists because `core:default` was granted for months. That alias
/// pulls in `core:image:default` → `allow-from-path`, which is an
/// unconditional `std::fs::read` of any host path with no scope check, and
/// nothing in the frontend has ever imported `@tauri-apps/api/image`.
/// Every `#[tauri::command]` is registered, and every registration names a
/// command that exists.
///
/// This is the shape of the bug that caused the original OAuth-callback
/// complaint: `set_auth_bridge_enabled` existed, worked, and had a typed
/// frontend wrapper — with **zero call sites**. The switch the docs told
/// users to flip was never wired to anything, so the bridge stayed off and
/// every login callback was refused. Nothing failed; the feature was simply
/// absent, and no test noticed because both halves compiled.
///
/// The reverse direction matters too, and for a sharper reason: a command
/// that is registered but reachable from nowhere is still IPC surface a
/// compromised webview can call. `list_sibling_containers` — which returned
/// every container on the daemon, including the user's unrelated work —
/// sat in exactly that state, and this test is what found it. It has since
/// been removed at all four levels: registration, command, docker helper,
/// and the frontend wrapper and type.
///
/// So this asserts the two lists agree, and leaves *deciding* what belongs
/// on them to a human. It cannot see frontend call sites; `tsc` and the
/// vitest suite cover that side.
#[test]
fn every_command_is_registered_exactly_once() {
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
let mut defined: BTreeSet<String> = BTreeSet::new();
// Walk the source tree for the command attribute and take the `fn` name
// that follows.
//
// The first version of this matched `line.trim() == "#[tauri::command]"`
// exactly and broke on the first non-`#` line. An audit got five real,
// compiling, unregistered commands past it — `#[tauri::command(async)]`,
// `#[tauri::command(rename_all = "snake_case")]`, a trailing comment,
// spaces in the path, and a bare `#[command]` after `use tauri::command`
// — plus `pub(crate) fn` and a `///` line between attribute and `fn`.
// Every one of those is a command the frontend could not call, which is
// the bug this test exists for, and the test stayed green.
//
// The asymmetry matters: confusion on the *definition* side is a silent
// pass, while on the *registration* side it fails loudly against
// legitimate code — and rustc already covers that direction. So this
// errs toward over-matching definitions.
fn collect(dir: &std::path::Path, out: &mut BTreeSet<String>) {
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) else { return };
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if path.is_dir() {
collect(&path, out);
} else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
let Ok(text) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) else { continue };
let lines: Vec<&str> = text.lines().collect();
for (i, line) in lines.iter().enumerate() {
let t = line.trim();
// `#[tauri::command]`, `#[tauri::command(async)]`,
// `#[tauri :: command]`, a bare `#[command]` under
// `use tauri::command`, and any of those with a
// trailing comment.
let attr = t.strip_prefix("#[").map(|a| {
a.split(']').next().unwrap_or("").replace(' ', "")
});
let is_command_attr = attr.is_some_and(|a| {
a == "command" || a == "tauri::command"
|| a.starts_with("command(")
|| a.starts_with("tauri::command(")
});
if !is_command_attr {
continue;
}
// Skip further attributes and doc comments rather than
// giving up at the first line that is not an attribute.
for next in lines.iter().skip(i + 1) {
let t = next.trim();
if t.starts_with('#') || t.starts_with("//") || t.is_empty() {
continue;
}
// Any visibility, then `fn` or `async fn`.
let after_vis = t
.strip_prefix("pub(crate) ")
.or_else(|| t.strip_prefix("pub(super) "))
.or_else(|| t.strip_prefix("pub(in crate) "))
.or_else(|| t.strip_prefix("pub "))
.unwrap_or(t);
let after_async =
after_vis.strip_prefix("async ").unwrap_or(after_vis);
if let Some(rest) = after_async.strip_prefix("fn ") {
if let Some(name) = rest.split(['(', '<']).next() {
out.insert(name.trim().to_string());
}
}
break;
}
}
}
}
}
collect(
std::path::Path::new(concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/src")),
&mut defined,
);
// The registration list, read from this file rather than from a macro
// expansion so the test does not depend on `generate_handler!`'s shape.
let this = include_str!("lib.rs");
let handler = this
.split_once("generate_handler![")
.and_then(|(_, rest)| rest.split_once("])"))
.map(|(inside, _)| inside)
.expect("lib.rs should contain a generate_handler! list");
// Line-based, not `split(',')`: the list is grouped under `// Docker`
// style comments, and splitting on commas glues each comment to the
// command that follows it. A `starts_with("//")` filter then drops that
// command — silently, and once per group.
let registered: BTreeSet<String> = handler
.lines()
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|l| !l.is_empty() && !l.starts_with("//"))
.filter_map(|l| {
l.trim_end_matches(',')
.rsplit("::")
.next()
.map(|n| n.trim().to_string())
})
.filter(|n| !n.is_empty())
.collect();
assert!(
!defined.is_empty() && !registered.is_empty(),
"the scan found nothing — it has stopped testing anything (defined={}, registered={})",
defined.len(),
registered.len()
);
let unregistered: Vec<&String> = defined.difference(&registered).collect();
assert!(
unregistered.is_empty(),
"these commands exist but are not registered, so the frontend cannot call them: {:?}",
unregistered
);
let undefined: Vec<&String> = registered.difference(&defined).collect();
assert!(
undefined.is_empty(),
"these are registered but no `#[tauri::command]` defines them: {:?}",
undefined
);
// "exactly once" was in this test's name and not in its body: both
// sides were sets, so registering the same command twice in a
// hand-maintained 118-line list compiled, warned about nothing, and
// passed here.
let mut seen: Vec<&str> = Vec::new();
let mut duplicated: Vec<&str> = Vec::new();
for line in handler
.lines()
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|l| !l.is_empty() && !l.starts_with("//"))
{
if let Some(name) = line.trim_end_matches(',').rsplit("::").next() {
let name = name.trim();
if name.is_empty() {
continue;
}
if seen.contains(&name) {
duplicated.push(name);
} else {
seen.push(name);
}
}
}
assert!(
duplicated.is_empty(),
"these are registered more than once: {:?}",
duplicated
);
}
#[test]
fn the_capability_grants_are_the_ones_that_were_reviewed() {
let raw = include_str!("../capabilities/default.json");
let parsed: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(raw).expect("capabilities/default.json must parse");
let listed: Vec<String> = parsed["permissions"]
.as_array()
.expect("a `permissions` array")
.iter()
.map(|p| match p {
// A scoped grant is an object; its identifier is what matters here.
serde_json::Value::Object(o) => o["identifier"]
.as_str()
.expect("a scoped grant needs an identifier")
.to_string(),
other => other.as_str().expect("a grant is a string or an object").to_string(),
})
.collect();
let mut sorted = listed.clone();
sorted.sort();
let mut expected = vec![
"core:event:allow-listen",
"core:event:allow-unlisten",
"core:webview:allow-internal-toggle-devtools",
"dialog:allow-open",
"dialog:allow-save",
"opener:allow-open-url",
];
expected.sort();
assert_eq!(
sorted, expected,
"the capability set changed. That is allowed — but it is the IPC \
surface a compromised webview can call, so update this list \
deliberately rather than to make the test pass."
);
// Belt and braces: the `*:default` aliases are the specific trap here,
// because they expand to a set the file never spells out. `store:*` in
// particular was an arbitrary host-file read/write primitive.
for grant in &listed {
assert!(
!grant.ends_with(":default"),
"{} is an alias — it expands to permissions this file does not \
name. Enumerate them instead.",
grant
);
assert!(
!grant.starts_with("store:"),
"store:* is `PathBuf::push` against AppData, which an absolute \
path discards: an arbitrary host-file read/write."
);
}
}
}
+2 -65
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,6 @@
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
/// The level the dispatch is built with, and the level restored by hand if
/// installing it fails — see the failure branch in [`init`] for why that
/// matters more than it looks.
const LOG_LEVEL: log::LevelFilter = log::LevelFilter::Info;
/// Returns the log directory path: `<data_dir>/triple-c/logs/`
fn log_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {
dirs::data_dir().map(|d| d.join("triple-c").join("logs"))
@@ -38,7 +33,7 @@ pub fn init() {
message
))
})
.level(LOG_LEVEL)
.level(log::LevelFilter::Info)
.chain(std::io::stderr());
if let Some((_path, file)) = &log_file_path {
@@ -46,28 +41,7 @@ pub fn init() {
}
if let Err(e) = dispatch.apply() {
// H2's other half. `fern::Dispatch::apply` calls `log::set_boxed_logger`
// and only then `log::set_max_level`, so a failure returns with the
// global filter still at its default, `LevelFilter::Off`. That is not
// merely "no log output": every `log::info!(…)` expands to
// `if Info <= max_level() { … }`, so at `Off` the macro never evaluates
// its own arguments. Anything a call site put in an argument list —
// a function call, an `await`, a side effect — silently stops
// happening, app-wide, because a logger could not be installed.
//
// Call sites must not put effects in log arguments (see the
// pre-migration scrub in `migration_commands.rs`), but "the whole
// program's log macros are dead and nothing said so" is its own
// hazard, so the level this dispatch was configured with is restored
// by hand. Nothing is listening — `log`'s default logger is a no-op —
// but the macros evaluate, and the one thing that *is* guaranteed to
// reach the user, the stderr line below, says what happened.
eprintln!(
"Failed to initialise logger: {}. Log output is disabled for this run; \
log macros still evaluate their arguments.",
e
);
log::set_max_level(LOG_LEVEL);
eprintln!("Failed to initialise logger: {}", e);
}
// Install a panic hook that writes to the log file so crashes are captured.
@@ -97,40 +71,3 @@ pub fn init() {
log::info!("Logging to {}", path.display());
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn a_logger_that_could_not_be_installed_still_leaves_the_macros_evaluating() {
// H2: `log::info!(…)` expands to `if Info <= max_level() { … }`, so at
// `LevelFilter::Off` the arguments are never evaluated. `fern` returns
// before `set_max_level` when `apply()` fails, which leaves exactly
// that state — and a call site that folded an effect into an argument
// list then stops performing it, app-wide, because a log file could not
// be opened. The failure branch restores the level for that reason.
//
// Asserted on the level itself rather than by driving `init`, which
// installs a process-global logger and a panic hook and can only run
// once per process.
assert_ne!(LOG_LEVEL, log::LevelFilter::Off);
// The property that makes the above worth asserting, demonstrated
// against the macro itself: a side effect in an argument list runs only
// while the level admits the record.
let mut ran = false;
let effect = |v: &mut bool| {
*v = true;
0
};
let previous = log::max_level();
log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Off);
log::info!("{}", effect(&mut ran));
assert!(!ran, "the premise is wrong: arguments evaluated at LevelFilter::Off");
log::set_max_level(LOG_LEVEL);
log::info!("{}", effect(&mut ran));
assert!(ran, "arguments did not evaluate at the level this module configures");
log::set_max_level(previous);
}
}
-139
View File
@@ -1,145 +1,6 @@
// Prevents additional console window on Windows in release
#![cfg_attr(not(debug_assertions), windows_subsystem = "windows")]
/// WebKitGTK's DMA-BUF renderer (its default accelerated-compositing path
/// since 2.42) fails outright on some Mesa/driver/compositor combinations
/// under Wayland, killing the webview and leaving a blank window — see
/// triple-c#34, reported on CachyOS/Arch with Wayland.
///
/// **This is not the only cause of a blank window, and the error text alone
/// does not tell them apart.** An earlier version of this comment quoted
/// `Could not create default EGL display: EGL_BAD_PARAMETER. Aborting.` as
/// the error this fixes. The AppImage produces that same string for an
/// entirely unrelated reason: it bundled a `libwayland-client.so.0` that
/// shadowed the host's, and the host's `libEGL_mesa.so.0` has a hard
/// DT_NEEDED on that library, so the EGL driver failed to load before any
/// renderer choice was reachable. This flag was set, and correctly, and made no difference —
/// which cost a round of debugging that started from the comment rather than
/// from the evidence. See `scripts/unbundle-wayland-client.sh`.
///
/// Set unconditionally on Linux rather than gated on `WAYLAND_DISPLAY`: that
/// variable is exported into an XWayland client's environment too, so a
/// gate on it wouldn't even cleanly separate "Wayland" from "X11" — and
/// there is no reliable heuristic at all for the actual variable that
/// matters, which Mesa/driver/compositor combination is affected. This is
/// the blunt instrument, chosen deliberately because the fallback is a real
/// trade, not a free one: the terminal's `@xterm/addon-webgl` renderer
/// (`TerminalView.tsx`) is the one surface in this app actually asking for
/// GPU compositing, and it degrades to xterm's canvas renderer under this
/// setting — slower on very heavy output, but the addon's own construction
/// is already wrapped in a fallback (`WebGL not available` is a handled
/// case, not a crash), so this is a real but graceful downgrade, traded
/// against a startup abort that has no fallback at all.
///
/// Must be set before `triple_c_lib::run()` — GTK/WebKitGTK reads it at
/// their own init time, which happens inside the Tauri builder that
/// function calls into, not at binary load.
///
/// A user who has already set this themselves is left alone — with one
/// correction. The earlier version of this function left *any* pre-set value
/// alone, including `0`, on the assumption WebKitGTK reads the variable as a
/// boolean. WebKitGTK reads it as presence-only, so `WEBKIT_DISABLE_DMABUF_
/// RENDERER=0` disabled DMA-BUF exactly like `=1` did, and there was no value
/// at all a user could set to get the accelerated path back: the escape hatch
/// the comment described did not exist. `0`, `false` and empty are now treated
/// as an explicit opt-out and the variable is *removed*, which is the only
/// thing WebKitGTK reads as "enabled". The default is unchanged — unset still
/// means disabled on Linux, so nobody who was not deliberately overriding this
/// sees any difference.
///
/// That matters more than it looks, because the trade described above is not
/// the trade actually being made. `@xterm/addon-webgl` does not fall back to
/// the canvas renderer here: its constructor throws only when WebGL is
/// *absent*, and with DMA-BUF disabled WebGL is still present — served by
/// software rasterisation. So the addon loads happily and every terminal frame
/// is rendered on the CPU and copied, which is slower than the canvas renderer
/// this comment assumed it would degrade to, not faster. See
/// `terminal_gpu_rendering` in `AppSettings` for the switch that decides
/// whether the addon is loaded at all.
///
/// This env var also leaks to whatever the app spawns afterwards — notably
/// a cold-launched default browser via the `opener` plugin's `xdg-open`
/// call. Narrow in practice (an already-running browser just receives the
/// URL; most non-WebKitGTK browsers ignore the variable entirely), but
/// worth knowing before chasing the "links don't open" half of triple-c#34
/// as a separate, unrelated cause.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
const DMABUF_VAR: &str = "WEBKIT_DISABLE_DMABUF_RENDERER";
/// What to do with `WEBKIT_DISABLE_DMABUF_RENDERER`, given whatever it is
/// already set to. Split from the mutation so it can be tested without
/// touching process-wide environment state from a parallel test runner.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum DmabufAction {
/// Not set by the user — apply the workaround.
Disable,
/// Explicitly opted out. WebKitGTK reads presence, not value, so the only
/// way to express "enabled" is for the variable not to exist.
Remove,
/// Set to something meaning "disabled". Already what we want; leave it.
LeaveAlone,
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
fn dmabuf_action(current: Option<&str>) -> DmabufAction {
match current {
None => DmabufAction::Disable,
Some(value) => match value.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"" | "0" | "false" | "no" => DmabufAction::Remove,
_ => DmabufAction::LeaveAlone,
},
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
fn apply_webkit_wayland_workaround() {
let current = std::env::var(DMABUF_VAR).ok();
match dmabuf_action(current.as_deref()) {
DmabufAction::Disable => std::env::set_var(DMABUF_VAR, "1"),
DmabufAction::Remove => std::env::remove_var(DMABUF_VAR),
DmabufAction::LeaveAlone => {}
}
}
#[cfg(all(test, target_os = "linux"))]
mod tests {
use super::{dmabuf_action, DmabufAction};
#[test]
fn unset_gets_the_workaround() {
assert_eq!(dmabuf_action(None), DmabufAction::Disable);
}
#[test]
fn falsey_values_opt_out_by_removing_the_variable() {
// The bug this replaces: these all previously read as "user set it,
// leave it alone", and WebKitGTK then disabled DMA-BUF anyway because
// it only checks presence. There was no way to ask for the GPU path.
for value in ["0", "false", "no", "", " 0 ", "FALSE", "No"] {
assert_eq!(
dmabuf_action(Some(value)),
DmabufAction::Remove,
"{value:?} should opt out"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn other_values_are_left_alone() {
for value in ["1", "true", "yes", "anything"] {
assert_eq!(
dmabuf_action(Some(value)),
DmabufAction::LeaveAlone,
"{value:?} should be left alone"
);
}
}
}
fn main() {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
apply_webkit_wayland_workaround();
triple_c_lib::run()
}
-21
View File
@@ -135,26 +135,6 @@ pub struct AppSettings {
pub gateway: GatewaySettings,
#[serde(default)]
pub global_claude_code_settings: Option<ClaudeCodeSettings>,
/// Whether the terminal loads `@xterm/addon-webgl`.
///
/// `None` is "auto", and auto is not the same answer on every platform.
/// On Linux the app disables WebKitGTK's DMA-BUF renderer at startup (see
/// `apply_webkit_wayland_workaround` in `main.rs`, and triple-c#34), which
/// does not remove WebGL — it leaves it backed by software rasterisation.
/// The addon therefore loads successfully and then renders every frame on
/// the CPU, which is slower than the canvas renderer it would otherwise
/// have fallen back to. So auto means enabled on macOS and Windows, and
/// disabled on Linux.
///
/// `Some(true)` / `Some(false)` force it either way on any platform. A
/// Linux user running X11, or one whose driver stack is unaffected, can
/// turn it back on; anyone seeing terminal lag can turn it off without
/// waiting for a release. Deliberately `Option<bool>` rather than `bool`:
/// the zero value has to mean "we choose", not "off", or every existing
/// settings file would silently pin the answer at whatever the default was
/// the day it was written.
#[serde(default)]
pub terminal_gpu_rendering: Option<bool>,
}
fn default_stt_model() -> String {
@@ -246,7 +226,6 @@ impl Default for AppSettings {
stt: SttSettings::default(),
gateway: GatewaySettings::default(),
global_claude_code_settings: None,
terminal_gpu_rendering: None,
}
}
}
+4 -8
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
pub mod app_settings;
pub mod project;
pub mod container_config;
pub mod app_settings;
pub mod gateway_settings;
pub mod migration;
pub mod note;
pub mod project;
pub mod settings_export;
pub mod update_info;
pub use app_settings::*;
pub use project::*;
pub use container_config::*;
pub use app_settings::*;
pub use gateway_settings::*;
pub use migration::*;
pub use note::*;
pub use project::*;
pub use settings_export::*;
pub use update_info::*;
-34
View File
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// One note. A scratchpad entry the user can also fire at a running Claude
/// session.
///
/// Deliberately has no `kind`/`type` field. What makes a note "for the agent"
/// is that the user pressed Send, not a mode chosen when it was written — a
/// classification decision at writing time is one the user is least willing to
/// make, and it would turn one pane into two features.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub struct Note {
pub id: String,
pub title: String,
pub body: String,
/// Pinned notes sort first, then by `updated_at` descending.
#[serde(default)]
pub pinned: bool,
pub created_at: String,
pub updated_at: String,
}
impl Note {
pub fn new(title: String, body: String) -> Self {
let now = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
Self {
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
title,
body,
pinned: false,
created_at: now.clone(),
updated_at: now,
}
}
}
+23 -469
View File
@@ -8,100 +8,6 @@ pub struct EnvVar {
pub value: String,
}
/// Whether `key` is a name a shell will read back as an ordinary variable:
/// `[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*`.
///
/// ## Why a charset rule, and not just the reserved-name list
///
/// `docker::container::is_reserved_env_key` answers a different question — "is
/// this one of the names Triple-C manages itself" — and nothing anywhere asked
/// what the *characters* were. A key is joined into `KEY=VALUE` and handed to
/// the daemon, which puts it in the container's environment verbatim, so a name
/// that is not an identifier travels through unchallenged.
///
/// The one that matters is `BASH_FUNC_name%%`, bash's wire format for an
/// exported shell function: bash imports those at startup and the *body* is the
/// value. Today that is latent rather than live — the image's `/bin/sh` is
/// dash, which does not import them, and an auditor confirmed the vector fires
/// under `bash -c` and not under `sh -c` in the shipped image. But the
/// pre-commit scrub runs `/bin/sh -c` **as root**, `/bin/sh` is whatever
/// `ubuntu:24.04` points it at, and nothing pins that. One base-image change,
/// or one call site spelled `bash`, turns a stored project setting into root
/// code execution inside the container at commit time.
///
/// So the rule is the shape of the thing rather than a list of the names that
/// are known to be dangerous: `IFS`, `LD_PRELOAD` and `PATH` are all perfectly
/// good identifiers and are the user's business, while nothing legitimate needs
/// a `%`, a `(` or a space in an environment variable name.
///
/// The key is judged **trimmed**, because that is what `create_container` sends
/// — ` FOO ` already reaches the container as `FOO`, and refusing it here would
/// break a setting that works.
pub fn is_valid_env_key(key: &str) -> bool {
let mut chars = key.trim().chars();
match chars.next() {
Some(c) if c.is_ascii_alphabetic() || c == '_' => {}
_ => return false,
}
chars.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_')
}
/// Validate a custom environment variable list that is about to be stored,
/// admitting the entries it is already stored with.
///
/// Same shape, and the same reasoning, as
/// `commands::project_commands::validate_project_paths_update`: nothing ever
/// checked these keys, so `projects.json` and `settings.json` in the field can
/// hold whatever was typed. Holding every save to the new rule would make such
/// a project unsavable *entirely* — `update_project` is the single command
/// behind the whole Config tab — and would buy nothing, because the stored key
/// is already being handed to every container that starts. An entry carried
/// over verbatim is admitted; a new or edited one is held to the rule, which is
/// what keeps the escalation closed, since escalation means *introducing* a bad
/// key through this command.
///
/// Counted rather than set-tested, for the same reason as the folder rows: a
/// second copy of an existing entry is a new entry.
///
/// The blank entry is not a violation. "+ Add variable" appends
/// `{key: "", value: ""}` and saves the list immediately, so refusing it would
/// turn the button itself into an error toast; `create_container` skips an
/// empty key, so it reaches nothing.
pub fn validate_env_vars_update(stored: &[EnvVar], incoming: &[EnvVar]) -> Result<(), String> {
// An entry with no key is the placeholder, whatever is in its value:
// `create_container` skips it, so it reaches nothing and there is nothing
// to refuse. The editor saves on every blur, and typing the value before
// the name is an ordinary way to fill a row in.
let is_blank = |v: &EnvVar| v.key.trim().is_empty();
let mut carried: std::collections::HashMap<(&str, &str), usize> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
for v in stored.iter().filter(|v| !is_blank(v)) {
*carried
.entry((v.key.as_str(), v.value.as_str()))
.or_insert(0) += 1;
}
for v in incoming.iter().filter(|v| !is_blank(v)) {
match carried.get_mut(&(v.key.as_str(), v.value.as_str())) {
Some(remaining) if *remaining > 0 => {
*remaining -= 1;
}
_ => {
if !is_valid_env_key(&v.key) {
return Err(format!(
"'{}' is not a usable environment variable name. Use a letter or \
underscore followed by letters, digits or underscores.",
v.key
));
}
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub struct ProjectPath {
pub host_path: String,
@@ -179,141 +85,31 @@ impl PermissionMode {
/// Settings for Claude Code CLI behavior inside the container.
/// These map to Claude Code env vars and ~/.claude/settings.json entries.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Default)]
#[serde(from = "StoredClaudeCodeSettings")]
/// Every field is three-state, and the third state is load-bearing.
///
/// `None` means "not set at this level". For a *project* that is "inherit
/// whatever the global settings say"; for the *global* settings it is "leave
/// Claude Code's own default alone". `Some(false)` is a deliberate off, which
/// is what lets a project turn a globally-enabled setting back off — with a
/// plain `bool` there is no value that can express that, which is why these
/// were widened from `bool`.
pub struct ClaudeCodeSettings {
/// TUI renderer. `None` leaves settings.json's `tui` key unset, which is
/// what lets Claude Code pick the renderer itself; `Some("default")` pins
/// the classic main-screen renderer and `Some("fullscreen")` the alt-screen
/// one. All three are distinct — "let it choose" is not "classic".
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
/// TUI rendering mode: None = default, Some("fullscreen") = flicker-free alt-screen
#[serde(default)]
pub tui_mode: Option<String>,
/// Saved `/effort` level: `None` = unset, otherwise one of
/// `"low" | "medium" | "high" | "xhigh"`. Written to settings.json as
/// `effortLevel` (**not** `effort`, which Claude Code has never read).
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
/// Effort level: None = default, Some("low"|"medium"|"high")
#[serde(default)]
pub effort: Option<String>,
/// Disable auto-scroll in fullscreen TUI mode. Held in the *disabled* sense
/// because Claude Code's `autoScrollEnabled` defaults to `true`, so the
/// zero value of this field has to mean "leave it on".
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub auto_scroll_disabled: Option<bool>,
/// Collapse tool output to one-line summaries. Written to settings.json as
/// `viewMode: "focus"`; there is no `focusMode` key in Claude Code.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub focus_mode: Option<bool>,
/// Disable auto-scroll in fullscreen TUI mode
#[serde(default)]
pub auto_scroll_disabled: bool,
/// Enable focus mode (collapsed tool output)
#[serde(default)]
pub focus_mode: bool,
/// Show thinking summaries in responses
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub show_thinking_summaries: Option<bool>,
/// Turn the session recap **off**.
///
/// Held in the disabled sense for the same reason as `auto_scroll_disabled`,
/// and the rename from the old `enable_session_recap` is load-bearing rather
/// than cosmetic. Claude Code's recap is on by default, so the old field was
/// inverted: switching it on was a no-op and switching it off did nothing at
/// all. Reusing the name with the opposite meaning would have read every
/// stored `enable_session_recap: false` — which is what every project that
/// never touched the control holds — as "the user turned the recap off" and
/// silently disabled it for all of them. A new name lets the old key be
/// ignored, which lands every existing project on the correct default.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub session_recap_disabled: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
pub show_thinking_summaries: bool,
/// Enable session recap when returning to a session
#[serde(default)]
pub enable_session_recap: bool,
/// Strip credentials from subprocess environments
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub env_scrub: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
pub env_scrub: bool,
/// Enable 1-hour prompt cache TTL (vs default 5-minute)
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub prompt_caching_1h: Option<bool>,
}
/// `ClaudeCodeSettings` in every shape `projects.json` and `settings.json` can
/// be holding, which is what [`ClaudeCodeSettings`] is actually deserialised
/// through.
///
/// ## The upgrade this exists to survive
///
/// Before the widening, the five booleans were plain `bool`s with
/// `#[serde(default)]` and no `skip_serializing_if`, so **every** settings
/// object ever written carries an explicit `"env_scrub": false` — not because
/// anyone chose it, but because that is what a `bool` serialises to. Under the
/// old merge (`if p.x { true } else { g.x }`) that `false` carried no
/// information at all: it was the only value an unset switch could produce, and
/// the global always won.
///
/// Read as `Some(false)` by the new code it becomes a *deliberate off* that
/// beats a global `Some(true)` — so upgrading silently turned five settings off
/// for every project that had ever opened this editor, `env_scrub` ("strip
/// credentials from subprocess environments") among them. There is no store
/// migration anywhere: `projects_store` parses these structs directly.
///
/// ## How an old record is told apart from a new one
///
/// By `enable_session_recap`. It was in the struct from the day it existed and
/// was a plain `bool`, so its key is present in every pre-widening record and
/// in no other — the field was *renamed* to `session_recap_disabled` precisely
/// so the old key could be ignored (see the doc on that field), and the new
/// code has never written it. Its presence is therefore an exact statement that
/// these bytes were written by a binary in which `false` meant "unset", and the
/// booleans are read back that way: `true` is a real choice and survives,
/// `false` becomes `None` and inherits again.
///
/// Nothing marks a *new* record, and nothing needs to: absent is `None` (the
/// fields skip serialising when unset) and a present `false` is the deliberate
/// off the widening was for. That is also what keeps a downgrade survivable —
/// an older binary reads an absent key as `false` through its own
/// `#[serde(default)]`, where a `null` would fail to parse and take the whole
/// of `projects.json` down with it, since `ProjectsStore` parses all-or-nothing
/// and starts empty on an error.
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct StoredClaudeCodeSettings {
#[serde(default)]
tui_mode: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
effort: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
auto_scroll_disabled: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
focus_mode: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
show_thinking_summaries: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
session_recap_disabled: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
env_scrub: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default)]
prompt_caching_1h: Option<bool>,
/// The pre-widening spelling of `session_recap_disabled`, and the *only*
/// use of its value: presence dates the record. Its meaning was inverted
/// and it never worked, so it is read for the marker and discarded.
#[serde(default)]
enable_session_recap: Option<bool>,
}
impl From<StoredClaudeCodeSettings> for ClaudeCodeSettings {
fn from(stored: StoredClaudeCodeSettings) -> Self {
let pre_widening = stored.enable_session_recap.is_some();
// On a pre-widening record `false` is what an untouched switch wrote,
// so it means "not set at this level" and must inherit. A `true` was a
// real choice either way.
let read = |v: Option<bool>| if pre_widening { v.filter(|on| *on) } else { v };
ClaudeCodeSettings {
tui_mode: stored.tui_mode,
effort: stored.effort,
auto_scroll_disabled: read(stored.auto_scroll_disabled),
focus_mode: read(stored.focus_mode),
show_thinking_summaries: read(stored.show_thinking_summaries),
session_recap_disabled: read(stored.session_recap_disabled),
env_scrub: read(stored.env_scrub),
prompt_caching_1h: read(stored.prompt_caching_1h),
}
}
pub prompt_caching_1h: bool,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -352,14 +148,13 @@ pub struct Project {
/// Grant the container what a VPN client needs to build a tunnel:
/// `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, the `/dev/net/tun` device, and the WireGuard
/// `src_valid_mark` sysctl. Without all three a client (PIA, WireGuard,
/// OpenVPN) installs and runs but its connection attempt hangs until it
/// times out, because it cannot create the tunnel interface or touch the
/// routing table.
/// OpenVPN, Tailscale) installs and runs but its connection attempt hangs
/// until it times out, because it cannot create the tunnel interface or
/// touch the routing table.
///
/// Off by default and deliberately opt-in: `NET_ADMIN` lets anything in the
/// container reconfigure its own network stack, which reaches further than
/// it sounds — see `vpn_host_config` for what it does and does not confer.
/// Unlike `auth_bridge_enabled` this *is*
/// container reconfigure its own network stack, which is a meaningful step
/// out of the default sandbox. Unlike `auth_bridge_enabled` this *is*
/// container state, so it carries a `triple-c.vpn-support` label and is
/// compared in `container_needs_recreation` — capabilities and devices are
/// fixed at creation and can only change by recreating the container.
@@ -422,61 +217,6 @@ pub enum ProjectStatus {
Error,
}
/// What `remove_project` could not delete, named so the UI can say so instead
/// of reporting a clean removal that was not one.
///
/// The project record is dropped from `projects.json` regardless — see the
/// long comment on `remove_project` for why refusing is not the answer — but
/// anything named here is also written to a pending-cleanup record that
/// startup housekeeping retries, so it stays reachable after the project it
/// belonged to no longer exists.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProjectRemovalReport {
/// The project's container, if it could not be removed. Named by its
/// deterministic `triple-c-{id}` name (see `Project::container_name`),
/// not the container id, since the id can be stale or absent and the
/// name is what a later retry can still resolve.
pub container: Option<String>,
/// The `triple-c-snapshot-{id}` image, if it could not be removed.
pub image: Option<String>,
/// Named volumes (home, claude config) that could not be removed.
pub volumes: Vec<String>,
/// True once the leftovers above were durably recorded for automatic
/// retry on the next launch. False means the pending-cleanup record
/// itself could not be written — nothing will retry these, and the UI
/// must say so rather than promising a retry that will not happen.
/// Meaningless (and left at its default) when `is_clean()` is true.
pub retry_scheduled: bool,
}
impl ProjectRemovalReport {
/// True when nothing was left behind.
pub fn is_clean(&self) -> bool {
self.container.is_none() && self.image.is_none() && self.volumes.is_empty()
}
}
/// What `rebuild_project_container` (Reset) produced: the project as it
/// stands after restarting, and anything Reset could not clear.
///
/// Reset's contract is "back to a clean base image", so a leftover volume or
/// image here is reused/rebuilt-from as-is by the container this creates —
/// the opposite of what was asked for — and unlike [`ProjectRemovalReport`]
/// there is no pending-cleanup record for either: the project id survives
/// Reset, so a later Reset attempt can retry them itself.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct ProjectResetOutcome {
pub project: Project,
/// The `triple-c-snapshot-{id}` image, if Reset could not remove it. The
/// more serious of the two leftovers here: the new container is created
/// from this image whenever it exists, so a surviving image means Reset
/// silently rebuilt the exact system layer it was asked to discard.
pub leftover_image: Option<String>,
/// Volumes that survived Reset and were mounted into the new container
/// unchanged.
pub leftover_volumes: Vec<String>,
}
/// Which AI model backend/provider the project uses.
/// - `Anthropic`: Direct Anthropic API (user runs `claude login` inside the container)
/// - `Bedrock`: AWS Bedrock with per-project AWS credentials
@@ -700,189 +440,3 @@ impl Project {
val
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// ── ProjectRemovalReport ────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn a_report_is_clean_only_with_nothing_left_behind() {
assert!(ProjectRemovalReport::default().is_clean());
let mut r = ProjectRemovalReport::default();
r.container = Some("abc123".to_string());
assert!(!r.is_clean(), "a leftover container must not read as clean");
let mut r = ProjectRemovalReport::default();
r.image = Some("triple-c-snapshot-x:latest".to_string());
assert!(!r.is_clean(), "a leftover image must not read as clean");
let mut r = ProjectRemovalReport::default();
r.volumes.push("triple-c-home-x".to_string());
assert!(!r.is_clean(), "a leftover volume must not read as clean");
}
// ── Custom environment variable names ─────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn an_env_var_name_has_to_be_a_shell_identifier() {
for ok in ["PATH", "_", "_x", "MY_VAR2", "a", " SPACED_BY_THE_EDITOR "] {
assert!(is_valid_env_key(ok), "'{}' should be a usable name", ok);
}
for bad in [
// bash's wire format for an exported shell function: the value is
// the body, and a `bash` that imports it runs it. The scrub exec is
// `/bin/sh -c` as root, and nothing pins `/bin/sh` to dash.
"BASH_FUNC_stat%%",
"BASH_FUNC_ls()",
"MY VAR",
"2FAST",
"WITH-DASH",
"WITH.DOT",
"",
" ",
"$(id)",
"A=B",
] {
assert!(!is_valid_env_key(bad), "'{}' should be refused", bad);
}
}
fn env(key: &str, value: &str) -> EnvVar {
EnvVar { key: key.to_string(), value: value.to_string() }
}
#[test]
fn a_bad_env_var_name_cannot_be_introduced_but_a_stored_one_does_not_brick_the_editor() {
let bad = [env("BASH_FUNC_stat%%", "() { id; }")];
// Introducing it through the Config tab is the escalation.
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&[], &bad).is_err());
// Already stored: it is handed to every container that starts whether
// or not an unrelated save is allowed through, and refusing the save
// would make every toggle on the Config tab fail.
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&bad, &bad).is_ok());
// Editing its value is a new entry, and refused again.
assert!(
validate_env_vars_update(&bad, &[env("BASH_FUNC_stat%%", "() { rm -rf /; }")]).is_err()
);
// Fixing the name is what the message asks for, and it saves.
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&bad, &[env("STAT", "() { id; }")]).is_ok());
// Dropping it entirely is always fine.
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&bad, &[]).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn the_blank_row_the_add_button_saves_is_not_an_error() {
// "+ Add variable" appends an empty entry and saves the list at once,
// so this is the button, not an attempt at anything.
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&[], &[env("", "")]).is_ok());
// Typing the value before the name is an ordinary way to fill it in,
// and an entry with no name reaches no container either way.
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&[], &[env("", "value-first")]).is_ok());
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&[], &[env("GOOD", "v"), env("", "")]).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn a_stored_entry_may_be_kept_but_not_multiplied() {
let stored = [env("BAD NAME", "v")];
assert!(validate_env_vars_update(&stored, &stored).is_ok());
// A second copy is a new entry, and held to the rule.
assert!(
validate_env_vars_update(&stored, &[env("BAD NAME", "v"), env("BAD NAME", "v")])
.is_err()
);
}
// ── Claude Code settings written before the fields were widened ───────
/// `projects.json` exactly as the shipped `main` binary wrote it: the five
/// booleans were plain `bool`s that always serialised, so every project
/// that ever opened the editor carries `false` for the ones it never
/// touched.
const MAIN_SHAPE_PROJECT: &str = r#"{
"id": "p1",
"name": "demo",
"paths": [{ "host_path": "/home/u/demo", "mount_name": "demo" }],
"container_id": null,
"status": "stopped",
"backend": "anthropic",
"bedrock_config": null,
"ollama_config": null,
"openai_compatible_config": null,
"allow_docker_access": false,
"ssh_key_path": null,
"git_user_name": null,
"git_user_email": null,
"claude_code_settings": {
"tui_mode": "fullscreen",
"effort": null,
"auto_scroll_disabled": false,
"focus_mode": false,
"show_thinking_summaries": false,
"enable_session_recap": false,
"env_scrub": false,
"prompt_caching_1h": false
},
"created_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"updated_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}"#;
#[test]
fn a_setting_stored_as_false_by_the_old_binary_still_inherits_the_global() {
let project: Project = serde_json::from_str(MAIN_SHAPE_PROJECT).unwrap();
let stored = project.claude_code_settings.expect("settings should parse");
// Read verbatim these would be `Some(false)`, which under
// `docker::container::merge_claude_code_settings` beats the global.
assert_eq!(stored.env_scrub, None);
assert_eq!(stored.auto_scroll_disabled, None);
assert_eq!(stored.focus_mode, None);
assert_eq!(stored.show_thinking_summaries, None);
assert_eq!(stored.prompt_caching_1h, None);
assert_eq!(stored.session_recap_disabled, None);
// A value the user did choose is untouched.
assert_eq!(stored.tui_mode.as_deref(), Some("fullscreen"));
// The merge rule itself, spelled the way
// `merge_claude_code_settings` spells it. `main` resolved this with
// `if p.env_scrub { true } else { g.env_scrub }`, i.e. the global won —
// and it has to go on winning, because the user never turned this off.
let global = ClaudeCodeSettings { env_scrub: Some(true), ..Default::default() };
assert_eq!(
stored.env_scrub.or(global.env_scrub),
Some(true),
"upgrading silently turned off 'strip credentials from subprocess environments'"
);
}
#[test]
fn an_off_chosen_in_the_new_editor_still_beats_a_global_on() {
// Same record without the pre-widening key: this `false` is the
// deliberate off the widening exists to make expressible.
let json = r#"{ "env_scrub": false }"#;
let chosen: ClaudeCodeSettings = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap();
assert_eq!(chosen.env_scrub, Some(false));
let global = ClaudeCodeSettings { env_scrub: Some(true), ..Default::default() };
assert_eq!(chosen.env_scrub.or(global.env_scrub), Some(false));
}
#[test]
fn an_unset_setting_is_written_as_absent_rather_than_null() {
// A downgrade parses these fields as plain `bool` with
// `#[serde(default)]`: an absent key is `false`, a `null` is a parse
// error — and `ProjectsStore` parses all-or-nothing, so one project
// with one null empties the whole list and the next save persists that.
let json = serde_json::to_string(&ClaudeCodeSettings::default()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(json, "{}");
assert!(!json.contains("null"));
let partial = ClaudeCodeSettings { env_scrub: Some(false), ..Default::default() };
let json = serde_json::to_string(&partial).unwrap();
assert_eq!(json, r#"{"env_scrub":false}"#);
// And it reads back as what it is.
let round_tripped: ClaudeCodeSettings = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
assert_eq!(round_tripped, partial);
}
}
-366
View File
@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
//! Settings export/import — see triple-c#35.
//!
