Let a project's container run a VPN client

A VPN client installed in a container today starts, runs, and then hangs
until its connection times out. Nothing reports an error: a default
container has no /dev/net/tun to open and no CAP_NET_ADMIN to add an
interface or a route with, and clients surface that as a generic timeout
rather than a permissions failure.

Add an opt-in per-project "VPN support" switch granting the three things
a tunnel needs. They are useless individually, which is why
vpn_host_config() defines the set in one place and the tests assert all
of it:

  * CAP_NET_ADMIN — Docker's default bounding set has net_raw but not
    net_admin, so a client can ping but never connect.
  * /dev/net/tun — passed through from the host so the kernel's tun
    module backs it, rather than mknod-ed inside.
  * net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark — WireGuard's wg-quick sets this and
    cannot from inside a container, /proc/sys being read-only, so its
    handshakes are dropped by reverse-path filtering.

Off by default and deliberately opt-in: NET_ADMIN lets anything in the
container reconfigure that container's network stack. It is namespaced —
no authority over the host's interfaces or any other container.

Capabilities and devices are fixed when a container is created, so this
is container state and takes the label-and-compare treatment.
triple-c.vpn-support is written unconditionally, false included, for the
usual docker commit reason: a true stamped once would ride the snapshot
image into every future container and make the switch impossible to turn
back off. A missing label reads as false and off is byte-identical to
today, so no existing project is churned.

Requesting the device fails at creation when the host kernel has no tun
module, which would otherwise surface as a project that simply refuses to
start. explain_create_failure() rewrites that one error to name the
switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-versus-your-machine distinction, and
leaves every other failure untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/workflows/build-app.yml

@@ -39,48 +39,13 @@ jobs:
           MAJOR_MINOR=$(cat VERSION | tr -d '[:space:]')
           echo "Major.Minor: ${MAJOR_MINOR}"
 
-          # The patch number is **one past the highest patch already used**, and
+          # Find the latest tag matching v{MAJOR_MINOR}.N (exclude -mac, -win suffixes)
-          # never a distance.
+          # `|| true` so an empty grep result doesn't fail the step under pipefail.
-          #
+          LATEST_TAG=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" --sort=-v:refname | grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" | head -1 || true)
-          # It used to be `git rev-list --count <highest tag>..HEAD`, which is
-          # not a counter at all: it measures how far HEAD has drifted from
-          # whichever tag sorts highest, and that resets to zero every time a
-          # tag is cut. The published history is the proof — each of these is
-          # exactly what the old formula returned at the time:
-          #
-          #   v0.4.0 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3    looked fine
-          #   v0.4.3 -> 4 commits -> v0.4.4    fine by luck, 4 > 3
-          #   v0.4.4 -> 2 commits -> v0.4.2    went backwards
-          #   v0.4.4 -> 6 commits -> v0.4.6    jumped, skipping .5
-          #   v0.4.6 -> 3 commits -> v0.4.3    already taken; the upload failed
-          #
-          # Reusing a version is worse than failing to publish one: the macOS
-          # and Windows steps replace assets in place, so a duplicate silently
-          # rewrote a release that had been public for three days. Monotonic
-          # numbering is what stops that at the source.
-          #
-          # Suffixed tags count too. `create-tag` is skipped when any platform
-          # job fails, so a run can publish v0.4.7-mac and never create the
-          # plain v0.4.7 — reading only unsuffixed tags would then hand the
-          # same number out twice.
-          HIGHEST=$(git tag -l "v${MAJOR_MINOR}.*" \
-            | grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+(-mac|-win)?$" \
-            | sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+).*/\1/" \
-            | sort -n | tail -1 || true)
 
