shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
01a2f6aec8
Project Home (DESIGN-REVIEW §B2): the project is promoted from a 280px
sidebar card to a first-class main-area view. ProjectCard.tsx (1,257
lines) is replaced by a select-only ProjectRow plus tabs for Overview,
Sessions, Automation, Config and Files. The PortMappings, FileManager
and ContainerProgress modals are absorbed rather than reimplemented.
Config gains a Saved/Saving/Failed indicator — save-on-blur failures
previously reached only console.error.
Tier-1 polish (DESIGN-REVIEW §A): new elevation, muted-accent, disabled
and focus-ring tokens; a global :focus-visible ring with every
focus:outline-none removed; filled buttons moved to --accent-emphasis
and white-on-success toggles retired, fixing three WCAG AA failures
(2.1:1, 2.5:1, 2.4:1); a shared Modal primitive with role="dialog",
focus trap and restore, adopted by all remaining modals; status
indicators that carry a glyph and word rather than colour alone.
Ctrl+Shift+W closes a tab, deliberately not Ctrl+W — that is readline's
kill-word, used constantly in the terminal this app is built around.
Auth Bridge: a general loopback-callback bridge so browser logins run
inside a container (aws sso login, Concourse fly login, claude login)
can complete against the host browser. Listeners are discovered from
/proc/net/tcp{,6} — ss/netstat/lsof are absent from the image — bound on
host 127.0.0.1 only, and tunnelled in over the Docker API via socat,
which keeps working on Docker Desktop where container IPs are not
routable. Falls back to [::1] because Node resolves localhost to IPv6
first, so claude login often binds ::1 alone. Opt-in per project.
This extracts create_attached_exec() and moves the existing terminal
session path onto it, so there is one attached-exec implementation
rather than two.
Shared auth token: `claude setup-token` is run in a container, the token
is stored in the OS keychain and injected as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
into Anthropic-backend projects. Contrary to the initial design note,
setup-token uses an Anthropic-hosted redirect and blocks on a stdin
paste prompt rather than a loopback callback, so a stdin command is
required for the flow to complete.
The token is never logged, never returned to the frontend, and is
redacted from the streamed output with a stateful matcher that withholds
any tail that could still grow into a secret. Change detection uses a
random rotation id rather than a hash, since a hash in a docker-inspect
readable label would be an offline verification oracle.
Frontend 33 -> 51 tests; Rust 34 tests. Both builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
228 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
228 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Triple-C Roadmap — Claude Code Feature Parity
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**Date:** 2026-08-09 · **Baseline:** v0.3.0 · **Claude Code reference:** 2.1.226
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Companion to [DESIGN-REVIEW.md](DESIGN-REVIEW.md), which covers visual design and
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information architecture. This document covers *which Claude Code capabilities Triple-C
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should surface, and why.*
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---
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## Guiding principle
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> **Triple-C shows state and launches things. Claude Code edits its own config.**
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Triple-C's built-in MCP server management was removed in this cycle because Claude Code
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absorbed the capability natively (`claude mcp add/list/remove`, `.mcp.json`, `/mcp`).
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Hooks, skills, agents, plugins, output styles, and statusline are the same species: files
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under `.claude/` with first-class Claude Code TUIs. Building GUI form editors for them
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means losing the same race again.
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What Claude Code cannot do is what Triple-C uniquely owns: **the container boundary and
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what persists behind it** — the config volume, workspace mounts, lifecycle, the bundled
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scheduler, and the fleet view across many projects.
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---
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## Current coverage (v0.3.0)
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Triple-C sets exactly five `settings.json` keys, plus a sandbox block:
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| Key | Surfaced as |
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|---|---|
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| `tui` | TUI Mode select (`fullscreen`) |
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| `effort` | Effort Level select (`low`/`medium`/`high`) |
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| `autoScrollEnabled` | Auto-Scroll Disabled toggle |
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| `focusMode` | Focus Mode toggle |
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| `showThinkingSummaries` | Thinking Summaries toggle |
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| `sandbox.*` | Sandbox toggle (`enabled`, `enableWeakerNestedSandbox`, `allowUnsandboxedCommands`) |
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Plus four env feature flags — `CLAUDE_CODE_NO_FLICKER`, `CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY`,
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`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB`, `ENABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_1H` — and arbitrary user-set
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`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vars via the Env Vars modal.
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Also covered: per-project auth backends (Anthropic OAuth, Bedrock incl. SSO refresh,
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Ollama, OpenAI-compatible), user-level `CLAUDE.md` composition, `claude update` on every
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container start, terminal ergonomics (OAuth URL detection, OSC 52 clipboard, image paste,
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file drag-drop, STT), the web terminal, and workspace backup.