//! `SettingsExportPayload` is the whole plaintext export before encryption
//! and after decryption (see `storage::settings_crypto`). It bundles
//! `AppSettings` — with one field carved out, see below — with the global
//! secrets that live in the OS keychain instead: the shared Claude Code
//! OAuth login and the model gateway's two keys. Per-project settings,
//! per-project secrets, and anything living in a project's Docker volumes
//! are deliberately out of scope: this exports the *host* environment, not
//! any one project's.
//!
//! **`AppSettings` is not entirely the non-secret shape it looks like.**
//! `WebTerminalSettings::access_token` is a live bearer credential for a
//! server that binds every interface, stored as a plain field on the
//! struct that is otherwise safe to treat as config. A review of this
//! feature caught it: exporting `AppSettings` wholesale would have carried
//! that token along as if it were as inert as a port number, and — worse —
//! importing it would apply `web_terminal.enabled` and the token together
//! with no more warning than any other setting, letting a crafted export
//! silently stand up a LAN-listening terminal server with an
//! attacker-known token on the next launch. `export_settings` /
//! `apply_settings_import` blank this field out of the `settings` they
//! read from and write to, and it travels only through
//! [`ExportedSecrets::web_terminal_access_token`] instead, with the same
//! "only overwrite what the import actually has" treatment as the other
//! three secrets.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use super::{AppSettings, ImageSource};
/// Bumped when the shape of [`SettingsExportPayload`] changes in a way that
/// isn't just an additive, `#[serde(default)]`-covered field — e.g. if a
/// field is ever removed or its meaning changes. `apply_settings_import`
/// checks this before touching anything.
pub const SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION: u32 = 1;
/// The global secrets bundled into an export. Deliberately a separate struct
/// from `AppSettings`: these live in the OS keychain, never in
/// `settings.json`, and — outside of this export/import flow — the values
/// themselves never cross into the frontend; see the doc comments on
/// `storage::secure::get_gateway_api_key` and
/// `commands::settings_export_commands` for why that boundary matters here
/// too.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct ExportedSecrets {
#[serde(default)]
pub claude_oauth_token: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub gateway_api_key: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub gateway_master_key: Option<String>,
/// See the module doc comment — this is `AppSettings::web_terminal
/// .access_token`, carved out because it is a live bearer credential,
/// not config, despite living on a struct that is otherwise safe to
/// export wholesale.
#[serde(default)]
pub web_terminal_access_token: Option<String>,
}
impl ExportedSecrets {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
let blank = |s: &Option<String>| s.as_deref().is_none_or(|v| v.trim().is_empty());
blank(&self.claude_oauth_token)
&& blank(&self.gateway_api_key)
&& blank(&self.gateway_master_key)
&& blank(&self.web_terminal_access_token)
}
}
/// What `apply_settings_import` hands back: the settings that were actually
/// saved, plus a human-readable note for each keychain secret this import
/// carried but could not be restored. A keychain write failing partway
/// through must not read as unqualified success just because the settings
/// half of the import went through.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SettingsImportOutcome {
pub settings: AppSettings,
#[serde(default)]
pub secret_restore_warnings: Vec<String>,
}
/// The full plaintext payload — this is what gets encrypted on export and
/// what decryption recovers on import. Never written to disk unencrypted;
/// see `storage::settings_crypto`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SettingsExportPayload {
pub format_version: u32,
/// RFC3339. Purely informational — shown in the import preview so a user
/// picking between a few old export files has something to go on.
pub exported_at: String,
/// The exporting app's `CARGO_PKG_VERSION`. Also informational: every
/// field below already round-trips through `#[serde(default)]`-covered
/// `AppSettings`, so an older or newer export still deserializes; this is
/// for a human to notice "this is from a much older version" if an import
/// ever looks wrong, not something the code branches on.
pub app_version: String,
pub settings: AppSettings,
#[serde(default)]
pub secrets: ExportedSecrets,
}
/// What `preview_settings_import` hands the frontend before anything is
/// applied — counts and presence flags only, **never** a secret value itself,
/// so this type is safe to return across the IPC boundary and render
/// directly. The confirmation UI is built from this.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SettingsImportPreview {
pub exported_at: String,
pub app_version: String,
pub custom_env_var_count: usize,
pub gateway_model_count: usize,
pub has_claude_code_settings: bool,
pub has_claude_oauth_token: bool,
pub has_gateway_api_key: bool,
pub has_gateway_master_key: bool,
pub has_web_terminal_access_token: bool,
/// Whether the imported settings turn the web terminal on. Named
/// separately from the token above: `enabled` and the token are two
/// different fields, either can be true without the other, and
/// "this import turns on a service that listens on your network" is
/// exactly the kind of change a wholesale settings replace must not
/// bury in a generic "settings replaced" line — see the module doc
/// comment on why this field exists at all.
pub enables_web_terminal: bool,
/// Non-blank custom base URLs the import would set, so a redirect of
/// model traffic to somewhere other than the usual provider is visible
/// at import time rather than discovered later. These are endpoints, not
/// secrets — safe to show verbatim, unlike everything above.
#[serde(default)]
pub ollama_base_url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub llamacpp_base_url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub openai_compatible_base_url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub gateway_api_base: Option<String>,
/// Whether the import sets a custom Docker image, and its name if so —
/// disclosed for the same reason as the base URLs above, and arguably
/// more sharply: this is the image *every* project container is created
/// from (`models::container_config::resolve_image_name`), so a crafted
/// export pointing it at an attacker-controlled image is a path to
/// running arbitrary code with whatever a project's containers are
/// allowed to reach (the Docker socket, an SSH key, project files) —
/// not merely a redirected API endpoint.
#[serde(default)]
pub image_source: ImageSource,
#[serde(default)]
pub custom_image_name: Option<String>,
}
/// A cap on how much of a decrypted, not-yet-trusted string gets echoed back
/// into a preview a user reads and a UI renders without truncation of its
/// own. Applied to every field above that carries free-form text straight
/// from the import file rather than a count or a boolean — a base URL or an
/// image name a hostile export author controls has had no validation done
/// on it yet at preview time, and nothing stops it from being pathological
/// (embedded control characters, or long enough to blow out the confirmation
/// dialog and push the security warnings below it off screen).
const MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN: usize = 100;
fn sanitize_for_preview(value: &str) -> String {
let cleaned: String = value.chars().filter(|c| !c.is_control()).collect();
let trimmed = cleaned.trim();
if trimmed.chars().count() > MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN {
let truncated: String = trimmed.chars().take(MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN).collect();
format!("{}", truncated)
} else {
trimmed.to_string()
}
}
impl SettingsImportPreview {
pub fn from_payload(payload: &SettingsExportPayload) -> Self {
let non_blank = |s: &Option<String>| s.as_deref().is_some_and(|v| !v.trim().is_empty());
let sanitized_non_blank = |s: &Option<String>| {
s.as_deref()
.map(sanitize_for_preview)
.filter(|v| !v.is_empty())
};
Self {
exported_at: payload.exported_at.clone(),
app_version: payload.app_version.clone(),
custom_env_var_count: payload.settings.global_custom_env_vars.len(),
gateway_model_count: payload.settings.gateway.models.len(),
has_claude_code_settings: payload.settings.global_claude_code_settings.is_some(),
has_claude_oauth_token: non_blank(&payload.secrets.claude_oauth_token),
has_gateway_api_key: non_blank(&payload.secrets.gateway_api_key),
has_gateway_master_key: non_blank(&payload.secrets.gateway_master_key),
has_web_terminal_access_token: non_blank(&payload.secrets.web_terminal_access_token),
enables_web_terminal: payload.settings.web_terminal.enabled,
ollama_base_url: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.global_ollama.base_url),
llamacpp_base_url: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.global_llamacpp.base_url),
openai_compatible_base_url: sanitized_non_blank(
&payload.settings.global_openai_compatible.base_url,
),
gateway_api_base: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.gateway.api_base),
image_source: payload.settings.image_source.clone(),
custom_image_name: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.custom_image_name),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::models::AppSettings;
fn payload_with(secrets: ExportedSecrets) -> SettingsExportPayload {
let settings = AppSettings {
global_custom_env_vars: vec![
crate::models::EnvVar {
key: "A".to_string(),
value: "1".to_string(),
},
crate::models::EnvVar {
key: "B".to_string(),
value: "2".to_string(),
},
],
..AppSettings::default()
};
SettingsExportPayload {
format_version: SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION,
exported_at: "2026-08-27T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
app_version: "0.4.14".to_string(),
settings,
secrets,
}
}
#[test]
fn the_preview_never_carries_a_secret_value() {
let payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some("sk-super-secret-token".to_string()),
gateway_api_key: Some("sk-another-secret".to_string()),
gateway_master_key: Some("sk-triple-c-yet-another".to_string()),
web_terminal_access_token: Some("wt-super-secret-token".to_string()),
});
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&preview).unwrap();
assert!(!serialized.contains("sk-super-secret-token"));
assert!(!serialized.contains("sk-another-secret"));
assert!(!serialized.contains("sk-triple-c-yet-another"));
assert!(!serialized.contains("wt-super-secret-token"));
assert!(preview.has_claude_oauth_token);
assert!(preview.has_gateway_api_key);
assert!(preview.has_gateway_master_key);
assert!(preview.has_web_terminal_access_token);
}
#[test]
fn a_blank_secret_reads_as_absent_in_the_preview() {
// A keychain entry that exists but holds only whitespace must not
// read as "present" — same "blank counts as absent" rule the
// keychain layer itself applies when storing these.
let payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some(" ".to_string()),
gateway_api_key: None,
gateway_master_key: None,
web_terminal_access_token: Some(" ".to_string()),
});
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert!(!preview.has_claude_oauth_token);
assert!(!preview.has_gateway_api_key);
assert!(!preview.has_gateway_master_key);
assert!(!preview.has_web_terminal_access_token);
}
#[test]
fn enabling_the_web_terminal_is_surfaced_regardless_of_whether_a_token_came_with_it() {
// `enabled` and the token are independent fields — a crafted export
// could set one without the other, and both are worth a user's
// attention: this is the field that exists specifically so "this
// import turns on a service that listens on your network" cannot
// hide inside a generic "settings replaced" summary.
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.web_terminal.enabled = true;
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert!(preview.enables_web_terminal);
assert!(!preview.has_web_terminal_access_token);
}
#[test]
fn custom_base_urls_are_surfaced_but_blank_ones_read_as_absent() {
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.global_ollama.base_url = Some("http://attacker.example:11434".to_string());
payload.settings.global_llamacpp.base_url = Some(" ".to_string());
payload.settings.gateway.api_base = Some("https://gateway.example/v1".to_string());
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert_eq!(
preview.ollama_base_url.as_deref(),
Some("http://attacker.example:11434")
);
assert_eq!(preview.llamacpp_base_url, None);
assert_eq!(preview.openai_compatible_base_url, None);
assert_eq!(
preview.gateway_api_base.as_deref(),
Some("https://gateway.example/v1")
);
}
#[test]
fn counts_reflect_the_real_settings() {
let payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert_eq!(preview.custom_env_var_count, 2);
}
#[test]
fn an_empty_secrets_bundle_reports_itself_as_empty() {
assert!(ExportedSecrets::default().is_empty());
assert!(!ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some("x".to_string()),
..Default::default()
}
.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_secrets_bundle_holding_only_whitespace_still_reports_itself_as_empty() {
// Matches the "blank counts as absent" rule every other consumer of
// these fields applies (`has_claude_oauth_token` and friends above) —
// a keychain entry that exists but holds only whitespace carries
// nothing usable, so the export-time "nothing to export" log line
// must still fire for it.
assert!(ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some(" ".to_string()),
..Default::default()
}
.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_custom_docker_image_is_surfaced() {
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.image_source = crate::models::ImageSource::Custom;
payload.settings.custom_image_name = Some("ghcr.io/attacker/triple-c:latest".to_string());
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert_eq!(preview.image_source, crate::models::ImageSource::Custom);
assert_eq!(
preview.custom_image_name.as_deref(),
Some("ghcr.io/attacker/triple-c:latest")
);
}
#[test]
fn preview_strings_are_stripped_of_control_characters_and_capped_in_length() {
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.global_ollama.base_url =
Some(format!("http://example.test/{}\u{0007}bell", "x".repeat(200)));
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
let shown = preview.ollama_base_url.expect("non-blank base url");
assert!(!shown.contains('\u{0007}'), "control character leaked into the preview");
// +1 for the trailing ellipsis appended when truncated.
assert!(
shown.chars().count() <= MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN + 1,
"preview string was not capped: {} chars",
shown.chars().count()
);
}
}
-18
View File
@@ -26,24 +26,6 @@ pub struct GitHubRelease {
pub body: String,
pub assets: Vec<GitHubAsset>,
pub published_at: String,
/// Whether GitHub itself has this release marked as a prerelease.
/// `#[serde(default)]` rather than required: every response GitHub sends
/// carries this, but nothing here should refuse to parse the rest of a
/// release over one missing field. Defaults to `false` (offered) rather
/// than `true` (excluded) — a missing field only happens if GitHub's API
/// shape changes, and "API changed, therefore updates silently stop
/// working forever" is the worse failure of the two.
///
/// `build-app.yml`'s own mirror never publishes a prerelease, but
/// `.gitea/workflows/backfill-releases.yml` forwards every Gitea release
/// unfiltered, `prerelease` included. A preview release's `preview-<sha>`
/// tag already fails semver parsing on its own, so this field is not what
/// stops *that* case — it is what stops the case tag-parsing can't catch:
/// a normally-tagged release (`v0.4.13`) that someone marks as a
/// prerelease on Gitea (a hotfix candidate, an RC) and a backfill then
/// mirrors as-is. Real defence for that case, not a no-op.
#[serde(default)]
pub prerelease: bool,
}
/// GitHub API asset response (internal).
-370
View File
@@ -1,370 +0,0 @@
//! Per-project mutual exclusion for everything that rewrites a project's
//! container or its snapshot image.
//!
//! ## Why polling was not enough
//!
//! Until this module existed the app had exactly one mutual-exclusion
//! primitive — the `ACTIVE_MIGRATIONS` set behind
//! `migration_commands::is_migrating` — and it was **one-way**. A migration
//! took a guard for its whole run; everything else merely *asked once, at
//! entry*, whether a migration was in flight and then proceeded with no claim
//! of its own. Two non-migration operations on the same project could not see
//! each other at all, and a migration could start underneath one that was
//! already halfway through.
//!
//! That is not a theoretical gap. Compaction resolves
//! `triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest` when its build starts and commits back over
//! that same tag minutes later, and the Settings panel is a sidebar rather than
//! a modal — so Project Home stays live with Start, Stop, Reset and Migrate all
//! clickable while a compaction runs. Three interleavings were reproduced:
//!
//! * Compaction commits `flat(A)` over `:latest` after a migration has already
//! moved that tag to a new lineage. The migration is silently reverted, the
//! config replay lands twice, and the migration record says
//! `awaiting-confirmation` against a base the tag no longer points at.
//! * Compaction resolves A, the user starts the project and works for an hour,
//! a recreate commits D over `:latest`, and the compaction then overwrites it
//! with `flat(A)` — orphaning an hour of system-layer work while reporting
//! success and a byte saving.
//! * Compaction resurrects the system layer a Reset had just destroyed.
//!
//! Every one of those is "two writers of `:latest`, neither holding anything".
//! So this registry replaces the polling with an actual claim: an operation
//! **acquires** a [`ProjectGuard`] and holds it for its whole run, and a second
//! operation on the same project is refused with a message naming the holder.
//!
//! ## What this does NOT protect against, stated plainly
//!
//! **This is in-process state.** Two copies of the app pointed at the same
//! Docker daemon share nothing here: instance A's compaction and instance B's
//! migration will both acquire happily and then race exactly as before.
//! `reap_probe_containers` and the `triple-c-compact-*` / `triple-c-scrub-*`
//! sweeps are worse than that — they are daemon-wide force-removals driven by
//! a name or a label, so instance B can destroy a container instance A is
//! mid-commit against.
//!
//! A daemon-visible lock was considered and rejected for now, and the reasoning
//! is recorded here so it is not re-derived from scratch:
//!
//! * A **lock container** would work — container names are unique daemon-wide
//! and `create` fails atomically on a name conflict — but a container has to
//! be created *from an image*, and that pins the image. A lock on
//! `triple-c-snapshot-{id}` would block the very `rmi`/sweep paths it guards,
//! and a leaked lock container would pin multiple gigabytes forever.
//! * A **named volume** is not usable: `create_volume` on an existing name
//! returns the existing volume rather than failing, so it cannot be a
//! test-and-set.
//! * A **label on the snapshot image** is not atomic — read/modify/commit has
//! the same race it would be trying to close.
//!
//! So the cross-process case is **documented, not solved**. What this module
//! does do about it is bound the damage: [`any_held_excluding`] lets the daemon-wide
//! reapers skip work while this process is mid-operation, and the reapers
//! themselves gained age gates so a young container belonging to somebody else
//! is left alone (see `docker::migration::reap_probe_containers`).
//!
//! ## Refuse, do not queue
//!
//! [`try_acquire`] never waits. Every caller is a user-initiated action behind
//! a button, and a button that blocks for the four minutes a compaction takes
//! is worse than one that says what is running. The refusal string is written
//! for the user and names the holder.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Mutex, OnceLock};
/// The operations that claim a project.
///
/// One variant per *class of writer*, not per command: `Recreate` covers Start
/// as well, because Start's create-and-commit path is the same writer of
/// `triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest` that a recreate is.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ProjectOp {
/// `migrate_project_to_base`, `resume_migration`, `rollback_migration`,
/// `confirm_migration`.
Migration,
/// `disk::compact_snapshot` — the long one, and the reason this exists.
///
/// Not constructed on this branch: the Disk panel and its compaction were
/// held back for separate hardening and live on `hold/disk-and-dragout`.
/// The variant stays because this registry is the thing that made those
/// operations safe to re-land, and a re-land that had to re-derive the
/// claim classes would be re-deriving the bug.
#[allow(dead_code)]
Compaction,
/// Start / stop / recreate. Anything in `start_project_container`'s path.
Recreate,
/// `rebuild_project_container` — deletes both volumes and the snapshot.
Reset,
/// `disk::destroy` — a volume, a snapshot image, or a rollback pin.
Destroy,
/// `disk::clear_caches` — an exec into the live container. It does not
/// write `:latest`, but it must not run while the container is being
/// removed out from under it.
///
/// Not constructed on this branch, for the same reason as
/// [`ProjectOp::Compaction`].
#[allow(dead_code)]
CacheClear,
/// `container::scrub_secrets_from_snapshots` — the third writer of
/// `triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest`, reached from `clear_claude_token`. It
/// creates a scratch container from the snapshot and commits back over the
/// same tag, so it is the same read-modify-write shape as a compaction and
/// loses the same race: any `:latest` move landing between its create and
/// its commit is overwritten by an image derived from the pre-read state.
SecretScrub,
}
impl ProjectOp {
/// What is happening, phrased for the message a user reads.
pub fn describe(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
ProjectOp::Migration => "A container base update is running for this project",
ProjectOp::Compaction => "This project's snapshot is being compacted",
ProjectOp::Recreate => "This project's container is being started or recreated",
ProjectOp::Reset => "This project is being reset",
ProjectOp::Destroy => "Something of this project's is being deleted",
ProjectOp::CacheClear => "This project's caches are being cleared",
ProjectOp::SecretScrub => "A revoked credential is being removed from this project's snapshot",
}
}
/// What the *refused* caller was trying to do, for the tail of the message.
fn blocked_action(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
ProjectOp::Migration => "starting a base update",
ProjectOp::Compaction => "compacting its snapshot",
ProjectOp::Recreate => "starting or recreating its container",
ProjectOp::Reset => "resetting it",
ProjectOp::Destroy => "deleting anything of its",
ProjectOp::CacheClear => "clearing its caches",
ProjectOp::SecretScrub => "removing a credential from its snapshot",
}
}
}
/// Project id → the operation currently holding it.
///
/// A `std::sync::Mutex` rather than a `tokio` one on purpose: it is only ever
/// held for the length of a `HashMap` insert or remove, never across an await,
/// and [`is_held_by`] has to be callable from the synchronous helpers in
/// `disk.rs` that already ask this question.
static HOLDERS: OnceLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, ProjectOp>>> = OnceLock::new();
fn holders() -> &'static Mutex<HashMap<String, ProjectOp>> {
HOLDERS.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()))
}
/// A claim on one project, released on drop.
///
/// RAII rather than an explicit release for the reason [`ProjectOp::Migration`]'s
/// predecessor already learned: a plain release statement is skipped by an
/// early `?`, by a panic, and by the future simply being dropped. A guard is
/// not.
/// Dropping this releases the claim, so a caller that discards it has taken no
/// lock at all — `let _ = try_acquire(...)` drops immediately and reads as
/// success. `#[must_use]` makes that a compile warning rather than a race.
#[must_use = "the claim is released as soon as this guard is dropped; bind it for the whole operation"]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ProjectGuard {
project_id: String,
}
impl Drop for ProjectGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// `into_inner` on a poisoned lock: a panic while some other thread held
// this map for the duration of one insert cannot have left it
// inconsistent, and refusing to release afterwards would strand the
// project as permanently busy.
holders()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.remove(&self.project_id);
}
}
/// Claim a project for `op`, or say who has it.
///
/// The error is user-facing copy, not a debug string — it goes straight back
/// over IPC to a toast.
pub fn try_acquire(project_id: &str, op: ProjectOp) -> Result<ProjectGuard, String> {
let mut map = holders().lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
if let Some(holder) = map.get(project_id).copied() {
return Err(format!(
"{}. Wait for it to finish before {}.",
holder.describe(),
op.blocked_action()
));
}
map.insert(project_id.to_string(), op);
Ok(ProjectGuard {
project_id: project_id.to_string(),
})
}
/// Which operation holds this project, if any.
pub fn held(project_id: &str) -> Option<ProjectOp> {
holders()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.get(project_id)
.copied()
}
/// Whether this project is held by exactly `op`.
///
/// `migration_commands::is_migrating` is this, specialised — which is the whole
/// point of folding `ACTIVE_MIGRATIONS` into this registry: there is now one
/// answer to "is something happening to this project", not two that can
/// disagree.
pub fn is_held_by(project_id: &str, op: ProjectOp) -> bool {
held(project_id) == Some(op)
}
/// Whether any project **other than** `exclude_project_id` is currently held by
/// `op`. Pass an empty id to ask about every project.
///
/// Used by the daemon-wide reapers, which cannot tell which project a
/// `triple-c-compact-*` container belongs to — the name carries a random uuid,
/// not a project id — so "is this process compacting anything right now" is the
/// only in-process question they can ask before force-removing one. The
/// exclusion is for the reaper that runs *inside* a compaction, which is
/// already holding a claim of its own and would otherwise see it and skip.
///
/// No production caller on this branch: the compaction reaper it was written
/// for went to `hold/disk-and-dragout` with the rest of the Disk panel. Kept
/// (and still tested) because it is the only bound this module offers on the
/// cross-process case documented above.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn any_held_excluding(op: ProjectOp, exclude_project_id: &str) -> bool {
holders()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.iter()
.any(|(project_id, held)| *held == op && project_id != exclude_project_id)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Ids are namespaced per test: the registry is process-global, and
/// `cargo test` runs these on several threads at once.
fn id(name: &str) -> String {
format!("project-lock-test-{}", name)
}
#[test]
fn a_second_acquire_on_the_same_project_is_refused() {
let p = id("second-acquire");
let first = try_acquire(&p, ProjectOp::Compaction).expect("first claim");
let second = try_acquire(&p, ProjectOp::Recreate);
let err = second.expect_err("a second claim must be refused, not queued");
// The refusal has to name the holder — "busy" alone leaves the user
// with nothing to wait for.
assert!(err.contains("snapshot is being compacted"), "{}", err);
assert!(err.contains("starting or recreating"), "{}", err);
drop(first);
// And it has to be retakeable the moment the holder goes away. Bound
// rather than discarded: `#[must_use]` is what stops a real caller
// writing `try_acquire(...)` and believing it holds something.
let retaken = try_acquire(&p, ProjectOp::Recreate).expect("released on drop");
drop(retaken);
}
#[test]
fn the_guard_releases_on_an_early_return() {
let p = id("early-return");
fn bails(project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let _guard = try_acquire(project_id, ProjectOp::Reset)?;
Err("something failed".to_string())
}
assert!(bails(&p).is_err());
assert_eq!(held(&p), None, "an early `?` must not strand the claim");
}
#[test]
fn the_guard_releases_on_a_panic() {
let p = id("panic");
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
let _guard = try_acquire(&id("panic"), ProjectOp::Migration).unwrap();
panic!("boom");
});
assert!(result.is_err());
assert_eq!(held(&p), None, "a panic must not strand the claim either");
}
#[test]
fn two_projects_do_not_block_each_other() {
let a = id("independent-a");
let b = id("independent-b");
let _one = try_acquire(&a, ProjectOp::Compaction).expect("a");
let _two = try_acquire(&b, ProjectOp::Compaction).expect("b");
assert!(is_held_by(&a, ProjectOp::Compaction));
assert!(is_held_by(&b, ProjectOp::Compaction));
}
#[test]
fn is_held_by_distinguishes_the_operation() {
let p = id("which-op");
let _guard = try_acquire(&p, ProjectOp::Compaction).unwrap();
assert!(is_held_by(&p, ProjectOp::Compaction));
assert!(
!is_held_by(&p, ProjectOp::Migration),
"a compaction is not a migration — `is_migrating` is built on this"
);
}
#[test]
fn any_held_sees_across_projects() {
let p = id("any-held");
assert!(!any_held_excluding(ProjectOp::Destroy, ""));
let _guard = try_acquire(&p, ProjectOp::Destroy).unwrap();
assert!(any_held_excluding(ProjectOp::Destroy, ""));
// …and a holder can ask the question without its own claim answering
// it, which is what lets a compaction sweep leftovers before it starts.
assert!(!any_held_excluding(ProjectOp::Destroy, &p));
}
/// Concurrency, not just sequencing: N threads racing for one project must
/// produce exactly one winner.
#[test]
fn exactly_one_of_many_racing_threads_wins() {
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
let p = id("race");
let start = Arc::new(std::sync::Barrier::new(8));
// The second barrier is what makes this deterministic rather than
// merely likely: no winner releases until every thread has had its
// turn, so "only one got in" cannot be an artefact of a loser arriving
// after the winner already left.
let attempted = Arc::new(std::sync::Barrier::new(8));
let won = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let mut handles = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..8 {
let start = Arc::clone(&start);
let attempted = Arc::clone(&attempted);
let won = Arc::clone(&won);
let p = p.clone();
handles.push(std::thread::spawn(move || {
start.wait();
let claim = try_acquire(&p, ProjectOp::Compaction);
if claim.is_ok() {
won.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
attempted.wait();
drop(claim);
}));
}
for handle in handles {
handle.join().unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(
won.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
1,
"eight threads raced for one project and more than one got in"
);
assert_eq!(held(&p), None);
}
}
+4 -398
View File
@@ -49,29 +49,6 @@ fn sanitize(project_id: &str) -> String {
/// Read a project's migration state. `Ok(None)` means no migration is in
/// flight; an unparseable file is treated the same way (and logged) rather than
/// blocking every future migration on a corrupt record.
///
/// **A corrupt record is copied aside and left in place.** An earlier version
/// *renamed* it to `.bak`, on the reasoning that a file nothing can parse
/// should stop making the project look busy. That destroyed the one signal
/// [`has_record`] exists to carry. The chain, in order:
///
/// 1. The rename makes the file vanish, so `has_record` — pure filesystem
/// presence — flips to false.
/// 2. `reconcile_migration` calls this, gets `Ok(None)`, and returns. An
/// in-flight or interrupted migration becomes invisible: no resume offer, no
/// rollback offer, and the phase is never normalised.
/// 3. Both pin reapers use `has_record` as their conservative guard, so the
/// project's `:pre-migration-*` tag — the only copy of its pre-migration
/// system layer — is now "ownerless" to both of them, and the startup sweep
/// turns the untag into a deletion.
///
/// A record that cannot be parsed is exactly the case where the *most*
/// conservative answer is wanted, not the least. So the bytes are copied to a
/// **uniquely named** backup (a fixed `.bak` meant a second corruption silently
/// overwrote the first, and nothing ever read either back) and the original
/// stays where it is. The pin it describes then ages out through the ownerless
/// tombstone in `docker::migration::reap_stale_migration_pins` rather than
/// being reaped on the next app start.
pub fn load(project_id: &str) -> Result<Option<MigrationState>, String> {
let path = state_path(project_id)?;
if !path.exists() {
@@ -82,326 +59,27 @@ pub fn load(project_id: &str) -> Result<Option<MigrationState>, String> {
match serde_json::from_str::<MigrationState>(&data) {
Ok(state) => Ok(Some(state)),
Err(e) => {
// Three outcomes, and they must not be conflated: a copy was made,
// a copy was deliberately not made, or a copy failed. The previous
// version folded "already kept enough" into `Ok(())` and then told
// the user "a copy was kept at <path>" — naming a file that was
// never created. A message that invents a backup is worse than no
// message, because it is what someone reads before going to look
// for their data.
let backup = corrupt_backup_path(&path, &chrono::Utc::now());
let kept = if backup.exists() {
Kept::AlreadyThere
} else if corrupt_backups_full(&path) {
Kept::EnoughAlready(MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS)
} else {
match fs::copy(&path, &backup) {
Ok(_) => Kept::Copied,
Err(e) => Kept::Failed(e.to_string()),
}
};
log::error!(
"Failed to parse migration state for project {}: {} — treating as absent, but \
the record is left in place so `has_record` still protects its rollback pin{}",
"Failed to parse migration state for project {}: {} — treating as absent",
project_id,
e,
match kept {
Kept::Copied | Kept::AlreadyThere =>
format!(" (a copy is at {})", backup.display()),
// The earliest copies are the ones worth having, so the cap
// keeps those and drops this one. Say so, rather than
// implying a file exists.
Kept::EnoughAlready(n) => format!(
" (no copy kept — {} earlier copies of this record are already saved \
alongside it)",
n
),
Kept::Failed(ref e) => format!(" (could not keep a copy: {})", e),
}
e
);
Ok(None)
}
}
}
/// What [`load`] did about a copy of an unparseable record, so the log line can
/// tell the truth about whether a file exists.
enum Kept {
Copied,
/// This exact second's copy was already on disk.
AlreadyThere,
/// The cap is reached; the earlier copies are kept and this one is not.
EnoughAlready(usize),
Failed(String),
}
/// Where a copy of an unparseable record is kept.
///
/// Timestamped rather than a fixed `.bak`: a second corruption used to
/// overwrite the first, so the one case where the user's bytes matter most was
/// the case where they were most likely to be gone.
fn corrupt_backup_path(path: &std::path::Path, now: &chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>) -> PathBuf {
path.with_extension(format!("json.corrupt-{}.bak", now.format("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")))
}
/// How many timestamped copies of one project's corrupt record are kept.
///
/// Timestamping fixed the "second corruption overwrote the first" bug and
/// introduced its opposite: [`load`] runs on every reconcile, every survey and
/// every reaper pass, so a record that is *persistently* unparseable — the
/// normal case, since nothing repairs it — mints a new copy every time the
/// clock's second changes. Nothing ever reads them back and nothing ever
/// removed them.
///
/// Four is enough for the only use there is: a human looking at what the file
/// held. See [`corrupt_backups_full`] for why the cap is applied before the
/// copy rather than by pruning after it.
const MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS: usize = 4;
/// Whether [`MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS`] copies of this record already exist.
///
/// Asked *before* the copy rather than pruning after it, so the cap is not
/// implemented by writing a file and deleting it again on every pass — and so
/// the copies that survive are the oldest, which are the ones taken closest to
/// whatever produced the corruption.
///
/// A directory that cannot be listed answers "not full": failing open here
/// costs at most one extra file, and failing closed would drop the very first
/// copy of a record nothing else has kept.
fn corrupt_backups_full(path: &std::path::Path) -> bool {
let (Some(dir), Some(stem)) = (path.parent(), path.file_stem()) else {
return false;
};
// `{stem}.json.corrupt-` — the same shape `corrupt_backup_path` builds, so
// this can never match another project's copies or an unrelated `.bak`.
let prefix = format!("{}.json.corrupt-", stem.to_string_lossy());
let Ok(entries) = fs::read_dir(dir) else {
return false;
};
entries
.flatten()
.filter(|e| {
let name = e.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string();
name.starts_with(&prefix) && name.ends_with(".bak")
})
.count()
>= MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS
}
/// Whether a project has a migration record on disk *at all*, without parsing
/// it.
///
/// The pin reaper needs "is this project's rollback image still somebody's only
/// copy?" and must answer it conservatively. [`load`] cannot be used for that
/// question on its own — it deliberately reports a corrupt record as absent —
/// so this asks the filesystem instead. `load` moving a corrupt record aside is
/// what keeps the two answers from disagreeing forever.
pub fn has_record(project_id: &str) -> Result<bool, String> {
Ok(state_path(project_id)?.exists())
}
/// Atomically **and durably** write a project's migration state.
///
/// Write-temp-then-rename alone is only half of it, and the missing half is the
/// half this record exists for. `fs::write` returns once the bytes are in the
/// page cache; a rename over them is atomic *with respect to other readers*,
/// not with respect to power loss. Losing power in that window leaves the
/// rename applied and the data not yet written — i.e. a 0-byte or truncated
/// `{id}.json` — which is precisely the corrupt-record case above, produced by
/// the code whose job is to make that case impossible.
///
/// So: fsync the file before the rename, and fsync the *directory* after it,
/// because the rename itself is directory metadata and is not durable until the
/// directory is synced. A sync that fails is reported rather than swallowed —
/// this is the crash record, and "probably written" is not a state it may be
/// in.
/// Atomically write a project's migration state.
pub fn save(project_id: &str, state: &MigrationState) -> Result<(), String> {
let path = state_path(project_id)?;
let data = serde_json::to_string_pretty(state)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to serialize migration state: {}", e))?;
let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
{
use std::io::Write;
let mut file = fs::File::create(&tmp)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write migration state: {}", e))?;
file.write_all(data.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write migration state: {}", e))?;
file.sync_all()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to flush migration state to disk: {}", e))?;
}
fs::write(&tmp, data).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write migration state: {}", e))?;
fs::rename(&tmp, &path).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to commit migration state: {}", e))?;
sync_dir(&path);
// A project with a record is not ownerless, whatever a reaper concluded
// before this write — so the grace clock is thrown away rather than left to
// expire against a pin that now has an owner again.
clear_ownerless_for_project(project_id);
Ok(())
}
/// fsync the directory holding `path`, so a rename into it survives power loss.
///
/// Best effort *only* on the platforms where it is meaningless: Windows has no
/// directory handle to sync and returns an error for the attempt, so a failure
/// is logged rather than propagated. The file's own `sync_all` above is the
/// part that carries the data, and it is not best effort.
fn sync_dir(path: &std::path::Path) {
let Some(dir) = path.parent() else {
return;
};
match fs::File::open(dir).and_then(|d| d.sync_all()) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(e) => log::debug!(
"Could not fsync the migrations directory {}: {} — the record itself was flushed",
dir.display(),
e
),
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Ownerless-pin tombstones
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Marker recording **when a rollback pin was first seen with no record behind
/// it**.
///
/// ## Why the grace period cannot be measured from the tag
///
/// `docker::migration::pin_is_reapable` used to date a pin from the timestamp
/// encoded in `pre-migration-<YYYYmmdd-HHMMSS>` — i.e. from when the migration
/// *started*. That is the wrong epoch by a whole feature. A migration is
/// allowed to sit at `awaiting-confirmation` indefinitely; `keep_rollback`
/// exists precisely so a user can run on the new base for a month before
/// deciding. If that project's record is then lost — a corrupt file, a deleted
/// state file, a half-restored data directory — the pin is fourteen days old on
/// the very first check, so it is untagged on the next app start and the
/// startup sweep deletes the image two lines later. The fourteen-day grace
/// period the constant promises is zero in the only situation it was written
/// for.
///
/// The clock has to start when the *claim* was lost, and nothing on the daemon
/// records that moment. So it is written down here, the first time a reaper
/// notices, and the age is measured from the marker.
///
/// One file per `(project_id, tag)` in the migrations directory, holding an
/// RFC3339 instant. Tiny, and losing one costs a fresh fourteen days rather
/// than a deletion — the failure direction that keeps somebody's only rollback
/// copy.
fn ownerless_marker_path(project_id: &str, tag: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
Ok(migrations_dir()?.join(format!(
"{}.{}.ownerless",
sanitize(project_id),
sanitize(tag)
)))
}
/// Read the first-observed instant for a pin, creating the marker if this is
/// the first sighting. Returns `None` when the clock has not started yet.
///
/// **Clock skew is handled here rather than at the comparison.** A host clock
/// that was running fast when the marker was written leaves a timestamp in the
/// future; measured naively that is a negative age, which a `num_days() >= 14`
/// test reads as "never reapable" — a pin that can never be collected, forever.
/// A marker dated after `now` is therefore rewritten to `now`, restarting the
/// grace period. The other direction — a clock jumping forward — cannot shorten
/// the period below what has actually elapsed on the *marker's* terms, because
/// there is nothing to compare against but wall time; what it cannot do any
/// more is make every pin instantly reapable, which dating from the tag did.
///
/// ## Why the write re-checks `has_record`
///
/// Both reapers ask [`has_record`] and only call this when the answer is no,
/// which leaves a window: a [`save`] landing between the two runs its
/// `clear_ownerless_for_project` against a marker that does not exist yet, and
/// this then plants one — dated *now* — behind a perfectly valid record. The
/// marker is invisible while the record stands, so nothing notices. It only
/// matters later, if that record is legitimately lost: the pin is then already
/// fourteen days ownerless on its very first check and is reaped with **zero**
/// grace, which is the exact failure the tombstone exists to prevent.
///
/// So the write is followed by a second `has_record`, and a marker that turns
/// out to sit behind a record is removed again. The two orderings that remain
/// are both safe: a `save` completing *after* this re-check clears the marker
/// itself, and one completing before it is what the re-check sees.
pub fn note_ownerless_since(
project_id: &str,
tag: &str,
now: &chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
) -> Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>> {
let path = ownerless_marker_path(project_id, tag).ok()?;
let existing = fs::read_to_string(&path).ok().and_then(|raw| {
chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(raw.trim())
.ok()
.map(|t| t.with_timezone(&chrono::Utc))
});
match existing {
Some(seen) if seen <= *now => Some(seen),
// Absent, unparseable, or dated in the future: (re)start the clock.
_ => {
if let Err(e) = fs::write(&path, now.to_rfc3339()) {
log::warn!(
"Could not record that rollback pin {}:{} is ownerless: {} — its grace \
period restarts on the next check",
project_id,
tag,
e
);
return None;
}
// A record that appeared while this was being written owns the pin,
// and a tombstone behind an owned pin is a fourteen-day head start
// on reaping it the moment that record is next lost.
if has_record(project_id).unwrap_or(false) {
log::debug!(
"A migration record for {} appeared while marking {} ownerless; \
the marker was dropped again",
project_id,
tag
);
clear_ownerless(project_id, tag);
}
None
}
}
}
/// Forget a pin's ownerless marker. Missing is success.
///
/// Called when the pin is untagged, and when a record reappears for the
/// project — a re-migrated project must not inherit the previous run's clock.
pub fn clear_ownerless(project_id: &str, tag: &str) {
let Ok(path) = ownerless_marker_path(project_id, tag) else {
return;
};
match fs::remove_file(&path) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
Err(e) => log::warn!("Could not remove {}: {}", path.display(), e),
}
}
/// Drop every ownerless marker belonging to one project.
///
/// A project that has a record again is by definition not ownerless, whatever
/// a reaper concluded before.
pub fn clear_ownerless_for_project(project_id: &str) {
let Ok(dir) = migrations_dir() else {
return;
};
let prefix = format!("{}.", sanitize(project_id));
let Ok(entries) = fs::read_dir(&dir) else {
return;
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let name = entry.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string();
if name.starts_with(&prefix) && name.ends_with(".ownerless") {
let _ = fs::remove_file(entry.path());
}
}
}
/// Remove a project's migration state file. Missing is success.
pub fn clear(project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let path = state_path(project_id)?;
@@ -426,39 +104,6 @@ pub fn clear_staging(project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn corrupt_copies_of_one_record_are_capped() {
// `load` runs on every reconcile, every survey and every reaper pass,
// and nothing repairs an unparseable record — so a persistently corrupt
// one minted a new timestamped copy every time the clock's second
// changed, and nothing ever removed them.