-          # A re-run of a commit that already released must not mint a new
+          if [ -n "$LATEST_TAG" ]; then
-          # version just because its own tag now exists.
+            echo "Latest matching tag: ${LATEST_TAG}"
-          EXISTING=$(git tag --points-at HEAD \
+            PATCH=$(git rev-list --count "${LATEST_TAG}..HEAD")
-            | grep -E "^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.[0-9]+$" \
-            | sed -E "s/^v${MAJOR_MINOR}\.([0-9]+)$/\1/" \
-            | sort -n | tail -1 || true)
-
-          if [ -n "$EXISTING" ]; then
-            echo "HEAD is already tagged v${MAJOR_MINOR}.${EXISTING} — reusing it"
-            PATCH="${EXISTING}"
-          elif [ -n "$HIGHEST" ]; then
-            echo "Highest patch already used on this line: ${HIGHEST}"
-            PATCH=$((HIGHEST + 1))
           else
             # A minor line nobody has tagged yet is a *new* line, and a new line
             # starts at .0 — that is what "we are moving to 0.4.x" means. The
@@ -200,70 +165,21 @@ jobs:
         env:
           TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
         run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
           TAG="v${{ needs.compute-version.outputs.version }}"
-
+          # Create release
-          # Idempotent get-or-create, matching build-macos. This step used to
+          curl -s -X POST \
-          # POST /releases unconditionally: against a tag that already existed
-          # Gitea answered 409, the grep below found no id, and the run died
-          # with a bare "exitcode '1'" and not one line of output explaining
-          # it — `curl -s` with no `-f` swallows the HTTP error, so nothing
-          # ever said "409" or "duplicate tag". Hence -fsS throughout, and
-          # pipefail so a failure cannot be stepped over.
-          HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sS -o release.json -w '%{http_code}' \
-            -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-            "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/tags/${TAG}")
-          case "${HTTP_CODE}" in
-            200)
-              echo "Release ${TAG} already exists, reusing"
-              ;;
-            404)
-              echo "Creating release ${TAG}"
-              curl -fsS -X POST \
             -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
             -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
             -d "{\"tag_name\": \"${TAG}\", \"name\": \"Triple-C ${TAG} (Linux)\", \"body\": \"Automated build from commit ${{ gitea.sha }}\"}" \
             "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases" > release.json
-              ;;
+          RELEASE_ID=$(cat release.json | grep -o '"id":[0-9]*' | head -1 | grep -o '[0-9]*')
-            *)
-              echo "Unexpected ${HTTP_CODE} looking up release ${TAG}:" >&2
-              cat release.json >&2
-              exit 1
-              ;;
-          esac
-
-          RELEASE_ID=$(python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(open('release.json')).get('id',''))")
-          if [ -z "${RELEASE_ID}" ]; then
-            echo "No release id for ${TAG}; refusing to upload into nothing:" >&2
-            cat release.json >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
           echo "Release ID: ${RELEASE_ID}"
-
+          # Upload each artifact
-          # Replace-not-conflict, so a retry after a partial upload succeeds.
-          # Versions are monotonic now (see compute-version), so this can only
-          # ever be replacing an asset from a failed run of this same commit —
-          # never one belonging to an already-published version.
           for file in artifacts/*; do
             [ -f "$file" ] || continue
             filename=$(basename "$file")
-
-            EXISTING_ID=$(curl -sS \
-              -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-              "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}/assets" \
-              | python3 -c "import json,sys; t=sys.argv[1]; print(next((a['id'] for a in json.load(sys.stdin) if a.get('name')==t), ''))" "${filename}" || true)
-            if [ -n "${EXISTING_ID}" ]; then
-              echo "Deleting existing asset ${filename} (id ${EXISTING_ID})"
-              curl -fsS -X DELETE \
-                -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
-                "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases/${RELEASE_ID}/assets/${EXISTING_ID}"
-            fi
-
             echo "Uploading ${filename}..."
-            curl -fsS --http1.1 \
+            curl -s -X POST \
-              --retry 5 --retry-all-errors --retry-delay 5 \
-              --max-time 600 \
-              -X POST \
               -H "Authorization: token ${TOKEN}" \
               -H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
               --data-binary "@${file}" \

CLAUDE.md

@@ -273,6 +273,30 @@ migration and Reset. Four things here are not obvious:
   actively **removes** `triple-c-*.crt` when the setting is cleared — `/usr/local/share` rides the
   project's snapshot image, so turning the feature off has to undo, not merely stop.
 
