Remove some long-standing commented code (#4242)

This actually was implemented elsewhere for eventing but the commented code wasn't removed. We can finally be free.
2024-01-17 09:29:31 -08:00
1 parent 5505833702
commit e07503add4
@@ -711,93 +711,3 @@ func wrapHandlerWithCallbackInterceptor(h http.Handler, c *Controller) http.Hand
 		h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
 	})
 }
 /*
 func WrapForwardedForHandler(h http.Handler, authorizedAddrs []*sockaddr.SockAddrMarshaler, rejectNotPresent, rejectNonAuthz bool, hopSkips int) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		headers, headersOK := r.Header[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For")]
 		if !headersOK || len(headers) == 0 {
 			if !rejectNotPresent {
 				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 				return
 			}
 			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("missing x-forwarded-for header and configured to reject when not present"))
 			return
 		}
 		host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
 		if err != nil {
 			// If not rejecting treat it like we just don't have a valid
 			// header because we can't do a comparison against an address we
 			// can't understand
 			if !rejectNotPresent {
 				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 				return
 			}
 			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errwrap.Wrapf("error parsing client hostport: {{err}}", err))
 			return
 		}
 		addr, err := sockaddr.NewIPAddr(host)
 		if err != nil {
 			// We treat this the same as the case above
 			if !rejectNotPresent {
 				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 				return
 			}
 			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errwrap.Wrapf("error parsing client address: {{err}}", err))
 			return
 		}
 		var found bool
 		for _, authz := range authorizedAddrs {
 			if authz.Contains(addr) {
 				found = true
 				break
 			}
 		}
 		if !found {
 			// If we didn't find it and aren't configured to reject, simply
 			// don't trust it
 			if !rejectNonAuthz {
 				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 				return
 			}
 			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("client address not authorized for x-forwarded-for and configured to reject connection"))
 			return
 		}
 		// At this point we have at least one value and it's authorized
 		// Split comma separated ones, which are common. This brings it in line
 		// to the multiple-header case.
 		var acc []string
 		for _, header := range headers {
 			vals := strings.Split(header, ",")
 			for _, v := range vals {
 				acc = append(acc, strings.TrimSpace(v))
 			}
 		}
 		indexToUse := len(acc) - 1 - hopSkips
 		if indexToUse < 0 {
 			// This is likely an error in either configuration or other
 			// infrastructure. We could either deny the request, or we
 			// could simply not trust the value. Denying the request is
 			// "safer" since if this logic is configured at all there may
 			// be an assumption it can always be trusted. Given that we can
 			// deny accepting the request at all if it's not from an
 			// authorized address, if we're at this point the address is
 			// authorized (or we've turned off explicit rejection) and we
 			// should assume that what comes in should be properly
 			// formatted.
 			respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("malformed x-forwarded-for configuration or request, hops to skip (%d) would skip before earliest chain link (chain length %d)", hopSkips, len(headers)))
 			return
 		}
 		r.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(acc[indexToUse], port)
 		h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 		return
 	})
 }
 */