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"triple-c-corrupt-cap-{}",
uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
));
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("temp dir");
let record = dir.join("some-project.json");
assert!(!corrupt_backups_full(&record), "an empty directory is not full");
for n in 0..MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS {
fs::write(
dir.join(format!("some-project.json.corrupt-2026010{}-000000.bak", n)),
"x",
)
.unwrap();
}
assert!(corrupt_backups_full(&record));
// Another project's copies, and an unrelated `.bak`, are not this
// record's — the prefix is the whole point of the naming.
let other = dir.join("other-project.json");
assert!(!corrupt_backups_full(&other));
fs::write(dir.join("some-project.json.bak"), "x").unwrap();
assert!(!corrupt_backups_full(&other));
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn project_ids_cannot_escape_the_migrations_directory() {
assert_eq!(sanitize("../../etc/passwd"), "______etc_passwd");
@@ -470,43 +115,4 @@ mod tests {
"ab62cd24-51aa-4645-8f5c-17a124062050"
);
}
/// The log line must not name a backup that was never written.
///
/// `load` runs on every reconcile, every survey and every reaper pass, so a
/// persistently corrupt record hits the `MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS` cap within
/// seconds. The previous code folded "already kept enough" into `Ok(())`
/// and then reported " (a copy was kept at <path>)" — pointing at a file
/// that does not exist. That is the message someone reads immediately
/// before going to look for their data.
#[test]
fn the_corrupt_record_message_only_claims_a_copy_that_exists() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"tc-mstore-{}",
uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
let path = dir.join("p.json");
std::fs::write(&path, b"{ not json").unwrap();
// Fill the cap with copies that really are on disk.
for i in 0..MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS {
let b = path.with_extension(format!("json.corrupt-2026010{}-000000.bak", i));
std::fs::write(&b, b"{ not json").unwrap();
}
assert!(corrupt_backups_full(&path), "precondition: the cap is reached");
// With the cap reached, no new copy may be created — and that is the
// state in which the old message lied.
let before: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(&dir).unwrap().flatten().collect();
let fresh = corrupt_backup_path(&path, &chrono::Utc::now());
assert!(
!fresh.exists(),
"the cap is reached, so this timestamped copy must not be written"
);
let after: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(&dir).unwrap().flatten().collect();
assert_eq!(before.len(), after.len(), "nothing new appeared on disk");
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
}
-3
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
pub mod migration_store;
pub mod notes_store;
pub mod pending_cleanup;
pub mod projects_store;
pub mod secure;
pub mod settings_crypto;
pub mod settings_store;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
-593
View File
@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
//! Host-side persistence for per-project notes.
//!
//! One JSON file per project under `<data_dir>/triple-c/notes/`, on the same
//! free-function shape as `migration_store` — no struct, nothing in
//! `AppState`, no in-memory copy. `ProjectsStore` holds a `Mutex` because it
//! caches the project list; a store that reads and writes the file per call
//! has nothing to cache and nothing to guard.
//!
//! Deliberately *not* a field on `Project`. `projects.json` is rewritten on
//! every blur by the debounced-nothing save path in `useSaveState`, so notes
//! there would mean the whole project list is rewritten per edit, and a note
//! save racing a Config save would silently drop one of them.
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::{Mutex, OnceLock};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::models::Note;
/// The version stamped into every notes file this build writes.
const NOTES_FORMAT_VERSION: u32 = 1;
/// What is actually on disk: a version envelope around the notes.
///
/// The list is wrapped rather than written bare because the wrapper costs
/// nothing today and cannot be added cheaply later — once files exist in the
/// field, every reader has to sniff two shapes forever. `version` is written
/// and read back but nothing branches on it yet: it is the hook a future
/// format change hangs off, and its value is only useful if it has been there
/// since the first file.
///
/// Not in `models/` and not exposed over IPC: the frontend receives
/// `Vec<Note>` from `list_notes` and never sees the envelope, so this is a
/// storage detail rather than part of the IPC contract.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct ProjectNotes {
version: u32,
#[serde(default)]
notes: Vec<Note>,
}
/// Serialises the read-modify-write half of an upsert or delete.
///
/// Nothing here is cached, so there is no shared state to protect — but an
/// upsert reads the whole file, edits one entry and writes it back, and two of
/// those interleaving would lose whichever note was written first. The read
/// path does not take it.
fn write_lock() -> &'static Mutex<()> {
static LOCK: OnceLock<Mutex<()>> = OnceLock::new();
LOCK.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(()))
}
/// `<data_dir>/triple-c/notes`, created on demand.
pub fn notes_dir() -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
let dir = dirs::data_dir()
.ok_or_else(|| {
"Could not determine data directory. Set XDG_DATA_HOME on Linux.".to_string()
})?
.join("triple-c")
.join("notes");
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create notes directory: {}", e))?;
Ok(dir)
}
/// Project ids are UUIDs, but they arrive over IPC, so refuse to let one steer
/// the write anywhere but the notes directory.
fn sanitize(project_id: &str) -> String {
project_id
.chars()
.map(|c| if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_' { c } else { '_' })
.collect()
}
fn notes_path_in(dir: &Path, project_id: &str) -> PathBuf {
dir.join(format!("{}.json", sanitize(project_id)))
}
// ── Public API. Each resolves the real directory, then defers to the `_in`
// variant, which is what the tests exercise against a temp dir. `ProjectsStore`
// hardcodes `dirs::data_dir()` in its constructor and is therefore untestable
// as a unit; this store does not inherit that. ─────────────────────────────
pub fn load(project_id: &str) -> Result<Vec<Note>, String> {
load_in(&notes_dir()?, project_id)
}
pub fn upsert(project_id: &str, note: Note) -> Result<Note, String> {
upsert_in(&notes_dir()?, project_id, note)
}
pub fn delete(project_id: &str, note_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
delete_in(&notes_dir()?, project_id, note_id)
}
/// Remove a project's notes file entirely. Missing is success.
pub fn clear(project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
clear_in(&notes_dir()?, project_id)
}
// ── Implementation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Read a project's notes. A missing file is an empty list.
///
/// **An unparseable file is copied aside and left in place**, then reported as
/// empty. Erroring instead would make the Notes tab permanently unusable for
/// that project with no way out through the UI; deleting instead would destroy
/// the only copy of what the user wrote. The copy is timestamped so a second
/// corruption cannot overwrite the first — which is the one taken before
/// anything rewrote the file, and therefore the one worth having — and capped,
/// because `list_notes` runs on *every* panel mount. See [`keep_corrupt_copy`].
fn load_in(dir: &Path, project_id: &str) -> Result<Vec<Note>, String> {
let path = notes_path_in(dir, project_id);
if !path.exists() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
let data = fs::read_to_string(&path).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read notes: {}", e))?;
match parse(&data) {
Ok(notes) => Ok(notes),
Err(e) => {
let kept = keep_corrupt_copy(&path, &chrono::Utc::now());
log::error!(
"Failed to parse notes for project {}: {} — treating as empty; the file is \
left in place{}",
project_id,
e,
kept.describe()
);
Ok(Vec::new())
}
}
}
/// Parse a notes file: the versioned envelope, or a bare array.
///
/// The bare array is what this store wrote before [`ProjectNotes`] existed —
/// only ever on a development build, but a developer's own notes are still
/// prose nothing else holds a copy of, and the alternative is `load_in`
/// declaring a perfectly readable file corrupt. It is read, never written: the
/// first save rewrites the file with an envelope.
fn parse(data: &str) -> Result<Vec<Note>, serde_json::Error> {
match serde_json::from_str::<ProjectNotes>(data) {
Ok(file) => Ok(file.notes),
// Report the envelope's error, not the array's — the envelope is the
// shape this store writes, so its message is the one that describes
// what is actually wrong with the file.
Err(envelope_err) => serde_json::from_str::<Vec<Note>>(data).map_err(|_| envelope_err),
}
}
/// How many timestamped copies of one project's corrupt notes file are kept.
///
/// Timestamping fixes "a second corruption overwrote the first" and introduces
/// its opposite: `load_in` runs on every `list_notes`, which is every panel
/// mount — every project switch, every dock-follows-tab change, every sub-tab
/// toggle. A file that is *persistently* unparseable (the normal case, since
/// nothing repairs it) would otherwise mint a fresh full copy of the user's
/// prose every time the clock's second changed. Nothing ever reads them back
/// and nothing ever removed them.
///
/// Four is enough for the only use there is: a human looking at what the file
/// held. Same constant, same reasoning as `migration_store`.
const MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS: usize = 4;
/// What [`keep_corrupt_copy`] did, so the log line can tell the truth about
/// whether a file exists.
///
/// Three outcomes, and they must not be conflated. Folding "already kept
/// enough" into success and then saying "a copy was kept" names a file that
/// was never created — which is what someone reads before going to look for
/// their data.
enum Kept {
Copied(PathBuf),
/// This exact second's copy was already on disk.
AlreadyThere(PathBuf),
/// The cap is reached; the earlier copies are kept and this one is not.
EnoughAlready(usize),
Failed(String),
}
impl Kept {
fn describe(&self) -> String {
match self {
Kept::Copied(p) | Kept::AlreadyThere(p) => format!(" (a copy is at {})", p.display()),
// The earliest copies are the ones worth having, so the cap keeps
// those and drops this one. Say so, rather than implying a file
// exists.
Kept::EnoughAlready(n) => format!(
" (no copy kept — {} earlier copies of this file are already saved alongside it)",
n
),
Kept::Failed(e) => format!(" (could not keep a copy: {})", e),
}
}
}
/// Where a copy of an unreadable notes file is kept.
fn corrupt_backup_path(path: &Path, now: &chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>) -> PathBuf {
path.with_extension(format!("json.corrupt-{}.bak", now.format("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")))
}
/// Whether [`MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS`] copies of this project's file already exist.
///
/// Asked *before* the copy rather than pruning after it, so the cap is not
/// implemented by writing a file and deleting it again on every pass — and so
/// the copies that survive are the oldest, which are the ones taken closest to
/// whatever produced the corruption.
///
/// A directory that cannot be listed answers "not full": failing open costs at
/// most one extra file, and failing closed would drop the very first copy of
/// prose nothing else has kept.
fn corrupt_backups_full(path: &Path) -> bool {
let (Some(dir), Some(stem)) = (path.parent(), path.file_stem()) else {
return false;
};
// `{stem}.json.corrupt-` — the same shape `corrupt_backup_path` builds, so
// this can never match another project's copies or an unrelated `.bak`.
let prefix = format!("{}.json.corrupt-", stem.to_string_lossy());
let Ok(entries) = fs::read_dir(dir) else {
return false;
};
entries
.flatten()
.filter(|e| {
let name = e.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string();
name.starts_with(&prefix) && name.ends_with(".bak")
})
.count()
>= MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS
}
fn keep_corrupt_copy(path: &Path, now: &chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>) -> Kept {
let backup = corrupt_backup_path(path, now);
if backup.exists() {
return Kept::AlreadyThere(backup);
}
if corrupt_backups_full(path) {
return Kept::EnoughAlready(MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS);
}
match fs::copy(path, &backup) {
Ok(_) => Kept::Copied(backup),
Err(e) => Kept::Failed(e.to_string()),
}
}
/// Insert or replace one note, leaving the rest untouched.
///
/// `created_at` and `id` are the store's, not the caller's: the webview sends
/// a whole `Note` back and must not be able to rewrite when a note was made.
/// `updated_at` is stamped here for the same reason.
fn upsert_in(dir: &Path, project_id: &str, mut note: Note) -> Result<Note, String> {
let _guard = write_lock().lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
let mut notes = load_in(dir, project_id)?;
note.updated_at = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
match notes.iter_mut().find(|n| n.id == note.id) {
Some(existing) => {
note.created_at = existing.created_at.clone();
*existing = note.clone();
}
None => notes.push(note.clone()),
}
save_all(dir, project_id, &notes)?;
Ok(note)
}
/// Remove one note. Removing one that is already gone is success — the UI can
/// retry a delete whose result it never saw.
fn delete_in(dir: &Path, project_id: &str, note_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let _guard = write_lock().lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
let mut notes = load_in(dir, project_id)?;
let before = notes.len();
notes.retain(|n| n.id != note_id);
if notes.len() == before {
return Ok(());
}
save_all(dir, project_id, &notes)
}
fn clear_in(dir: &Path, project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let _guard = write_lock().lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
let path = notes_path_in(dir, project_id);
match fs::remove_file(&path) {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(()),
Err(e) => Err(format!("Failed to remove notes: {}", e)),
}
}
/// Atomically **and durably** write the whole list.
///
/// Write-temp-then-rename alone is only half of it. `fs::write` returns once
/// the bytes are in the page cache; the rename is atomic with respect to other
/// readers, not to power loss. Losing power in that window leaves the rename
/// applied and the data not written — a truncated file, produced by the code
/// whose job is to prevent one. So the file is fsynced before the rename and
/// the directory after it, since the rename is directory metadata. Notes are
/// prose the user typed and nothing else holds a copy.
fn save_all(dir: &Path, project_id: &str, notes: &[Note]) -> Result<(), String> {
let path = notes_path_in(dir, project_id);
let file = ProjectNotes {
version: NOTES_FORMAT_VERSION,
notes: notes.to_vec(),
};
let data = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&file)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to serialize notes: {}", e))?;
let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
{
use std::io::Write;
let mut file =
fs::File::create(&tmp).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write notes: {}", e))?;
file.write_all(data.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write notes: {}", e))?;
file.sync_all()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to flush notes to disk: {}", e))?;
}
fs::rename(&tmp, &path).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to commit notes: {}", e))?;
sync_dir(&path);
Ok(())
}
/// fsync the directory holding `path`, so the rename survives power loss.
///
/// Best effort only where it is meaningless: Windows has no directory handle
/// to sync and returns an error for the attempt, so a failure is logged rather
/// than propagated. The file's own `sync_all` carries the data and is not best
/// effort.
fn sync_dir(path: &Path) {
let Some(dir) = path.parent() else { return };
if let Err(e) = fs::File::open(dir).and_then(|d| d.sync_all()) {
log::debug!(
"Could not fsync the notes directory {}: {} — the file itself was flushed",
dir.display(),
e
);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn temp_dir(tag: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"triple-c-notes-{}-{}",
tag,
uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("temp dir");
dir
}
fn corrupt_copies(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<String> {
std::fs::read_dir(dir)
.unwrap()
.flatten()
.map(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string())
.filter(|n| n.contains(".corrupt-"))
.collect()
}
#[test]
fn project_ids_cannot_escape_the_notes_directory() {
// The id arrives over IPC. It must not be able to steer the write.
assert_eq!(sanitize("../../etc/passwd"), "______etc_passwd");
assert_eq!(sanitize("a/b"), "a_b");
assert_eq!(sanitize("a\\b"), "a_b");
// A real UUID must survive untouched, or every note file would move
// the first time this function changed.
assert_eq!(
sanitize("ab62cd24-51aa-4645-8f5c-17a124062050"),
"ab62cd24-51aa-4645-8f5c-17a124062050"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_file_is_an_empty_list_not_an_error() {
let dir = temp_dir("missing");
assert_eq!(load_in(&dir, "nobody").unwrap(), Vec::<Note>::new());
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn an_upserted_note_round_trips() {
let dir = temp_dir("roundtrip");
let note = Note::new("Deploy steps".into(), "one\ntwo".into());
let saved = upsert_in(&dir, "p1", note.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(saved.id, note.id);
let loaded = load_in(&dir, "p1").unwrap();
assert_eq!(loaded.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(loaded[0].body, "one\ntwo");
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn upserting_an_existing_id_replaces_it_and_keeps_created_at() {
let dir = temp_dir("replace");
let mut note = Note::new("Title".into(), "first".into());
upsert_in(&dir, "p1", note.clone()).unwrap();
note.body = "second".into();
note.created_at = "1999-01-01T00:00:00Z".into(); // a client must not rewrite this
let saved = upsert_in(&dir, "p1", note.clone()).unwrap();
let loaded = load_in(&dir, "p1").unwrap();
assert_eq!(loaded.len(), 1, "an upsert must not append a duplicate");
assert_eq!(loaded[0].body, "second");
assert_ne!(
saved.created_at, "1999-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"created_at is owned by the store, not by whatever the webview sent"
);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn deleting_a_note_leaves_the_others_and_a_missing_one_is_success() {
let dir = temp_dir("delete");
let keep = upsert_in(&dir, "p1", Note::new("keep".into(), "".into())).unwrap();
let drop = upsert_in(&dir, "p1", Note::new("drop".into(), "".into())).unwrap();
delete_in(&dir, "p1", &drop.id).unwrap();
let loaded = load_in(&dir, "p1").unwrap();
assert_eq!(loaded.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(loaded[0].id, keep.id);
// Idempotent: removing what is already gone is not an error, because
// the UI can retry a delete it never saw the result of.
delete_in(&dir, "p1", &drop.id).unwrap();
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn an_unreadable_file_is_copied_aside_and_reads_as_empty() {
// Same reasoning as migration_store: a corrupt file must not make the
// tab permanently unusable, and the bytes must not be destroyed.
let dir = temp_dir("corrupt");
let path = notes_path_in(&dir, "p1");
std::fs::write(&path, b"{ not json").unwrap();
assert_eq!(load_in(&dir, "p1").unwrap(), Vec::<Note>::new());
assert!(path.exists(), "the unreadable file is left in place");
assert_eq!(
corrupt_copies(&dir).len(),
1,
"the bytes must be kept exactly once"
);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn what_is_written_is_a_version_envelope_not_a_bare_array() {
// The envelope costs nothing now and cannot be added cheaply once
// files exist in the field, so the very first file has to carry it.
let dir = temp_dir("envelope");
upsert_in(&dir, "p1", Note::new("t".into(), "b".into())).unwrap();
let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(notes_path_in(&dir, "p1")).unwrap();
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&raw).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed["version"], NOTES_FORMAT_VERSION);
assert_eq!(parsed["notes"].as_array().unwrap().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(parsed["notes"][0]["body"], "b");
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn a_pre_envelope_bare_array_still_reads_and_is_not_called_corrupt() {
// Only a development build ever wrote this shape, but declaring a
// perfectly readable file corrupt is the one outcome this store exists
// to avoid. It is read, never written back.
let dir = temp_dir("legacy");
let note = Note::new("Deploy".into(), "one\ntwo".into());
std::fs::write(
notes_path_in(&dir, "p1"),
serde_json::to_string(&vec![note.clone()]).unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
let loaded = load_in(&dir, "p1").unwrap();
assert_eq!(loaded.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(loaded[0].body, "one\ntwo");
let copies = corrupt_copies(&dir);
assert!(copies.is_empty(), "a readable file must not be copied aside");
// The next write upgrades it in place.
upsert_in(&dir, "p1", note).unwrap();
let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(notes_path_in(&dir, "p1")).unwrap();
assert!(raw.contains("\"version\""));
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn corrupt_copies_are_capped_rather_than_one_per_second() {
// `list_notes` runs on every panel mount, so an unrepaired file would
// otherwise mint a full copy of the user's prose every time the
// clock's second changed.
let dir = temp_dir("cap");
let path = notes_path_in(&dir, "p1");
std::fs::write(&path, b"{ not json").unwrap();
let base = chrono::Utc::now();
for i in 0..MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS as i64 + 3 {
let at = base + chrono::Duration::seconds(i);
let kept = keep_corrupt_copy(&path, &at);
if i < MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS as i64 {
assert!(matches!(kept, Kept::Copied(_)), "copy {} should be kept", i);
} else {
assert!(
matches!(kept, Kept::EnoughAlready(MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS)),
"copy {} should be refused by the cap",
i
);
}
}
assert_eq!(corrupt_copies(&dir).len(), MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn a_second_read_in_the_same_second_does_not_re_copy() {
let dir = temp_dir("samesecond");
let path = notes_path_in(&dir, "p1");
std::fs::write(&path, b"{ not json").unwrap();
let at = chrono::Utc::now();
assert!(matches!(keep_corrupt_copy(&path, &at), Kept::Copied(_)));
assert!(matches!(
keep_corrupt_copy(&path, &at),
Kept::AlreadyThere(_)
));
assert_eq!(corrupt_copies(&dir).len(), 1);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn the_log_line_never_claims_a_backup_that_was_not_written() {
// A message that invents a backup is worse than no message: it is what
// someone reads before going to look for their data.
let dir = temp_dir("honesty");
let path = notes_path_in(&dir, "p1");
std::fs::write(&path, b"{ not json").unwrap();
let copied = keep_corrupt_copy(&path, &chrono::Utc::now()).describe();
assert!(copied.contains("a copy is at"));
let refused = Kept::EnoughAlready(MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS).describe();
assert!(refused.contains("no copy kept"));
assert!(!refused.contains("a copy is at"));
let failed = Kept::Failed("permission denied".into()).describe();
assert!(failed.contains("could not keep a copy"));
assert!(!failed.contains("a copy is at"));
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn a_write_leaves_no_temp_file_behind() {
let dir = temp_dir("tmp");
upsert_in(&dir, "p1", Note::new("t".into(), "b".into())).unwrap();
let leftovers: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(&dir)
.unwrap()
.flatten()
.filter(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().ends_with(".tmp"))
.collect();
assert!(leftovers.is_empty(), "the rename must have consumed the temp file");
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn clearing_a_project_removes_its_file_and_missing_is_success() {
let dir = temp_dir("clear");
upsert_in(&dir, "p1", Note::new("t".into(), "b".into())).unwrap();
assert!(notes_path_in(&dir, "p1").exists());
clear_in(&dir, "p1").unwrap();
assert!(!notes_path_in(&dir, "p1").exists());
clear_in(&dir, "p1").unwrap(); // idempotent
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn clearing_is_what_project_removal_calls_and_it_never_fails_on_absence() {
// `remove_project` must not be able to fail because a project simply
// never had any notes — an orphaned notes file is harmless, a project
// that cannot be removed is not.
let dir = temp_dir("removal");
assert!(clear_in(&dir, "never-had-notes").is_ok());
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
}
@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
//! Host-side record of Docker resources `remove_project` could not delete.
//!
//! `remove_project` drops a project's id from `projects.json` unconditionally
//! — see the comment on `ProjectRemovalReport` — so once that happens nothing
//! in the app can name the leftover container, image or volume again by any
//! path a user can reach. This is what keeps it reachable anyway: one JSON
//! file per affected project under `<data_dir>/triple-c/pending-cleanup/`,
//! written *before* the project record is dropped. Startup housekeeping
//! retries every record on the next launch (see
//! `commands::project_commands::retry_pending_cleanup_logged`) and deletes
//! the ones that fully succeed.
//!
//! **This record is written in the same instant its record in `projects.json`
//! is destroyed, and it is the only remaining handle on the leftover
//! resource** — which is a stronger claim on durability than an ordinary
//! write-temp-then-rename gives. `storage::migration_store::save` carries the
//! same reasoning for the migration state file: `fs::write` returns once the
//! bytes are in the page cache, and a rename over them is atomic with respect
//! to other readers, not to power loss. A crash in that window leaves the
//! rename applied and the data half-written, which [`list`] then treats as
//! unparseable and skips — reproducing the exact bug this module exists to
//! close, silently, with only a startup log line as evidence. So `save` here
//! takes the same `File::create` → `write_all` → `sync_all` → `rename` →
//! directory-sync shape `migration_store` does.
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct PendingCleanup {
pub project_id: String,
/// Kept only so a log line or a future UI can name the project without a
/// second lookup — the project record itself is already gone by the time
/// this is read back.
pub project_name: String,
/// The project's container, if it could not be removed. Named by its
/// deterministic `triple-c-{id}` name rather than the (possibly stale)
/// container id Docker handed out — Docker's remove-container API
/// accepts either, and the name is the one identifier guaranteed to still
/// resolve to the same container by the time a retry runs.
pub container_id: Option<String>,
pub image: Option<String>,
pub volumes: Vec<String>,
pub recorded_at: String,
}
impl PendingCleanup {
/// True once nothing named here still needs to be removed.
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.container_id.is_none() && self.image.is_none() && self.volumes.is_empty()
}
}
/// `<data_dir>/triple-c/pending-cleanup`, created on demand.
fn dir() -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
let dir = dirs::data_dir()
.ok_or_else(|| {
"Could not determine data directory. Set XDG_DATA_HOME on Linux.".to_string()
})?
.join("triple-c")
.join("pending-cleanup");
fs::create_dir_all(&dir)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create pending-cleanup directory: {}", e))?;
Ok(dir)
}
/// Project ids are UUIDs, but they arrive over IPC, so refuse to let one steer
/// the write anywhere but the pending-cleanup directory. Mirrors
/// `storage::migration_store::sanitize`.
fn sanitize(project_id: &str) -> String {
project_id
.chars()
.map(|c| if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_' { c } else { '_' })
.collect()
}
/// Write (or overwrite) a project's pending-cleanup record.
pub fn save(record: &PendingCleanup) -> Result<(), String> {
save_in(&dir()?, record)
}
/// Remove a project's pending-cleanup record. Missing is success — this is
/// how a fully-succeeded retry (or a record that never existed) is expressed.
pub fn clear(project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
clear_in(&dir()?, project_id)
}
/// Every pending-cleanup record on disk. An unparseable file is logged and
/// skipped rather than blocking every other project's retry — the same
/// "one bad record can't wedge the rest" reasoning as the migration store.
pub fn list() -> Vec<PendingCleanup> {
let Ok(dir) = dir() else { return Vec::new() };
list_in(&dir)
}
fn path_in(dir: &Path, project_id: &str) -> PathBuf {
dir.join(format!("{}.json", sanitize(project_id)))
}
/// Durable write: fsync the file before the rename, and fsync the directory
/// after it — see the module doc comment for why a plain
/// write-temp-then-rename is not enough here. Mirrors
/// `storage::migration_store::save`/`sync_dir`.
fn save_in(dir: &Path, record: &PendingCleanup) -> Result<(), String> {
let path = path_in(dir, &record.project_id);
let data = serde_json::to_string_pretty(record)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to serialize pending cleanup record: {}", e))?;
let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
{
use std::io::Write;
let mut file = fs::File::create(&tmp)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write pending cleanup record: {}", e))?;
file.write_all(data.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write pending cleanup record: {}", e))?;
file.sync_all()
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to flush pending cleanup record to disk: {}", e))?;
}
fs::rename(&tmp, &path)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to commit pending cleanup record: {}", e))?;
sync_dir(&path);
Ok(())
}
fn clear_in(dir: &Path, project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let path = path_in(dir, project_id);
match fs::remove_file(&path) {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(()),
Err(e) => Err(format!("Failed to remove pending cleanup record: {}", e)),
}
}
fn list_in(dir: &Path) -> Vec<PendingCleanup> {
let Ok(entries) = fs::read_dir(dir) else { return Vec::new() };
entries
.flatten()
.filter(|e| e.path().extension().is_some_and(|ext| ext == "json"))
.filter_map(|e| {
let path = e.path();
let data = fs::read_to_string(&path).ok()?;
match serde_json::from_str::<PendingCleanup>(&data) {
Ok(record) => Some(record),
Err(err) => {
// Moved aside rather than left in place: a record nothing
// ever repairs would otherwise warn on every single
// startup forever, same as an ordinary `.json` file it
// would keep looking like one to `list_in` on the next
// call too. One aside-copy is enough here — this only
// ever holds names to retry removing, not the class of
// once-in-a-lifetime crash evidence `migration_store`
// keeps multiple timestamped backups of.
let corrupt = path.with_extension("json.corrupt");
let moved = !corrupt.exists() && fs::rename(&path, &corrupt).is_ok();
log::warn!(
"Could not parse pending cleanup record {}: {}{}",
path.display(),
err,
if moved {
format!(" — moved aside to {}", corrupt.display())
} else {
" — leaving it in place".to_string()
}
);
None
}
}
})
.collect()
}
/// fsync the directory holding `path`, so a rename into it survives power
/// loss. Best effort only on the platforms where it is meaningless: Windows
/// has no directory handle to sync and errors on the attempt, so failure is
/// logged rather than propagated — the file's own `sync_all` above is what
/// carries the data. Mirrors `storage::migration_store::sync_dir`, which is
/// private to that module, so this is a small deliberate duplicate rather
/// than a shared dependency between two otherwise-independent stores.
fn sync_dir(path: &Path) {
let Some(dir) = path.parent() else { return };
match fs::File::open(dir).and_then(|d| d.sync_all()) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(e) => log::debug!(
"Could not fsync the pending-cleanup directory {}: {} — the record itself was flushed",
dir.display(),
e
),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn temp_dir(name: &str) -> PathBuf {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"triple-c-pending-cleanup-{}-{}",
name,
uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
));
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
dir
}
fn record(project_id: &str) -> PendingCleanup {
PendingCleanup {
project_id: project_id.to_string(),
project_name: "Some Project".to_string(),
container_id: Some("triple-c-abc".to_string()),
image: Some("triple-c-snapshot-abc:latest".to_string()),
volumes: vec!["triple-c-home-abc".to_string()],
recorded_at: "2026-08-25T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
}
}
#[test]
fn project_ids_cannot_escape_the_pending_cleanup_directory() {
assert_eq!(sanitize("../../etc/passwd"), "______etc_passwd");
assert_eq!(sanitize("a/b"), "a_b");
assert_eq!(
sanitize("ab62cd24-51aa-4645-8f5c-17a124062050"),
"ab62cd24-51aa-4645-8f5c-17a124062050"
);
}
#[test]
fn is_empty_reflects_whatever_still_needs_removing() {
let mut r = record("p1");
assert!(!r.is_empty());
r.container_id = None;
r.image = None;
assert!(!r.is_empty(), "a leftover volume alone still counts");
r.volumes.clear();
assert!(r.is_empty());
}
/// Exercises the real `save_in`/`list_in`/`clear_in` — not a
/// re-implementation of their bodies — against a temp directory standing
/// in for `dir()`.
#[test]
fn a_saved_record_round_trips_and_clearing_removes_it() {
let dir = temp_dir("roundtrip");
let rec = record("proj-1");
save_in(&dir, &rec).expect("save");
let found = list_in(&dir);
assert_eq!(found.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(found[0].project_id, "proj-1");
assert_eq!(found[0].volumes, vec!["triple-c-home-abc".to_string()]);
clear_in(&dir, "proj-1").expect("clear");
assert!(list_in(&dir).is_empty());
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
/// A second `save` for the same project overwrites rather than appending
/// — a retry that narrows the leftovers must not leave the old, wider
/// record behind it.
#[test]
fn saving_the_same_project_twice_overwrites_not_appends() {
let dir = temp_dir("overwrite");
let mut rec = record("proj-1");
save_in(&dir, &rec).expect("save");
rec.container_id = None;
rec.image = None;
save_in(&dir, &rec).expect("save again");
let found = list_in(&dir);
assert_eq!(found.len(), 1, "one file per project, not one per save");
assert!(found[0].container_id.is_none());
assert_eq!(found[0].volumes, vec!["triple-c-home-abc".to_string()]);
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
/// A record that fails to parse must not poison the rest of the listing.
#[test]
fn an_unparseable_record_is_skipped_not_fatal() {
let dir = temp_dir("corrupt");
fs::write(dir.join("bad.json"), "{ not json").unwrap();
save_in(&dir, &record("proj-2")).expect("save");
let found = list_in(&dir);
assert_eq!(found.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(found[0].project_id, "proj-2");
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
/// A record that fails to parse is moved aside once, rather than left in
/// place to be re-warned about — and re-warned about — on every future
/// launch forever.
#[test]
fn an_unparseable_record_is_moved_aside_exactly_once() {
let dir = temp_dir("corrupt-aside");
let bad = dir.join("bad.json");
fs::write(&bad, "{ not json").unwrap();
list_in(&dir);
assert!(!bad.exists(), "the bad file should have been moved aside");
let corrupt = dir.join("bad.json.corrupt");
assert!(corrupt.exists(), "and the moved copy should be at .json.corrupt");
// A second pass must not warn about `bad.json` again — it is gone —
// and must not choke on `.json.corrupt` already being there.
assert!(list_in(&dir).is_empty());
assert!(corrupt.exists(), "the aside copy is not itself deleted");
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
/// `list_in` must not pick up the `.json.tmp` staging file `save_in`
/// leaves behind if a crash lands between the write and the rename — the
/// whole point of the temp-then-rename dance is that only the renamed
/// file is ever a complete record.
#[test]
fn a_leftover_tmp_file_is_not_listed() {
let dir = temp_dir("tmp-leftover");
fs::write(dir.join("proj-3.json.tmp"), "not a complete record").unwrap();
assert!(list_in(&dir).is_empty());
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
/// Clearing by project id must remove exactly the file that id maps to
/// under `sanitize`, and nothing else.
#[test]
fn clearing_one_project_does_not_touch_another() {
let dir = temp_dir("clear-scoped");
save_in(&dir, &record("proj-a")).unwrap();
save_in(&dir, &record("proj-b")).unwrap();
clear_in(&dir, "proj-a").unwrap();
let found = list_in(&dir);
assert_eq!(found.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(found[0].project_id, "proj-b");
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
}
+9 -145
View File
@@ -1,65 +1,9 @@
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use crate::models::Project;
/// The sticky marker for `projects.json`: `projects.json.corrupt`, beside it.
///
/// Derived from the file rather than from `dirs::data_dir()` so the marker
/// always lands in the directory the store is actually using — and so the
/// writer can be tested against a temp directory.
fn corrupt_marker_for(file_path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
file_path.with_extension("json.corrupt")
}
/// Keep the bytes of an unparseable `projects.json`, and record that it
/// happened.
///
/// **The existing `.bak` is never overwritten.** A second corruption used to
/// clobber the first, and the first is the valuable one: it was taken before
/// the app rewrote the file with whatever it had in memory, so it is the only
/// copy that can still hold the full project list. Later ones are copies of an
/// already-degraded file and get a timestamped name.
fn record_corrupt_load(file_path: &Path, now: &chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>) {
let first = file_path.with_extension("json.bak");
let backup = if first.exists() {
file_path.with_extension(format!("json.corrupt-{}.bak", now.format("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")))
} else {
first
};
if !backup.exists() {
if let Err(e) = fs::copy(file_path, &backup) {
log::error!("Failed to back up corrupted projects.json: {}", e);
} else {
log::error!(
"A copy of the unreadable projects.json was kept at {}",
backup.display()
);
}
}
// Sticky, and written even though nothing in the app reads it back on this
// branch: the Disk panel's `project_store_trust` was the reader and went to
// `hold/disk-and-dragout`. The marker stays because it is the only durable
// record that a project list was lost — the in-memory symptom does not
// survive the next save — and because re-deriving *when* it happened is
// impossible after the fact.
let marker = corrupt_marker_for(file_path);
if marker.exists() {
// The *first* corruption is the one that dates the loss.
return;
}
if let Err(e) = fs::write(&marker, now.to_rfc3339()) {
log::error!(
"Could not record the corrupt projects.json load at {}: {} — nothing will be able to \
tell later that the project list was incomplete",
marker.display(),
e
);
}
}
pub struct ProjectsStore {
projects: Mutex<Vec<Project>>,
file_path: PathBuf,
@@ -99,14 +43,20 @@ impl ProjectsStore {
Ok(parsed) => (parsed, migrated),
Err(e) => {
log::error!("Failed to parse migrated projects.json: {}. Starting with empty list.", e);
record_corrupt_load(&file_path, &chrono::Utc::now());
let backup = file_path.with_extension("json.bak");
if let Err(be) = fs::copy(&file_path, &backup) {
log::error!("Failed to back up corrupted projects.json: {}", be);
}
(Vec::new(), false)
}
}
}
Err(e) => {
log::error!("Failed to parse projects.json: {}. Starting with empty list.", e);
record_corrupt_load(&file_path, &chrono::Utc::now());
let backup = file_path.with_extension("json.bak");
if let Err(be) = fs::copy(&file_path, &backup) {
log::error!("Failed to back up corrupted projects.json: {}", be);
}
(Vec::new(), false)
}
}
@@ -253,89 +203,3 @@ impl ProjectsStore {
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn temp_dir(tag: &str) -> PathBuf {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"triple-c-store-{}-{}",
tag,
uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
));
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("temp dir");
dir
}
#[test]
fn a_corrupt_load_leaves_a_marker_the_next_write_cannot_erase() {
// H-3, the whole chain in one test. `ProjectsStore::new()` swallows an
// unparseable file into an empty list *without rewriting it*, and the
// first `save()` after that — as little as `update_status()` — writes
// `[{one project}]` over it. Everything the old guard keyed on ("the
// list is empty and the file exists") is gone at that point, while
// every *other* project's volumes are still on the daemon claimed by
// nobody.
let dir = temp_dir("corrupt");
let file = dir.join("projects.json");
fs::write(&file, "{ this is not a project list").unwrap();
let now = chrono::Utc::now();
record_corrupt_load(&file, &now);
let marker = corrupt_marker_for(&file);
assert!(marker.exists(), "the corrupt load must be recorded on disk");
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&marker).unwrap(), now.to_rfc3339());
assert!(
dir.join("projects.json.bak").exists(),
"the unreadable bytes must be kept"
);
// The write that used to erase the evidence. The marker is a separate
// file, so it does not care.
fs::write(&file, r#"[{"id":"the-one-project-started-since"}]"#).unwrap();
assert!(marker.exists());
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn a_second_corruption_keeps_the_first_copy_and_the_first_date() {
// The `.bak` used to be a fixed name, so a second corruption clobbered
// the first — and the first is the only copy taken before the app
// rewrote the file with whatever it had in memory, i.e. the only one
// that can still hold the full project list.
let dir = temp_dir("second");
let file = dir.join("projects.json");
fs::write(&file, "original bytes").unwrap();
let first = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z")
.unwrap()
.with_timezone(&chrono::Utc);
record_corrupt_load(&file, &first);
fs::write(&file, "degraded bytes").unwrap();
let second = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339("2026-06-01T00:00:00Z")
.unwrap()
.with_timezone(&chrono::Utc);
record_corrupt_load(&file, &second);
assert_eq!(
fs::read_to_string(dir.join("projects.json.bak")).unwrap(),
"original bytes",
"the first copy must survive the second corruption"
);
assert_eq!(
fs::read_to_string(dir.join("projects.json.corrupt-20260601-000000.bak")).unwrap(),
"degraded bytes"
);
// And the marker still dates the loss from the first failure, which is
// when the project list actually stopped being complete.
assert_eq!(
fs::read_to_string(corrupt_marker_for(&file)).unwrap(),
first.to_rfc3339()
);
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
}
+33 -207
View File
@@ -26,122 +26,47 @@ const CLAUDE_TOKEN_VERSION_SERVICE: &str = "triple-c-claude-oauth-token-version"
/// Fixed account name used for every triple-c keychain entry.
const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT: &str = "secret";
/// Every per-project secret this app stores, and therefore every one it has to
/// be able to delete.
///
/// This list is the **only** definition. It used to exist twice — once
/// implicitly, as whatever `store_secrets_for_project` happened to write, and
/// once explicitly, as a literal array inside `delete_project_secrets` — and
/// the two drifted: `openai-compatible-api-key` was added to the writer and
/// never to the deleter, so removing a project left a live provider API key in
/// the user's login keychain with nothing left in the app that referenced it,
/// or would ever offer to clean it up.