+### VPN support (`vpn_support_enabled`, `docker/container.rs`)
+
+An opt-in per-project switch granting the container what a VPN client needs to build a tunnel.
+`vpn_host_config()` is the single definition of what that means, and it is unit-tested because a
+container is created once by a very long function where a dropped capability is invisible.
+
+- **All three pieces or none.** `CAP_NET_ADMIN` (Docker's default set has `net_raw` but *not*
+  `net_admin`, so a client can ping but never connect), the `/dev/net/tun` device (absent
+  entirely from a default container — nothing to open even with the capability), and
+  `net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark=1` (WireGuard's `wg-quick` sets it and cannot from inside a
+  container, since `/proc/sys` is read-only, so handshake packets die to reverse-path filtering).
+  Any two without the third still presents as a connection that hangs to a timeout, which is why
+  the tests assert the whole set.
+- **The device is passed through from the host, never `mknod`-ed inside.** The kernel's `tun`
+  module has to back it. When the host has no such device the failure lands at *creation* — the
+  project simply won't start — so `explain_create_failure()` rewrites that one error to name the
+  switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-vs-your-machine distinction. Do not let it degrade to a raw
+  bollard string.
+- **`triple-c.vpn-support` is written unconditionally, including `false`.** The usual
+  `docker commit` reason: a `true` stamped once would ride the snapshot image into every future
+  container and make the switch impossible to turn off.
+- Off is byte-identical to a container created before the feature existed, and a missing label
+  reads as `false`, so no existing project is churned.
+
 ### Container Lifecycle
 
 Containers use a **stop/start** model (not create/destroy). Installed packages persist across stops. The `.claude` config dir uses a named Docker volume (`triple-c-claude-config-{projectId}`), nested inside the home volume (`triple-c-home-{projectId}`), so OAuth tokens and Claude Code config survive container stop/start *and* container recreation.

HOW-TO-USE.md

@@ -471,6 +471,32 @@ When enabled, the host Docker socket is mounted into the container so Claude Cod
 
 > Toggling this requires stopping and restarting the container to take effect.
 
+### VPN Support
+
+When enabled, the container is given the three things a VPN client needs to build a tunnel:
+the `NET_ADMIN` capability, the `/dev/net/tun` device, and the `net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark`
+sysctl that WireGuard requires. This is **off by default**.
+
+Without it, a client such as PIA, WireGuard, OpenVPN or Tailscale installs and its daemon starts
+normally, but the connection attempt **hangs until it times out** — a default container has no tun
+device to open and no permission to add an interface or a route, and most clients report that as a
+generic timeout rather than a permissions error.
+
+Things worth knowing:
+
+- `NET_ADMIN` applies to the container's **own** network namespace. It confers no authority over
+  the host's interfaces or over any other container. It does mean anything running in the
+  container can reconfigure that namespace, which is why it is opt-in.
+- The **Docker host's** kernel must have the `tun` module available. With Docker Desktop that is
+  the Linux VM, not your own machine. If it is missing, the container fails to create with an
+  error naming `/dev/net/tun` and pointing back at this setting.
+- A VPN client's kill switch applies to everything in the container, Claude Code included. If the
+  tunnel drops, expect API calls to fail until it reconnects or the kill switch is turned off.
+
+> This setting can only be changed when the container is stopped. Capabilities and devices are
+> fixed when a container is created, so toggling it recreates the container on the next start.
+> Recreation preserves the home and `.claude` volumes — it is not a Reset.
+
 ### Mission Control
 
 Toggle **Mission Control** to integrate Flight Control — an AI-first development methodology bundled with Triple-C — into the project. When enabled:

app/src-tauri/src/docker/container.rs

@@ -798,6 +798,92 @@ async fn resolve_base_image_id(image_name: &str, base_image_name: &str) -> Strin
         .unwrap_or_default()
 }
 