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---
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## Gap analysis
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### Committed for this cycle
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| # | Gap | Today | Plan |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 1 | **Permission modes** | one boolean → `--dangerously-skip-permissions` | Four-state control (Plan / Default / Accept Edits / Bypass) → `--permission-mode`. Verified choices on 2.1.226: `acceptEdits`, `auto`, `bypassPermissions`, `manual`, `dontAsk`, `plan`. |
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| 2 | **Session resume** | none | List sessions from the config volume; `[Resume]` opens a terminal on `claude --resume <id>`. |
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| 3 | **Capability inventory** | none | Read-only counts + names for skills / agents / hooks / plugins / commands / native MCP servers. Deep-link to the terminal to manage. |
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| 4 | **Automation** | `triple-c-scheduler` ships in every container with *zero* UI | Task list, cron editor, run-now, logs, notification badges. |
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| 5 | **Container auth handoff** | manual code paste | See "Authentication handoff" below — design decision pending. |
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### Deliberately skipped
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Status line builder · output-styles editor · hook *editors* · checkpoint/rewind browser ·
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plugin marketplace browser. Each is niche, natively handled by Claude Code's own TUI, or a
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settings-editor trap. Surface counts and deep-link instead.
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### Not yet scheduled
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- Granular `permissions.allow` / `ask` / `deny` rules and `additionalDirectories`
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- Sandbox detail settings (`filesystem.allowRead/allowWrite`, `allowedDomains`,
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`excludedCommands`) — currently documented for hand-editing via `SANDBOX_INSTRUCTIONS`
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- Project-level `.claude/settings.json` vs user-level settings hierarchy
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- A model picker. **Note:** the only model strings in the app today are stale placeholders
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(`anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-20250514-v1:0` in `AwsSettings.tsx` and `ProjectCard.tsx`,
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`qwen3.5:27b`, `gpt-4o / gemini-pro / etc.`). These are free-text placeholders, not
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dropdowns, but they should be refreshed to current model identifiers regardless.
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- The container's settings.json merge is **shallow** (`jq -s '.[0] * .[1]'`), so a
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user-authored nested block such as `sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite` is replaced wholesale
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on every container start. Worth deepening to `*` recursive merge.
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---
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## Authentication handoff
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**Goal:** stop making users hand-copy an auth code into every container.
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**Constraint discovered during research:** `claude login`'s callback server uses an
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**ephemeral port** and its redirect URI is **not configurable** for the main login flow
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(`--callback-port` and `oauth.callbackPort` apply to *MCP server* OAuth only). So a design
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that pre-assigns each container a fixed callback port and routes to it cannot work as
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stated — there is no fixed port to route.
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There is also a known container gotcha: on Linux, Node resolves `localhost` to IPv6 first,
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so the callback server may bind `[::1]:PORT` only and be unreachable over IPv4
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([anthropics/claude-code#44844](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/44844)).
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Two viable options:
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### Option A — long-lived token injection (simple)
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`claude setup-token` (verified present on 2.1.226: *"Set up a long-lived authentication
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token (requires Claude subscription)"*) returns a ~1-year OAuth token. Triple-C runs it in
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a running container, stores the token in the OS keychain via the existing `secure.rs`, and
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injects `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` into every container on the Anthropic backend.
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**Correction to an earlier assumption in this document.** `setup-token` does *not* start a
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loopback callback listener, so it does not need the Auth Bridge. Verified by running it
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under a pty: its `redirect_uri` is Anthropic-hosted
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(`https://platform.claude.com/oauth/code/callback`), the user copies a code off that page,
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and the CLI blocks at a `Paste code here if prompted >` prompt on **stdin**. A stdin path
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is therefore mandatory — the flow cannot complete without one.
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- No routing, no ports, no proxy.
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- One auth event covers every project.
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- Cost: small. Reuses existing keychain and env-injection plumbing.
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- Limits: token is subscription-scoped and expires annually; per the docs a `setup-token`
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token cannot drive Remote Control sessions or claude.ai connector fetches.
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Change detection uses a **random rotation id** in the `triple-c.claude-token-version`
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label, not a hash of the token. Labels are readable by anything that can run
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`docker inspect`, so a hash would be an offline verification oracle — given a candidate
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token you could confirm it. A presence boolean would instead miss rotations and silently
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leave containers on a stale token.
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### Option B — the Auth Bridge (general loopback-callback bridge)
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Option A only solves Claude Code. The same problem affects every CLI that authenticates by
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starting a temporary loopback listener and opening a browser at a URL that redirects back
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to it — Concourse `fly login` (random loopback port serving `/auth/callback`),
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`aws sso login`, and many others. Inside a container the host browser cannot reach that
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listener, so login stalls.
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Because the ports are ephemeral and unconfigurable, nothing can be pre-assigned. The bridge
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**discovers** listeners instead:
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1. While enabled for a running project, poll the container for loopback TCP listeners by
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reading `/proc/net/tcp` and `/proc/net/tcp6` over `docker exec` — no dependency on
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`ss`/`netstat`/`lsof`, which aren't guaranteed in the image.