///
/// Drift is now a compile-time-shaped error rather than a review-time one:
/// [`project_secret_entry`] refuses a key that is not in this list, so a new
/// secret cannot be stored until it has been added here, and adding it here is
/// what makes [`delete_project_secrets`] cover it.
pub const PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
"git-token",
"aws-access-key-id",
"aws-secret-access-key",
"aws-session-token",
"aws-bearer-token",
"openai-compatible-api-key",
];
/// The keychain entry for one per-project secret, rejecting any key name not in
/// [`PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS`]. See that constant for why the rejection matters.
fn project_secret_entry(project_id: &str, key_name: &str) -> Result<keyring::Entry, String> {
if !PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS.contains(&key_name) {
return Err(format!(
"Unknown project secret '{}'. Add it to PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS so project deletion \
clears it too.",
key_name
));
}
let service = format!("triple-c-project-{}-{}", project_id, key_name);
keyring::Entry::new(&service, KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT).map_err(|e| format!("Keyring error: {}", e))
}
/// Store a per-project secret in the OS keychain.
pub fn store_project_secret(project_id: &str, key_name: &str, value: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
project_secret_entry(project_id, key_name)?
let service = format!("triple-c-project-{}-{}", project_id, key_name);
let entry = keyring::Entry::new(&service, "secret")
.map_err(|e| format!("Keyring error: {}", e))?;
entry
.set_password(value)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to store project secret '{}': {}", key_name, e))
}
/// Retrieve a per-project secret from the OS keychain.
pub fn get_project_secret(project_id: &str, key_name: &str) -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
match project_secret_entry(project_id, key_name)?.get_password() {
let service = format!("triple-c-project-{}-{}", project_id, key_name);
let entry = keyring::Entry::new(&service, "secret")
.map_err(|e| format!("Keyring error: {}", e))?;
match entry.get_password() {
Ok(value) => Ok(Some(value)),
Err(keyring::Error::NoEntry) => Ok(None),
Err(e) => Err(format!("Failed to retrieve project secret '{}': {}", key_name, e)),
}
}
/// Delete one per-project secret, treating "wasn't there" as success.
pub fn delete_project_secret(project_id: &str, key_name: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
match project_secret_entry(project_id, key_name)?.delete_credential() {
Ok(()) | Err(keyring::Error::NoEntry) => Ok(()),
Err(e) => Err(format!("Failed to delete project secret '{}': {}", key_name, e)),
}
}
/// Write a per-project secret, or **clear** it when there is nothing to write.
///
/// This is the function every save path should call, and the reason it exists
/// is that the obvious `if let Some(v) = … { store(v) }` is wrong. The editors
/// in `components/projects/home/config/` send a blanked field as `null`
/// (`AccessSection.tsx`: `save({ git_token: gitToken || null })`), so a `None`
/// is a user asking for the secret to be *removed* — and skipping it left the
/// old value in the keychain, where `load_secrets_for_project` read it straight
/// back out and put it back on the project. Clearing a credential through the
/// UI was therefore impossible: the field looked empty and the container kept
/// getting the old token.
///
/// `Some("")` and `Some(" ")` are treated the same as `None` — a field the
/// user emptied, whichever shape it arrives in — because a stored empty secret
/// is not a secret, and `container_config` would inject it as an env var that
/// overrides the unset case with a blank.
// TODO(handoff): `commands/project_commands.rs::store_secrets_for_project` is
// the one caller this is for, and it still uses the `if let Some(v) = … ` shape
// that cannot clear anything. That file belongs to another change in this round,
// so the switch is deliberately left to it; the six call sites there become
// `store_or_clear_project_secret(&project.id, "<key>", field.as_deref())?`.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn store_or_clear_project_secret(
project_id: &str,
key_name: &str,
value: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
match secret_to_store(value) {
Some(v) => store_project_secret(project_id, key_name, v),
None => delete_project_secret(project_id, key_name),
}
}
/// The store-or-clear decision, split out so it can be tested without a
/// keychain backend: `Some` means "write this", `None` means "remove whatever
/// is there".
#[allow(dead_code)]
fn secret_to_store(value: Option<&str>) -> Option<&str> {
match value.map(str::trim) {
Some(v) if !v.is_empty() => Some(v),
_ => None,
}
}
/// Delete every known secret for a project from the OS keychain.
///
/// Called when a project is removed, so it must cover [`PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS`]
/// exhaustively — a key missed here outlives the project that explained it.
/// One key failing does not stop the rest: a partial cleanup that keeps going
/// leaves strictly fewer credentials behind than one that gives up.
/// Delete all known secrets for a project from the OS keychain.
pub fn delete_project_secrets(project_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
for key_name in PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS {
if let Err(e) = delete_project_secret(project_id, key_name) {
log::warn!("Failed to delete project secret '{}': {}", key_name, e);
let secret_keys = [
"git-token",
"aws-access-key-id",
"aws-secret-access-key",
"aws-session-token",
"aws-bearer-token",
];
for key_name in &secret_keys {
let service = format!("triple-c-project-{}-{}", project_id, key_name);
let entry = keyring::Entry::new(&service, "secret")
.map_err(|e| format!("Keyring error: {}", e))?;
match entry.delete_credential() {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(keyring::Error::NoEntry) => {}
Err(e) => {
log::warn!("Failed to delete project secret '{}': {}", key_name, e);
}
}
}
Ok(())
@@ -321,125 +246,26 @@ pub fn delete_gateway_api_key() -> Result<(), String> {
/// only enforces auth when a master key is configured, so Triple-C always
/// configures one.
pub fn get_or_create_gateway_master_key() -> Result<String, String> {
if let Some(existing) = get_gateway_master_key()? {
return Ok(existing);
if let Some(existing) = read_entry(GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY_SERVICE, "the gateway master key")? {
if !existing.trim().is_empty() {
return Ok(existing);
}
}
regenerate_gateway_master_key()
}
/// Read the gateway master key without minting one if none exists yet.
/// Distinct from [`get_or_create_gateway_master_key`], which mints as a side
/// effect the read half of that function must not have — settings export
/// (triple-c#35) needs "is there one, and if so what is it", not "make sure
/// one exists".
pub fn get_gateway_master_key() -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
Ok(read_entry(GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY_SERVICE, "the gateway master key")?
.filter(|k| !k.trim().is_empty()))
}
/// Mint a new gateway master key, invalidating the old one. Projects using the
/// previous value must be updated.
pub fn regenerate_gateway_master_key() -> Result<String, String> {
// LiteLLM requires the master key to start with `sk-`.
let key = format!("sk-triple-c-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
store_gateway_master_key(&key)?;
Ok(key)
}
/// Store an exact given gateway master key, replacing any previous one.
///
/// Distinct from [`regenerate_gateway_master_key`], which always mints a
/// fresh random value: this exists for settings import (triple-c#35), where
/// restoring the *same* key an export captured is the point — projects on
/// the destination machine may not exist yet, but a project migrated or
/// re-added later that still has the old key pasted into its config must
/// keep working against it. Blank input is rejected rather than silently
/// stored, matching every other `store_*` function in this module.
pub fn store_gateway_master_key(key: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
if key.trim().is_empty() {
return Err("Refusing to store an empty gateway master key.".to_string());
}
let entry = keyring::Entry::new(GATEWAY_MASTER_KEY_SERVICE, KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT)
.map_err(|e| format!("Keyring error: {}", e))?;
entry
.set_password(key.trim())
.set_password(&key)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to store the gateway master key: {}", e))?;
bump_gateway_secret_version()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// The regression this list exists for. `openai-compatible-api-key` was
/// written by `store_secrets_for_project` and missing from the delete list,
/// so it survived project deletion.
#[test]
fn every_secret_the_app_writes_is_one_it_can_delete() {
for key in [
"git-token",
"aws-access-key-id",
"aws-secret-access-key",
"aws-session-token",
"aws-bearer-token",
"openai-compatible-api-key",
] {
assert!(
PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS.contains(&key),
"{} is written by commands/project_commands.rs but would outlive the project",
key
);
}
}
#[test]
fn the_key_list_has_no_duplicates() {
let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
for key in PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS {
assert!(seen.insert(*key), "duplicate project secret key {}", key);
}
}
/// A key that is not in the list is refused *before* any keychain entry is
/// constructed, which is what makes the list authoritative rather than
/// advisory. Without this, a new secret can be stored under a name nothing
/// ever deletes.
#[test]
fn an_unlisted_key_cannot_be_stored_at_all() {
let err = store_project_secret("some-project", "brand-new-token", "value")
.expect_err("an unlisted key must be refused");
assert!(
err.contains("PROJECT_SECRET_KEYS"),
"the refusal should say how to fix it: {}",
err
);
let err = get_project_secret("some-project", "brand-new-token")
.expect_err("an unlisted key must be refused on read too");
assert!(err.contains("brand-new-token"), "{}", err);
let err = delete_project_secret("some-project", "brand-new-token")
.expect_err("an unlisted key must be refused on delete too");
assert!(err.contains("brand-new-token"), "{}", err);
}
/// The blanked-field case. `AccessSection.tsx` sends `gitToken || null`, so
/// a cleared field arrives as `None` — and before this existed, `None` was
/// skipped and the old secret stayed in the keychain forever.
#[test]
fn a_blanked_field_clears_rather_than_being_skipped() {
assert_eq!(secret_to_store(None), None);
assert_eq!(secret_to_store(Some("")), None);
assert_eq!(secret_to_store(Some(" \t\n")), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_real_value_is_stored_trimmed() {
assert_eq!(secret_to_store(Some("ghp_abc123")), Some("ghp_abc123"));
// Pasted credentials routinely carry a trailing newline.
assert_eq!(secret_to_store(Some(" ghp_abc123\n")), Some("ghp_abc123"));
}
bump_gateway_secret_version()?;
Ok(key)
}
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
//! Password-based encryption for the settings export/import file — see
//! triple-c#35.
//!
//! The exported payload can carry live credentials (the shared Claude OAuth
//! token, the gateway provider/master keys — see
//! `commands::settings_export_commands`), so this is not encryption for its
//! own sake; a wrong or missing key here is a real credential leak, not a
//! cosmetic bug. Argon2id derives a 256-bit key from the password (memory-
//! hard, meaningfully resistant to GPU/ASIC brute-forcing in a way PBKDF2 at
//! any reasonable iteration count is not), and AES-256-GCM is what actually
//! encrypts — authenticated, so a wrong password is detected by a failed tag
//! check rather than producing silent garbage.
//!
//! File format: `MAGIC (4 bytes) | salt (16 bytes) | nonce (12 bytes) |
//! ciphertext+tag`. The salt and nonce are not secret — they are written in
//! the clear right here, on purpose. The salt's only job is to make two
//! exports with the same password derive different keys (defeats a
//! precomputed-table attack against the password alone); the nonce's job is
//! GCM's requirement that a (key, nonce) pair never repeat. Both hold
//! because a fresh random value is drawn for each, on every call to
//! [`encrypt`].
//!
//! The whole header (magic + salt + nonce) is passed to AES-GCM as
//! associated data, not just placed alongside the ciphertext — free to do,
//! and it makes tampering with any header byte fail the same authentication
//! check the ciphertext gets, by construction rather than as a side effect
//! of the salt/nonce also feeding key derivation and the cipher.
use aes_gcm::aead::{Aead, KeyInit, Payload};
use aes_gcm::{Aes256Gcm, Nonce};
use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2, Params, Version};
use rand::RngCore;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
/// Identifies the file as a Triple-C settings export and pins the format —
/// a change to the salt/nonce lengths or the KDF/cipher choice below needs a
/// new magic value, not a silent reinterpretation of old bytes.
const MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"TCX1";
const SALT_LEN: usize = 16;
const NONCE_LEN: usize = 12;
const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
const HEADER_LEN: usize = MAGIC.len() + SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN;
/// Argon2id parameters: memory cost in KiB, time cost (iterations),
/// parallelism. `(19 MiB, 2, 1)` is OWASP's documented minimum recommendation
/// for Argon2id — deliberately heavier than a login-flow KDF would use, since
/// this runs once per export/import rather than on every request, so trading
/// roughly a second of wall time for real brute-force resistance costs
/// nothing a user would notice.
fn argon2_params() -> Params {
Params::new(19 * 1024, 2, 1, Some(KEY_LEN)).expect("hardcoded Argon2 params are valid")
}
/// The derived key is wrapped in `Zeroizing` so it is overwritten with zeros
/// when it drops rather than left in freed memory for whatever reuses that
/// stack slot next — cheap insurance (`zeroize` is already in the dependency
/// tree via `aes-gcm`) for material that exists only to decrypt live
/// credentials.
fn derive_key(password: &str, salt: &[u8]) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; KEY_LEN]>, String> {
let argon2 = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, Version::V0x13, argon2_params());
let mut key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; KEY_LEN]);
argon2
.hash_password_into(password.as_bytes(), salt, &mut *key)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to derive encryption key: {}", e))?;
Ok(key)
}
/// Encrypt `plaintext` with a key derived from `password`. Returns the whole
/// file's bytes (header + ciphertext) — see the module doc for the layout.
pub fn encrypt(plaintext: &[u8], password: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let mut salt = [0u8; SALT_LEN];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut salt);
let key = derive_key(password, &salt)?;
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let mut header = Vec::with_capacity(HEADER_LEN);
header.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
header.extend_from_slice(&salt);
header.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&*key)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to initialize cipher: {}", e))?;
// The header (magic + salt + nonce) is authenticated as associated data
// even though none of it is secret: it costs nothing extra here, and it
// means tampering with any header byte is caught by the same tag check
// that already covers the ciphertext, by construction rather than as a
// side effect of the header also feeding key/nonce derivation.
let ciphertext = cipher
.encrypt(nonce, Payload { msg: plaintext, aad: &header })
.map_err(|e| format!("Encryption failed: {}", e))?;
let mut out = header;
out.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
Ok(out)
}
/// Decrypt a file produced by [`encrypt`]. The one error this returns for a
/// wrong password is deliberately generic ("wrong password, or the file is
/// corrupted") rather than distinguishing the two: GCM's authentication tag
/// fails to verify for the wrong key on essentially any ciphertext, so there
/// is no reliable way to tell "wrong password" from "corrupted file" apart,
/// and guessing would be worse than saying so.
///
/// Returns `Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>` rather than a plain `Vec<u8>` — the plaintext
/// this recovers is the whole settings-plus-secrets payload, so it gets the
/// same "wipe it when it drops" treatment as the derived key in
/// [`derive_key`].
pub fn decrypt(data: &[u8], password: &str) -> Result<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>, String> {
if data.len() < HEADER_LEN {
return Err("This does not look like a Triple-C settings export (file too short).".to_string());
}
if &data[..MAGIC.len()] != MAGIC {
return Err("This does not look like a Triple-C settings export (unrecognized file).".to_string());
}
let header = &data[..HEADER_LEN];
let salt = &data[MAGIC.len()..MAGIC.len() + SALT_LEN];
let nonce_bytes = &data[MAGIC.len() + SALT_LEN..HEADER_LEN];
let ciphertext = &data[HEADER_LEN..];
let key = derive_key(password, salt)?;
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&*key)
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to initialize cipher: {}", e))?;
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(nonce_bytes);
cipher
.decrypt(nonce, Payload { msg: ciphertext, aad: header })
.map(Zeroizing::new)
.map_err(|_| "Wrong password, or the file is corrupted.".to_string())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn a_round_trip_with_the_right_password_recovers_the_plaintext() {
let plaintext = b"{\"settings\": \"whatever\"}";
let encrypted = encrypt(plaintext, "correct horse battery staple").unwrap();
let decrypted = decrypt(&encrypted, "correct horse battery staple").unwrap();
assert_eq!(&*decrypted, plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn the_wrong_password_fails_rather_than_returning_garbage() {
let encrypted = encrypt(b"secret payload", "correct password").unwrap();
let result = decrypt(&encrypted, "wrong password");
assert!(result.is_err(), "decrypting with the wrong password must fail, not silently succeed");
}
#[test]
fn two_exports_of_the_same_plaintext_and_password_produce_different_files() {
// If this ever failed it would mean the salt or nonce stopped being
// randomized — either one repeating is a real security regression
// (a fixed salt lets an attacker precompute against the password
// alone; a repeated (key, nonce) pair breaks GCM's guarantees
// outright), not just a cosmetic one.
let a = encrypt(b"same plaintext", "same password").unwrap();
let b = encrypt(b"same plaintext", "same password").unwrap();
assert_ne!(a, b, "two independent exports must not be byte-identical");
}
#[test]
fn corrupting_a_single_byte_of_ciphertext_is_detected() {
let mut encrypted = encrypt(b"tamper-evident payload", "a password").unwrap();
let last = encrypted.len() - 1;
encrypted[last] ^= 0xFF;
assert!(decrypt(&encrypted, "a password").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn a_file_that_is_too_short_is_rejected_cleanly_not_by_panicking() {
assert!(decrypt(b"short", "any password").is_err());
assert!(decrypt(b"", "any password").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn a_file_with_the_wrong_magic_is_rejected() {
let mut encrypted = encrypt(b"payload", "password").unwrap();
encrypted[0] = b'X';
assert!(decrypt(&encrypted, "password").is_err());
}
}
+8 -156
View File
@@ -3,78 +3,11 @@
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0, maximum-scale=1.0, user-scalable=no">
<!--
This page is served by an axum server bound 0.0.0.0 (remote access is the
feature) behind a permissive CORS layer, and it fronts a shell in a container.
It gets a CSP of its own because nothing else gives it one: the app's
`tauri.conf.json` CSP covers the desktop webview, never this document.
`default-src 'none'` is the base, so anything not named below is refused
outright. What is named:
script-src jsdelivr for the three xterm bundles, plus 'unsafe-inline' for
this page's own inline <script>. Nonces/hashes were considered
and rejected: the file is a static `include_str!()` asset, so a
hash would have to be recomputed by hand on every edit to the
script, and the failure mode of getting that wrong is a terminal
that silently will not start.
style-src the xterm stylesheet, this page's <style>, and the one inline
`style=` attribute below (style attributes need 'unsafe-inline').
connect-src the WebSocket back to this same server. `ws:`/`wss:` as schemes
rather than an origin, because the host and port are whatever
the user reached this page on and are not knowable at build time.
form-action / base-uri / object-src / frame-ancestors — all 'none'. Note
`frame-ancestors` is ignored in a <meta> CSP; it is here as a
statement of intent, and the real protection would be a response
header from `server.rs`.
Deliberately absent: 'unsafe-eval', and any origin other than jsdelivr.
-->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="
default-src 'none';
script-src 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net;
style-src 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net;
img-src 'self' data:;
font-src 'self' data:;
connect-src 'self' ws: wss:;
form-action 'none';
base-uri 'none';
object-src 'none';
frame-ancestors 'none';
">
<title>Triple-C Web Terminal</title>
<!--
Subresource Integrity on every CDN asset.
Without it this page executes whatever jsdelivr returns, inside a document
that holds the web terminal's access token and drives a shell in a container —
an upstream compromise, a hijacked package version or a MITM on a phone's
network is arbitrary code with that reach. The hashes below were computed
from the exact bytes at these pinned versions. `crossorigin="anonymous"` is
required for SRI to be checked on a cross-origin fetch.
Bumping a version means recomputing its hash:
curl -sS <url> | openssl dgst -sha384 -binary | openssl base64 -A
A mismatched hash blocks the asset, so a stale hash shows up immediately as a
terminal that does not render — never as an unverified load.
These are still remote loads: the remote terminal does not work with no
internet on the client side, and vendoring the ~300 KB of minified xterm into
this file would fix that. It was not done here — SRI already closes the
integrity half, which is the security half, and the availability half is a
separate call about binary size and diff readability.
-->
<link rel="stylesheet"
href="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/xterm@5.5.0/css/xterm.min.css"
integrity="sha384-tStR1zLfWgsiXCF3IgfB3lBa8KmBe/lG287CL9WCeKgQYcp1bjb4/+mwN6oti4Co"
crossorigin="anonymous">
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/xterm@5.5.0/lib/xterm.min.js"
integrity="sha384-J4qzUjBl1FxyLsl/kQPQIOeINsmp17OHYXDOMpMxlKX53ZfYsL+aWHpgArvOuof9"
crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/addon-fit@0.10.0/lib/addon-fit.min.js"
integrity="sha384-XGqKrV8Jrukp1NITJbOEHwg01tNkuXr6uB6YEj69ebpYU3v7FvoGgEg23C1Gcehk"
crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/addon-web-links@0.11.0/lib/addon-web-links.min.js"
integrity="sha384-S1biLeI8L/bFduIVvCxbn/l4EtaG4nTqQjGF7qCYTbsGXGFe8KgIKXtw4+UWxprv"
crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/xterm@5.5.0/css/xterm.min.css">
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/xterm@5.5.0/lib/xterm.min.js"></script>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/addon-fit@0.10.0/lib/addon-fit.min.js"></script>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@xterm/addon-web-links@0.11.0/lib/addon-web-links.min.js"></script>
<style>
:root {
--bg-primary: #1a1b26;
@@ -401,9 +334,6 @@
autocomplete="off" autocorrect="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false"
enterkeyhint="send" inputmode="text">
<button class="key-btn" id="btnEnter">Enter</button>
<!-- A newline *without* submitting. There is no Shift on a phone keyboard,
so the chord the desktop app binds needs a key of its own here. -->
<button class="key-btn" id="btnNewline" title="Insert a newline without submitting (Shift+Enter)">&#8629;+</button>
<button class="key-btn" id="btnTab">Tab</button>
<button class="key-btn" id="btnCtrlC">^C</button>
</div>
@@ -430,19 +360,6 @@
const emptyState = document.getElementById('emptyState');
const mobileInput = document.getElementById('mobileInput');
const btnEnter = document.getElementById('btnEnter');
const btnNewline = document.getElementById('btnNewline');
// Whether the *active* session understands ESC+CR as "insert a newline".
//
// Only Claude Code does. `bash -l` has no readline binding for `\e\r`, so
// sending it there is a silent no-op — which is worse from the mobile bar
// than from a hardware key, because the bar puts a dedicated button on
// screen that appears to do nothing. The xterm key handler is already scoped
// this way; these two paths were not.
function activeSessionTakesEscCr() {
const s = activeSessionId && sessions[activeSessionId];
return !!s && s.type === 'claude';
}
const btnTab = document.getElementById('btnTab');
const btnCtrlC = document.getElementById('btnCtrlC');
const scrollBottomBtn = document.getElementById('scrollBottomBtn');
@@ -602,7 +519,7 @@
updateProjectList(msg.projects);
break;
case 'opened':
onSessionOpened(msg.session_id, msg.project_name, msg.session_type);
onSessionOpened(msg.session_id, msg.project_name);
break;
case 'output':
onSessionOutput(msg.session_id, msg.data);
@@ -653,18 +570,8 @@
});
}
function onSessionOpened(sessionId, projectName, serverSessionType) {
// Prefer the type the *server* reports for this session. The old path read
// a single `pendingSessionType` global set at request time, so opening two
// sessions before the first reply landed swapped their labels — routine on
// mobile, where nothing disables the buttons. That was cosmetic until
// Shift+Enter became type-dependent: a Claude session labelled `shell`
// sends a bare CR and submits a half-written prompt.
//
// The fallback keeps an older server working, and defaults to `claude`,
// which is the safe direction — ESC+CR is an unbound no-op in bash, while
// a bare CR in Claude Code loses the prompt.
const sessionType = serverSessionType || pendingSessionType || 'claude';
function onSessionOpened(sessionId, projectName) {
const sessionType = pendingSessionType || 'claude';
pendingSessionType = null;
// Create terminal
@@ -740,34 +647,6 @@
});
});
// Shift+Enter inserts a newline in Claude Code's prompt instead of
// submitting it. xterm.js does not consult `shiftKey` for Enter, so
// without this Shift+Enter is byte-identical to Enter.
//
// `\x1b\r` — ESC then CR — is what Claude Code parses as `return` with
// meta, and it is the same sequence its own `/terminal-setup` installs for
// VS Code, Cursor, Alacritty and Zed. Do not "simplify" it to `\n`: that
// also works in Claude Code, but a shell would *run* the line, so the two
// session types would diverge. Claude sessions only, for that reason —
// `bash -l` has no readline binding for `\e\r`.
term.attachCustomKeyEventHandler(e => {
if (
e.type === 'keydown' && e.key === 'Enter' && e.shiftKey &&
!e.ctrlKey && !e.altKey && !e.metaKey && !e.isComposing &&
sessionType === 'claude'
) {
sendTerminalInput('\x1b\r');
// `preventDefault()` is what stops the submit, not the `return false`.
// xterm's `_keyDown` returns before setting `_keyDownHandled`, so
// `_keyPress` still fires and emits a bare CR for Enter — inserting the
// newline and then submitting the prompt anyway. See the same comment
// in TerminalView.tsx.
e.preventDefault();
return false;
}
return true;
});
// Track scroll position for scroll-to-bottom button
term.onScroll(() => updateScrollButton());
@@ -819,7 +698,6 @@
switchToSession(remaining[remaining.length - 1]);
} else {
activeSessionId = null;
syncNewlineButton();
emptyState.style.display = '';
}
}
@@ -846,7 +724,6 @@
function switchToSession(sessionId) {
activeSessionId = sessionId;
syncNewlineButton();
// Update tab styles
document.querySelectorAll('.tab').forEach(t => t.classList.remove('active'));
@@ -922,11 +799,7 @@
sendTerminalInput(val);
mobileInput.value = '';
}
// Shift+Enter is a newline, not a submit — same bytes, and the same
// reasoning, as the terminal's own key handler above. A hardware
// keyboard on a tablet is the only way to reach this; the phone case is
// the dedicated newline button beside Enter.
sendTerminalInput(e.shiftKey && activeSessionTakesEscCr() ? '\x1b\r' : '\r');
sendTerminalInput('\r');
} else if (e.key === 'Tab') {
e.preventDefault();
sendTerminalInput('\t');
@@ -934,27 +807,6 @@
});
btnEnter.onclick = () => { sendTerminalInput('\r'); mobileInput.focus(); };
btnNewline.onclick = () => {
if (!activeSessionTakesEscCr()) { mobileInput.focus(); return; }
sendTerminalInput('\x1b\r');
mobileInput.focus();
};
// Keep the button's affordance honest: on a shell tab there is no byte that
// means "newline without running the line", so the control is disabled
// rather than left looking live.
function syncNewlineButton() {
const usable = activeSessionTakesEscCr();
btnNewline.disabled = !usable;
btnNewline.title = usable
? 'Insert a newline without submitting (Shift+Enter)'
: 'Only Claude sessions support this — a shell runs the line instead';
}
// With no session open yet, `activeSessionTakesEscCr()` is already false —
// but nothing had called this, so the button rendered live before the first
// tab existed.
syncNewlineButton();
btnTab.onclick = () => { sendTerminalInput('\t'); mobileInput.focus(); };
btnCtrlC.onclick = () => { sendTerminalInput('\x03'); mobileInput.focus(); };
+11 -35
View File
@@ -46,16 +46,6 @@ enum ServerMessage {
Opened {
session_id: String,
project_name: String,
/// Echoed back so the client can label the session from the reply
/// rather than from a global set at request time.
///
/// Without it the client correlates through a single
/// `pendingSessionType`, so opening two sessions before the first
/// reply lands swaps their labels. That used to be cosmetic; it stopped
/// being cosmetic when Shift+Enter became type-dependent, because a
/// Claude session mislabelled as a shell now submits a half-written
/// prompt instead of inserting a newline.
session_type: String,
},
Output {
session_id: String,
@@ -206,11 +196,6 @@ pub async fn handle_connection(socket: WebSocket, state: Arc<WebTerminalState>)
writer_handle.abort();
}
/// The desktop terminal's update prelude, reused verbatim. Shared rather than
/// copied so the web terminal cannot drift from it — a duplicated `const` with
/// a "keep these identical" comment is only as good as the next reader.
use crate::commands::terminal_commands::UPDATE_PRELUDE;
/// Build the command for a terminal session, mirroring terminal_commands.rs logic.
fn build_terminal_cmd(project: &Project, settings_store: &crate::storage::settings_store::SettingsStore) -> Vec<String> {
let is_bedrock_profile = project.backend == Backend::Bedrock
@@ -222,6 +207,17 @@ fn build_terminal_cmd(project: &Project, settings_store: &crate::storage::settin
let permission_args = project.effective_permission_mode().cli_args();
if !is_bedrock_profile {
let mut cmd = vec!["claude".to_string()];
cmd.extend(permission_args);
return cmd;
}
let profile = aws_commands::resolve_profile_for_project(
project,
settings_store.get().global_aws.aws_profile.as_deref(),
);
// The args are interpolated into a shell script string below, so
// single-quote each one.
let permission_flags: String = permission_args
@@ -230,19 +226,6 @@ fn build_terminal_cmd(project: &Project, settings_store: &crate::storage::settin
.collect();
let claude_cmd = format!("exec claude{}", permission_flags);
if !is_bedrock_profile {
return vec![
"bash".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
format!("{}\n{}\n", UPDATE_PRELUDE, claude_cmd),
];
}
let profile = aws_commands::resolve_profile_for_project(
project,
settings_store.get().global_aws.aws_profile.as_deref(),
);
let script = format!(
r#"
echo "Validating AWS session for profile '{profile}'..."
@@ -267,11 +250,9 @@ else
echo ""
fi
fi
{update_prelude}
{claude_cmd}
"#,
profile = profile,
update_prelude = UPDATE_PRELUDE,
claude_cmd = claude_cmd
);
@@ -338,11 +319,6 @@ async fn handle_open(
let _ = out_tx.send(ServerMessage::Opened {
session_id,
project_name,
// Derived from the same match that chose `cmd` above, not echoed from
// the request: anything that is not exactly "bash" runs Claude, so
// echoing the raw value would label an unrecognised string as its own
// type and put the client back where it started.
session_type: if session_type == Some("bash") { "bash" } else { "claude" }.to_string(),
});
Ok(())
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
}
],
"security": {
"csp": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' blob:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' ipc: http://ipc.localhost; frame-src http://127.0.0.1:47820 http://127.0.0.1:47821 http://127.0.0.1:47822 http://127.0.0.1:47823 http://127.0.0.1:47824 http://127.0.0.1:47825 http://127.0.0.1:47826 http://127.0.0.1:47827; form-action 'none'; base-uri 'none'; object-src 'none'"
"csp": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' asset: https://asset.localhost; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' ipc: http://ipc.localhost; frame-src http://127.0.0.1:47820 http://127.0.0.1:47821 http://127.0.0.1:47822 http://127.0.0.1:47823 http://127.0.0.1:47824 http://127.0.0.1:47825 http://127.0.0.1:47826 http://127.0.0.1:47827"
}
},
"bundle": {
+8 -29
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,11 @@ import { listen } from "@tauri-apps/api/event";
import Sidebar from "./components/layout/Sidebar";
import TopBar from "./components/layout/TopBar";
import StatusBar from "./components/layout/StatusBar";
import NotesDock from "./components/layout/NotesDock";
import TerminalView from "./components/terminal/TerminalView";
import DockerInstallDialog from "./components/DockerInstallDialog";
import ProjectHome from "./components/projects/home/ProjectHome";
import AddProjectDialog from "./components/projects/AddProjectDialog";
import ToastHost from "./components/ui/ToastHost";
import { PaneVisibilityProvider } from "./components/ui/PaneVisibility";
import StatusIndicator from "./components/ui/StatusIndicator";
import Button from "./components/ui/Button";
import { useDocker } from "./hooks/useDocker";
@@ -130,39 +128,23 @@ export default function App() {
<WelcomeScreen />
) : (
<div className="w-full h-full">
{/* Every tab stays mounted and the inactive ones are merely
`hidden`, which a dialog's portal to `document.body` does not
inherit: a confirmation opened in one project stayed painted
over whatever tab the user switched to, kept its focus trap,
and being a blocking overlay refused every native file
drop in the window. `PaneVisibilityProvider` is how a `Modal`
inside a pane finds out the pane stepped aside. */}
{homeProjectIds.map((projectId) => (
<PaneVisibilityProvider
<ProjectHome
key={projectId}
visible={activeTabKey === homeTabKey(projectId)}
>
<ProjectHome
projectId={projectId}
active={activeTabKey === homeTabKey(projectId)}
/>
</PaneVisibilityProvider>
projectId={projectId}
active={activeTabKey === homeTabKey(projectId)}
/>
))}
{sessions.map((session) => (
<PaneVisibilityProvider
<TerminalView
key={session.id}
visible={session.id === activeSessionId}
>
<TerminalView
sessionId={session.id}
active={session.id === activeSessionId}
/>
</PaneVisibilityProvider>
sessionId={session.id}
active={session.id === activeSessionId}
/>
))}
</div>
)}
</main>
<NotesDock />
</div>
<StatusBar stt={stt} />
<ToastHost />
@@ -174,9 +156,6 @@ export default function App() {
className="fixed inset-0 z-50 flex items-center justify-center bg-[var(--bg-primary)]/95 backdrop-blur-sm"
role="status"
aria-live="polite"
/* Covers the whole window, so no pane underneath may accept a
native file drop while it is up see `lib/dropTarget.ts`. */
data-blocks-drop="true"
data-testid="shutdown-overlay"
>
<div className="flex flex-col items-center gap-2 px-6 text-center">
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { renderMarkdown } from "./HelpDialog";
/**
* `renderMarkdown` builds HTML by regex substitution and the result is handed
* to `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`. Its input is the help document, which is
* fetched from GitHub at runtime remote, versioned by someone else, and not
* something the app gets to trust. These tests pin the escaping.
*/
/**
* Parse rendered HTML and return its first anchor, asserting that *no* element
* anywhere in the output grew an attribute outside the allowed set. A broken
* attribute value is only interesting if it becomes an attribute, so the check
* has to run through a real parser rather than over the string.
*/
const ALLOWED_ATTRS = new Set(["class", "href", "target", "rel", "id"]);
function onlyAnchor(html: string): HTMLAnchorElement {
const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(html, "text/html");
for (const el of Array.from(doc.body.querySelectorAll("*"))) {
for (const name of attrNames(el)) {
expect(ALLOWED_ATTRS.has(name), `unexpected attribute ${name}`).toBe(true);
}
}
const anchors = doc.querySelectorAll("a");
expect(anchors.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
return anchors[0] as HTMLAnchorElement;
}
/** Attribute names the parser actually saw on an element. */
function attrNames(el: Element): string[] {
return Array.from(el.attributes).map((a) => a.name);
}
describe("renderMarkdown escaping", () => {
it("escapes the quote characters an attribute value is delimited by", () => {
const html = renderMarkdown('He said "hi" and it\'s fine.');
expect(html).not.toMatch(/said "hi"/);
expect(html).toContain("&quot;hi&quot;");
expect(html).toContain("it&#39;s");
});
it("does not let a link target break out of href=\"…\"", () => {
// The sink: the URL capture is `[^)]+`, which includes `"` and spaces, and
// the value lands directly inside `href="…"`. Asserted through the DOM,
// not by string matching — the payload text legitimately survives *inside*
// the attribute value; what must not happen is it becoming an attribute.
const a = onlyAnchor(
renderMarkdown(
'[click](https://example.com/" onmouseover="steal() formaction="https://evil.example)',
),
);
expect(attrNames(a)).toEqual(["class", "href", "target", "rel"]);
expect(a.getAttribute("href")).toContain('" onmouseover="');
});
it("does not let an in-document anchor break out of href=\"#…\"", () => {
const a = onlyAnchor(
renderMarkdown('[jump](#top" onfocus="steal() autofocus="x)'),
);
expect(attrNames(a)).toEqual(["class", "href"]);
});
it("does not let a bare URL break out of href=\"…\"", () => {
const a = onlyAnchor(
renderMarkdown('See https://example.com/a"onmouseover="steal()\n'),
);
expect(attrNames(a)).toEqual(["class", "href", "target", "rel"]);
});
it("still renders ordinary links intact", () => {
const html = renderMarkdown("[docs](https://example.com/a?x=1&y=2)");
// `&` was entity-escaped by the first pass and must not be escaped twice.
expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com/a?x=1&amp;y=2"');
expect(html).not.toContain("&amp;amp;");
expect(html).toContain('target="_blank"');
expect(html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
expect(html).toContain(">docs</a>");
});
it("still renders an in-document anchor link intact", () => {
const html = renderMarkdown("[jump](#getting-started)");
expect(html).toContain('href="#getting-started"');
});
it("keeps header slugs stable across the new quote escaping", () => {
// The regression this guards: quotes now become entities *before*
// `slugify` sees them, and an entity's letters would otherwise survive
// into the id ("claude39s-setup"), silently breaking every
// `[…](#claudes-setup)` in the document.
expect(renderMarkdown("## Claude's setup")).toContain('id="claudes-setup"');
expect(renderMarkdown('## The "safe" mode')).toContain('id="the-safe-mode"');
});
it("still refuses to emit raw tags from the source document", () => {
const html = renderMarkdown("<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>");
expect(html).not.toContain("<img");
expect(html).toContain("&lt;img");
});
});
+7 -56
View File
@@ -12,67 +12,21 @@ function slugify(text: string): string {
return text
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/<[^>]+>/g, "") // strip HTML tags (e.g. from inline code)
// Quote characters are escaped to entities before this runs (see
// `renderMarkdown`). Drop those two entities whole, so a header with an
// apostrophe or a quote slugifies to what it did when the character was
// simply stripped — otherwise every such anchor id silently changes and
// the in-document links pointing at it stop resolving. `&amp;`/`&lt;`/
// `&gt;` are deliberately not in this list: they were already entities
// before, so their existing (odd) slugs are the established ones.
.replace(/&quot;|&#39;/g, "")
.replace(/[^\w\s-]/g, "") // remove non-word chars except spaces/dashes
.replace(/\s+/g, "-") // spaces to dashes
.replace(/-+/g, "-") // collapse consecutive dashes
.replace(/^-|-$/g, ""); // trim leading/trailing dashes
}
/**
* Escape a captured markdown value that is about to be interpolated into an
* HTML *attribute* value.
*
* `renderMarkdown` entity-escapes the whole document first, but that pass only
* covered `&`, `<` and `>` not the quote characters, which is all an
* attribute value is delimited by. `[x](https://a" onload="…)` therefore closed
* `href="` and started a new attribute, because the URL capture is `[^)]+` and
* `"` is in `[^)]`. The document is remote GitHub markdown, so that capture is
* not ours to trust.
*
* Only quotes are escaped here: `&`, `<` and `>` have already been converted by
* the caller, and re-escaping the `&` would double-encode every `&amp;` in a
* query string.
*/
function attr(value: string): string {
return value.replace(/"/g, "&quot;").replace(/'/g, "&#39;");
}
/**
* Simple markdown-to-HTML converter for the help content.
*
* Exported for `HelpDialog.test.tsx`: the output goes to
* `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, so the escaping rules below are security rules and
* need to be asserted rather than assumed.
*/
export function renderMarkdown(md: string): string {
/** Simple markdown-to-HTML converter for the help content. */
function renderMarkdown(md: string): string {
let html = md;
// Normalize line endings
html = html.replace(/\r\n/g, "\n");
// Escape HTML entities (but we'll re-introduce tags below).
//
// The quote characters are part of this on purpose. Everything below builds
// HTML by regex substitution, and several of those substitutions drop a
// capture straight into an attribute value (`href="$2"`). Leaving `"` and `'`
// live meant a link target could close the attribute and open another one —
// in a document fetched from GitHub at runtime and handed to
// `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`. Escaping here closes every such sink at the
// source; `attr()` below is the belt to this pair of braces.
html = html
.replace(/&/g, "&amp;")
.replace(/</g, "&lt;")
.replace(/>/g, "&gt;")
.replace(/"/g, "&quot;")
.replace(/'/g, "&#39;");
// Escape HTML entities (but we'll re-introduce tags below)
html = html.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
// Fenced code blocks (```...```)
html = html.replace(/```(\w*)\n([\s\S]*?)```/g, (_m, _lang, code) => {
@@ -130,15 +84,13 @@ export function renderMarkdown(md: string): string {
// Markdown-style anchor links [text](#anchor)
html = html.replace(
/\[([^\]]+)\]\(#([^)]+)\)/g,
(_m, text: string, anchor: string) =>
`<a class="help-link" href="#${attr(anchor)}">${text}</a>`,
'<a class="help-link" href="#$2">$1</a>',
);
// Markdown-style external links [text](url)
html = html.replace(
/\[([^\]]+)\]\((https?:\/\/[^)]+)\)/g,
(_m, text: string, url: string) =>
`<a class="help-link" href="${attr(url)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">${text}</a>`,
'<a class="help-link" href="$2" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">$1</a>',
);
// Unordered list items (- ...)