+/// The `/dev/net/tun` character device, as it is named on both sides.
+const TUN_DEVICE: &str = "/dev/net/tun";
+
+/// The `HostConfig` fields "VPN support" contributes: `CapAdd`, `Devices`,
+/// `Sysctls` — in that order.
+type VpnHostConfigParts = (
+    Option<Vec<String>>,
+    Option<Vec<bollard::models::DeviceMapping>>,
+    Option<HashMap<String, String>>,
+);
+
+/// The three host-config pieces a VPN client needs, or all-`None` when the
+/// project has not opted in.
+///
+/// Returned as a triple rather than set inline so the exact shape is unit
+/// testable — a container is created once, by a very long async function, and a
+/// silently-dropped capability looks identical to a VPN server that is simply
+/// unreachable.
+///
+/// All three are required together and each fails differently on its own:
+/// * **`CAP_NET_ADMIN`** — without it the client cannot create an interface or
+///   write a route. Docker's default bounding set grants `net_raw` but not
+///   `net_admin`, which is why a client can ping but never connect.
+/// * **`/dev/net/tun`** — the device is absent from a default container, so
+///   there is nothing to open even with the capability. It is passed through
+///   from the host rather than `mknod`-ed inside, so the kernel's `tun` module
+///   backs it.
+/// * **`net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark`** — WireGuard's own `wg-quick` sets
+///   this, and cannot from inside a container (`/proc/sys` is read-only), so
+///   its handshake packets are dropped by reverse-path filtering. Harmless for
+///   OpenVPN-based clients, so it is set unconditionally with the rest.
+///
+/// This is namespaced to the container's own network stack: `NET_ADMIN` confers
+/// no authority over the host's interfaces or over any other container.
+fn vpn_host_config(enabled: bool) -> VpnHostConfigParts {
+    if !enabled {
+        return (None, None, None);
+    }
+
+    let devices = vec![bollard::models::DeviceMapping {
+        path_on_host: Some(TUN_DEVICE.to_string()),
+        path_in_container: Some(TUN_DEVICE.to_string()),
+        cgroup_permissions: Some("rwm".to_string()),
+    }];
+
+    let sysctls = HashMap::from([(
+        "net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark".to_string(),
+        "1".to_string(),
+    )]);
+
+    (
+        Some(vec!["NET_ADMIN".to_string()]),
+        Some(devices),
+        Some(sysctls),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Turn the daemon's device-passthrough failure into an explanation.
+///
+/// Requesting `/dev/net/tun` fails at *creation* when the host kernel has no
+/// `tun` module — and the raw bollard error names a path the user will look for
+/// on the wrong machine, since with Docker Desktop the relevant host is the
+/// Linux VM rather than their own. Left unmapped this surfaces as a project
+/// that simply refuses to start, with nothing pointing back at the switch that
+/// caused it.
+fn explain_create_failure(err: &str, vpn_enabled: bool) -> String {
+    let device_missing = vpn_enabled
+        && err.contains(TUN_DEVICE)
+        && (err.contains("no such file or directory")
+            || err.contains("No such file or directory")
+            || err.contains("error gathering device information"));
+
+    if device_missing {
+        return format!(
+            "Failed to create container: the Docker host has no {} device, which \
+             \"VPN support\" requires. The host kernel needs the `tun` module \
+             loaded (on Docker Desktop that is the Linux VM, not your own \
+             machine). Turn VPN support off in Config → Runtime to start this \
+             project without it. Original error: {}",
+            TUN_DEVICE, err
+        );
+    }
+
+    format!("Failed to create container: {}", err)
+}
+
 pub async fn create_container(
     project: &Project,
     docker_socket_path: &str,
@@ -1375,6 +1461,13 @@ pub async fn create_container(
     labels.insert("triple-c.image".to_string(), image_name.to_string());
     labels.insert("triple-c.timezone".to_string(), timezone.unwrap_or("").to_string());
     labels.insert("triple-c.mission-control".to_string(), project.mission_control_enabled.to_string());
+    // Capabilities, devices and sysctls are fixed at creation, so this is
+    // container state and gets the label-and-compare treatment. Written
+    // unconditionally (`false`, not omitted) because `docker commit` copies
+    // container labels onto the snapshot image: a `true` stamped once would
+    // otherwise ride that snapshot into every future container and make the
+    // switch impossible to turn back off.
+    labels.insert("triple-c.vpn-support".to_string(), project.vpn_support_enabled.to_string());
     labels.insert("triple-c.permission-mode".to_string(),
         project.effective_permission_mode().as_env_value().to_string());
     labels.insert("triple-c.custom-env-fingerprint".to_string(), custom_env_fingerprint.clone());
@@ -1443,10 +1536,15 @@ pub async fn create_container(
         labels.insert((*key).to_string(), (*value).to_string());
     }
 