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2. For each newly-appeared loopback listener, bind **the same port on the host's
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`127.0.0.1`** (never `0.0.0.0` — that would expose container internals to the LAN).
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3. Proxy each accepted connection into the container over the Docker API via
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`socat - TCP:127.0.0.1:<port>` (socat already ships in the image), reusing the existing
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attached-exec streaming in `docker/exec.rs`. Going through the Docker API rather than a
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container IP keeps this working on Docker Desktop, where container IPs are not routable
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from the host.
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4. Fall back to `TCP6:[::1]:<port>` when the listener appeared only on IPv6 — on Linux,
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Node resolves `localhost` to IPv6 first, so `claude login` frequently binds `::1` only
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([anthropics/claude-code#44844](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/44844)).
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5. Tear down when the listener vanishes, the container stops, the bridge is disabled, or
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the app exits. Ports already covered by the project's explicit port mappings are skipped;
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host-side conflicts are reported rather than silently swallowed.
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Opt-in per project (`auth_bridge_enabled`, default off), since it makes container-internal
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loopback services reachable from the host.
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**Plan:** ship **A** for Claude Code specifically — it removes the pain for the common case
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at a fraction of the cost — and **B** as the general mechanism covering every other CLI.
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They compose: A means most users never trigger a browser login at all; B catches AWS SSO,
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Concourse, and anything else that needs a real callback.
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---
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## Sequencing
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**Phase 0 — done.** Remove MCP (frontend, backend, entrypoint, docs) with a self-healing
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migration for containers created against the old per-project Docker network.
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**Phase 1 — foundations.** Permission modes end-to-end (including the scheduler bug fix
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below). Read-only introspection backend: sessions, capabilities, scheduler.
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**Phase 2 — Tier-1 polish.** Focus rings, contrast fixes, real buttons, inline start/stop
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progress, status labels, onboarding welcome screen, shared accessible `<Modal>`.
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**Phase 3 — Project Home.** Move project config out of the sidebar card into a tabbed
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main-area view (Overview / Sessions / Automation / Config), dissolving the modal pile and
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splitting the 1,257-line `ProjectCard`.
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**Phase 4 — authentication handoff.** Option A, then evaluate B.
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**Phase 5 — Library.** Global skills/agents/commands with per-project enable, synced into
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the config volume by the entrypoint. Generalizes the pattern the MCP tab was reaching for.
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---
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## Bugs found during this review
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1. **Scheduled tasks ignore the project's permission setting.**
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`container/triple-c-task-runner:69` runs
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`claude -p "$PROMPT" --dangerously-skip-permissions` unconditionally, regardless of the
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project's Full Permissions toggle. Being fixed as part of Phase 1.
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2. **Docs claim Reset preserves credentials; it does not.**
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`rebuild_project_container` calls `remove_project_volumes`, which deletes both
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`triple-c-home-{id}` (holding `~/.claude.json`) and `triple-c-claude-config-{id}`
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(holding `~/.claude`). README.md, HOW-TO-USE.md, and CLAUDE.md all still state that
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OAuth tokens survive a Reset. Pre-existing; not yet corrected.
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3. **Stale model placeholders** — see "Not yet scheduled" above.
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4. **Silent save failures.** Project config saves on blur; failures go only to
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`console.error`. No user-visible indication. Fixed in Phase 3 — `useProjectSave`
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now renders a Saved / Saving / Save failed indicator and raises a toast.
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---
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## Known gaps left by Phase 2–3
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- **`open_terminal_session` takes no command argument.** "Resume session" and
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"Manage in terminal" therefore open a bash tab and *type* the command after a
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fixed prompt delay. It works, but it is timing-dependent and will misfire on a
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slow container start. The fix is a `command: Option<String>` parameter on the
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Tauri command so the exec launches the process directly.
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- **Uptime is observed, not reported.** `get_container_info` returns a status enum
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with no start time, so Project Home records "running since" when the app *sees*
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the transition. A container already running when the app launches shows
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`● Running` with no elapsed time. Surfacing Docker's `State.StartedAt` would fix it.
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- **`lucide-react` was not adopted** (DESIGN-REVIEW Tier-1 #9) — no package-registry
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access in the build environment used for this cycle. The existing inline SVGs and
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text glyphs remain.
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- **The tab strip stayed in the TopBar** rather than moving onto the terminal panel's
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top edge. DESIGN-REVIEW §A6 asks for the move but its own §B2 layout diagram puts
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the tabs in the TopBar; the diagram won. Worth revisiting.
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- **`Ctrl+Shift+W`, not `Ctrl+W`, closes a tab.** Plain `Ctrl+W` is readline's
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`kill-word`, used constantly inside the terminal this app is built around;
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intercepting it globally would break word-erase in every shell.
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