@@ -165,8 +117,7 @@ export function renderMarkdown(md: string): string {
// Links - convert bare URLs to clickable links (skip already-wrapped URLs)
html = html.replace(
/(?<!="|'>)(https?:\/\/[^\s<)]+)/g,
(_m, url: string) =>
`<a class="help-link" href="${attr(url)}" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">${url}</a>`,
'<a class="help-link" href="$1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">$1</a>',
);
// Wrap remaining loose text lines in paragraphs
+12 -6
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import {
} from "../../store/appState";
import { effectivePermissionMode } from "../projects/PermissionModeControl";
import { ProjectStatusIndicator } from "../ui/StatusIndicator";
import { sessionDisplayName } from "../../lib/sessionName";
import type { PermissionMode } from "../../lib/types";
interface ContextMenuState {
@@ -196,10 +195,11 @@ export default function MainTabs() {
}
const session = sessions.find((s) => s.id === tabKeyId(key));
if (!session) return "";
return sessionDisplayName(
session,
projects.find((p) => p.id === session.projectId),
);
const custom = getCustomName(session.projectId, session.id);
return custom
? `${session.projectName}: ${custom}`
: (session.sessionName ?? session.projectName) +
(session.sessionType === "bash" ? " (bash)" : "");
};
const endDrag = () => {
@@ -358,7 +358,13 @@ export default function MainTabs() {
const session = sessions.find((s) => s.id === sessionId);
if (!session) return null;
const project = projects.find((p) => p.id === session.projectId);
const displayLabel = sessionDisplayName(session, project);
const customName = getCustomName(session.projectId, session.id);
const baseLabel =
(session.sessionName ?? session.projectName) +
(session.sessionType === "bash" ? " (bash)" : "");
const displayLabel = customName
? `${session.projectName}: ${customName}`
: baseLabel;
const isRenaming = renamingId === session.id;
const badge = project ? MODE_BADGE[effectivePermissionMode(project)] : null;
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent } from "@testing-library/react";
import NotesDock from "./NotesDock";
import type { Project, TerminalSession } from "../../lib/types";
vi.mock("../notes/NotesDockPanel", () => ({
default: ({ projectId }: { projectId: string }) => (
<div data-testid="panel">{`panel:${projectId}`}</div>
),
}));
let state: Record<string, unknown> = {};
vi.mock("../../store/appState", () => ({
useAppState: Object.assign(
(selector: (s: unknown) => unknown) => selector(state),
{ getState: () => state },
),
isHomeTab: (k: string) => k.startsWith("home:"),
isTerminalTab: (k: string) => k.startsWith("term:"),
tabKeyId: (k: string) => k.slice(k.indexOf(":") + 1),
// The mocked store module still needs to supply the width constants the
// dock imports from it for the separator's aria-value attributes.
NOTES_DOCK_MIN_WIDTH: 260,
NOTES_DOCK_MAX_WIDTH: 720,
}));
const session: TerminalSession = {
id: "s1",
projectId: "p9",
projectName: "api",
sessionType: "claude",
sessionName: null,
};
beforeEach(() => {
state = {
notesDockOpen: true,
setNotesDockOpen: vi.fn(),
toggleNotesDock: vi.fn(),
notesDockWidth: 352,
setNotesDockWidth: vi.fn(),
activeTabKey: null,
sessions: [session],
projects: [{ id: "p9", name: "api" } as unknown as Project],
};
});
describe("NotesDock", () => {
it("renders nothing when closed", () => {
state.notesDockOpen = false;
const { container } = render(<NotesDock />);
expect(container).toBeEmptyDOMElement();
});
it("follows a project home tab", () => {
state.activeTabKey = "home:p1";
render(<NotesDock />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("panel")).toHaveTextContent("panel:p1");
});
it("follows the project of the active terminal tab", () => {
// The dock exists to be visible while the agent runs, so a terminal tab
// must resolve to its project, not to nothing.
state.activeTabKey = "term:s1";
render(<NotesDock />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("panel")).toHaveTextContent("panel:p9");
});
it("explains itself when no project is active", () => {
state.activeTabKey = null;
render(<NotesDock />);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("panel")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText(/open a project/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("shows nothing for a terminal whose session has gone", () => {
state.activeTabKey = "term:vanished";
render(<NotesDock />);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("panel")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("renders at the stored width", () => {
state.activeTabKey = "home:p1";
state.notesDockWidth = 420;
render(<NotesDock />);
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Notes")).toHaveStyle({ width: "420px" });
});
it("has a keyboard-reachable resize handle", () => {
// Drag is a mouse gesture; a separator that only responds to pointer
// events is unusable without one.
state.activeTabKey = "home:p1";
render(<NotesDock />);
const handle = screen.getByRole("separator", { name: /resize notes/i });
fireEvent.keyDown(handle, { key: "ArrowLeft" });
expect(state.setNotesDockWidth).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("widens on ArrowLeft and narrows on ArrowRight, by the exact step", () => {
// The dock sits on the right edge, so dragging or pressing left grows it
// and right shrinks it. Asserting only "was called" would pass even if
// the branches were swapped or the sign inverted.
state.activeTabKey = "home:p1";
render(<NotesDock />);
const handle = screen.getByRole("separator", { name: /resize notes/i });
fireEvent.keyDown(handle, { key: "ArrowLeft" });
expect(state.setNotesDockWidth).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(368);
fireEvent.keyDown(handle, { key: "ArrowRight" });
expect(state.setNotesDockWidth).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(336);
});
});
-128
View File
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
import { useShallow } from "zustand/react/shallow";
import {
useAppState,
isHomeTab,
isTerminalTab,
tabKeyId,
NOTES_DOCK_MIN_WIDTH,
NOTES_DOCK_MAX_WIDTH,
} from "../../store/appState";
import NotesDockPanel from "../notes/NotesDockPanel";
import Button from "../ui/Button";
/**
* Notes beside whatever is on screen.
*
* Project Home and Terminal are sibling top-level tabs, so notes living only
* in a sub-tab would be hidden exactly when the agent is running which is
* when a note is worth sending. The dock is the answer to that.
*
* **It takes space from inside the window and never resizes it.** Growing the
* OS window was tried and rejected on evidence: honoured under XWayland,
* silently corrupting under native Wayland, where `outer_position()` returns a
* confident `Ok(0,0)` for a window that is somewhere else. See the design doc,
* §6.1. Narrowing the terminal instead costs nothing `TerminalView`'s
* ResizeObserver already reflows xterm and resizes the container PTY.
*/
export default function NotesDock() {
const {
notesDockOpen,
setNotesDockOpen,
notesDockWidth,
setNotesDockWidth,
activeTabKey,
sessions,
} = useAppState(
useShallow((s) => ({
notesDockOpen: s.notesDockOpen,
setNotesDockOpen: s.setNotesDockOpen,
notesDockWidth: s.notesDockWidth,
setNotesDockWidth: s.setNotesDockWidth,
activeTabKey: s.activeTabKey,
sessions: s.sessions,
})),
);
// Dragging the separator. Pointer capture rather than window listeners, so
// the drag survives the pointer crossing the terminal — which swallows
// events — and ends correctly if the button is released outside the window.
const onPointerDown = (e: React.PointerEvent<HTMLDivElement>) => {
e.preventDefault();
const handle = e.currentTarget;
handle.setPointerCapture(e.pointerId);
const startX = e.clientX;
const startWidth = notesDockWidth;
// The dock is on the right, so dragging left widens it.
const onMove = (move: PointerEvent) =>
setNotesDockWidth(startWidth + (startX - move.clientX));
const onUp = () => {
handle.releasePointerCapture(e.pointerId);
handle.removeEventListener("pointermove", onMove);
handle.removeEventListener("pointerup", onUp);
};
handle.addEventListener("pointermove", onMove);
handle.addEventListener("pointerup", onUp);
};
const onHandleKeyDown = (e: React.KeyboardEvent<HTMLDivElement>) => {
const step = e.shiftKey ? 64 : 16;
if (e.key === "ArrowLeft") {
e.preventDefault();
setNotesDockWidth(notesDockWidth + step);
} else if (e.key === "ArrowRight") {
e.preventDefault();
setNotesDockWidth(notesDockWidth - step);
}
};
if (!notesDockOpen) return null;
// Follow whatever is in front: a home tab is its own project, a terminal tab
// is the project it belongs to.
let projectId: string | null = null;
if (activeTabKey && isHomeTab(activeTabKey)) {
projectId = tabKeyId(activeTabKey);
} else if (activeTabKey && isTerminalTab(activeTabKey)) {
projectId =
sessions.find((s) => s.id === tabKeyId(activeTabKey))?.projectId ?? null;
}
return (
<aside
aria-label="Notes"
style={{ width: `${notesDockWidth}px` }}
className="relative flex-shrink-0 flex flex-col min-h-0 bg-[var(--bg-secondary)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded-[var(--radius-panel)] overflow-hidden"
>
{/* Separator, not decoration: it carries a role and arrow keys, because
a resize that only answers to a drag is unavailable to anyone not
using a mouse. */}
<div
role="separator"
aria-label="Resize notes panel"
aria-orientation="vertical"
aria-valuenow={notesDockWidth}
aria-valuemin={NOTES_DOCK_MIN_WIDTH}
aria-valuemax={NOTES_DOCK_MAX_WIDTH}
tabIndex={0}
onPointerDown={onPointerDown}
onKeyDown={onHandleKeyDown}
className="absolute left-0 top-0 h-full w-1.5 cursor-col-resize hover:bg-[var(--accent-muted)] transition-colors"
/>
<div className="flex items-center justify-between gap-2 px-3 h-9 flex-shrink-0 border-b border-[var(--border-color)]">
<h2 className="text-[13px] font-semibold text-[var(--text-primary)]">Notes</h2>
<Button variant="ghost" onClick={() => setNotesDockOpen(false)} aria-label="Close notes">
Close
</Button>
</div>
<div className="flex-1 min-h-0">
{projectId ? (
<NotesDockPanel projectId={projectId} />
) : (
<p className="p-4 text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
Open a project or a terminal to see its notes.
</p>
)}
</div>
</aside>
);
}
+8 -32
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ interface Props {
export default function StatusBar({ stt }: Props) {
const {
projects, sessions, terminalHasSelection, activeSessionId, sttEnabled,
notesDockOpen, toggleNotesDock, terminalMouseCaptured, releaseActiveMouse,
terminalAtBottom, scrollActiveToBottom,
} = useAppState(
useShallow(s => ({
projects: s.projects,
@@ -18,18 +18,11 @@ export default function StatusBar({ stt }: Props) {
terminalHasSelection: s.terminalHasSelection,
activeSessionId: s.activeSessionId,
sttEnabled: s.appSettings?.stt?.enabled,
notesDockOpen: s.notesDockOpen,
toggleNotesDock: s.toggleNotesDock,
terminalMouseCaptured: s.terminalMouseCaptured,
releaseActiveMouse: s.releaseActiveMouse,
terminalAtBottom: s.terminalAtBottom,
scrollActiveToBottom: s.scrollActiveToBottom,
}))
);
const running = projects.filter((p) => p.status === "running").length;
// Only in a Claude tab: the chord is bound there and nowhere else, and a hint
// for a key that does nothing is worse than no hint.
const inClaudeSession = sessions.some(
(s) => s.id === activeSessionId && s.sessionType === "claude",
);
return (
<div className="flex items-center h-6 px-4 bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded-[var(--radius-panel)] text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
@@ -52,34 +45,17 @@ export default function StatusBar({ stt }: Props) {
</span>
</>
)}
{!terminalHasSelection && inClaudeSession && (
<>
<span className="mx-2">|</span>
<span title="Sends ESC+CR — the sequence Claude Code's own /terminal-setup installs. Alt+Enter does the same.">
Shift+Enter: newline
</span>
</>
)}
{/* Right-aligned controls: mouse release + Notes + STT mic */}
{/* Right-aligned controls: Jump to Current + STT mic */}
<div className="ml-auto flex items-center gap-3 pl-2">
{activeSessionId && terminalMouseCaptured && (
{activeSessionId && !terminalAtBottom && (
<button
data-mouse-release="true"
onClick={() => releaseActiveMouse()}
onClick={() => scrollActiveToBottom()}
className="text-[var(--accent)] hover:text-[var(--accent-hover)] cursor-pointer"
title="A program in the container is reading the mouse, so clicks and drags go to it instead of selecting text. Click, or press Ctrl+Shift+X, to take it back. To select text without taking it back, hold Shift while dragging (Option on macOS)."
title="Scroll the terminal to the latest output"
>
🖱 Mouse captured release
Jump to Current
</button>
)}
<button
onClick={toggleNotesDock}
aria-pressed={notesDockOpen}
className="text-[var(--accent)] hover:text-[var(--accent-hover)] cursor-pointer"
title="Show or hide the notes panel beside the current tab"
>
Notes
</button>
{sttEnabled && activeSessionId && (
<SttButton
state={stt.state}
-71
View File
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
import SendToAgentButton from "./SendToAgentButton";
import Button from "../ui/Button";
interface Props {
projectId: string;
title: string;
body: string;
onTitleChange: (value: string) => void;
onBodyChange: (value: string) => void;
onCommit: () => void;
onDelete: () => void;
}
/**
* Title and body, saved when a field loses focus.
*
* Plain text on purpose. There is no markdown rendering and no view/edit split,
* so there is no moment where the text on screen is not the text that would be
* sent which is what makes "the agent gets exactly what you see" true rather
* than nearly true.
*/
export default function NoteEditor({
projectId,
title,
body,
onTitleChange,
onBodyChange,
onCommit,
onDelete,
}: Props) {
return (
<div className="flex flex-col h-full min-h-0 gap-2 p-3">
{/* Wraps rather than overflows. The two buttons are a group with a fixed
appetite (~190px) and the title field can shrink only so far, so in a
narrow dock the title takes the first row and the buttons the second.
Without the wrap the group is simply clipped by the dock's
`overflow-hidden`, which puts Delete off-window with no scrollbar to
reach it. */}
<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-2">
<input
value={title}
onChange={(e) => onTitleChange(e.target.value)}
onBlur={onCommit}
placeholder="Note title"
aria-label="Note title"
className="flex-1 min-w-24 px-2 h-8 bg-[var(--bg-primary)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded-[var(--radius-control)] text-[13px] text-[var(--text-primary)] focus:border-[var(--accent)] transition-colors"
/>
<div className="flex items-center gap-2 flex-shrink-0">
{/* The live editor text, not `note.body` what is on screen is what
gets sent. */}
<SendToAgentButton projectId={projectId} body={body} />
<Button variant="danger" onClick={onDelete} aria-label="Delete note">
Delete
</Button>
</div>
</div>
<textarea
value={body}
onChange={(e) => onBodyChange(e.target.value)}
onBlur={onCommit}
placeholder="Reminders, gotchas, a prompt worth keeping…"
aria-label="Note body"
className="flex-1 min-h-0 w-full px-3 py-2 bg-[var(--bg-primary)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded-[var(--radius-control)] text-[13px] text-[var(--text-primary)] focus:border-[var(--accent)] resize-none font-mono transition-colors"
/>
<p className="text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
Notes save when a field loses focus. Sending puts the note in the agent&rsquo;s
prompt you press Enter.
</p>
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent } from "@testing-library/react";
import NoteSwitcher from "./NoteSwitcher";
import type { Note } from "../../lib/types";
const onTitleChange = vi.fn();
const onCommit = vi.fn();
const onSelect = vi.fn();
const note = (over: Partial<Note> = {}): Note => ({
id: "n1",
title: "Deploy steps",
body: "",
pinned: false,
created_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
...over,
});
const setup = (notes: Note[], selectedId = notes[0]?.id ?? "", title = notes[0]?.title ?? "") =>
render(
<NoteSwitcher
notes={notes}
selectedId={selectedId}
title={title}
onTitleChange={onTitleChange}
onCommit={onCommit}
onSelect={onSelect}
/>,
);
beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
describe("NoteSwitcher", () => {
it("edits the title in place, committing on blur", () => {
setup([note()]);
const field = screen.getByLabelText("Note title");
expect(field).toHaveValue("Deploy steps");
fireEvent.change(field, { target: { value: "Deploy steps v2" } });
expect(onTitleChange).toHaveBeenCalledWith("Deploy steps v2");
expect(onCommit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
fireEvent.blur(field);
expect(onCommit).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it("keeps the other notes out of the way until asked for", () => {
setup([note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas" })]);
expect(screen.queryByText("Gotchas")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
expect(screen.getByRole("option", { name: "Gotchas" })).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("reports whether the list is open", () => {
setup([note()]);
const trigger = screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i });
expect(trigger).toHaveAttribute("aria-expanded", "false");
fireEvent.click(trigger);
expect(trigger).toHaveAttribute("aria-expanded", "true");
});
it("marks the current note as the selected option", () => {
setup([note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas" })], "n2", "Gotchas");
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
expect(screen.getByRole("option", { name: "Gotchas" })).toHaveAttribute(
"aria-selected",
"true",
);
expect(screen.getByRole("option", { name: "Deploy steps" })).toHaveAttribute(
"aria-selected",
"false",
);
});
it("selects a note and closes", () => {
setup([note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas" })]);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("option", { name: "Gotchas" }));
expect(onSelect).toHaveBeenCalledWith("n2");
expect(screen.queryByRole("listbox")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("names an untitled note rather than showing an empty row", () => {
setup([note({ title: " " })]);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
expect(screen.getByRole("option", { name: "Untitled note" })).toBeInTheDocument();
});
// Notes are addressed by id, never by title. Two untitled notes are the
// ordinary case, and a title-keyed list would collapse them into one row.
it("lists two notes that share a title as two options", () => {
setup([note({ id: "n1", title: "" }), note({ id: "n2", title: "" })]);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
const options = screen.getAllByRole("option", { name: "Untitled note" });
expect(options).toHaveLength(2);
fireEvent.click(options[1]);
expect(onSelect).toHaveBeenCalledWith("n2");
});
it("closes on Escape without selecting anything", () => {
setup([note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas" })]);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
fireEvent.keyDown(document, { key: "Escape" });
expect(screen.queryByRole("listbox")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(onSelect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
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@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import type { Note } from "../../lib/types";
export const UNTITLED = "Untitled note";
interface Props {
notes: Note[];
selectedId: string;
title: string;
onTitleChange: (value: string) => void;
onCommit: () => void;
onSelect: (id: string) => void;
}
/**
* One row that both names the current note and switches to another.
*
* The dock has no room for a permanent list of titles, so the title field
* doubles as the label of what is open and the chevron beside it holds the
* rest. Renaming therefore needs no separate affordance.
*
* Two honest controls rather than one `role="combobox"`: a text field and a
* button that opens a listbox. A real combobox owes its listbox keyboard
* navigation, active-descendant tracking and an input that filters none of
* which this needs, and half of which is worse than not claiming the role.
*
* `OverflowMenu` is deliberately not reused here despite the shape being
* close. It keys its items by label, and notes are addressed by id: two
* untitled notes are the ordinary case and would collapse into one row.
*/
export default function NoteSwitcher({
notes,
selectedId,
title,
onTitleChange,
onCommit,
onSelect,
}: Props) {
const [open, setOpen] = useState(false);
const rootRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
// Same dismissal contract as `OverflowMenu`, so the two feel identical.
useEffect(() => {
if (!open) return;
const onDocClick = (e: MouseEvent) => {
if (!rootRef.current?.contains(e.target as Node)) setOpen(false);
};
const onKey = (e: KeyboardEvent) => {
if (e.key === "Escape") setOpen(false);
};
document.addEventListener("mousedown", onDocClick);
document.addEventListener("keydown", onKey);
return () => {
document.removeEventListener("mousedown", onDocClick);
document.removeEventListener("keydown", onKey);
};
}, [open]);
return (
<div ref={rootRef} className="relative flex items-center gap-1 min-w-0">
<input
value={title}
onChange={(e) => onTitleChange(e.target.value)}
onBlur={onCommit}
placeholder="Note title"
aria-label="Note title"
className="flex-1 min-w-0 px-2 h-7 bg-[var(--bg-primary)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded-[var(--radius-control)] text-[13px] text-[var(--text-primary)] focus:border-[var(--accent)] transition-colors"
/>
<button
type="button"
aria-label="Switch note"
aria-haspopup="listbox"
aria-expanded={open}
onClick={() => setOpen((o) => !o)}
className="inline-flex items-center justify-center h-7 w-6 flex-shrink-0 rounded-[var(--radius-control)] border border-[var(--border-color)] bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)] text-[var(--text-secondary)] hover:text-[var(--text-primary)] hover:bg-[var(--border-color)] transition-colors"
>
<span aria-hidden="true" className="leading-none text-[10px]"></span>
</button>
{open && (
<div
role="listbox"
aria-label="Notes"
className="absolute right-0 top-full mt-1 z-40 w-full max-h-64 overflow-y-auto py-1 bg-[var(--bg-overlay)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded-[var(--radius-panel)]"
style={{ boxShadow: "var(--shadow-overlay)" }}
>
{/* Buttons directly inside the listbox: wrapping each in an `<li>`
would put an implicit `listitem` between the listbox and its
options, which is not a child role a listbox owns. */}
{notes.map((n) => (
<button
key={n.id}
type="button"
role="option"
aria-selected={n.id === selectedId}
onClick={() => {
onSelect(n.id);
setOpen(false);
}}
className={`block w-full text-left px-3 py-1.5 text-xs truncate transition-colors hover:bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)] ${
n.id === selectedId
? "text-[var(--text-primary)] bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)]"
: "text-[var(--text-secondary)]"
}`}
>
{n.title.trim() || UNTITLED}
</button>
))}
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
import NotesDockPanel from "./NotesDockPanel";
import type { Note } from "../../lib/types";
const saveNote = vi.fn(async () => true);
const deleteNote = vi.fn(async () => true);
const createNote = vi.fn();
let notes: Note[] = [];
let loading = false;
vi.mock("../../hooks/useNotes", () => ({
useNotes: () => ({
notes,
loading,
saveState: { status: "idle", error: null },
createNote,
saveNote,
deleteNote,
}),
}));
const sendProps: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
vi.mock("./SendToAgentButton", () => ({
default: (props: Record<string, unknown>) => {
sendProps.push(props);
return <button type="button">Send to agent</button>;
},
}));
const note = (over: Partial<Note> = {}): Note => ({
id: "n1",
title: "Deploy steps",
body: "one\ntwo",
pinned: false,
created_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
...over,
});
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
sendProps.length = 0;
notes = [];
loading = false;
});
describe("NotesDockPanel", () => {
it("says it is loading rather than flashing an empty state", () => {
loading = true;
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
expect(screen.getByText(/loading notes/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("offers a first note when the project has none", async () => {
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /new note/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(createNote).toHaveBeenCalled());
});
// The point of the redesign: the dock spends its height on the note being
// written, not on a permanent list of the ones that are not.
it("shows one note at a time, the rest behind the switcher", () => {
notes = [note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas" })];
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Note title")).toHaveValue("Deploy steps");
expect(screen.queryByText("Gotchas")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
expect(screen.getByRole("option", { name: "Gotchas" })).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("switches to the note picked from the list", () => {
notes = [note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas", body: "careful" })];
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /switch note/i }));
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("option", { name: "Gotchas" }));
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Note title")).toHaveValue("Gotchas");
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("careful");
});
it("saves the body when it loses focus, and not before", () => {
notes = [note()];
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
const body = screen.getByLabelText("Note body");
fireEvent.change(body, { target: { value: "one\ntwo\nthree" } });
expect(saveNote).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
fireEvent.blur(body);
expect(saveNote).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ id: "n1", body: "one\ntwo\nthree" }),
);
});
it("keeps New and Delete in the overflow menu, out of the writing area", async () => {
notes = [note()];
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /note actions/i }));
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("menuitem", { name: /delete note/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(deleteNote).toHaveBeenCalledWith("n1"));
});
it("opens the note it just created", async () => {
notes = [note()];
createNote.mockResolvedValueOnce(note({ id: "n9", title: "" }));
const view = render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /note actions/i }));
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("menuitem", { name: /new note/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(createNote).toHaveBeenCalled());
notes = [note(), note({ id: "n9", title: "" })];
view.rerender(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Note title")).toHaveValue(""),
);
});
// The send bar sits on the dock's bottom edge, inside an `overflow-hidden`
// panel, so both of these are load-bearing rather than cosmetic.
it("sends from a full-width bar whose menu opens upward", () => {
notes = [note()];
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i })).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(sendProps.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ fullWidth: true, dropUp: true });
});
it("sends what is on screen, not what was last saved", () => {
notes = [note()];
render(<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Note body"), {
target: { value: "edited but not blurred" },
});
expect(sendProps.at(-1)).toMatchObject({ body: "edited but not blurred" });
});
});
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@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
import { useMemo, useState } from "react";
import { useNotes } from "../../hooks/useNotes";
import { useNoteDraft } from "./useNoteDraft";
import NoteSwitcher from "./NoteSwitcher";
import SendToAgentButton from "./SendToAgentButton";
import Button from "../ui/Button";
import OverflowMenu from "../ui/OverflowMenu";
import SaveIndicator from "../ui/SaveIndicator";
interface Props {
projectId: string;
}
/**
* Notes at dock width.
*
* Deliberately not `NotesPanel` in a narrower box. The tab can afford a column
* of titles beside the editor; the dock cannot, and shrinking that layout
* spends its height on chrome a title strip, a wrapped button row and a
* paragraph of help for a body that ends up a few words wide.
*
* So the dock shows exactly one note. The title row names it and switches to
* another, the actions that are not writing live in the overflow menu, and
* everything left over is the body. Roughly 240px of height comes back.
*
* What the two surfaces share is the part that must not drift: `useNotes` for
* the cache and its write ordering, and `useNoteDraft` for when a keystroke
* becomes a save. Only the layout is different.
*/
export default function NotesDockPanel({ projectId }: Props) {
const { notes, loading, saveState, createNote, saveNote, deleteNote } =
useNotes(projectId);
const [selectedId, setSelectedId] = useState<string | null>(null);
const selected = useMemo(
() => notes.find((n) => n.id === selectedId) ?? notes[0] ?? null,
[notes, selectedId],
);
const { title, body, setTitle, setBody, commit } = useNoteDraft(
selected,
saveNote,
);
const onCreate = async () => {
const note = await createNote();
if (note) setSelectedId(note.id);
};
if (loading) {
return (
<p className="p-4 text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)]">Loading notes</p>
);
}
if (!selected) {
return (
<div className="flex-1 flex flex-col items-center justify-center gap-3 p-4">
<p className="text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)] text-center">
Keep reminders here, and send any of them straight to a running Claude
session.
</p>
<Button variant="primary" onClick={onCreate}>
New note
</Button>
</div>
);
}
return (
<div className="flex flex-col h-full min-h-0">
<div className="flex items-center gap-1 px-2 py-1.5 flex-shrink-0 border-b border-[var(--border-color)]">
<div className="flex-1 min-w-0">
<NoteSwitcher
notes={notes}
selectedId={selected.id}
title={title}
onTitleChange={setTitle}
onCommit={commit}
onSelect={setSelectedId}
/>
</div>
{/* Renders nothing while idle, so it costs no width until it matters. */}
<SaveIndicator state={saveState} />
<OverflowMenu
label="Note actions"
items={[
{ label: "New note", onSelect: () => void onCreate() },
{
label: "Delete note",
danger: true,
onSelect: () => void deleteNote(selected.id),
},
]}
/>
</div>
<textarea
value={body}
onChange={(e) => setBody(e.target.value)}
onBlur={commit}
placeholder="Reminders, gotchas, a prompt worth keeping…"
aria-label="Note body"
className="flex-1 min-h-0 w-full px-3 py-2 bg-transparent text-[13px] text-[var(--text-primary)] resize-none font-mono"
/>
<div className="px-2 py-2 flex-shrink-0 border-t border-[var(--border-color)]">
{/* The live draft, not `selected.body` what is on screen is what gets
sent. `dropUp` because the dock clips its own overflow. */}
<SendToAgentButton
projectId={projectId}
body={body}
fullWidth
dropUp
/>
</div>
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, within, fireEvent, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
import NotesPanel from "./NotesPanel";
import NotesDockPanel from "./NotesDockPanel";
import { useAppState } from "../../store/appState";
import type { Note } from "../../lib/types";
/**
* Two panels, one project the configuration the app actually runs in.
*
* `NotesTab` mounts a `NotesPanel` and `NotesDock` mounts a `NotesDockPanel`,
* and the dock follows the active tab's project, so opening the dock over a
* Project Home tab mounts both for the *same* project. Every other notes test
* mounts exactly one, which is precisely the configuration in which a
* per-panel cache looks correct: it is only with two that an edit made in one
* is seen or lost by the other. `useNotes` is deliberately **not** mocked
* here; the cache is what is under test.
*
* The two are different components on purpose, which is exactly why this test
* pairs them rather than mounting the same one twice: the layouts diverged,
* and the cache and draft rules they share are what must not.
*/
const files: Record<string, Note[]> = {};
vi.mock("../../lib/tauri-commands", () => ({
listNotes: async (p: string) => [...(files[p] ?? [])],
saveNote: async (p: string, n: Note) => {
const list = files[p] ?? (files[p] = []);
const at = list.findIndex((x) => x.id === n.id);
if (at === -1) list.unshift(n);
else list[at] = n;
return n;
},
deleteNote: async (p: string, id: string) => {
files[p] = (files[p] ?? []).filter((x) => x.id !== id);
},
}));
vi.mock("./SendToAgentButton", () => ({
default: () => <button type="button">Send to agent</button>,
}));
const note = (over: Partial<Note> = {}): Note => ({
id: "n1",
title: "Deploy steps",
body: "one",
pinned: false,
created_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
...over,
});
/** The tab and the dock, mounted together the way `App` mounts them. */
function renderBothSurfaces() {
render(
<>
<div data-testid="tab">
<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />
</div>
<div data-testid="dock">
<NotesDockPanel projectId="p1" />
</div>
</>,
);
return {
tab: () => within(screen.getByTestId("tab")),
dock: () => within(screen.getByTestId("dock")),
};
}
beforeEach(() => {
for (const key of Object.keys(files)) delete files[key];
files.p1 = [note()];
useAppState.setState({ notesByProject: {}, notesLoading: {}, toasts: [] });
});
describe("the tab and the dock both open on one project", () => {
it("shows an edit made in one surface in the other", async () => {
const { tab, dock } = renderBothSurfaces();
await waitFor(() => expect(tab().getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("one"));
const dockTitle = dock().getByLabelText("Note title");
fireEvent.change(dockTitle, { target: { value: "Deploy steps v2" } });
fireEvent.blur(dockTitle);
// The other surface's list *and* its editor, not just one of them.
await waitFor(() =>
expect(tab().getByRole("button", { name: /deploy steps v2/i })).toBeInTheDocument(),
);
expect(tab().getByLabelText("Note title")).toHaveValue("Deploy steps v2");
});
it("does not write one surface's stale copy over the other's edit", async () => {
// The reported repro: edit in the dock, then go back to the tab and edit
// there. With a cache per panel, the tab committed `{...staleNote, ...}`
// and the dock's edit was gone from disk with no error and no indicator.
const { tab, dock } = renderBothSurfaces();
await waitFor(() => expect(tab().getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("one"));
const dockTitle = dock().getByLabelText("Note title");
fireEvent.change(dockTitle, { target: { value: "Deploy steps v2" } });
fireEvent.blur(dockTitle);
await waitFor(() => expect(files.p1[0].title).toBe("Deploy steps v2"));
const tabBody = tab().getByLabelText("Note body");
fireEvent.change(tabBody, { target: { value: "two" } });
fireEvent.blur(tabBody);
await waitFor(() => expect(files.p1[0].body).toBe("two"));
expect(files.p1).toHaveLength(1);
expect(files.p1[0].title).toBe("Deploy steps v2");
});
it("reads the project once for both surfaces", async () => {
// Two panels are two `useNotes`, but the in-flight flag is per project, so
// mounting the dock over an open Notes tab does not re-read the file.
const listNotes = vi.spyOn(
await import("../../lib/tauri-commands"),
"listNotes",
);
renderBothSurfaces();
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getAllByLabelText("Note body")[0]).toHaveValue("one"),
);
expect(listNotes).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
listNotes.mockRestore();
});
it("keeps text the user is part-way through typing when the other surface saves", async () => {
// Showing a remote edit must never mean discarding an unsaved local one.
const { tab, dock } = renderBothSurfaces();
await waitFor(() => expect(tab().getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("one"));
const tabBody = tab().getByLabelText("Note body");
fireEvent.change(tabBody, { target: { value: "half-typed" } });
const dockBody = dock().getByLabelText("Note body");
fireEvent.change(dockBody, { target: { value: "saved in the dock" } });
fireEvent.blur(dockBody);
await waitFor(() => expect(files.p1[0].body).toBe("saved in the dock"));
expect(tabBody).toHaveValue("half-typed");
});
it("falls back to another note when the selected one is deleted", async () => {
// The claim a differently-named test in NotesPanel.test.tsx used to make
// and could not keep: `useNotes` is mocked there and its list never
// changes, so the fallback was invisible. Here the list is real.
files.p1 = [note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas", body: "beware" })];
const { tab } = renderBothSurfaces();
await waitFor(() => expect(tab().getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("one"));
fireEvent.click(tab().getByRole("button", { name: /delete note/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(tab().getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("beware"));
expect(tab().queryByRole("button", { name: /deploy steps/i })).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(files.p1).toHaveLength(1);
});
it("shows a note created in one surface in the other", async () => {
const { tab, dock } = renderBothSurfaces();
await waitFor(() => expect(tab().getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("one"));
// The dock keeps New behind its overflow menu — its height belongs to the
// note being written, not to a button row.
fireEvent.click(dock().getByRole("button", { name: /note actions/i }));
fireEvent.click(dock().getByRole("menuitem", { name: /new note/i }));
await waitFor(() =>
expect(tab().getAllByRole("button", { name: /untitled note/i })).toHaveLength(1),
);
expect(files.p1).toHaveLength(2);
});
});
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
import NotesPanel from "./NotesPanel";
import type { Note } from "../../lib/types";
const saveNote = vi.fn(async () => true);
const deleteNote = vi.fn(async () => true);
const createNote = vi.fn();
let notes: Note[] = [];
let loading = false;
vi.mock("../../hooks/useNotes", () => ({
useNotes: () => ({
notes,
loading,
saveState: { status: "idle", error: null },
createNote,
saveNote,
deleteNote,
}),
}));
vi.mock("./SendToAgentButton", () => ({
default: ({ body }: { body: string }) => (
<button type="button" data-testid="send">{`send:${body}`}</button>
),
}));
const note = (over: Partial<Note> = {}): Note => ({
id: "n1",
title: "Deploy steps",
body: "one\ntwo",
pinned: false,
created_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z",
...over,
});
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
notes = [];
loading = false;
});
describe("NotesPanel", () => {
it("invites the user to start when there are no notes", () => {
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
expect(screen.getByText(/no notes yet/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("lists notes by title and selects the first", () => {
notes = [note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas" })];
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /deploy steps/i })).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("one\ntwo");
});
it("shows an untitled note under a placeholder rather than a blank row", () => {
notes = [note({ title: "" })];
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /untitled note/i })).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("switches the editor when another note is selected", () => {
notes = [note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas", body: "beware" })];
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /gotchas/i }));
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Note body")).toHaveValue("beware");
});
it("saves on blur, not on every keystroke", async () => {
notes = [note()];
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
const body = screen.getByLabelText("Note body");
fireEvent.change(body, { target: { value: "edited" } });
expect(saveNote).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
fireEvent.blur(body);
await waitFor(() => expect(saveNote).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ id: "n1", body: "edited" }),
));
});
it("does not save on blur when nothing changed", async () => {
// Clicking through notes to read them must not write the file.
notes = [note()];
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.blur(screen.getByLabelText("Note body"));
await waitFor(() => expect(saveNote).not.toHaveBeenCalled());
});
it("hands the live editor text to the send button, not the last saved copy", () => {
// Sending what is on screen is the whole contract: no transform on the way
// out except the newline substitution.
notes = [note()];
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Note body"), { target: { value: "fresh" } });
expect(screen.getByTestId("send")).toHaveTextContent("send:fresh");
});
it("asks the hook to delete the selected note", async () => {
// Only the call: `useNotes` is mocked here and the mocked list never
// changes, so nothing in this file can exercise what the panel selects
// afterwards. The fallback is covered against the real hook in
// NotesPanel.shared.test.tsx.
notes = [note(), note({ id: "n2", title: "Gotchas" })];
render(<NotesPanel projectId="p1" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /delete note/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(deleteNote).toHaveBeenCalledWith("n1"));
});
});
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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
import { useMemo, useState } from "react";
import { useNotes } from "../../hooks/useNotes";
import { useNoteDraft } from "./useNoteDraft";
import NoteEditor from "./NoteEditor";
import Button from "../ui/Button";
import SaveIndicator from "../ui/SaveIndicator";
interface Props {
projectId: string;
}
const UNTITLED = "Untitled note";
/**
* The notes surface itself, shared by the Project Home tab and the dock so the
* two cannot drift into different behaviour.
*
* Master/detail: titles beside the editor when there is room, stacked above it
* when there is not. That is a **container** query, not a viewport one, because
* the two surfaces differ in width while sharing a viewport the dock opens at
* 352px and the tab is the width of the main area. A `md:` breakpoint would
* read the window and give both the same answer, which is the wrong answer for
* one of them.
*
* The threshold is arithmetic, not taste: side by side needs the 192px list,
* plus an editor wide enough for its own action row (~280px), plus the divider.
* Below ~473px the editor is narrower than its buttons, so `@lg` (512px) is the
* first stop that clears it.
*
* The editor holds draft text locally and commits on blur, which is how every
* other editable field in the app behaves (`ClaudeInstructionsEditor`, the
* Config tab).
*/
export default function NotesPanel({ projectId }: Props) {
const { notes, loading, saveState, createNote, saveNote, deleteNote } =
useNotes(projectId);
const [selectedId, setSelectedId] = useState<string | null>(null);
const selected = useMemo(
() => notes.find((n) => n.id === selectedId) ?? notes[0] ?? null,
[notes, selectedId],
);
const { title, body, setTitle, setBody, commit } = useNoteDraft(
selected,
saveNote,
);
const onCreate = async () => {
const note = await createNote();
if (note) setSelectedId(note.id);
};
if (loading) {
return (
<p className="p-4 text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)]">Loading notes</p>
);
}
return (
<div className="@container flex flex-col h-full min-h-0">
<div className="flex items-center justify-between gap-2 px-3 py-2 border-b border-[var(--border-color)]">
<Button variant="primary" onClick={onCreate}>
New note
</Button>
<SaveIndicator state={saveState} />
</div>
{notes.length === 0 ? (
<div className="flex-1 flex items-center justify-center p-4">
<p className="text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)] text-center">
No notes yet. Keep reminders here, and send any of them straight to a
running Claude session.