+    let (cap_add, devices, sysctls) = vpn_host_config(project.vpn_support_enabled);
+
     let host_config = HostConfig {
         mounts: Some(mounts),
         port_bindings: if port_bindings.is_empty() { None } else { Some(port_bindings) },
         init: Some(true),
+        cap_add,
+        devices,
+        sysctls,
         ..Default::default()
     };
 
@@ -1476,7 +1574,7 @@ pub async fn create_container(
     let response = docker
         .create_container(Some(options), config)
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create container: {}", e))?;
+        .map_err(|e| explain_create_failure(&e.to_string(), project.vpn_support_enabled))?;
 
     Ok(response.id)
 }
@@ -2367,6 +2465,19 @@ pub async fn container_needs_recreation(
         return Ok(true);
     }
 
+    // ── VPN support (NET_ADMIN + /dev/net/tun + sysctl) ───────────────────
+    // A container's capabilities, devices and sysctls are set at creation and
+    // cannot be changed on a running or stopped container, so recreation is the
+    // only way a toggle here takes effect. A missing label means the container
+    // predates the feature, which is the same thing as having it off — so
+    // existing projects are not churned until someone actually turns it on.
+    let expected_vpn = project.vpn_support_enabled.to_string();
+    let container_vpn = get_label("triple-c.vpn-support").unwrap_or_else(|| "false".to_string());
+    if container_vpn != expected_vpn {
+        log::info!("VPN support mismatch (container={:?}, expected={:?})", container_vpn, expected_vpn);
+        return Ok(true);
+    }
+
     // ── Permission mode ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     // The mode is injected as the TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE env var, and
     // container env can only change by recreating the container. A missing
@@ -2616,6 +2727,76 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(fp, "");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn vpn_support_off_touches_nothing_in_the_host_config() {
+        // The default must stay byte-identical to a container created before the
+        // feature existed, or every project recreates on the next start.
+        let (cap_add, devices, sysctls) = vpn_host_config(false);
+        assert_eq!(cap_add, None);
+        assert_eq!(devices, None);
+        assert_eq!(sysctls, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vpn_support_on_grants_all_three_pieces() {
+        // Each is useless without the others — a client with the capability but
+        // no device, or the device but no capability, still times out — so this
+        // asserts the whole set rather than any one of them.
+        let (cap_add, devices, sysctls) = vpn_host_config(true);
+
+        assert_eq!(cap_add, Some(vec!["NET_ADMIN".to_string()]));
+
+        let devices = devices.expect("the tun device must be passed through");
+        assert_eq!(devices.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(devices[0].path_on_host.as_deref(), Some(TUN_DEVICE));
+        assert_eq!(devices[0].path_in_container.as_deref(), Some(TUN_DEVICE));
+        assert_eq!(devices[0].cgroup_permissions.as_deref(), Some("rwm"));
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            sysctls
+                .expect("wireguard needs src_valid_mark")
+                .get("net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark")
+                .map(String::as_str),
+            Some("1")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn vpn_support_never_grants_more_than_net_admin() {
+        // NET_ADMIN is already a step out of the sandbox. Anything else added
+        // here (SYS_ADMIN, or a blanket privileged flag) would be a much larger
+        // one, so pin the set.
+        let (cap_add, _, _) = vpn_host_config(true);
+        assert_eq!(cap_add.unwrap(), vec!["NET_ADMIN"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_missing_tun_device_is_explained_rather_than_echoed() {
+        let raw = "error gathering device information while adding custom device \
+                   \"/dev/net/tun\": no such file or directory";
+        let msg = explain_create_failure(raw, true);
+        assert!(msg.contains("VPN support"), "should name the switch: {}", msg);
+        assert!(msg.contains("tun` module"), "should name the cause: {}", msg);
+        assert!(msg.contains(raw), "should keep the original error: {}", msg);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unrelated_failures_are_left_alone() {
+        // Including a tun error on a project that never asked for VPN support —
+        // that came from somewhere else and must not be misattributed.
+        let name_clash = "Conflict. The container name \"/triple-c-x\" is already in use";
+        assert_eq!(
+            explain_create_failure(name_clash, true),
+            format!("Failed to create container: {}", name_clash)
+        );
+
+        let tun_err = "no such file or directory: /dev/net/tun";
+        assert_eq!(
+            explain_create_failure(tun_err, false),
+            format!("Failed to create container: {}", tun_err)
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn the_orphan_sweep_only_ever_looks_at_our_own_untagged_images() {
         // Both conditions are load-bearing. Without `dangling` the sweep would