</p>
</div>
) : (
<div className="flex-1 min-h-0 flex flex-col @lg:flex-row">
{/* Stacked: a capped strip of titles above the editor, so the note
being written keeps most of the height. Side by side: a full-height
column of the fixed width the editor's arithmetic assumes. */}
<ul className="flex-shrink-0 overflow-y-auto py-1 max-h-32 border-b @lg:max-h-none @lg:w-48 @lg:border-b-0 @lg:border-r border-[var(--border-color)]">
{notes.map((n) => (
<li key={n.id}>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => setSelectedId(n.id)}
className={`w-full text-left px-3 py-1.5 text-xs truncate transition-colors ${
selected?.id === n.id
? "bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)] text-[var(--text-primary)]"
: "text-[var(--text-secondary)] hover:text-[var(--text-primary)]"
}`}
>
{n.title.trim() || UNTITLED}
</button>
</li>
))}
</ul>
<div className="flex-1 min-w-0">
{selected && (
<NoteEditor
projectId={projectId}
title={title}
body={body}
onTitleChange={setTitle}
onBodyChange={setBody}
onCommit={commit}
onDelete={() => void deleteNote(selected.id)}
/>
)}
</div>
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
import SendToAgentButton from "./SendToAgentButton";
import type { Project, TerminalSession } from "../../lib/types";
const sendInput = vi.fn(async () => {});
let sessions: TerminalSession[] = [];
vi.mock("../../hooks/useTerminal", () => ({
useTerminal: () => ({ sessions, sendInput }),
}));
const setActiveTabKey = vi.fn();
const requestTerminalFocus = vi.fn();
const pushToast = vi.fn();
let projects: Project[] = [];
vi.mock("../../store/appState", () => ({
useAppState: Object.assign(
(selector: (s: unknown) => unknown) =>
selector({ projects, setActiveTabKey, requestTerminalFocus, pushToast }),
{
getState: () => ({
projects,
setActiveTabKey,
requestTerminalFocus,
pushToast,
}),
},
),
terminalTabKey: (id: string) => `term:${id}`,
}));
const session = (over: Partial<TerminalSession> = {}): TerminalSession => ({
id: "s1",
projectId: "p1",
projectName: "api",
sessionType: "claude",
sessionName: null,
...over,
});
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
sessions = [];
projects = [{ id: "p1", name: "api", renamed_session_names: {} } as unknown as Project];
});
describe("SendToAgentButton", () => {
// Unavailable, not `disabled`: the reason a note cannot be sent is the whole
// content of these states, and native `disabled` announces it to nobody.
it("says why it cannot send when the project has no running session", () => {
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" />);
const button = screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i });
expect(button).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true");
expect(button).toHaveAccessibleDescription(
"No running Claude session for this project",
);
});
it("says why it cannot send an empty note", () => {
sessions = [session()];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body=" " />);
expect(
screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }),
).toHaveAccessibleDescription("Nothing to send — this note is empty");
});
it("is unavailable when the only session belongs to another project", () => {
sessions = [session({ projectId: "other" })];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" />);
expect(
screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }),
).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true");
});
it("is unavailable when the only session is a bash tab", () => {
// `bash -l`'s readline has no binding for ESC+CR and just bells, so a
// shell is never a target.
sessions = [session({ sessionType: "bash" })];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" />);
expect(
screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }),
).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true");
});
// `aria-disabled` is advisory — it blocks nothing on its own. Without the
// guard this swap would turn a greyed-out button into a live one.
it("sends nothing when activated while unavailable", () => {
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" />);
const button = screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i });
fireEvent.click(button);
fireEvent.keyDown(button, { key: "Enter" });
fireEvent.keyDown(button, { key: " " });
expect(sendInput).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(screen.queryByRole("menu")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("sends straight to the one session, with newlines converted and no terminator", async () => {
sessions = [session()];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body={"one\ntwo"} />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(sendInput).toHaveBeenCalledWith("s1", "one\x1b\rtwo"));
expect(sendInput.mock.calls[0][1].endsWith("\r")).toBe(false);
});
it("focuses the terminal it sent to, so the user watches it land", async () => {
sessions = [session()];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hi" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(setActiveTabKey).toHaveBeenCalledWith("term:s1"));
});
it("offers a menu of display names when several sessions are open", async () => {
sessions = [session(), session({ id: "s2", sessionName: "review" })];
projects = [
{ id: "p1", name: "api", renamed_session_names: { s1: "release" } } as unknown as Project,
];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hi" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
expect(sendInput).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole("menuitem", { name: "api: release" }));
await waitFor(() => expect(sendInput).toHaveBeenCalledWith("s1", "hi"));
});
it("reports a failed send rather than looking like it worked", async () => {
sessions = [session()];
sendInput.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("session closed"));
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hi" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(pushToast).toHaveBeenCalled());
});
it("does nothing for an empty note", () => {
sessions = [session()];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body=" " />);
const button = screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i });
expect(button).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true");
fireEvent.click(button);
fireEvent.keyDown(button, { key: "Enter" });
expect(sendInput).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("opens the session menu upward when it sits at the foot of the dock", async () => {
sessions = [session({ id: "s1" }), session({ id: "s2" })];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" dropUp />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
// Anchored to the button's top edge, not below it: the dock clips its own
// overflow, so a downward menu at the bottom edge is invisible.
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.getByRole("menu")).toHaveClass("bottom-full"));
});
// Switching to the tab is not enough. When the dock is open beside the
// terminal it sends to, that terminal is already the active tab, so
// `setActiveTabKey` changes nothing and no effect re-runs — leaving focus on
// this button, one click short of the Enter the user came to press.
it("hands focus to the terminal so the next keystroke is Enter", async () => {
sessions = [session()];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(requestTerminalFocus).toHaveBeenCalledWith("s1"));
});
it("leaves focus alone when the send failed", async () => {
sessions = [session()];
sendInput.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("pty gone"));
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
await waitFor(() => expect(pushToast).toHaveBeenCalled());
expect(requestTerminalFocus).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("focuses the session picked from the menu, not the first one", async () => {
sessions = [session(), session({ id: "s2", sessionName: "review" })];
render(<SendToAgentButton projectId="p1" body="hello" />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /send to agent/i }));
fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole("menuitem", { name: "review" }));
await waitFor(() => expect(requestTerminalFocus).toHaveBeenCalledWith("s2"));
});
});
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { useShallow } from "zustand/react/shallow";
import { useTerminal } from "../../hooks/useTerminal";
import { useAppState, terminalTabKey } from "../../store/appState";
import { toClaudePayload } from "../../lib/claudeInput";
import { sessionDisplayName } from "../../lib/sessionName";
import Button from "../ui/Button";
interface Props {
projectId: string;
body: string;
/**
* Open the session menu above the button instead of below. The dock puts
* this at its foot, and the dock clips its own overflow, so a downward menu
* there is drawn outside the panel and never seen.
*/
dropUp?: boolean;
/** Fill the row. The dock's send bar is the width of the dock. */
fullWidth?: boolean;
}
/**
* Puts a note into a running Claude session's prompt.
*
* Three behaviours by target count: none disables the button, one sends
* straight there, several ask which. It never guesses the note goes to a
* session the user named, or to the only one there is.
*
* Only `claude` sessions are offered. A bash tab would receive ESC+CR as an
* unbound readline key and answer with a bell (see `lib/claudeInput.ts`).
*/
export default function SendToAgentButton({
projectId,
body,
dropUp = false,
fullWidth = false,
}: Props) {
const { sessions, sendInput } = useTerminal();
const { projects, setActiveTabKey, requestTerminalFocus, pushToast } =
useAppState(
useShallow((s) => ({
projects: s.projects,
setActiveTabKey: s.setActiveTabKey,
requestTerminalFocus: s.requestTerminalFocus,
pushToast: s.pushToast,
})),
);
const [menuOpen, setMenuOpen] = useState(false);
const rootRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
const targets = useMemo(
() =>
sessions.filter(
(s) => s.projectId === projectId && s.sessionType === "claude",
),
[sessions, projectId],
);
const project = projects.find((p) => p.id === projectId);
const hasBody = body.trim().length > 0;
const unavailable = targets.length === 0 || !hasBody;
// Same dismissal contract as `ui/OverflowMenu` and the tab context menu.
useEffect(() => {
if (!menuOpen) return;
const onDocClick = (e: MouseEvent) => {
if (!rootRef.current?.contains(e.target as Node)) setMenuOpen(false);
};
const onKey = (e: KeyboardEvent) => {
if (e.key === "Escape") setMenuOpen(false);
};
document.addEventListener("mousedown", onDocClick);
document.addEventListener("keydown", onKey);
return () => {
document.removeEventListener("mousedown", onDocClick);
document.removeEventListener("keydown", onKey);
};
}, [menuOpen]);
const send = useCallback(
async (sessionId: string) => {
setMenuOpen(false);
try {
// No trailing CR: the note lands in the prompt and the user presses
// Enter. Newlines become ESC+CR so it arrives as one message rather
// than one prompt per line.
await sendInput(sessionId, toClaudePayload(body));
// A courtesy, not part of the send: if the tab cannot be focused the
// text still went.
setActiveTabKey(terminalTabKey(sessionId));
// Switching tabs is not the same as taking focus, and when the dock is
// open beside the terminal it just sent to, that tab is already the
// active one — so nothing above moves the caret off this button. The
// note is sitting in the prompt waiting for Enter; put the user there.
requestTerminalFocus(sessionId);
} catch (e) {
pushToast({
kind: "error",
message: "Could not send the note to the agent",
detail: String(e),
});
}
},
[body, sendInput, setActiveTabKey, requestTerminalFocus, pushToast],
);
const onClick = useCallback(() => {
// The target is resolved at click time and pinned for the whole send, the
// hazard `useSTT` guards against by capturing its session at record start:
// the list can change while the request is in flight.
if (targets.length === 1) {
void send(targets[0].id);
return;
}
setMenuOpen((open) => !open);
}, [targets, send]);
const title = !hasBody
? "Nothing to send — this note is empty"
: targets.length === 0
? "No running Claude session for this project"
: "Put this note into the agent's prompt (you press Enter)";
return (
<div
ref={rootRef}
className={`relative ${fullWidth ? "block w-full" : "inline-block"}`}
>
<Button
variant="secondary"
size={fullWidth ? "md" : "sm"}
className={fullWidth ? "w-full" : ""}
// Not `disabled`: every one of these reasons is information, and
// `disabled` takes the button — reason and all — out of the
// accessibility tree. `Button` guards the click for us.
unavailable={unavailable}
unavailableReason={title}
onClick={onClick}
aria-haspopup={targets.length > 1 ? "menu" : undefined}
aria-expanded={targets.length > 1 ? menuOpen : undefined}
title={title}
>
Send to agent
</Button>
{menuOpen && targets.length > 1 && (
<div
role="menu"
className={`absolute right-0 z-40 min-w-[12rem] py-1 bg-[var(--bg-overlay)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded-[var(--radius-panel)] text-xs ${
dropUp ? "bottom-full mb-1" : "mt-1"
}`}
style={{ boxShadow: "var(--shadow-overlay)" }}
>
{targets.map((s) => (
<button
key={s.id}
type="button"
role="menuitem"
onClick={() => void send(s.id)}
className="w-full text-left px-3 py-1.5 text-[var(--text-primary)] hover:bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)] transition-colors"
>
{sessionDisplayName(s, project)}
</button>
))}
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}
-61
View File
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import type { Note } from "../../lib/types";
/**
* Draft text for the note being edited, committed when a field loses focus.
*
* This is the half the dock and the tab must never disagree on, so it lives
* here rather than in either layout. The two surfaces differ in how they show
* notes; they must not differ in when a keystroke becomes a save.
*
* The draft is "untouched" exactly while it still matches what was last copied
* out of the store, which is what lets an edit made on the *other* surface
* reach this one's editor without ever discarding half-typed text.
*/
export function useNoteDraft(
selected: Note | null,
saveNote: (note: Note) => Promise<unknown>,
) {
const [title, setTitle] = useState("");
const [body, setBody] = useState("");
const seeded = useRef<{ id: string | null; title: string; body: string }>({
id: null,
title: "",
body: "",
});
// Re-seed on a change of note, and on a change to the *stored* text of the
// note already open — the second case is the dock and the tab showing one
// project at once.
useEffect(() => {
if (!selected) {
seeded.current = { id: null, title: "", body: "" };
setTitle("");
setBody("");
return;
}
const untouched =
title === seeded.current.title && body === seeded.current.body;
if (seeded.current.id !== selected.id || untouched) {
seeded.current = {
id: selected.id,
title: selected.title,
body: selected.body,
};
setTitle(selected.title);
setBody(selected.body);
}
}, [selected?.id, selected?.title, selected?.body]); // eslint-disable-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
const commit = () => {
if (!selected) return;
// Reading is not editing: clicking through notes must not rewrite the file.
if (title === selected.title && body === selected.body) return;
// Mark the draft as matching what was just committed, so the store update
// this save produces reads as "no change" rather than as a stale re-seed.
seeded.current = { id: selected.id, title, body };
void saveNote({ ...selected, title, body });
};
return { title, body, setTitle, setBody, commit };
}
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor, act } from "@testing-library/react";
import AddProjectDialog from "./AddProjectDialog";
const add = vi.fn();
vi.mock("../../hooks/useProjects", () => ({
useProjects: () => ({ add }),
}));
vi.mock("@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog", () => ({
open: vi.fn(async () => null),
}));
/** A promise whose resolution this test controls, so `loading` can be held open. */
function deferred() {
let resolve!: (v: unknown) => void;
const promise = new Promise((r) => {
resolve = r;
});
return { promise, resolve };
}
function fillValidForm() {
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Project name"), {
target: { value: "my-project" },
});
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Folder 1 host path"), {
target: { value: "/home/user/my-project" },
});
}
function submitButton() {
return screen.getByRole("button", { name: /Add Project|Adding/ });
}
describe("AddProjectDialog", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it("adds the project with the name and folder entered", async () => {
add.mockResolvedValue({ id: "p1" });
const onClose = vi.fn();
render(<AddProjectDialog onClose={onClose} />);
fillValidForm();
fireEvent.click(submitButton());
await waitFor(() =>
expect(add).toHaveBeenCalledWith("my-project", [
{ host_path: "/home/user/my-project", mount_name: "my-project" },
]),
);
await waitFor(() => expect(onClose).toHaveBeenCalled());
});
it("keeps the submit button announced, and explains why, while adding", async () => {
const { promise, resolve } = deferred();
add.mockReturnValue(promise);
render(<AddProjectDialog onClose={vi.fn()} />);
fillValidForm();
fireEvent.click(submitButton());
// Native `disabled` would remove the button from the accessibility tree
// exactly when it has something to say.
await waitFor(() =>
expect(submitButton()).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true"),
);
expect(submitButton()).not.toBeDisabled();
expect(submitButton()).toHaveAccessibleDescription(/being added/i);
await act(async () => resolve({ id: "p1" }));
});
it("ignores clicks and Enter/Space on the submit button while adding", async () => {
const { promise, resolve } = deferred();
add.mockReturnValue(promise);
render(<AddProjectDialog onClose={vi.fn()} />);
fillValidForm();
fireEvent.click(submitButton());
await waitFor(() =>
expect(submitButton()).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true"),
);
fireEvent.click(submitButton());
fireEvent.keyDown(submitButton(), { key: "Enter" });
fireEvent.keyDown(submitButton(), { key: " " });
expect(add).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
await act(async () => resolve({ id: "p1" }));
});
it("ignores a form submit raised from elsewhere while adding", async () => {
const { promise, resolve } = deferred();
add.mockReturnValue(promise);
render(<AddProjectDialog onClose={vi.fn()} />);
fillValidForm();
fireEvent.click(submitButton());
await waitFor(() =>
expect(submitButton()).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true"),
);
// Enter in a text field submits a form regardless of the submit button's
// state, so the handler has to guard itself too.
// Modal portals to document.body, so the form is not under `container`.
const form = document.querySelector("form");
expect(form).not.toBeNull();
fireEvent.submit(form!);
expect(add).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
await act(async () => resolve({ id: "p1" }));
});
it("leaves the submit button plainly available when idle", () => {
render(<AddProjectDialog onClose={vi.fn()} />);
expect(submitButton()).not.toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled");
expect(submitButton()).toHaveAccessibleDescription("");
});
});
@@ -55,10 +55,6 @@ export default function AddProjectDialog({ onClose }: Props) {
const handleSubmit = async (e?: React.FormEvent) => {
if (e) e.preventDefault();
// The submit button is `aria-disabled` rather than `disabled` while an add
// is in flight, and Enter inside a text field submits the form without
// touching the button at all. Both routes end here, so the guard does too.
if (loading) return;
if (!name.trim()) {
setError("Project name is required");
return;
@@ -101,19 +97,7 @@ export default function AddProjectDialog({ onClose }: Props) {
<Button size="md" variant="ghost" onClick={onClose}>
Cancel
</Button>
<Button
size="md"
variant="primary"
type="submit"
form={formId}
unavailable={loading}
unavailableReason="The project is being added. Wait for it to finish."
title={
loading
? "The project is being added. Wait for it to finish."
: undefined
}
>
<Button size="md" variant="primary" type="submit" form={formId} disabled={loading}>
{loading ? "Adding…" : "Add Project"}
</Button>
</>
@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent } from "@testing-library/react";
import ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor, { CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS } from "./ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor";
import type { ClaudeCodeSettings } from "../../lib/types";
function renderEditor(
settings: ClaudeCodeSettings | null,
scope: "global" | "project" = "global",
) {
const onSave = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
render(
<ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor
scope={scope}
settings={settings}
disabled={false}
onSave={onSave}
/>,
);
return onSave;
}
describe("ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor", () => {
it("shows the two default-on settings as on for a project that never touched them", () => {
// Claude Code's session recap and fullscreen auto-scroll are both on by
// default, and the fields behind them store the *disabled* sense. A toggle
// rendered straight from the field would tell every existing user their
// recap is off.
renderEditor(null);
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Session recap" })).toBeChecked();
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auto-scroll" })).toBeChecked();
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Focus mode" })).not.toBeChecked();
});
it("stores the disabled sense when an inverted toggle is switched off", () => {
const onSave = renderEditor(null);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Session recap" }));
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ session_recap_disabled: true }),
);
});
it("collapses back to null once every setting is at its default again", () => {
// `null` is what tells the backend this project adds nothing over the
// global settings, so the round trip has to land exactly back on it.
const onSave = renderEditor({ ...CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS, session_recap_disabled: true });
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Session recap" }));
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(null);
});
it("offers the classic renderer as a choice distinct from automatic", () => {
// Leaving `tui` unset lets Claude Code pick; pinning "default" is a
// different, and previously unreachable, instruction.
const onSave = renderEditor(null);
const tui = screen.getByLabelText("TUI mode");
expect(
Array.from(tui.querySelectorAll("option")).map((o) => o.getAttribute("value")),
).toEqual(["", "default", "fullscreen"]);
fireEvent.change(tui, { target: { value: "default" } });
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ tui_mode: "default" }));
});
it("offers every effort level Claude Code accepts", () => {
// Verified against the shipped `claude` binary's own schema rather than
// inferred: low/medium/high/xhigh/max. `max` was missing until an audit
// checked externally — which is the whole weakness of this test. It can
// only prove the editor agrees with this list, never that the list is the
// one Claude Code reads. The same blind spot is why `effort` and
// `focusMode` were confidently wrong for months.
renderEditor(null);
expect(
Array.from(
screen.getByLabelText("Effort level").querySelectorAll("option"),
).map((o) => o.getAttribute("value")),
).toEqual(["", "low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max"]);
});
describe("project scope", () => {
it("offers Global as a third state so a project can decline to have an opinion", () => {
renderEditor(null, "project");
const focus = screen.getByLabelText("Focus mode");
expect(
Array.from(focus.querySelectorAll("option")).map((o) => o.getAttribute("value")),
).toEqual(["global", "off", "on"]);
expect((focus as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("global");
});
it("stores a deliberate false so the project can turn a global On back off", () => {
// The reason the field widened from boolean to boolean|null. Under the
// old merge there was no project value that could produce this.
const onSave = renderEditor(null, "project");
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Focus mode"), { target: { value: "off" } });
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ focus_mode: false }),
);
});
it("does not collapse a deliberate off to null", () => {
// `null` means inherit. Collapsing here would silently hand the setting
// straight back to the global value the user just overrode.
const onSave = renderEditor(null, "project");
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Focus mode"), { target: { value: "off" } });
expect(onSave).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(null);
});
it("round-trips the inverted fields through the disabled sense", () => {
// Session recap stores `session_recap_disabled`, so choosing "off" has to
// store `true` and choosing "on" has to store `false`.
const onSave = renderEditor(null, "project");
const recap = screen.getByLabelText("Session recap");
fireEvent.change(recap, { target: { value: "off" } });
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ session_recap_disabled: true }),
);
fireEvent.change(recap, { target: { value: "on" } });
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ session_recap_disabled: false }),
);
});
it("shows a stored override rather than the inherited state", () => {
renderEditor({ ...CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS, session_recap_disabled: true }, "project");
expect((screen.getByLabelText("Session recap") as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe(
"off",
);
});
/**
* Auto-scroll is the second inverted field and had no project-scope test at
* all every assertion above rides on `session_recap_disabled`, so a
* `BOOLEAN_FIELDS` entry that lost its `invert` flag would be caught for
* one of the two and pass silently for the other. It is stored as
* `auto_scroll_disabled`, so every value here reads back the other way up.
*/
describe("auto-scroll", () => {
const AUTO = "Auto-scroll";
it("starts on Global, which is not the same as on", () => {
// Claude Code scrolls by default, so an inheriting project *behaves*
// as on — but it has taken no position, and rendering it as "On" would
// make a later global change look like it had no effect.
renderEditor(null, "project");
expect((screen.getByLabelText(AUTO) as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("global");
});
it("stores the disabled sense in both directions", () => {
const onSave = renderEditor(null, "project");
const auto = screen.getByLabelText(AUTO);
fireEvent.change(auto, { target: { value: "off" } });
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ auto_scroll_disabled: true }),
);
fireEvent.change(auto, { target: { value: "on" } });
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ auto_scroll_disabled: false }),
);
});
it("hands the setting back to the global level when Global is chosen", () => {
// Back to no opinion, and with nothing else set that collapses the
// whole object to `null` — the value that means "adds nothing over the
// global settings".
const onSave = renderEditor(
{ ...CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS, auto_scroll_disabled: true },
"project",
);
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText(AUTO), { target: { value: "global" } });
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenCalledWith(null);
});
it("reads a stored override back the right way up", () => {
renderEditor({ ...CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS, auto_scroll_disabled: true }, "project");
expect((screen.getByLabelText(AUTO) as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("off");
});
});
});
/**
* The inverted fields store a *deviation*, so a stored `false` is the one
* value that means "the user deliberately re-enabled the default". Nothing
* asserted it: every existing test drives the `true` (turned off) direction
* or the `null` (untouched) one, and both scopes would still read correctly
* if the inversion were dropped from the `false` branch alone.
*/
describe.each([
["session_recap_disabled", "Session recap"] as const,
["auto_scroll_disabled", "Auto-scroll"] as const,
])("a stored false on %s", (key, label) => {
it("reads as On at project scope, not as Off", () => {
renderEditor({ ...CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS, [key]: false }, "project");
expect((screen.getByLabelText(label) as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("on");
});
it("reads as on at global scope, where the control is a switch", () => {
renderEditor({ ...CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS, [key]: false });
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: label })).toBeChecked();
});
});
/**
* A settings object with nothing set at this level arrives as `{}`: the Rust
* struct skips serialising a field it has no value for, which is what keeps
* an older binary able to parse `projects.json` after a downgrade. It is also
* the exact shape a project stored before the fields were widened is read
* back as every one of its `false`s meant "unset" so reading absent as
* "off" would show a switch the user never touched as a deliberate choice.
*/
it("reads an absent field as Global rather than as Off", () => {
renderEditor({} as ClaudeCodeSettings, "project");
expect((screen.getByLabelText("Env scrub") as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("global");
expect((screen.getByLabelText("Session recap") as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("global");
});
it("still collapses to null when an absent-field object is edited back", () => {
const onSave = renderEditor({} as ClaudeCodeSettings, "global");
// Off and straight back on: the round trip has to land on `null`, or an
// untouched global stops being indistinguishable from one never opened.
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Session recap" }));
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Session recap" }));
expect(onSave).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(null);
});
});
@@ -8,91 +8,52 @@ interface Props {
disabled: boolean;
disabledReason?: string;
onSave: (settings: ClaudeCodeSettings | null) => Promise<unknown>;
/**
* `"project"` adds a third "Global" state to every switch, because a project
* has somewhere to inherit *from*. The global editor has no such fallback
* unset there just means Claude Code's own default so it stays a plain
* on/off and never renders the extra choice.
*/
scope?: "global" | "project";
}
export const CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS: ClaudeCodeSettings = {
tui_mode: null,
effort: null,
auto_scroll_disabled: null,
focus_mode: null,
show_thinking_summaries: null,
session_recap_disabled: null,
env_scrub: null,
prompt_caching_1h: null,
auto_scroll_disabled: false,
focus_mode: false,
show_thinking_summaries: false,
enable_session_recap: false,
env_scrub: false,
prompt_caching_1h: false,
};
/**
* "Nothing is set at this level", which is saved as `null` rather than as a
* struct of nulls so that a project with no opinion is indistinguishable from
* one that never opened this editor.
*
* Note `false` is *not* a default any more: it is a deliberate off that
* overrides a global on, so a settings object holding one has to be persisted.
*/
function isAllDefaults(s: ClaudeCodeSettings): boolean {
// `== null`, not `===`: an unset field is *absent* on the wire, not null.
// The Rust struct skips serialising one it has no value for, so a project
// whose stored settings were all "unset" arrives here as `{}` — and reading
// that as "off" is exactly the mistake the three-state control exists to
// avoid. See the note on `ClaudeCodeSettings` in `lib/types.ts`.
return (
s.tui_mode == null &&
s.effort == null &&
s.auto_scroll_disabled == null &&
s.focus_mode == null &&
s.show_thinking_summaries == null &&
s.session_recap_disabled == null &&
s.env_scrub == null &&
s.prompt_caching_1h == null
s.tui_mode === null &&
s.effort === null &&
s.auto_scroll_disabled === false &&
s.focus_mode === false &&
s.show_thinking_summaries === false &&
s.enable_session_recap === false &&
s.env_scrub === false &&
s.prompt_caching_1h === false
);
}
/**
* Two of Claude Code's settings are **on by default**, so the field behind them
* stores the *disabled* sense (`auto_scroll_disabled`, `session_recap_disabled`)
* that is what makes an untouched project mean "leave Claude Code alone"
* rather than "the user turned this off". `invert` is what lets those still
* read as an ordinary on/off switch here: the toggle shows the feature's state,
* the field stores the deviation from the default.
*/
const BOOLEAN_FIELDS: {
key: keyof Omit<ClaudeCodeSettings, "tui_mode" | "effort">;
label: string;
hint: string;
invert?: boolean;
}[] = [
{
key: "focus_mode",
label: "Focus mode",
// It summarises tool *calls*, not all output — and it does nothing at all
// unless the fullscreen renderer is on, which is a separate switch above.
// Saying so here is cheaper than the user concluding the setting is broken,
// which is the complaint that started this whole round of work.
hint: "Summarises each tool call to one line, showing the last prompt and the final response. Needs TUI mode set to Fullscreen.",
},
{ key: "focus_mode", label: "Focus mode", hint: "Collapses tool output to one-line summaries." },
{
key: "show_thinking_summaries",
label: "Thinking summaries",
hint: "Shows Claude's thinking process as summaries.",
},
{
key: "session_recap_disabled",
key: "enable_session_recap",
label: "Session recap",
hint: "Shows a one-line recap when you return to the terminal after a few minutes away.",
invert: true,
hint: "Provides context when returning to a session.",
},
{
key: "auto_scroll_disabled",
label: "Auto-scroll",
hint: "Follows new output to the bottom in fullscreen rendering.",
invert: true,
label: "Auto-scroll disabled",
hint: "Disables auto-scroll when in fullscreen TUI mode.",
},
{
key: "env_scrub",
@@ -111,7 +72,6 @@ export default function ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor({
disabled,
disabledReason,
onSave,
scope = "global",
}: Props) {
const [local, setLocal] = useState<ClaudeCodeSettings>(
settings ?? { ...CLAUDE_CODE_DEFAULTS },
@@ -135,16 +95,9 @@ export default function ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor({
</p>
)}
{/*
Three states, not two. Leaving `tui` unset is what lets Claude Code pick
the renderer for itself, which is not the same as pinning the classic
one and the key is now always written (or explicitly deleted), so
"Automatic" has to be selectable rather than merely being what you get
when nothing is emitted.
*/}
<SwitchRow
label="TUI mode"
hint="Classic renders in your terminal's scrollback; fullscreen is the flicker-free alt-screen."
hint="Enables flicker-free alt-screen rendering."
control={
<select
value={local.tui_mode ?? ""}
@@ -153,8 +106,7 @@ export default function ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor({
disabled={disabled}
className={selectClass}
>
<option value="">Automatic</option>
<option value="default">Classic</option>
<option value="">Default</option>
<option value="fullscreen">Fullscreen</option>
</select>
}
@@ -175,79 +127,25 @@ export default function ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor({
<option value="low">Low</option>
<option value="medium">Medium</option>
<option value="high">High</option>
<option value="xhigh">Extra high</option>
{/* `max` is accepted by the CLI and was missing here. Confirmed
against the shipped claude binary's own schema, not just docs. */}
<option value="max">Maximum</option>
</select>
}
/>
{BOOLEAN_FIELDS.map(({ key, label, hint, invert }) => {
const stored = local[key];
if (scope === "global") {
// No level above this one to inherit from, so "unset" and "off" are
// the same instruction here and a plain switch is the honest control.
// Unset therefore has to *display* as Claude Code's own default —
// which for the two inverted fields is on, not off.
const checked = invert ? stored !== true : stored === true;
return (
<SwitchRow
key={key}
{BOOLEAN_FIELDS.map(({ key, label, hint }) => (
<SwitchRow
key={key}
label={label}
hint={hint}
control={
<Toggle
label={label}
hint={hint}
control={
<Toggle
label={label}
checked={checked}
disabled={disabled}
onChange={(v) => {
// Collapse back to null at the default rather than storing
// a redundant `false`, so an untouched global stays
// indistinguishable from one that was never opened.
const atDefault = invert ? v : !v;
apply({
[key]: atDefault ? null : invert ? !v : v,
} as Partial<ClaudeCodeSettings>);
}}
/>
}
checked={local[key]}
disabled={disabled}
onChange={(v) => apply({ [key]: v } as Partial<ClaudeCodeSettings>)}
/>
);
}
// `stored` holds the deviation from Claude Code's default, so an
// inverted field reads back the other way round — see BOOLEAN_FIELDS.
const selected =
stored == null ? "global" : (invert ? !stored : stored) ? "on" : "off";
return (
<SwitchRow
key={key}
label={label}
hint={hint}
control={
<select
value={selected}
aria-label={label}
disabled={disabled}
onChange={(e) => {
const choice = e.target.value;
const next =
choice === "global" ? null : invert ? choice === "off" : choice === "on";
apply({ [key]: next } as Partial<ClaudeCodeSettings>);
}}
className={selectClass}
>
<option value="global">Global</option>
<option value="off">Off</option>
<option value="on">On</option>
</select>
}
/>
);
})}
}
/>
))}
</div>
);
}
@@ -28,24 +28,10 @@ export default function ConfirmRemoveModal({ projectName, onConfirm, onCancel }:
</>
}
>
{/*
Everything remove_project() destroys, named. It removes the container,
*both* named volumes (triple-c-home-{id} and triple-c-claude-config-{id}),
the triple-c-snapshot-{id} image and the project's keychain secrets so
an accurate warning has to reach past "the config volume". The last
sentence is the reassuring half and matters just as much: project folders
are bind mounts from the host and nothing here touches them.
*/}
<p className="text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
Are you sure you want to remove{" "}
<strong className="text-[var(--text-primary)]">{projectName}</strong>? This deletes
its container, both of its volumes and its saved container image so the home
directory, the Claude login and config, installed skills, session transcripts,
scheduled tasks and any stored credentials all go with it.
</p>
<p className="mt-2 text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
Your project folders on this machine are mounted in, not copied, and are left
untouched.
<strong className="text-[var(--text-primary)]">{projectName}</strong>? This will
delete the container, config volume, and stored credentials.
</p>
</Modal>
);
@@ -122,6 +122,14 @@ describe("ProjectRow", () => {
});
it("only allows opening a terminal while the container runs", () => {
const { unmount } = render(<ProjectRow project={baseProject} />);
expect(
screen.getByRole("button", {
name: "Open a Claude terminal for Test Project",
}),
).toBeDisabled();
unmount();
render(<ProjectRow project={{ ...baseProject, status: "running" }} />);
fireEvent.click(
screen.getByRole("button", {
@@ -131,38 +139,6 @@ describe("ProjectRow", () => {
expect(mockOpenClaudeTerminal).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("keeps the terminal button announced, and explains why, while stopped", () => {
render(<ProjectRow project={baseProject} />);
const button = screen.getByRole("button", {
name: "Open a Claude terminal for Test Project",
});
// Native `disabled` would drop the button out of the accessibility tree
// and out of the tab order, taking the reason with it.
expect(button).not.toBeDisabled();
expect(button).toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled", "true");
expect(button).toHaveAccessibleDescription(/is not running/i);
});
it("ignores clicks and Enter/Space on the terminal button while stopped", () => {
render(<ProjectRow project={baseProject} />);
const button = screen.getByRole("button", {
name: "Open a Claude terminal for Test Project",
});
fireEvent.click(button);
fireEvent.keyDown(button, { key: "Enter" });
fireEvent.keyDown(button, { key: " " });
expect(mockOpenClaudeTerminal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("drops aria-disabled once the container is running", () => {
render(<ProjectRow project={{ ...baseProject, status: "running" }} />);
const button = screen.getByRole("button", {
name: "Open a Claude terminal for Test Project",
});
expect(button).not.toHaveAttribute("aria-disabled");
expect(button).not.toHaveAccessibleDescription(/is not running/i);
});
it("shows container progress inline rather than in a blocking modal", () => {
setStore({ containerProgress: { "test-1": "Pulling image…" } });
render(<ProjectRow project={{ ...baseProject, status: "starting" }} />);
+4 -18
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import type { Project } from "../../lib/types";
import { useAppState, homeTabKey } from "../../store/appState";
import { useProjectActions } from "../../hooks/useProjectActions";
import { ProjectStatusIndicator } from "../ui/StatusIndicator";
import { useUnavailable } from "../ui/unavailable";
interface Props {
project: Project;
@@ -32,15 +31,6 @@ export default function ProjectRow({ project }: Props) {
const isTransitioning =
project.status === "starting" || project.status === "stopping";
// A terminal needs a running container. Saying so out loud beats a `disabled`
// attribute that hides the button — and the reason — from anyone not using a
// mouse and eyes.
const terminal = useUnavailable({
unavailable: !isRunning,
reason: `${project.name} is not running. Start it to open a terminal.`,
onClick: () => openClaudeTerminal(),
});
return (
<div
className={`group relative px-2 py-1.5 rounded-[var(--radius-control)] transition-colors min-w-0 overflow-hidden ${
@@ -123,14 +113,11 @@ export default function ProjectRow({ project }: Props) {
</button>
<button
type="button"
{...terminal.controlProps}
title={
isRunning
? `Open a Claude terminal for ${project.name}`
: `${project.name} is not running. Start it to open a terminal.`
}
disabled={!isRunning}
onClick={() => openClaudeTerminal()}
title={`Open a Claude terminal for ${project.name}`}
aria-label={`Open a Claude terminal for ${project.name}`}
className="w-6 h-6 flex items-center justify-center rounded-[var(--radius-control)] text-[var(--text-secondary)] hover:text-[var(--text-primary)] hover:bg-[var(--bg-primary)] disabled:text-[var(--text-disabled)] aria-disabled:text-[var(--text-disabled)] aria-disabled:hover:text-[var(--text-disabled)] aria-disabled:hover:bg-transparent aria-disabled:cursor-not-allowed transition-colors"
className="w-6 h-6 flex items-center justify-center rounded-[var(--radius-control)] text-[var(--text-secondary)] hover:text-[var(--text-primary)] hover:bg-[var(--bg-primary)] disabled:text-[var(--text-disabled)] transition-colors"
>
<svg
className="w-3.5 h-3.5"
@@ -147,7 +134,6 @@ export default function ProjectRow({ project }: Props) {
<line x1="13" y1="15" x2="17" y2="15" />
</svg>
</button>
{terminal.reasonNode}
</div>
</div>
);
@@ -571,57 +571,4 @@ describe("BrowserTab", () => {
// The view is still in the tab, where it was.
expect(screen.getByTitle("Playwright browser view for api-server")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("pins the pane's sandbox: same-origin kept, top-navigation never granted", async () => {
await renderLive();
const frame = await screen.findByTitle("Playwright browser view for api-server");
const tokens = new Set(
(frame.getAttribute("sandbox") ?? "").split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean),
);
// What is framed here is served by a process *inside* the container, which
// is the untrusted side of this app. A top-navigation grant would let that
// page set `top.location` and steer the whole Triple-C app window away from
// itself — a sandbox escape from the app's point of view — and
// `allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox` is the same hole one step removed: it
// hands a popup an entirely unsandboxed context. Checked token by token so
// the failure names the one that was added.
for (const forbidden of [
"allow-top-navigation",
"allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation",
"allow-top-navigation-to-custom-protocols",
"allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox",
]) {
expect(
tokens.has(forbidden),
`FORBIDDEN iframe sandbox token "${forbidden}" on the browser view pane. ` +
"A page served from inside the container could then navigate the whole " +
"Triple-C app window away from itself (or run a popup unsandboxed) — a " +
"sandbox escape. Remove it from the iframe in BrowserTab.tsx.",
).toBe(false);
}
// `allow-same-origin` must stay. The browser_view proxy's token gate
// recognises the pane's own sub-resource requests by their `Origin`/
// `Referer` header; dropping this token gives the frame an opaque origin,
// which sends `null`, so the proxy refuses those requests and the pane
// renders blank.
expect(
tokens.has("allow-same-origin"),
'REQUIRED iframe sandbox token "allow-same-origin" is missing from the ' +
"browser view pane. Without it the frame has an opaque origin and sends " +
"`Origin: null`, which the browser_view proxy's token gate refuses — the " +
"pane goes blank.",
).toBe(true);
// And the exact set, so any *other* new grant is a deliberate edit here too.
expect([...tokens].sort()).toEqual([
"allow-downloads",
"allow-forms",
"allow-modals",
"allow-popups",
"allow-same-origin",
"allow-scripts",
]);
});
});
@@ -457,35 +457,6 @@ export default function BrowserTab({ project, active }: Props) {
// host-side gate checks before anything reaches the container.
src={status.url ?? undefined}
title={`Playwright browser view for ${project.name}`}
// What is framed here is served by a process inside the container,
// which is the untrusted side of this app. Unsandboxed, it could
// simply set `top.location` and navigate the *app's* webview
// somewhere of its choosing — the frame is cross-origin, so it cannot
// read the app, but steering the whole window is not something a
// viewer pane should be able to do.
//
// The allowances are what the Playwright dashboard actually needs and
// no more:
// allow-scripts — it is an application, not a document.
// allow-same-origin — it must reach its own WebSocket and assets,
// and the host-side gate recognises the pane's
// own sub-resource requests by their
// `Origin`/`Referer`; an opaque origin would
// send `null` and be refused. This does not
// grant access to *this* app: 127.0.0.1:4782x
// is a different origin from the app's.
// allow-forms/-modals/-downloads/-popups — dashboard UI affordances
// (trace download, confirm dialogs, opening a
// page in a new window).
//
// Deliberately absent, and the point of the attribute:
// `allow-top-navigation`, `allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation`
// and `allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox`. Do not add them.
//
// No `referrerPolicy` either: the gate in `browser_view/proxy.rs`
// reads the token out of a same-origin `Referer`, so stripping it
// would break the pane.
sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-modals allow-downloads allow-popups"
className="flex-1 min-h-0 w-full border-0 bg-[var(--bg-primary)]"
/>
) : live ? (
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import type { FileEntry } from "../../../lib/types";
import { readContainerFile } from "../../../lib/tauri-commands";
import Button from "../../ui/Button";
import Modal from "../../ui/Modal";
import { formatBytes } from "./format";
import {
decodeBase64,
imageMimeFor,
looksBinary,
previewKind,
previewLimit,
} from "./filePreview";
interface Props {
projectId: string;
entry: FileEntry;
onClose: () => void;
}
type Preview =
| { kind: "loading" }
| { kind: "error"; message: string }
/** Too big to render whole — said so rather than shown as a half-file. */
| { kind: "too-large" }
| { kind: "text"; text: string; truncated: boolean; shownBytes: number; trueSize: number }
| { kind: "image"; url: string }
| { kind: "unsupported" };
/**
* Read-only preview of one container file.
*
* Images are rendered from a `blob:` URL rather than a `data:` one the object
* URL is revocable (so the bytes are released the moment the modal closes) and
* keeps a multi-megabyte base64 string out of the DOM. `blob:` is in the app's
* `img-src` for exactly this; the asset protocol deliberately is not enabled.
*/
export default function FileViewerModal({ projectId, entry, onClose }: Props) {
const [preview, setPreview] = useState<Preview>({ kind: "loading" });
/**
* The object URL currently on screen.
*
* This used to be an effect-local variable revoked from the effect's own
* cleanup, which runs *before* the replacement effect body so switching
* entries (or any re-run of the effect for the same entry) released the URL
* the `<img>` was still pointing at, and a blank image was the result until
* the new read landed. If the new read failed, it stayed blank. So the
* hand-over is explicit instead: a URL is revoked only once its replacement
* exists, and unmount is what releases the last one.