app/src-tauri/src/models/project.rs

@@ -145,6 +145,21 @@ pub struct Project {
     /// container-recreation label.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub browser_view_enabled: bool,
+    /// Grant the container what a VPN client needs to build a tunnel:
+    /// `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, the `/dev/net/tun` device, and the WireGuard
+    /// `src_valid_mark` sysctl. Without all three a client (PIA, WireGuard,
+    /// OpenVPN, Tailscale) installs and runs but its connection attempt hangs
+    /// until it times out, because it cannot create the tunnel interface or
+    /// touch the routing table.
+    ///
+    /// Off by default and deliberately opt-in: `NET_ADMIN` lets anything in the
+    /// container reconfigure its own network stack, which is a meaningful step
+    /// out of the default sandbox. Unlike `auth_bridge_enabled` this *is*
+    /// container state, so it carries a `triple-c.vpn-support` label and is
+    /// compared in `container_needs_recreation` — capabilities and devices are
+    /// fixed at creation and can only change by recreating the container.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub vpn_support_enabled: bool,
     /// Use the shared, long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (from
     /// `claude setup-token`, held in the OS keychain) for this project instead
     /// of requiring its own `claude login`. Only consulted when `backend` is
@@ -366,6 +381,7 @@ impl Project {
             mission_control_enabled: false,
             auth_bridge_enabled: false,
             browser_view_enabled: false,
+            vpn_support_enabled: false,
             use_shared_auth_token: default_use_shared_auth_token(),
             full_permissions: false,
             permission_mode: None,

app/src/components/projects/home/OverviewTab.tsx

@@ -120,6 +120,15 @@ export default function OverviewTab({
               {project.mission_control_enabled ? "ON" : "OFF"}
             </span>
           </span>
+          {/* Only when granted. It is off for nearly every project and an
+              always-present "VPN OFF" would be noise, but where it *is* on the
+              container holds NET_ADMIN, which is worth seeing at a glance. */}
+          {project.vpn_support_enabled && (
+            <span className="text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
+              VPN support{" "}
+              <span className="text-[var(--text-primary)] font-medium">ON</span>
+            </span>
+          )}
           <button
             type="button"
             onClick={() => onOpenTab("config")}

app/src/components/projects/home/config/RuntimeSection.tsx

@@ -57,6 +57,19 @@ export default function RuntimeSection({
           }
         />
 
+        <SwitchRow
+          label="VPN support"
+          hint="Grants NET_ADMIN and the /dev/net/tun device so a VPN client (PIA, WireGuard, OpenVPN, Tailscale) can build a tunnel inside the container. Without it a client installs and runs but its connection hangs until it times out. Anything in the container can then reconfigure the container's own network stack; the host's is untouched."
+          control={
+            <Toggle
+              label="VPN support"
+              checked={project.vpn_support_enabled}
+              disabled={disabled}
+              onChange={(v) => save({ vpn_support_enabled: v })}
+            />
+          }
+        />
+
         <SwitchRow
           label="Mission Control"
           hint="A web dashboard for monitoring and managing Claude sessions remotely."

app/src/lib/types.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ export interface Project {
   auth_bridge_enabled: boolean;
   /** Opt in to the browser-view pane. Host-side only, like `auth_bridge_enabled`. */
   browser_view_enabled: boolean;
+  /** Grant NET_ADMIN, /dev/net/tun and the WireGuard `src_valid_mark` sysctl so
+   *  a VPN client inside the container can build a tunnel. Unlike the two flags
+   *  above this is container state — changing it recreates the container. */
+  vpn_support_enabled: boolean;
   /** Use the shared long-lived Claude Code token (from `claude setup-token`,
    *  held in the OS keychain) instead of this project's own `claude login`.
    *  Defaults to true; only applies when `backend` is "anthropic" and a token