*/
const objectUrlRef = useRef<string | null>(null);
/** Release the previous URL now that something else is on screen. */
const replaceObjectUrl = (next: string | null) => {
const previous = objectUrlRef.current;
objectUrlRef.current = next;
if (previous && previous !== next) URL.revokeObjectURL(previous);
};
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
(async () => {
try {
const wantImage = previewKind(entry.name) === "image";
const result = await readContainerFile(projectId, entry.path, previewLimit(entry.name));
if (cancelled) return;
const bytes = decodeBase64(result.contents_base64);
if (wantImage) {
// A truncated image is not a smaller image, it is a broken one.
if (result.truncated) {
setPreview({ kind: "too-large" });
replaceObjectUrl(null);
return;
}
const blob = new Blob([bytes], { type: imageMimeFor(entry.name) ?? "image/png" });
const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
// The replacement is in hand, so the previous one can go.
setPreview({ kind: "image", url });
replaceObjectUrl(url);
return;
}
if (looksBinary(bytes)) {
setPreview({ kind: "unsupported" });
replaceObjectUrl(null);
return;
}
setPreview({
kind: "text",
text: new TextDecoder().decode(bytes),
truncated: result.truncated,
shownBytes: bytes.length,
trueSize: result.size,
});
replaceObjectUrl(null);
} catch (e) {
if (!cancelled) setPreview({ kind: "error", message: String(e) });
}
})();
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [projectId, entry.name, entry.path]);
// The bytes are released when the dialog goes, which is the whole reason the
// preview is a `blob:` URL rather than a `data:` one.
useEffect(
() => () => {
if (objectUrlRef.current) URL.revokeObjectURL(objectUrlRef.current);
objectUrlRef.current = null;
},
[],
);
const footer = (
<Button size="md" variant="primary" onClick={onClose}>
Close
</Button>
);
return (
<Modal
title={entry.name}
description={`${entry.path} · ${formatBytes(entry.size)}`}
onClose={onClose}
footer={footer}
widthClassName="w-[52rem]"
>
{preview.kind === "loading" && (
<p className="text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)]">Loading</p>
)}
{preview.kind === "error" && (
<p role="alert" className="text-[13px] text-[var(--error)]">
{preview.message}
</p>
)}
{preview.kind === "too-large" && (
<p className="text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
This file is {formatBytes(entry.size)} too large to preview in the app. Use
Save to host on its row to open it in a program that can, or read it from a
terminal in the container.
</p>
)}
{preview.kind === "unsupported" && (
<p className="text-[13px] text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
There is no preview for this file type. Use Save to host on its row to open it
in a program that can, or read it from a terminal in the container.
</p>
)}
{preview.kind === "text" && (
<>
{preview.truncated && (
<p className="mb-2 text-xs text-[var(--warning)]">
Showing the first {formatBytes(preview.shownBytes)} of {formatBytes(preview.trueSize)}.
</p>
)}
{/* Focusable, and its own scroll container, because a megabyte of
text in an unfocusable `<pre>` is reachable by mouse wheel and by
nothing else no PageDown, no arrows, no keyboard at all. A
scrollable region needs an accessible name to be worth landing
on, hence the role and label. No `focus:outline-none`: the global
`:focus-visible` ring is what says where the caret went. */}
<pre
tabIndex={0}
role="region"
aria-label={`${entry.name} contents`}
className="max-h-[60vh] overflow-auto whitespace-pre-wrap break-words font-mono text-xs text-[var(--text-primary)]"
>
{preview.text}
</pre>
</>
)}
{preview.kind === "image" && (
<img src={preview.url} alt={entry.name} className="max-w-full mx-auto" />
)}
</Modal>
);
}
@@ -1,474 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, act, waitFor, within } from "@testing-library/react";
import FilesTab from "./FilesTab";
import type { FileContents, FileEntry, Project } from "../../../lib/types";
const listContainerFiles = vi.fn();
const renameContainerPath = vi.fn(async () => "");
const createContainerDirectory = vi.fn(async () => "");
const readContainerFile = vi.fn();
const uploadFilesToContainer = vi.fn();
const downloadContainerFile = vi.fn();
vi.mock("../../../lib/tauri-commands", () => ({
listContainerFiles: (p: string, path: string) => listContainerFiles(p, path),
renameContainerPath: (p: string, f: string, t: string) => renameContainerPath(p, f, t),
createContainerDirectory: (p: string, parent: string, n: string) =>
createContainerDirectory(p, parent, n),
readContainerFile: (p: string, path: string, max?: number) => readContainerFile(p, path, max),
uploadFilesToContainer: (p: string, dir: string) => uploadFilesToContainer(p, dir),
downloadContainerFile: (p: string, path: string) => downloadContainerFile(p, path),
}));
/** Transient failures land in `ToastHost`, not in an inline string. */
const pushToast = vi.fn();
vi.mock("../../../store/appState", () => ({
useAppState: { getState: () => ({ pushToast }) },
}));
const toastText = () =>
pushToast.mock.calls
.map(([toast]) => `${toast.kind}: ${toast.message} ${toast.detail ?? ""}`)
.join("\n");
const project = { id: "p1", name: "api", status: "running" } as unknown as Project;
const entry = (name: string, extra: Partial<FileEntry> = {}): FileEntry => ({
name,
path: `/workspace/${name}`,
is_directory: false,
is_symlink: false,
size: 12,
modified: "2024-05-01 10:00:00",
permissions: "644",
...extra,
});
const contents = (text: string, extra: Partial<FileContents> = {}): FileContents => ({
contents_base64: btoa(text),
truncated: false,
size: text.length,
...extra,
});
async function renderTab() {
const view = render(<FilesTab project={project} />);
await act(async () => {
await Promise.resolve();
});
return view;
}
/** Every row that is part of the grid's roving tabindex, in order. */
const gridRows = () => Array.from(document.querySelectorAll("tr[data-file-row]"));
/** The rows that are actually tab stops. There must never be more than one. */
const tabStops = () => gridRows().filter((r) => r.getAttribute("tabindex") === "0");
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([
entry("src", { is_directory: true, path: "/workspace/src" }),
entry("notes.txt"),
]);
// Not implemented in jsdom; the image preview needs both halves.
URL.createObjectURL = vi.fn(() => "blob:mock-url");
URL.revokeObjectURL = vi.fn();
});
describe("FilesTab listing", () => {
it("lists /workspace once the container is running", async () => {
await renderTab();
expect(listContainerFiles).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace");
expect(screen.getByText("notes.txt")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("says nothing about files while the container is stopped", async () => {
render(<FilesTab project={{ ...project, status: "stopped" } as Project} />);
expect(screen.getByText(/Start the container/)).toBeTruthy();
expect(listContainerFiles).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("labels a symlink, which no longer masquerades as a plain file", async () => {
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([
entry("app", { is_directory: true, is_symlink: true }),
]);
await renderTab();
expect(screen.getByTitle("Symbolic link")).toBeTruthy();
});
});
describe("FilesTab open semantics", () => {
it("selects on a single click without navigating", async () => {
await renderTab();
listContainerFiles.mockClear();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByText("src"));
expect(listContainerFiles).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(screen.getByText("src").closest("tr")?.getAttribute("aria-selected")).toBe("true");
});
it("navigates a directory on double click", async () => {
await renderTab();
listContainerFiles.mockClear();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(screen.getByText("src"));
});
expect(listContainerFiles).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace/src");
});
it("walks the rows with the arrow keys, which is what makes the grid role honest", async () => {
await renderTab();
const first = screen.getByText("src").closest("tr")!;
first.focus();
fireEvent.keyDown(first, { key: "ArrowDown" });
expect(document.activeElement).toBe(screen.getByText("notes.txt").closest("tr"));
fireEvent.keyDown(document.activeElement!, { key: "ArrowUp" });
expect(document.activeElement).toBe(first);
});
it("opens a directory from the keyboard with Enter", async () => {
await renderTab();
listContainerFiles.mockClear();
const row = screen.getByText("src").closest("tr")!;
// Not a tab stop — `..` holds the grid's single one until the arrows move
// it — but still focusable and still openable from the keyboard.
expect(row.getAttribute("tabindex")).toBe("-1");
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.keyDown(row, { key: "Enter" });
});
expect(listContainerFiles).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace/src");
});
});
describe("FilesTab viewer", () => {
it("shows a text file's contents in a dialog", async () => {
readContainerFile.mockResolvedValue(contents("hello from the container"));
await renderTab();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(screen.getByText("notes.txt"));
});
const dialog = await screen.findByRole("dialog");
expect(dialog).toBeTruthy();
expect(await screen.findByText("hello from the container")).toBeTruthy();
// A text file gets the text-sized budget, not the image one.
expect(readContainerFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace/notes.txt", 1024 * 1024);
});
it("renders an image through a revocable blob URL, not a data URI", async () => {
// `data:` is absent from the app's img-src on purpose; `blob:` is what was
// added, and the object URL has to be released when the dialog closes.
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([entry("logo.png", { size: 4 })]);
readContainerFile.mockResolvedValue(contents("\x89PNG"));
await renderTab();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(screen.getByText("logo.png"));
});
const img = (await screen.findByAltText("logo.png")) as HTMLImageElement;
expect(img.getAttribute("src")).toBe("blob:mock-url");
expect(readContainerFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace/logo.png", 5 * 1024 * 1024);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Close" }));
await waitFor(() => expect(URL.revokeObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith("blob:mock-url"));
});
it("refuses an oversized image rather than drawing a half-decoded one", async () => {
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([entry("huge.png", { size: 40 * 1024 * 1024 })]);
readContainerFile.mockResolvedValue(contents("\x89PNG", { truncated: true, size: 40 * 1024 * 1024 }));
await renderTab();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(screen.getByText("huge.png"));
});
expect(await screen.findByText(/too large to preview/)).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.queryByAltText("huge.png")).toBeNull();
// A refusal has to name the way out, and the way out is now the button on
// the row rather than the `cat`-it-in-a-terminal workaround that existed
// because the button did not.
// Scoped to the modal: every file row also carries a "Save to host…"
// button now, so an unscoped query matches the grid behind the overlay and
// would pass with the refusal saying nothing at all.
expect(
within(screen.getByRole("dialog")).getByText(/Save to host/),
).toBeTruthy();
});
it("says so in words when only a prefix of a big text file came back", async () => {
readContainerFile.mockResolvedValue(
contents("first megabyte", { truncated: true, size: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }),
);
await renderTab();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(screen.getByText("notes.txt"));
});
expect(await screen.findByText(/Showing the first/)).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByText("first megabyte")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("says there is no preview, and where to open the file instead", async () => {
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([entry("blob.bin")]);
readContainerFile.mockResolvedValue(contents("a\x00b"));
await renderTab();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(screen.getByText("blob.bin"));
});
expect(await screen.findByText(/no preview for this file type/)).toBeTruthy();
});
});
describe("FilesTab rename", () => {
it("commits an inline rename on Enter and re-lists", async () => {
await renderTab();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Rename — notes.txt" }));
const input = screen.getByLabelText("New name for notes.txt") as HTMLInputElement;
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "renamed.txt" } });
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.keyDown(input, { key: "Enter" });
fireEvent.blur(input);
});
expect(renameContainerPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace/notes.txt", "renamed.txt");
});
it("abandons the rename on Escape", async () => {
await renderTab();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Rename — notes.txt" }));
const input = screen.getByLabelText("New name for notes.txt");
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "nope.txt" } });
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.keyDown(input, { key: "Escape" });
});
expect(renameContainerPath).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(screen.queryByLabelText("New name for notes.txt")).toBeNull();
});
it("starts a rename from the keyboard with F2", async () => {
await renderTab();
const row = screen.getByText("notes.txt").closest("tr")!;
fireEvent.keyDown(row, { key: "F2" });
expect(screen.getByLabelText("New name for notes.txt")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("reports a refused rename where it can be seen, not three hundred rows down", async () => {
// The inline `error` div is the first child of the *scrolling* list, so
// deep in a directory this used to be a rename box that stayed open and
// said nothing. `ToastHost` is fixed, above the modal layer, and persists.
renameContainerPath.mockRejectedValue("mv: cannot move '/etc/hosts': Permission denied");
await renderTab();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Rename — notes.txt" }));
const input = screen.getByLabelText("New name for notes.txt");
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "x" } });
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.blur(input);
});
expect(toastText()).toContain("Permission denied");
expect(screen.queryByRole("alert")).toBeNull();
// The editor stays open, because the rename did not happen.
expect(screen.getByLabelText("New name for notes.txt")).toBeTruthy();
});
});
describe("FilesTab new folder", () => {
it("creates a folder under the current directory", async () => {
await renderTab();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "New folder" }));
const input = screen.getByLabelText("New folder name");
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "assets" } });
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.blur(input);
});
expect(createContainerDirectory).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace", "assets");
});
});
describe("FilesTab grid focus", () => {
it("gives the grid exactly one tab stop and moves it with the arrows", async () => {
// Every row used to be `tabIndex={0}`: a 400-entry directory was ~1200 tab
// stops and Tab could not get out of the list.
await renderTab();
expect(gridRows()).toHaveLength(3); // .. , src, notes.txt
expect(tabStops()).toHaveLength(1);
expect(tabStops()[0].getAttribute("data-file-row")).toBe("..");
fireEvent.keyDown(tabStops()[0], { key: "ArrowDown" });
expect(tabStops()).toHaveLength(1);
expect(tabStops()[0].getAttribute("data-file-row")).toBe("src");
expect(document.activeElement).toBe(tabStops()[0]);
fireEvent.keyDown(tabStops()[0], { key: "End" });
expect(tabStops()[0].getAttribute("data-file-row")).toBe("notes.txt");
fireEvent.keyDown(tabStops()[0], { key: "Home" });
expect(tabStops()[0].getAttribute("data-file-row")).toBe("..");
});
it("keeps focus inside the grid after Enter opens a directory", async () => {
// Rows are keyed by name, so navigating unmounts the focused `<tr>` — and
// nothing used to re-focus, which ejected the user to `<body>`.
await renderTab();
const row = screen.getByText("src").closest("tr")!;
row.focus();
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValueOnce([
entry("index.ts", { path: "/workspace/src/index.ts" }),
]);
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.keyDown(row, { key: "Enter" });
});
expect(screen.getByText("index.ts")).toBeTruthy();
expect(document.activeElement).not.toBe(document.body);
expect((document.activeElement as HTMLElement).closest("tr[data-file-row]")).toBeTruthy();
expect(tabStops()).toHaveLength(1);
});
it("puts focus back on the row after a rename is abandoned", async () => {
await renderTab();
const row = screen.getByText("notes.txt").closest("tr")!;
fireEvent.keyDown(row, { key: "F2" });
const input = screen.getByLabelText("New name for notes.txt");
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.keyDown(input, { key: "Escape" });
});
expect(document.activeElement).toBe(
gridRows().find((r) => r.getAttribute("data-file-row") === "notes.txt"),
);
});
it("follows a committed rename to the row's new name", async () => {
// Explicit, because `clearAllMocks` clears calls but not implementations,
// and an earlier test in this file leaves this one rejecting.
renameContainerPath.mockResolvedValue("/workspace/renamed.txt");
await renderTab();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Rename — notes.txt" }));
const input = screen.getByLabelText("New name for notes.txt");
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "renamed.txt" } });
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValueOnce([
entry("src", { is_directory: true, path: "/workspace/src" }),
entry("renamed.txt"),
]);
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.blur(input);
});
expect(document.activeElement).toBe(
gridRows().find((r) => r.getAttribute("data-file-row") === "renamed.txt"),
);
});
});
describe("FilesTab grid semantics", () => {
it("names its columns", async () => {
await renderTab();
for (const name of ["Name", "Size", "Modified", "Actions"]) {
expect(screen.getByRole("columnheader", { name })).toBeTruthy();
}
});
it("says folder or file in words, not in hue and a hidden emoji", async () => {
await renderTab();
const dir = screen.getByText("src").closest("tr")!;
const plain = screen.getByText("notes.txt").closest("tr")!;
expect(dir.textContent).toContain("Folder");
expect(plain.textContent).toContain("File");
});
it("keeps the visible label inside the accessible name (WCAG 2.5.3)", async () => {
await renderTab();
const rename = screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Rename — notes.txt" });
expect(rename.textContent).toBe("Rename");
expect(rename.getAttribute("aria-label")).toContain(rename.textContent!);
});
it("mounts the live region empty, then fills it", async () => {
// A `role="status"` node inserted already carrying its text is frequently
// not announced at all, which is how every one of these went by in silence.
createContainerDirectory.mockResolvedValue("/workspace/new");
await renderTab();
const live = screen.getByRole("status");
expect(live.textContent).toBe("");
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "New folder" }));
});
const input = screen.getByLabelText("New folder name");
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "new" } });
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.blur(input);
});
// Same node throughout — it is never unmounted.
expect(screen.getByRole("status")).toBe(live);
expect(live.textContent).toContain('Created "new"');
});
it("keeps a listing failure inline, where the rows it explains are missing", async () => {
// The one failure that does *not* go to the toast host: it is on screen,
// in context, and there is nothing for it to scroll behind.
listContainerFiles.mockRejectedValue("Permission denied");
await renderTab();
expect(screen.getByRole("alert").textContent).toContain("Permission denied");
});
});
/**
* The pane's two host-transfer affordances.
*
* They are asserted at the *button* level and not only in the hook, because
* this is the half that was actually lost: the commands behind them had been
* deleted, but so had the controls, and a working command nobody can reach is
* the same regression. Neither button names a host path Rust opens the
* dialog so what a click is required to prove is that the container-side
* argument reaching the backend is the one the user is looking at.
*/
describe("FilesTab host transfers", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
uploadFilesToContainer.mockResolvedValue({ uploaded: [], failures: [] });
downloadContainerFile.mockResolvedValue(4);
});
it("uploads into the directory currently on screen", async () => {
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([entry("src", { is_directory: true })]);
await renderTab();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(screen.getByText("src"));
});
uploadFilesToContainer.mockResolvedValueOnce({
uploaded: ["/workspace/src/a.txt"],
failures: [],
});
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Upload…" }));
});
expect(uploadFilesToContainer).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace/src");
});
it("offers Save to host on a file and not on a folder", async () => {
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([
entry("notes.txt"),
entry("src", { is_directory: true }),
]);
await renderTab();
// The accessible name carries the row, per WCAG 2.5.3 — and it is how a
// per-row action is told apart from every other row's copy of it.
expect(
screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Save to host — notes.txt" }),
).toBeTruthy();
expect(
screen.queryByRole("button", { name: "Save to host — src" }),
).toBeNull();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Save to host — notes.txt" }));
});
expect(downloadContainerFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", "/workspace/notes.txt");
});
it("does not open the file viewer when Save to host is double-clicked", async () => {
// Opening a file is a *double*-click on the row, and a double-click on a
// button inside that row still bubbles — `onClick`'s `stopPropagation` does
// nothing about it. So an impatient double-click on Save used to save the
// file and drop the viewer modal over the pane at the same time, on top of
// the save dialog the backend had just opened.
listContainerFiles.mockResolvedValue([entry("notes.txt")]);
readContainerFile.mockResolvedValue(contents("hello"));
await renderTab();
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.doubleClick(
screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Save to host — notes.txt" }),
);
});
expect(readContainerFile).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
+54 -482
View File
@@ -1,252 +1,34 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
import type { FileEntry, Project } from "../../../lib/types";
import { useEffect } from "react";
import type { Project } from "../../../lib/types";
import { useFileManager } from "../../../hooks/useFileManager";
import Button from "../../ui/Button";
import FileViewerModal from "./FileViewerModal";
import { formatBytes } from "./format";
interface Props {
project: Project;
}
/** Key of the synthetic "go up one level" row. No listing ever contains `..`. */
const PARENT_ROW = "..";
/**
* The project's file browser.
*
* It lists, opens, renames and creates folders inside the container, and it
* copies single files across the boundary: "Upload…" in the toolbar, and a
* per-row "Save to host…".
*
* **Neither of those names a host path, and this file must never learn how
* to.** Four successive audits found that host paths crossing IPC were where
* the criticals lived a frontend `open()`/`save()` handing Rust a string is
* exactly the shape that failed so the picker is opened by the *backend*
* (`pick_files_to_upload` / `pick_save_path` in `commands/file_commands.rs`).
* What this file *sends* is a project id and a container path; the host side of
* the transfer is chosen by a person in an OS dialog. That is why
* `uploadFiles()` takes no argument and `saveToHost()` takes only the entry.
* (A failed transfer does report a host path back, in the text of its error
* the inbound direction is the one that is closed, not both.)
*
* Drag-and-drop is deliberately still absent, in both directions. A file also
* gets into a container by being dropped onto the Terminal tab, and a whole
* tree comes back out through "Back up container" in the project's menu
* which is still the right answer for a directory, since "Save to host…" is one
* file at a time and is not offered on folders.
*
* Interaction model, chosen to match every desktop file manager rather than
* the old half-and-half: **single click selects, double click opens**. That
* moved directory navigation onto double click too a single click used to
* navigate, which made it impossible to select a directory in order to rename
* it. Keyboard mirrors it exactly: Enter opens, F2 renames.
*
* ## Focus, and why it is a roving tabindex
*
* Every row used to be `tabIndex={0}`, which made a 400-entry directory about
* twelve hundred tab stops Tab could not get *out* of the list, let alone
* past it and rows are keyed by name, so navigating unmounted the focused
* `<tr>` and dropped focus to `<body>`: Enter on a directory ejected you from
* the grid, arrows dead, Tab restarting from the top of the document. So
* exactly one row carries `tabIndex={0}` (the *active* row), the arrows move
* it, and a single effect below is responsible for putting focus back on a
* sensible row after anything that re-renders the list.
*/
/** The old 42rem FileManager popup, now a main-area section. */
export default function FilesTab({ project }: Props) {
const {
currentPath,
entries,
loading,
error,
completed,
navigate,
goUp,
refresh,
renameEntry,
createFolder,
uploadFiles,
saveToHost,
uploading,
savingPaths,
downloadFile,
uploadFile,
} = useFileManager(project.id);
const running = project.status === "running";
/** The row the user has selected, by name — names are unique in a directory. */
const [selected, setSelected] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [renaming, setRenaming] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [renameDraft, setRenameDraft] = useState("");
const [creatingFolder, setCreatingFolder] = useState(false);
const [folderDraft, setFolderDraft] = useState("");
const [viewing, setViewing] = useState<FileEntry | null>(null);
/** The row that owns the grid's single tab stop. */
const [activeRow, setActiveRow] = useState<string | null>(null);
const paneRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
const renameInputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
const folderInputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
useEffect(() => {
if (running) navigate("/workspace");
// Re-list when the container comes up.
}, [navigate, running]);
// Leaving a directory invalidates every in-flight row interaction.
useEffect(() => {
setSelected(null);
setRenaming(null);
}, [currentPath]);
useEffect(() => {
if (renaming) {
renameInputRef.current?.focus();
renameInputRef.current?.select();
}
}, [renaming]);
useEffect(() => {
if (creatingFolder) folderInputRef.current?.focus();
}, [creatingFolder]);
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Roving tabindex
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Every row's key, in visual order. The parent row is a row like any other. */
const rowKeys = useMemo(
() => [
...(currentPath !== "/" ? [PARENT_ROW] : []),
...entries.map((entry) => entry.name),
],
[currentPath, entries],
);
/**
* The active row, resolved against what is actually on screen. Keeping the
* *intent* in state and resolving it at render time means a rename or a
* deletion cannot leave the grid with no tab stop at all.
*/
const active = activeRow && rowKeys.includes(activeRow) ? activeRow : rowKeys[0];
const rowElement = useCallback((key: string): HTMLElement | undefined => {
// Matched on the dataset rather than a selector, because a file name is
// user data and can contain quotes, brackets and backslashes.
const rows = paneRef.current?.querySelectorAll<HTMLElement>("tr[data-file-row]") ?? [];
return Array.from(rows).find((row) => row.dataset.fileRow === key);
}, []);
const focusRow = useCallback(
(key: string) => {
setActiveRow(key);
rowElement(key)?.focus();
},
[rowElement],
);
/**
* Where focus should land the next time the grid re-renders, if it is loose.
* `key` is a preference, not a promise the row may not exist any more (a
* rename that failed, a navigation into a different directory), in which case
* the first row takes it.
*/
const wantFocus = useRef<{ key: string | null } | null>(null);
/**
* The single place that decides where focus goes after the list changes.
*
* Runs after a navigation (rows are keyed by name, so the focused `<tr>` is
* gone), after a rename commits or is abandoned, and after Escape. It never
* *steals* focus: if the user has moved on to a button or the breadcrumb it
* drops the request instead, so a background re-list cannot yank the caret
* out from under them.
*/
useEffect(() => {
if (renaming !== null) return; // the rename input owns focus
const want = wantFocus.current;
if (!want) return;
wantFocus.current = null;
const focused = document.activeElement as HTMLElement | null;
const loose =
!focused ||
focused === document.body ||
focused === document.documentElement ||
!!focused.closest?.("tr[data-file-row]");
if (!loose) return;
const key = want.key && rowKeys.includes(want.key) ? want.key : rowKeys[0];
if (key !== undefined) focusRow(key);
}, [rowKeys, renaming, focusRow]);
/** Arrow / Home / End movement over the rows. */
const moveActive = useCallback(
(from: string, to: 1 | -1 | "first" | "last") => {
if (rowKeys.length === 0) return;
const i = rowKeys.indexOf(from);
const next =
to === "first"
? 0
: to === "last"
? rowKeys.length - 1
: Math.min(rowKeys.length - 1, Math.max(0, (i < 0 ? 0 : i) + to));
focusRow(rowKeys[next]);
},
[rowKeys, focusRow],
);
const startRename = useCallback((entry: FileEntry) => {
setSelected(entry.name);
setActiveRow(entry.name);
setRenameDraft(entry.name);
setRenaming(entry.name);
// Whichever way the rename ends, focus comes back to this row unless the
// commit renames it — `commitRename` overwrites the preference below.
wantFocus.current = { key: entry.name };
}, []);
const commitRename = useCallback(
async (entry: FileEntry) => {
const renamedTo = renameDraft.trim();
wantFocus.current = { key: renamedTo || entry.name };
const done = await renameEntry(entry, renameDraft);
if (done) setRenaming(null);
},
[renameEntry, renameDraft],
);
const commitFolder = useCallback(async () => {
const created = folderDraft.trim();
const done = await createFolder(folderDraft);
if (done) {
setCreatingFolder(false);
setFolderDraft("");
wantFocus.current = { key: created || null };
}
}, [createFolder, folderDraft]);
/** Double click / Enter: directories navigate, files open the viewer. */
const openEntry = useCallback(
(entry: FileEntry) => {
if (entry.is_directory) {
// The new listing's first row is `..`, which is the sensible landing
// place: it is where you go to undo the step you just took.
wantFocus.current = { key: null };
navigate(entry.path);
} else {
setViewing(entry);
}
},
[navigate],
);
const openParent = useCallback(() => {
// Coming back up, the directory just left is the interesting row.
const leaving = currentPath.split("/").filter(Boolean).pop() ?? null;
wantFocus.current = { key: leaving };
goUp();
}, [currentPath, goUp]);
const breadcrumbs =
currentPath === "/"
? [{ label: "/", path: "/" }]
@@ -273,25 +55,8 @@ export default function FilesTab({ project }: Props) {
);
}
const rowClass = (isSelected: boolean) =>
`cursor-pointer transition-colors ${
isSelected
? "bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)]"
: "hover:bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)]"
}`;
const headerClass = "px-2 py-1.5 font-medium text-[var(--text-secondary)]";
/**
* The live region's text. One region, always mounted, filled and emptied
* a `role="status"` node that is *inserted* already carrying its text is
* frequently not announced at all, which is how every completion notice used
* to go by in silence.
*/
const liveText = completed ?? "";
return (
<div ref={paneRef} className="relative flex flex-col h-full min-h-0">
<div className="flex flex-col h-full min-h-0">
<div className="flex items-center gap-1 px-4 py-2 border-b border-[var(--border-color)] text-xs overflow-x-auto flex-shrink-0">
<nav aria-label="Path" className="flex items-center gap-1">
{breadcrumbs.map((crumb, i) => (
@@ -299,10 +64,7 @@ export default function FilesTab({ project }: Props) {
{i > 0 && <span className="text-[var(--text-secondary)]">/</span>}
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => {
wantFocus.current = { key: null };
navigate(crumb.path);
}}
onClick={() => navigate(crumb.path)}
className="text-[var(--accent)] hover:text-[var(--accent-hover)] transition-colors whitespace-nowrap font-mono"
>
{crumb.label}
@@ -311,38 +73,13 @@ export default function FilesTab({ project }: Props) {
))}
</nav>
<div className="flex-1" />
<span role="status" className="mr-2 text-[var(--text-secondary)] whitespace-nowrap">
{liveText}
</span>
<Button
onClick={() => {
setFolderDraft("");
setCreatingFolder(true);
}}
>
New folder
</Button>
{/* The file picker this opens belongs to Rust, not to the webview so
this file imports no dialog plugin and never composes a host path.
`uploadFiles` takes no argument for the same reason. */}
<Button
onClick={() => void uploadFiles()}
disabled={uploading}
className="ml-1"
>
{uploading ? "Uploading…" : "Upload…"}
</Button>
<Button onClick={uploadFile}>Upload file</Button>
<Button onClick={refresh} disabled={loading} className="ml-1">
Refresh
</Button>
</div>
<div className="flex-1 overflow-y-auto min-h-0">
{/* The one failure that stays inline: it explains why the grid below is
empty, it is in context, and there are no rows for it to scroll
behind. Every *transient* failure rename, new folder goes to
`ToastHost` instead, which is above the file viewer's overlay and
does not scroll away. */}
{error && (
<div role="alert" className="px-4 py-2 text-xs text-[var(--error)]">
{error}
@@ -354,218 +91,61 @@ export default function FilesTab({ project }: Props) {
Loading
</div>
) : (
<table role="grid" aria-label="Files" className="w-full text-xs">
<thead>
<tr role="row">
<th role="columnheader" scope="col" className={`${headerClass} px-4 text-left`}>
Name
</th>
<th role="columnheader" scope="col" className={`${headerClass} text-right`}>
Size
</th>
<th role="columnheader" scope="col" className={`${headerClass} text-left`}>
Modified
</th>
<th role="columnheader" scope="col" className={`${headerClass} text-right`}>
Actions
</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<table className="w-full text-xs">
<tbody>
{creatingFolder && (
<tr role="row">
<td role="gridcell" className="px-4 py-1.5" colSpan={4}>
<input
ref={folderInputRef}
value={folderDraft}
aria-label="New folder name"
placeholder="Folder name"
onChange={(e) => setFolderDraft(e.target.value)}
onBlur={commitFolder}
onKeyDown={(e) => {
if (e.key === "Enter") (e.target as HTMLInputElement).blur();
if (e.key === "Escape") {
setCreatingFolder(false);
setFolderDraft("");
}
}}
className="w-64 px-1 py-0 select-text bg-[var(--bg-primary)] border border-[var(--accent)] rounded-[var(--radius-control)] text-xs font-mono text-[var(--text-primary)]"
/>
</td>
</tr>
)}
{currentPath !== "/" && (
<tr
role="row"
data-file-row={PARENT_ROW}
tabIndex={active === PARENT_ROW ? 0 : -1}
aria-label="Parent directory"
onClick={() => setActiveRow(PARENT_ROW)}
onDoubleClick={openParent}
onKeyDown={(e) => {
if (e.key === "Enter") {
e.preventDefault();
openParent();
} else if (e.key === "ArrowDown" || e.key === "ArrowUp") {
e.preventDefault();
moveActive(PARENT_ROW, e.key === "ArrowDown" ? 1 : -1);
} else if (e.key === "Home" || e.key === "End") {
e.preventDefault();
moveActive(PARENT_ROW, e.key === "Home" ? "first" : "last");
}
}}
onClick={goUp}
className="cursor-pointer hover:bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)] transition-colors"
>
<td role="gridcell" className="px-4 py-1.5 text-[var(--text-primary)] font-mono">
<span className="sr-only">Folder, </span>
..
</td>
<td role="gridcell" colSpan={3} />
<td className="px-4 py-1.5 text-[var(--text-primary)] font-mono">..</td>
<td colSpan={3} />
</tr>
)}
{entries.map((entry) => {
const isSelected = selected === entry.name;
const isRenaming = renaming === entry.name;
return (
<tr
key={entry.name}
role="row"
data-file-row={entry.name}
tabIndex={active === entry.name ? 0 : -1}
aria-selected={isSelected}
onClick={() => {
setSelected(entry.name);
setActiveRow(entry.name);
}}
onDoubleClick={() => openEntry(entry)}
onKeyDown={(e) => {
if (isRenaming) return;
if (e.key === "Enter") {
e.preventDefault();
setSelected(entry.name);
setActiveRow(entry.name);
openEntry(entry);
} else if (e.key === "F2") {
e.preventDefault();
startRename(entry);
} else if (e.key === "ArrowDown" || e.key === "ArrowUp") {
e.preventDefault();
moveActive(entry.name, e.key === "ArrowDown" ? 1 : -1);
} else if (e.key === "Home" || e.key === "End") {
e.preventDefault();
moveActive(entry.name, e.key === "Home" ? "first" : "last");
}
}}
className={rowClass(isSelected)}
>
<td role="gridcell" className="px-4 py-1.5">
{isRenaming ? (
<input
ref={renameInputRef}
value={renameDraft}
aria-label={`New name for ${entry.name}`}
onChange={(e) => setRenameDraft(e.target.value)}
onClick={(e) => e.stopPropagation()}
onDoubleClick={(e) => e.stopPropagation()}
onBlur={() => commitRename(entry)}
onKeyDown={(e) => {
e.stopPropagation();
if (e.key === "Enter") (e.target as HTMLInputElement).blur();
if (e.key === "Escape") setRenaming(null);
}}
className="w-64 px-1 py-0 select-text bg-[var(--bg-primary)] border border-[var(--accent)] rounded-[var(--radius-control)] text-xs font-mono text-[var(--text-primary)]"
/>
) : (
<span
className={`font-mono ${
entry.is_directory
? "text-[var(--accent)]"
: "text-[var(--text-primary)]"
}`}
>
{/* Directory-ness was carried by hue and an
`aria-hidden` emoji, i.e. by nothing at all for a
screen reader. The emoji stays hidden it reads
as "file folder" in some voices and as nothing in
others and the word is what is announced. */}
<span className="sr-only">
{entry.is_directory ? "Folder, " : "File, "}
</span>
{entry.is_directory && <span aria-hidden="true">📁 </span>}
<span>{entry.name}</span>
{entry.is_symlink && (
<span
className="ml-1 text-[var(--text-secondary)]"
title="Symbolic link"
>
link
</span>
)}
</span>
)}
</td>
<td role="gridcell" className="px-2 py-1.5 text-[var(--text-secondary)] text-right whitespace-nowrap tabular-nums">
{!entry.is_directory && formatBytes(entry.size)}
</td>
<td role="gridcell" className="px-2 py-1.5 text-[var(--text-secondary)] whitespace-nowrap">
{entry.modified}
</td>
<td role="gridcell" className="px-2 py-1.5 text-right whitespace-nowrap">
{!isRenaming && (
<>
{/* WCAG 2.5.3: the accessible name has to *contain*
the visible label, so the row context is appended
rather than substituted. "Rename notes.txt" used
to be the whole name, which left a voice-control
user saying "click Rename" at a button that had
no such name. */}
<Button
aria-label={`Rename — ${entry.name}`}
onClick={(e) => {
e.stopPropagation();
startRename(entry);
}}
>
Rename
</Button>
{/* Folders have no single-file equivalent a
recursive download is what "Back up container" is
for, and offering one here would mean rebuilding
the tree-walking this pane deliberately does not
do. */}
{!entry.is_directory && (
<Button
aria-label={`Save to host — ${entry.name}`}
className="ml-1"
// Only this row: a large file can take a while,
// and there is no reason the rest of the pane
// should go dead while it is written.
disabled={savingPaths.has(entry.path)}
onClick={(e) => {
e.stopPropagation();
void saveToHost(entry);
}}
// A double-click is its own event, and
// `onClick`'s `stopPropagation` says nothing
// about it — so an impatient double-click here
// reached the row's `onDoubleClick` and dropped
// the viewer modal over the pane, on top of the
// save dialog the backend had just opened.
onDoubleClick={(e) => e.stopPropagation()}
>
{savingPaths.has(entry.path) ? "Saving…" : "Save to host…"}
</Button>
)}
</>
)}
</td>
</tr>
);
})}
{entries.map((entry) => (
<tr
key={entry.name}
onClick={() => entry.is_directory && navigate(entry.path)}
className={`${
entry.is_directory ? "cursor-pointer" : ""
} hover:bg-[var(--bg-tertiary)] transition-colors`}
>
<td className="px-4 py-1.5">
<span
className={`font-mono ${
entry.is_directory
? "text-[var(--accent)]"
: "text-[var(--text-primary)]"
}`}
>
{entry.is_directory ? "📁 " : ""}
{entry.name}
</span>
</td>
<td className="px-2 py-1.5 text-[var(--text-secondary)] text-right whitespace-nowrap tabular-nums">
{!entry.is_directory && formatBytes(entry.size)}
</td>
<td className="px-2 py-1.5 text-[var(--text-secondary)] whitespace-nowrap">
{entry.modified}
</td>
<td className="px-2 py-1.5 text-right">
{!entry.is_directory && (
<Button
aria-label={`Download ${entry.name}`}
onClick={(e) => {
e.stopPropagation();
downloadFile(entry);
}}
>
Download
</Button>
)}
</td>
</tr>
))}
{entries.length === 0 && !loading && (
<tr role="row">
<tr>
<td
role="gridcell"
colSpan={4}
className="px-4 py-8 text-center text-[var(--text-secondary)]"
>
@@ -577,14 +157,6 @@ export default function FilesTab({ project }: Props) {
</table>
)}
</div>
{viewing && (
<FileViewerModal
projectId={project.id}
entry={viewing}
onClose={() => setViewing(null)}
/>
)}
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
import type { Project } from "../../../lib/types";
import NotesPanel from "../../notes/NotesPanel";
interface Props {
project: Project;
}
/**
* Notes as a Project Home sub-tab.
*
* The same panel the dock shows. This is the roomy view for writing; the dock
* is the one that stays visible while the agent works.
*/
export default function NotesTab({ project }: Props) {
return (
<div className="h-full min-h-0">
<NotesPanel projectId={project.id} />
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from "react";
import { useShallow } from "zustand/react/shallow";
import { projectRemovalIsClean } from "../../../lib/types";
import { useAppState } from "../../../store/appState";
import { useProjectActions } from "../../../hooks/useProjectActions";
import { useProjects } from "../../../hooks/useProjects";
@@ -18,9 +17,7 @@ import AutomationTab from "./AutomationTab";
import ConfigTab from "./ConfigTab";
import FilesTab from "./FilesTab";
import BrowserTab from "./BrowserTab";
import NotesTab from "./NotesTab";
import { formatUptime } from "./format";
import { describeLeftovers, leftoverPronoun, leftoverVerb } from "./removalReport";
const TABS = [
{ id: "overview", label: "Overview" },
@@ -29,7 +26,6 @@ const TABS = [
{ id: "config", label: "Config" },
{ id: "files", label: "Files" },
{ id: "browser", label: "Browser" },
{ id: "notes", label: "Notes" },
] as const;
export type ProjectHomeTabId = (typeof TABS)[number]["id"];
@@ -257,7 +253,6 @@ export default function ProjectHome({ projectId, active }: Props) {
{tab === "browser" && (
<BrowserTab project={project} active={active && tab === "browser"} />
)}
{tab === "notes" && <NotesTab project={project} />}
</div>
{showMigration && (
@@ -287,25 +282,7 @@ export default function ProjectHome({ projectId, active }: Props) {
onConfirm={async () => {
setConfirmRemove(false);
try {
const report = await remove(project.id);
if (!projectRemovalIsClean(report)) {
const verb = leftoverVerb(report);
if (report.retry_scheduled) {
useAppState.getState().pushToast({
kind: "info",
message: `${project.name}” was removed, but Triple-C could not confirm all its Docker resources were removed`,
detail: `Triple-C could not confirm ${describeLeftovers(report)} ${verb} removed. It will check again the next time it starts.`,
});
} else {
// The pending-cleanup record itself failed to save — no
// retry will happen, so this must not promise one.
useAppState.getState().pushToast({
kind: "error",
message: `${project.name}” was removed, but Triple-C could not confirm its Docker resources were removed`,
detail: `Triple-C could not confirm ${describeLeftovers(report)} ${verb} removed, and could not record this for a retry. You may need to remove ${leftoverPronoun(report)} manually (\`docker rm\` / \`docker rmi\` / \`docker volume rm\`).`,
});
}
}
await remove(project.id);
} catch (e) {
useAppState.getState().pushToast({
kind: "error",
@@ -311,22 +311,10 @@ export default function TaskEditorModal({ project, task, onClose, onSaved }: Pro
</div>
{task && (
/*
An edit is `add` then `remove` (see `update_scheduled_task`), and
`triple-c-scheduler`'s remove now reaps the task's log directory
so on a current container the old logs are gone, not merely filed
under the old id, which is what this used to promise.
It is deliberately not stated as a certainty. `/usr/local/bin` only
changes on base-image migration or Reset, so a project still running
an older base image carries the older scheduler, whose remove leaves
the log directory behind. "Assume they go with it" is true in both
worlds and spares the user a paragraph about which one they are in.
*/
<p className="text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
The scheduler has no edit command, so saving re-creates this task under a new id and
removes <code className="font-mono">{task.id}</code>. Assume its earlier run logs go
with it.
removes <code className="font-mono">{task.id}</code>. Its previous run logs stay under
the old id.
</p>
)}
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { useSecretField } from "../../../../hooks/useSecretField";
import { open } from "@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog";
import type { Project } from "../../../../lib/types";
import Button from "../../../ui/Button";
@@ -25,15 +24,14 @@ export default function AccessSection({
const [caCertPath, setCaCertPath] = useState(project.ca_cert_path ?? "");
const [gitName, setGitName] = useState(project.git_user_name ?? "");
const [gitEmail, setGitEmail] = useState(project.git_user_email ?? "");
// Never seeded from `project` — the backend does not serialize secrets, so
// the box is always empty and only an edit may speak about the stored value.
const gitToken = useSecretField(project.id);
const [gitToken, setGitToken] = useState(project.git_token ?? "");
useEffect(() => {
setSshKeyPath(project.ssh_key_path ?? "");
setCaCertPath(project.ca_cert_path ?? "");
setGitName(project.git_user_name ?? "");
setGitEmail(project.git_user_email ?? "");
setGitToken(project.git_token ?? "");
}, [project]);
return (
@@ -103,19 +101,15 @@ export default function AccessSection({
<Field
label="Git HTTPS token"
hint={
gitToken.edited
? "Saved when you click away. Clearing the box removes the stored token."
: "A personal access token (e.g. a GitHub PAT) for HTTPS git operations inside the container. A stored token is not shown; leave this empty to keep it."
}
hint="A personal access token (e.g. a GitHub PAT) for HTTPS git operations inside the container."
>
{(id) => (
<input
id={id}
type="password"
value={gitToken.value}
onChange={(e) => gitToken.setValue(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => save({ ...gitToken.patch("git_token") })}
value={gitToken}
onChange={(e) => setGitToken(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => save({ git_token: gitToken || null })}
placeholder="ghp_…"
disabled={disabled}
className={inputClass}
@@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
import AuthBridgeRow, { bridgeIndicator } from "./AuthBridgeRow";
import type { AuthBridgeStatus, Project } from "../../../../lib/types";
/**
* The bridge shipped with a working backend, a typed IPC wrapper, and no way to
* reach either: `setAuthBridgeEnabled` had zero call sites, and the
* `auth-bridge-changed` event had no listener so a host port the bridge could
* not take was a silent failure that presented as a login that simply hung.
* These tests hold both halves down.
*/
const getAuthBridgeStatus = vi.fn<() => Promise<AuthBridgeStatus>>();
const setAuthBridgeEnabled = vi.fn<(id: string, on: boolean) => Promise<AuthBridgeStatus>>();
vi.mock("../../../../lib/tauri-commands", () => ({
getAuthBridgeStatus: () => getAuthBridgeStatus(),
setAuthBridgeEnabled: (id: string, on: boolean) => setAuthBridgeEnabled(id, on),
}));
/** Captured so a test can push an `auth-bridge-changed` payload by hand. */
let emit: ((payload: unknown) => void) | null = null;
vi.mock("@tauri-apps/api/event", () => ({
listen: vi.fn(async (_name: string, handler: (e: { payload: unknown }) => void) => {
emit = (payload) => handler({ payload });
return () => {
emit = null;
};
}),
}));
const OFF: AuthBridgeStatus = { enabled: false, active_ports: [], conflicts: [] };
const project = {
id: "p1",
name: "api",
status: "running",
auth_bridge_enabled: false,
} as unknown as Project;
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
getAuthBridgeStatus.mockResolvedValue(OFF);
setAuthBridgeEnabled.mockResolvedValue({ ...OFF, enabled: true });
});
describe("AuthBridgeRow", () => {
it("turns the bridge on through its own command, not the project save", async () => {
// The dedicated command exists so this can be flipped while the container
// runs — which is exactly when a user discovers they need it. Routing it
// through the Config tab's stopped-only save would make it unreachable at
// the only moment it matters.
render(<AuthBridgeRow project={project} />);
await waitFor(() => expect(getAuthBridgeStatus).toHaveBeenCalled());
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" }));
await waitFor(() =>
expect(setAuthBridgeEnabled).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", true),
);
});
it("stays usable while the container is running", async () => {
render(<AuthBridgeRow project={project} />);
await waitFor(() => expect(getAuthBridgeStatus).toHaveBeenCalled());
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" })).not.toBeDisabled();
});
it("reports a port conflict the poller emitted", async () => {
getAuthBridgeStatus.mockResolvedValue({ ...OFF, enabled: true });
render(<AuthBridgeRow project={project} />);
await waitFor(() => expect(emit).not.toBeNull());
emit!({
project_id: "p1",
status: {
enabled: true,
active_ports: [],
conflicts: [
{ port: 54545, reason: "Host port 54545 is already in use (…); not bridged." },
],
},
});
expect(await screen.findByText(/Port 54545/)).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText("Port conflict")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("ignores an event for a different project", async () => {
getAuthBridgeStatus.mockResolvedValue({ ...OFF, enabled: true });
render(<AuthBridgeRow project={project} />);
await waitFor(() => expect(emit).not.toBeNull());
emit!({
project_id: "other",
status: { enabled: true, active_ports: [], conflicts: [{ port: 1, reason: "nope" }] },
});
expect(screen.queryByText(/Port 1:/)).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
/**
* The two halves of this row disagree about *when*, not about *what*.
*
* `set_auth_bridge_enabled` resolves with a status sampled as it returned;
* the poller's event carries one sampled afterwards. Writing the awaited
* value unconditionally therefore rolls the row back in time whenever the
* two overlap the row says "Watching" while a port is bound, which is the
* exact silent failure the event subscription was added to end. These two
* hold the ordering down from both the resolve and the reject side.
*/
describe("a pushed event outranks an older awaited result", () => {
/** A toggle that will not settle until the test says so. */
function deferToggle() {
let settle!: (s: AuthBridgeStatus) => void;
let fail!: (e: unknown) => void;
setAuthBridgeEnabled.mockImplementation(
() =>
new Promise<AuthBridgeStatus>((resolve, reject) => {
settle = resolve;
fail = reject;
}),
);
return { settle: (s: AuthBridgeStatus) => settle(s), fail: (e: unknown) => fail(e) };
}
const BRIDGING: AuthBridgeStatus = {
enabled: true,
active_ports: [{ port: 54545, family: "v4", bridged_at: "", ipv6_warning: null }],
conflicts: [],
};
async function startToggleThenPush() {
render(<AuthBridgeRow project={project} />);
await waitFor(() => expect(getAuthBridgeStatus).toHaveBeenCalled());
await waitFor(() => expect(emit).not.toBeNull());
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" }));
await waitFor(() => expect(setAuthBridgeEnabled).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", true));
// The poller binds a port while the command is still in flight.
emit!({ project_id: "p1", status: BRIDGING });
expect(await screen.findByText("Bridging 1 port")).toBeInTheDocument();
}
it("keeps the newer state when the command settles with the older one", async () => {
const toggle = deferToggle();
await startToggleThenPush();
// …and only now returns the snapshot it took *before* that port existed.
toggle.settle({ enabled: true, active_ports: [], conflicts: [] });
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" })).not.toBeDisabled(),
);
expect(screen.getByText("Bridging 1 port")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText("127.0.0.1:54545")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText("Watching")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("does not let the rollback undo a status pushed while it was failing", async () => {
// The command failed, so the error belongs on screen — but the bridge
// demonstrably came up, and reverting the switch to off would contradict
// the port listed right beside it.
const toggle = deferToggle();
await startToggleThenPush();
toggle.fail("bridge probe timed out");
expect(await screen.findByText(/probe timed out/)).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText("Bridging 1 port")).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" })).toBeChecked();
});
});
it("puts the switch back if the command rejects", async () => {
setAuthBridgeEnabled.mockRejectedValue("Project p1 not found");
render(<AuthBridgeRow project={project} />);
await waitFor(() => expect(getAuthBridgeStatus).toHaveBeenCalled());
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" }));
expect(await screen.findByText(/not found/)).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" })).not.toBeChecked();
});
});
describe("bridgeIndicator", () => {
// Every branch is a glyph plus a word — status is never colour alone.
it("says nothing is on when it is off", () => {
expect(bridgeIndicator(OFF, true)).toEqual({ tone: "off", label: "Off" });
});
it("puts a conflict ahead of everything else", () => {
expect(
bridgeIndicator(
{
enabled: true,
active_ports: [
{ port: 1, family: "v4", bridged_at: "", ipv6_warning: null },
],
conflicts: [{ port: 2, reason: "taken" }],
},
true,
).tone,
).toBe("error");
});
it("flags a port that only took the IPv4 half", () => {
// Node resolves `localhost` to IPv6 first on Linux, so a v4-only listener
// is a callback that never arrives in front of a bridge reporting healthy.
expect(
bridgeIndicator(
{
enabled: true,
active_ports: [
{ port: 1, family: "v6", bridged_at: "", ipv6_warning: "no ::1" },
],
conflicts: [],
},
true,
).label,
).toBe("IPv4 only");
});
it("counts the ports it is holding", () => {
expect(
bridgeIndicator(
{
enabled: true,
active_ports: [
{ port: 1, family: "v4", bridged_at: "", ipv6_warning: null },
{ port: 2, family: "v4", bridged_at: "", ipv6_warning: null },
],
conflicts: [],
},
true,
).label,
).toBe("Bridging 2 ports");
});
it("says it is waiting when the container is not running", () => {
// Enabled and holding nothing is normal; enabled with no container is a
// different thing, and saying so stops it reading as a failure.
expect(bridgeIndicator({ ...OFF, enabled: true }, false).label).toBe(
"Waiting for the container",
);
expect(bridgeIndicator({ ...OFF, enabled: true }, true).label).toBe("Watching");
});
});
@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { listen } from "@tauri-apps/api/event";
import {
getAuthBridgeStatus,
setAuthBridgeEnabled,
} from "../../../../lib/tauri-commands";
import type {
AuthBridgeChangedEvent,
AuthBridgeStatus,
Project,
} from "../../../../lib/types";
import { SwitchRow } from "../../../ui/Field";
import StatusIndicator, { type StatusTone } from "../../../ui/StatusIndicator";
import Toggle from "../../../ui/Toggle";
/** Emitted by `auth_bridge/mod.rs` whenever the port or conflict set changes. */
const AUTH_BRIDGE_EVENT = "auth-bridge-changed";
const LABEL = "Auth bridge";
/**
* What the indicator beside the switch says.
*
* Split out so the interesting part that a conflict is a *visible* failure
* can be tested without a container. Every branch pairs a glyph with a word;
* none of them are distinguished by colour alone.
*/
export function bridgeIndicator(
status: AuthBridgeStatus | null,
containerRunning: boolean,
): { tone: StatusTone; label: string } {
if (!status) return { tone: "unknown", label: "Checking" };
if (!status.enabled) return { tone: "off", label: "Off" };
// A conflict means a login is in progress and its port could not be taken —
// the one state where doing nothing is the wrong answer, and until now the
// one state nothing in the app reported at all.
if (status.conflicts.length > 0) {
return { tone: "error", label: "Port conflict" };
}
if (status.active_ports.some((p) => p.ipv6_warning)) {
return { tone: "busy", label: "IPv4 only" };
}
if (status.active_ports.length > 0) {
const n = status.active_ports.length;
return { tone: "running", label: `Bridging ${n} port${n === 1 ? "" : "s"}` };
}
// Enabled but holding nothing. Normal: there is only something to bridge
// while a login is actually waiting for a callback.
if (!containerRunning) {
return { tone: "stopped", label: "Waiting for the container" };
}
return { tone: "ok", label: "Watching" };
}
/**
* The switch for `auth_bridge_enabled`, and the only place it can be changed.
*
* Two things here are deliberate and easy to undo by accident:
*
* - **It does not go through the Config tab's `save`.** That path is gated on
* a stopped container, because almost everything else in the tab is baked
* into the container at creation. This is not: the bridge is entirely
* host-side, and `set_auth_bridge_enabled` exists precisely so it can be
* flipped *while a login is hanging*, which is when the user finds out they
* need it. Routing it through the generic save would make it unreachable at
* the only moment it matters.
* - **It subscribes to `auth-bridge-changed`.** The poller already emits the
* bridged-port and conflict sets on every change and, before this, nothing
* listened so a host port the bridge could not take was a completely
* silent failure, indistinguishable from a login that simply hung.
*/
export default function AuthBridgeRow({ project }: { project: Project }) {
const projectId = project.id;
const containerRunning = project.status === "running";
const [status, setStatus] = useState<AuthBridgeStatus | null>(null);
const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
/**
* Which write to `status` is the newest the same "is this still mine?"
* guard `useContainerMigration` uses around its async
* writes, and needed here for a reason that is easy to miss.
*
* There are two sources of truth for this row and only one of them is
* ordered. `set_auth_bridge_enabled` resolves with a status *sampled at the
* moment it returned*; the poller's `auth-bridge-changed` event carries one
* sampled later. Awaiting the command therefore hands back a value that may
* already be historical, and writing it unconditionally is how the row ends
* up saying "Watching" while a port is in fact bound the failure mode the
* event subscription exists to prevent, reintroduced one line below it.
*
* So every write claims a generation and only lands if it still holds it.
* A pushed event always claims a fresh one, which is what makes it win over
* an older awaited result no matter which order the two arrive in.
*/
const generation = useRef(0);
useEffect(() => {
const mine = ++generation.current;
let cancelled = false;
setStatus(null);
setError(null);
getAuthBridgeStatus(projectId)
.then((s) => {
// The initial fetch races the poller exactly like the toggle does: an
// event can land first and describe a bridge this reply predates.
if (!cancelled && generation.current === mine) setStatus(s);
})
.catch((e) => {
if (!cancelled) setError(String(e));
});
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [projectId]);
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
let unlisten: (() => void) | undefined;
listen<AuthBridgeChangedEvent>(AUTH_BRIDGE_EVENT, (event) => {
if (event.payload.project_id !== projectId) return;
// A pushed status is the most recent observation that exists, so it
// claims the newest generation and invalidates anything still in flight.
generation.current += 1;
setStatus(event.payload.status);
})
.then((un) => {
if (cancelled) un();
else unlisten = un;
})
.catch((e) => console.error("Auth bridge event subscription failed:", e));
return () => {
cancelled = true;
unlisten?.();
};
}, [projectId]);
const toggle = useCallback(
async (next: boolean) => {
setBusy(true);
setError(null);
// Optimistic, so the switch responds even though enabling has to await a
// container probe. It claims a generation like every other write, so a
// pushed event that lands mid-flight supersedes it rather than being
// undone by the settle below.
const mine = ++generation.current;
setStatus((s) => (s ? { ...s, enabled: next } : s));
try {
const settled = await setAuthBridgeEnabled(projectId, next);
// Stale by the time it arrived: the poller has already told us
// something newer, and `settled` predates it.
if (generation.current !== mine) return;
setStatus(settled);
} catch (e) {
// The error is reported either way — the command really did fail — but
// the rollback must not resurrect the pre-toggle value over a status
// the poller pushed while the command was failing.
setError(String(e));
if (generation.current !== mine) return;
setStatus((s) => (s ? { ...s, enabled: !next } : s));
} finally {
setBusy(false);
}
},
[projectId],
);
// Fall back to the persisted flag until the first status arrives, so the
// switch never renders in the wrong position.
const enabled = status?.enabled ?? project.auth_bridge_enabled;
const indicator = bridgeIndicator(status, containerRunning);
return (
<SwitchRow
label={LABEL}
hint={
<>
Mirrors a port a program inside the container is listening on onto the
host's <code>127.0.0.1</code>, so a browser OAuth callback can reach
the listener waiting inside the container {" "}
<code>claude login</code>, <code>aws sso login</code> and{" "}
<code>gh auth login</code> all work this way, and without it the
browser calls back into nothing and the login hangs. Host-side only:
it never recreates the container, and it can be switched on while one
is running. A bridged port is unauthenticated and reachable by any
local process for as long as the in-container listener exists, so
leave it off unless you need it.
<span className="mt-1 flex flex-wrap items-center gap-x-2 gap-y-1">
<StatusIndicator tone={indicator.tone} label={indicator.label} />
{status?.active_ports.map((p) => (
<span
key={p.port}
className="font-mono text-[var(--text-secondary)]"
title={p.ipv6_warning ?? `Bound on host 127.0.0.1:${p.port}`}
>
127.0.0.1:{p.port}
{p.ipv6_warning ? " (IPv4 only)" : ""}
</span>
))}
</span>
{status?.conflicts.map((c) => (
<span
key={c.port}
className="mt-1 block text-[var(--error)]"
role="status"
>
Port {c.port}: {c.reason}
</span>
))}
{status?.active_ports
.filter((p) => p.ipv6_warning)
.map((p) => (
<span key={p.port} className="mt-1 block text-[var(--warning)]">
Port {p.port}: {p.ipv6_warning}
</span>
))}
{error && (
<span className="mt-1 block text-[var(--error)]">{error}</span>
)}
</>
}
control={
<Toggle
label={LABEL}
checked={enabled}
// Never gated on the container being stopped — see the note above.
disabled={busy}
onChange={toggle}
/>
}
/>
);
}
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { useSecretField, withoutUntouchedSecrets } from "../../../../hooks/useSecretField";
import type {
Backend,
BedrockAuthMethod,
@@ -17,17 +16,6 @@ import Field, {
} from "../../../ui/Field";
import Toggle from "../../../ui/Toggle";
/** Bedrock fields held in the OS keychain, never serialized back to us. */
const BEDROCK_SECRET_KEYS = [
"aws_access_key_id",
"aws_secret_access_key",
"aws_session_token",
"aws_bearer_token",
] as const;
/** The same, for the OpenAI-compatible backend. */
const OPENAI_SECRET_KEYS = ["api_key"] as const;
export const DEFAULT_BEDROCK_CONFIG: BedrockConfig = {
auth_method: "static_credentials",
aws_region: "us-east-1",
@@ -77,12 +65,11 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
// Local text state — saved on blur, not on every keystroke.
const [bedrockRegion, setBedrockRegion] = useState(bedrock.aws_region);
// Secrets are never seeded from `project` — see `useSecretField`.
const accessKeyId = useSecretField(project.id);
const secretKey = useSecretField(project.id);
const sessionToken = useSecretField(project.id);
const [accessKeyId, setAccessKeyId] = useState(bedrock.aws_access_key_id ?? "");
const [secretKey, setSecretKey] = useState(bedrock.aws_secret_access_key ?? "");
const [sessionToken, setSessionToken] = useState(bedrock.aws_session_token ?? "");
const [profile, setProfile] = useState(bedrock.aws_profile ?? "");
const bearerToken = useSecretField(project.id);
const [bearerToken, setBearerToken] = useState(bedrock.aws_bearer_token ?? "");
const [bedrockModelId, setBedrockModelId] = useState(bedrock.model_id ?? "");
const [serviceTier, setServiceTier] = useState(bedrock.service_tier ?? "");
@@ -110,7 +97,9 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
project.openai_compatible_config?.base_url ??
DEFAULT_OPENAI_COMPATIBLE_CONFIG.base_url,
);
const oaiApiKey = useSecretField(project.id);
const [oaiApiKey, setOaiApiKey] = useState(
project.openai_compatible_config?.api_key ?? "",
);
const [oaiModelId, setOaiModelId] = useState(
project.openai_compatible_config?.model_id ?? "",
);
@@ -118,13 +107,14 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
project.openai_compatible_config?.haiku_model_id ?? "",
);
// Secret fields are deliberately absent here: `useSecretField` owns its own
// reset, and re-seeding one from `project` would write an empty string over
// whatever the user had half-typed on any unrelated project update.
useEffect(() => {
const bc = project.bedrock_config ?? DEFAULT_BEDROCK_CONFIG;
setBedrockRegion(bc.aws_region);
setAccessKeyId(bc.aws_access_key_id ?? "");
setSecretKey(bc.aws_secret_access_key ?? "");
setSessionToken(bc.aws_session_token ?? "");
setProfile(bc.aws_profile ?? "");
setBearerToken(bc.aws_bearer_token ?? "");
setBedrockModelId(bc.model_id ?? "");
setServiceTier(bc.service_tier ?? "");
setOllamaBaseUrl(project.ollama_config?.base_url ?? DEFAULT_OLLAMA_CONFIG.base_url);
@@ -139,18 +129,13 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
project.openai_compatible_config?.base_url ??
DEFAULT_OPENAI_COMPATIBLE_CONFIG.base_url,
);
setOaiApiKey(project.openai_compatible_config?.api_key ?? "");
setOaiModelId(project.openai_compatible_config?.model_id ?? "");
setOaiHaikuModelId(project.openai_compatible_config?.haiku_model_id ?? "");
}, [project]);
const saveBedrock = (patch: Partial<BedrockConfig>) =>
save({
bedrock_config: withoutUntouchedSecrets(
{ ...bedrock, ...patch },
patch,
BEDROCK_SECRET_KEYS,
),
});
save({ bedrock_config: { ...bedrock, ...patch } });
const saveOllama = (patch: Partial<OllamaConfig>) =>
save({
@@ -167,14 +152,10 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
const saveOpenAi = (patch: Partial<OpenAiCompatibleConfig>) =>
save({
openai_compatible_config: withoutUntouchedSecrets(
{
...(project.openai_compatible_config ?? DEFAULT_OPENAI_COMPATIBLE_CONFIG),
...patch,
},
patch,
OPENAI_SECRET_KEYS,
),
openai_compatible_config: {
...(project.openai_compatible_config ?? DEFAULT_OPENAI_COMPATIBLE_CONFIG),
...patch,
},
});
// Defaults to on: projects created before the field existed, and any data
@@ -280,9 +261,9 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
{(id) => (
<input
id={id}
value={accessKeyId.value}
onChange={(e) => accessKeyId.setValue(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => saveBedrock(accessKeyId.patch("aws_access_key_id"))}
value={accessKeyId}
onChange={(e) => setAccessKeyId(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => saveBedrock({ aws_access_key_id: accessKeyId || null })}
placeholder="AKIA…"
disabled={disabled}
className={monoInputClass}
@@ -297,10 +278,10 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
<input
id={id}
type="password"
value={secretKey.value}
onChange={(e) => secretKey.setValue(e.target.value)}
value={secretKey}
onChange={(e) => setSecretKey(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() =>
saveBedrock(secretKey.patch("aws_secret_access_key"))
saveBedrock({ aws_secret_access_key: secretKey || null })
}
disabled={disabled}
className={monoInputClass}
@@ -315,10 +296,10 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
<input
id={id}
type="password"
value={sessionToken.value}
onChange={(e) => sessionToken.setValue(e.target.value)}
value={sessionToken}
onChange={(e) => setSessionToken(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() =>
saveBedrock(sessionToken.patch("aws_session_token"))
saveBedrock({ aws_session_token: sessionToken || null })
}
disabled={disabled}
className={monoInputClass}
@@ -356,9 +337,9 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
<input
id={id}
type="password"
value={bearerToken.value}
onChange={(e) => bearerToken.setValue(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => saveBedrock(bearerToken.patch("aws_bearer_token"))}
value={bearerToken}
onChange={(e) => setBearerToken(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => saveBedrock({ aws_bearer_token: bearerToken || null })}
disabled={disabled}
className={monoInputClass}
/>
@@ -526,9 +507,9 @@ export default function ModelSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
<input
id={id}
type="password"
value={oaiApiKey.value}
onChange={(e) => oaiApiKey.setValue(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => saveOpenAi(oaiApiKey.patch("api_key"))}
value={oaiApiKey}
onChange={(e) => setOaiApiKey(e.target.value)}
onBlur={() => saveOpenAi({ api_key: oaiApiKey || null })}
placeholder="sk-…"
disabled={disabled}
className={monoInputClass}
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
import RuntimeSection from "./RuntimeSection";
import type { AuthBridgeStatus, Project } from "../../../../lib/types";
// The auth-bridge row owns its own IPC — see `AuthBridgeRow.tsx` for why it
// does not go through `save`.
const OFF_BRIDGE: AuthBridgeStatus = { enabled: false, active_ports: [], conflicts: [] };
const setAuthBridgeEnabled = vi.fn(async () => ({ ...OFF_BRIDGE, enabled: true }));
vi.mock("../../../../lib/tauri-commands", () => ({
getAuthBridgeStatus: vi.fn(async () => OFF_BRIDGE),
setAuthBridgeEnabled: (id: string, on: boolean) => setAuthBridgeEnabled(id, on),
}));
vi.mock("@tauri-apps/api/event", () => ({
listen: vi.fn(async () => () => {}),
}));
const baseProject: Project = {
id: "p1",
name: "api-server",
paths: [{ host_path: "/src/api", mount_name: "api" }],
container_id: null,
status: "stopped",
backend: "anthropic",
bedrock_config: null,
ollama_config: null,
llamacpp_config: null,
openai_compatible_config: null,
allow_docker_access: false,
sandbox_mode_enabled: true,
mission_control_enabled: false,
auth_bridge_enabled: false,
browser_view_enabled: false,
vpn_support_enabled: false,
use_shared_auth_token: true,
full_permissions: false,
permission_mode: null,
ssh_key_path: null,
ca_cert_path: null,
git_token: null,
git_user_name: null,
git_user_email: null,
custom_env_vars: [],
port_mappings: [],
claude_instructions: null,
claude_code_settings: null,
renamed_session_names: {},
created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
};
const VPN = "VPN support";
const save = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true);
function renderSection(over: Partial<Project> = {}, disabled = false) {
return render(
<RuntimeSection
project={{ ...baseProject, ...over }}
save={save}
disabled={disabled}
disabledReason="Container must be stopped to change this setting."
/>,
);
}
describe("RuntimeSection — VPN support toggle", () => {
beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
it("saves only the VPN flag when switched on", () => {
renderSection();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: VPN }));
expect(save).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ vpn_support_enabled: true });
});
it("saves the flag off again, rather than dropping the key", () => {
// Off has to be written explicitly: the container carries a
// `triple-c.vpn-support` label either way, and an absent value would leave
// the capability granted.
renderSection({ vpn_support_enabled: true });
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: VPN }));
expect(save).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ vpn_support_enabled: false });
});
it("reflects the project's current state", () => {
renderSection({ vpn_support_enabled: true });
expect(screen.getByRole("switch", { name: VPN })).toBeChecked();
});
it("cannot be changed while the container is running", () => {
// Capabilities and devices are fixed at creation, so this setting is gated
// on the container being stopped along with the rest of the tab.
renderSection({}, true);
const toggle = screen.getByRole("switch", { name: VPN });
expect(toggle).toBeDisabled();
fireEvent.click(toggle);
expect(save).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("warns that the change recreates the container", () => {
renderSection();
expect(
screen.getByText(/recreates the container on its next start/i),
).toBeInTheDocument();
});
});
/**
* `scope="project"` on the settings editor is one prop with no visible owner,
* and deleting it fails silently in the worst possible direction: the editor
* falls back to `"global"`, every three-state control collapses to an on/off
* switch, and a field the project is *inheriting* as on renders flat Off. The
* user then reads a lie and, worse, flipping that switch writes a deliberate
* `false` that overrides the global On they thought they were looking at.
*
* Nothing asserted the prop was passed, so these go through what is rendered
* rather than through props a switch where a select belongs is exactly the
* regression, and it is visible from the outside.
*/
describe("RuntimeSection — Claude Code settings are edited at project scope", () => {
beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
it("gives every setting the third Global state a project can inherit through", () => {
renderSection();
const focus = screen.getByLabelText("Focus mode") as HTMLSelectElement;
expect(
Array.from(focus.querySelectorAll("option")).map((o) => o.getAttribute("value")),
).toEqual(["global", "off", "on"]);
});
it("renders an untouched setting as inheriting, not as Off", () => {
// `claude_code_settings: null` means "this project has no opinion", which
// is not the same instruction as off. At global scope the same field is a
// plain unchecked switch — indistinguishable from a user who turned it
// off, and the reason the missing prop would never be noticed.
renderSection({ claude_code_settings: null });
expect((screen.getByLabelText("Focus mode") as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe(
"global",
);
expect(screen.queryByRole("switch", { name: "Focus mode" })).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("keeps a stored project override visible over the inherited value", () => {
renderSection({
claude_code_settings: {
tui_mode: null,
effort: null,
auto_scroll_disabled: null,
focus_mode: true,
show_thinking_summaries: null,
session_recap_disabled: null,
env_scrub: null,
prompt_caching_1h: null,
},
});
expect((screen.getByLabelText("Focus mode") as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("on");
});
});
describe("RuntimeSection — auth bridge toggle", () => {
beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
it("is reachable while the container is running", async () => {
// The rest of the tab is gated on a stopped container because those
// settings are baked in at creation. This one is host-side and has its own
// command, and the moment a user needs it is the moment a login is hanging
// in a *running* container — so the tab's `disabled` must not reach it.
renderSection({ status: "running" }, true);
const toggle = screen.getByRole("switch", { name: "Auth bridge" });
await waitFor(() => expect(toggle).not.toBeDisabled());
fireEvent.click(toggle);
await waitFor(() => expect(setAuthBridgeEnabled).toHaveBeenCalledWith("p1", true));
// And never through the generic project save, which would drop it on the
// floor while the container runs.
expect(save).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import { ConfigGroup, SwitchRow } from "../../../ui/Field";
import PermissionModeControl, { permissionModePatch } from "../../PermissionModeControl";
import ClaudeInstructionsEditor from "../../ClaudeInstructionsEditor";
import ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor from "../../ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor";
import AuthBridgeRow from "./AuthBridgeRow";
interface Props {
project: Project;
@@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ export default function RuntimeSection({
<SwitchRow
label="VPN support"
hint="Grants NET_ADMIN and the /dev/net/tun device so a VPN client (PIA, WireGuard, OpenVPN) can build a tunnel inside the container. Without it a client installs and runs but its connection hangs until it times out. Anything in the container can then reconfigure the container's own network stack; the host's is untouched. Changing this recreates the container on its next start — the home and .claude volumes are preserved."
hint="Grants NET_ADMIN and the /dev/net/tun device so a VPN client (PIA, WireGuard, OpenVPN, Tailscale) can build a tunnel inside the container. Without it a client installs and runs but its connection hangs until it times out. Anything in the container can then reconfigure the container's own network stack; the host's is untouched."
control={
<Toggle
label="VPN support"
@@ -71,12 +70,6 @@ export default function RuntimeSection({
}
/>
{/* Not gated on `disabled`: the bridge is host-side and has its own
command, so it can be switched on while a login is hanging which
is the only moment anyone reaches for it. It owns its state rather
than going through `save`. */}
<AuthBridgeRow project={project} />
<SwitchRow
label="Mission Control"
hint="A web dashboard for monitoring and managing Claude sessions remotely."
@@ -109,19 +102,9 @@ export default function RuntimeSection({
<ConfigGroup
title="Claude Code settings"
description={
"Per-project CLI behaviour. Anything left on Global follows Settings; " +
"Off overrides a global On. Changing any of these recreates the container, " +
"which commits a new image layer — so flipping switches repeatedly costs disk. " +
"Turning TUI mode, Effort level, Focus mode or Session recap back to Global " +
"also needs the base image updated first: those four are cleared by removing a " +
"key, and an older image's startup script ignores the instruction to remove it. " +
"Update the base image from Overview. TUI mode, Effort level and Focus mode " +
"visibly refuse to switch off until you do; Session recap just stays off silently."
}
description="Per-project CLI behaviour. These override the global defaults in Settings."
>
<ClaudeCodeSettingsEditor
scope="project"
settings={project.claude_code_settings}
disabled={disabled}
disabledReason={disabledReason}
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, fireEvent, act } from "@testing-library/react";
import WorkspaceSection from "./WorkspaceSection";
import type { Project } from "../../../../lib/types";
// The Browse button is the OS folder picker.
const open = vi.fn();
vi.mock("@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog", () => ({
open: (...args: unknown[]) => open(...args),
}));
const baseProject: Project = {
id: "p1",
name: "api-server",
paths: [{ host_path: "/src/api", mount_name: "api" }],
container_id: null,
status: "stopped",
backend: "anthropic",
bedrock_config: null,
ollama_config: null,
llamacpp_config: null,
openai_compatible_config: null,
allow_docker_access: false,
sandbox_mode_enabled: true,
mission_control_enabled: false,
auth_bridge_enabled: false,
browser_view_enabled: false,
vpn_support_enabled: false,
use_shared_auth_token: true,
full_permissions: false,
permission_mode: null,
ssh_key_path: null,
ca_cert_path: null,
git_token: null,
git_user_name: null,
git_user_email: null,
custom_env_vars: [],
port_mappings: [],
claude_instructions: null,
claude_code_settings: null,
renamed_session_names: {},
created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
};
const save = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true);
function renderSection(over: Partial<Project> = {}, disabled = false) {
return render(
<WorkspaceSection
project={{ ...baseProject, ...over }}
save={save}
disabled={disabled}
/>,
);
}
/** Every folder list this component has sent to `update_project`. */
function savedLists() {
return save.mock.calls
.filter(([patch]) => "paths" in patch)
.map(([patch]) => patch.paths);
}
describe("WorkspaceSection — the blank row is never stored", () => {
beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
/**
* The bug this file exists for. `create_container` mounts every stored row
* unfiltered, so a persisted `{host_path: "", mount_name: ""}` becomes
* `{"Target": "/workspace/", "Source": ""}` and the daemon refuses the whole
* container with `field Source must not be empty` the project can never be
* started or recreated again. Click "+ Add folder", blur a field, and it is
* bricked.
*/
it("drops the placeholder row when a real edit is saved", () => {
renderSection();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "+ Add folder" }));
const hostPath = screen.getByLabelText("Folder 1 host path");
fireEvent.change(hostPath, { target: { value: "/src/api-v2" } });
fireEvent.blur(hostPath);
expect(save).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(savedLists()[0]).toEqual([{ host_path: "/src/api-v2", mount_name: "api" }]);
});
it("drops it when Browse fills a different row in", async () => {
open.mockResolvedValueOnce("/src/api-v2");
renderSection();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "+ Add folder" }));
// The picker is awaited inside the handler, so the state update that
// follows it lands outside the click.
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.click(screen.getAllByRole("button", { name: "Browse" })[0]);
});
expect(savedLists()[0]).toEqual([{ host_path: "/src/api-v2", mount_name: "api" }]);
});
it("drops it when a row is removed", () => {
renderSection({
paths: [
{ host_path: "/src/api", mount_name: "api" },
{ host_path: "/src/web", mount_name: "web" },
],
});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "+ Add folder" }));
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Remove folder 2" }));
expect(savedLists()[0]).toEqual([{ host_path: "/src/api", mount_name: "api" }]);
});
it("never sends a row with an empty host path, whatever the route", () => {
renderSection();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "+ Add folder" }));
const hostPath = screen.getByLabelText("Folder 1 host path");
fireEvent.change(hostPath, { target: { value: "/src/api-v2" } });
fireEvent.blur(hostPath);
for (const list of savedLists()) {
for (const row of list) {
expect(row.host_path).not.toBe("");
expect(row.mount_name).not.toBe("");
}
}
});
});
describe("WorkspaceSection — what a blur is allowed to save", () => {
beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
/**
* Both inputs save on blur, so tabbing from the host path to the mount name
* fires a save with the name still empty which `update_project` refuses,
* turning an ordinary keystroke into an error toast.
*/
it("holds a half-filled row back until it is complete", () => {
renderSection();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "+ Add folder" }));
const newHostPath = screen.getByLabelText("Folder 2 host path");
fireEvent.change(newHostPath, { target: { value: "/src/web" } });
fireEvent.blur(newHostPath);
expect(save).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const newMountName = screen.getByLabelText("Folder 2 mount name");
fireEvent.change(newMountName, { target: { value: "web" } });
fireEvent.blur(newMountName);
expect(savedLists()[0]).toEqual([
{ host_path: "/src/api", mount_name: "api" },
{ host_path: "/src/web", mount_name: "web" },
]);
});
/**
* Blurring out of an untouched field is not an edit. Saving anyway would
* round-trip the filtered list through `project` and take the empty row away
* while the user was still filling it in.
*/
it("saves nothing when the blur changed nothing", () => {
renderSection();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "+ Add folder" }));
fireEvent.blur(screen.getByLabelText("Folder 1 mount name"));
expect(save).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(screen.getByLabelText("Folder 2 host path")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("still saves a rename, which does not go through the folder list", () => {
renderSection();
const name = screen.getByDisplayValue("api-server");
fireEvent.change(name, { target: { value: "api-v2" } });
fireEvent.blur(name);
expect(save).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ name: "api-v2" });
});
});
@@ -10,14 +10,6 @@ interface Props {
disabled: boolean;
}
/** Whether two folder lists are the same rows in the same order. */
function sameRows(a: ProjectPath[], b: ProjectPath[]): boolean {
return (
a.length === b.length &&
a.every((row, i) => row.host_path === b[i].host_path && row.mount_name === b[i].mount_name)
);
}
export default function WorkspaceSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
const [name, setName] = useState(project.name);
const [paths, setPaths] = useState<ProjectPath[]>(project.paths ?? []);
@@ -27,49 +19,6 @@ export default function WorkspaceSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
setPaths(project.paths ?? []);
}, [project]);
/**
* Persist a folder list, minus the rows that are only in it because the UI
* put them there.
*
* **The blank row must never reach the store.** "+ Add folder" inserts
* `{host_path: "", mount_name: ""}` deliberately, and `create_container`
* mounts every stored row unfiltered a stored blank one becomes
* `{"Target": "/workspace/", "Source": ""}`, which the daemon rejects with
* `field Source must not be empty`. The project then cannot be started or
* recreated at all, from a click and a blur. `AddProjectDialog` has always
* filtered this; this section computed the filtered list and then saved the
* unfiltered one.
*
* Every save goes through here for that reason Browse and Remove write the
* list too, and either can be holding a blank row from an earlier click.
*/
const persist = (rows: ProjectPath[]) => {
const filled = rows.filter((p) => p.host_path.trim() || p.mount_name.trim());
return save({ paths: filled });
};
/**
* Save only when every row is fully filled in.
*
* Both inputs save on blur, so tabbing from the host path to the mount name
* fires a save with the name still empty. `update_project` now validates
* a half-filled row is refused so the unconditional save turned an ordinary
* keystroke into an error toast. A blank row is *not* incomplete: the
* "+ Add folder" button adds one deliberately, and it is dropped on save.
*
* A blur that changed nothing saves nothing, which is what keeps the blank
* row on screen while it is being filled in: persisting the filtered list
* would round-trip through `project` and take the empty row away under the
* cursor.
*/
const saveIfComplete = () => {
const filled = paths.filter((p) => p.host_path.trim() || p.mount_name.trim());
const halfFilled = filled.some((p) => !p.host_path.trim() || !p.mount_name.trim());
if (halfFilled) return;
if (sameRows(filled, project.paths ?? [])) return;
return persist(paths);
};
return (
<ConfigGroup
title="Workspace"
@@ -121,7 +70,7 @@ export default function WorkspaceSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
updated[i] = { ...updated[i], host_path: e.target.value };
setPaths(updated);
}}
onBlur={() => saveIfComplete()}
onBlur={() => save({ paths })}
placeholder="/path/to/folder"
disabled={disabled}
className={`flex-1 min-w-0 ${inputClass}`}
@@ -141,7 +90,7 @@ export default function WorkspaceSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
mount_name: updated[i].mount_name || basename,
};
setPaths(updated);
persist(updated);
save({ paths: updated });
}
}}
>
@@ -158,7 +107,7 @@ export default function WorkspaceSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
updated[i] = { ...updated[i], mount_name: e.target.value };
setPaths(updated);
}}
onBlur={() => saveIfComplete()}
onBlur={() => save({ paths })}
placeholder="name"
disabled={disabled}
className={`w-40 ${monoInputClass}`}
@@ -172,7 +121,7 @@ export default function WorkspaceSection({ project, save, disabled }: Props) {
onClick={() => {
const updated = paths.filter((_, j) => j !== i);
setPaths(updated);
persist(updated);
save({ paths: updated });
}}
>
Remove

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