Security hardening (P0 RCE + audit follow-through), web macro editor, and redesign #6

Merged
jknapp merged 11 commits from security/p0-rce-hardening into main 2026-07-18 04:08:24 +00:00

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
shadowdao b5e5bed7dd security(relay): minor hardening follow-ups from PR review
- Uniform auth responses remove the session-enumeration oracle: unknown
  session and wrong password now return an identical 401 at the API layer and
  an identical WS handshake/close; desktop-status and the 503 "not connected"
  signal are only exposed after successful auth.
- Session-count cap re-checked after bcrypt.hash so concurrent creates can't
  overshoot maxSessions.
- Relay web client reconnect backoff resets only after a successful auth
  response (an accept-then-close server no longer defeats the backoff).
- idGenerator comment corrected to match the rejection-sampling; drop unused
  recordFailure return value.
- DEPLOY.md: document ALLOWED_ORIGINS for reverse-proxy deployments.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 18:13:33 -07:00
shadowdao 74bd3c2e98 security(web): remove creds from image URLs, auth-fail state, tighten CSP
Minor PR-review follow-ups for the local PWA:
- Macro images load via a header-authenticated fetch -> blob object URL in both
  token and relay modes, so no credential ever sits in an image URL; prior
  object URLs are revoked on re-render.
- Local-mode auth failure now shows a clear "Access token required" state and
  stops the reconnect/toast loop (one-shot), instead of retrying forever.
- CSP connect-src tightened from 'self' ws: wss: to 'self' (same-origin WS is
  covered); verified the live WebSocket still connects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 18:12:23 -07:00
shadowdao 60c3bbcedb docs: clarify relay web client is execute-only
Remote (relay) devices browse and trigger macros; macro authoring is
intentionally kept to the local network so what runs on the machine isn't
editable from the public internet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 18:09:32 -07:00
shadowdao d07005bde3 security(relay): fix lockout DoS and DOM XSS in web client
Addresses two Major findings from PR review:

- Auth lockout no longer griefable: the throttle key is namespaced per path
  and includes the client IP (web:<session>:<ip> vs desktop:<session>:<ip>),
  so a flood of bad web-client auths can neither lock other clients of the
  same session nor block the desktop from (re)authenticating. Per-socket
  failure close and brute-force lockout are preserved.
- Relay web client XSS eliminated: app.html tab/macro rendering rebuilt with
  createElement/textContent (no macro/tab value reaches innerHTML); inline
  scripts/handlers externalized to /static/app.js and /static/login.js so the
  helmet CSP now uses script-src 'self' (dropped 'unsafe-inline' for scripts).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 18:07:48 -07:00
shadowdao 0d6f48ca24 docs: document auth token, no-shell app commands, web editor, media keys
Update README for the new security model and features: local API access
token embedded in the URL/QR (and web.allow_lan), app commands executing
without a shell, relay password in OS keyring, web-based macro creation,
and media/system keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 10:39:16 -07:00
shadowdao 5896ec0893 security(web): enforce anti-clickjacking via response headers
frame-ancestors is ignored inside a <meta> CSP, so move clickjacking
protection to real response headers (X-Frame-Options: DENY) and add
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Referrer-Policy: no-referrer on all
responses. Drop the ineffective frame-ancestors token from the meta CSP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 10:37:25 -07:00
shadowdao 01163891ec design(web): "Tactile Deck" redesign with light/dark theming
- Full semantic design-token layer (surfaces, spacing scale, radii, elevation,
  type scale) as the single source of truth; electric-violet signature accent
  instead of default blue.
- Light + dark themes via prefers-color-scheme; muted text now meets WCAG AA
  (replaces low-contrast #aaa/#888).
- Macro cards read as physical keys (raised, hairline highlight, per-macro
  --macro-color wash + placeholder, press/executing feedback, 2-line clamp).
- Proper modal sheet (blurred scrim, sticky header/footer, focus rings),
  thumb-reachable floating action button, 44px tap targets, app-wide
  :focus-visible, and prefers-reduced-motion support.
- manifest + theme-color meta updated to the new palette.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 10:32:04 -07:00
shadowdao beba425868 security+robustness(py/gui): thread-safety, upload hardening, keyring
macro_manager:
- All macro reads/writes guarded by a lock; macros.json written atomically
  (temp + fsync + os.replace). Commands are copied under the lock and executed
  outside it so wait/keyboard steps don't block other threads.
- last_used disk writes debounced (>=5s) instead of a full rewrite per press.
- Validate key/hotkey names against pyautogui.KEYBOARD_KEYS and clamp wait ms;
  invalid input is skipped/logged, not blindly executed.

web_server:
- WebSocket receive loop always disconnects (fixes dead-socket leak); broadcast
  prunes failed sockets.
- POST /api/execute offloaded to a thread executor so a long macro no longer
  blocks the event loop.
- Image upload hardened: 5MB cap (413), real-image validation via Pillow,
  server-generated name under macro_images/, returns a relative path only,
  cleans up on failure.

gui:
- Execute macros off the Qt main thread (signal back to status bar); debounce
  resizeEvent and only rebuild when the column count changes.
- Relay password stored in the OS keyring when available (plaintext JSON blanked;
  graceful fallback if no backend); delete dialogs name the macro; honor the
  minimize-to-tray setting; surface save failures.
- Add media/system keys (volume, play/pause, track nav) to the macro editor.
- THEME gains shared danger/accent-hover colors; drop dead imports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 10:26:22 -07:00
shadowdao 435cc1aca9 security+feat(web): kill DOM XSS, add CSP, in-browser macro editor
Security:
- Eliminate DOM-based XSS: renderMacros/renderTabs rebuilt with
  createElement/textContent/setAttribute + addEventListener. No macro name,
  id, image_path, or category ever reaches innerHTML.
- Remove all inline on*= handlers; add a strict Content-Security-Policy meta
  (script-src 'self', object-src 'none', base-uri 'none', frame-ancestors
  'none').
- Guard JSON.parse on WebSocket frames.

Robustness:
- Service worker: network-first for the app shell + JS/CSS so fixes actually
  ship; synthetic 503 for offline API calls; drop no-op /ws intercept; bump
  cache version.
- WebSocket reconnect: exponential backoff (1s→30s), tear down old socket
  before reconnect, stop on pagehide/beforeunload.
- Tab-switch race fixed with a request-id guard; executing state cleared in
  finally.

Accessibility:
- Macro cards and tabs are real buttons with aria-labels/roles; toast +
  connection status are aria-live; removed user-scalable=no.

Feature — web-based macro creation/editing:
- Floating "+" button + modal command-sequence builder (text/key/hotkey/
  wait/app) with reorder/remove; create via POST, edit via PUT (prefilled
  from GET /api/macro/{id}), delete with a named confirm. Works in both local
  and relay auth modes. Empty state now offers "Create your first macro".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 10:24:14 -07:00
shadowdao eba5a2a38e security(relay): harden internet-facing relay server
Closes the account-takeover chain and related issues found in audit:

- WS auth brute-force protection: per-session lockout (authThrottle) + per-
  socket failure cap that closes the socket (1008); applied to both web-client
  and desktop auth. Failed auth no longer leaves the socket open for unlimited
  guesses.
- WS upgrades now pass an IP-based rate limiter and Origin allowlist before
  handleUpgrade (previously bypassed all HTTP middleware); trust proxy set so
  limiting keys on the real client IP.
- /health no longer leaks live session IDs (counts only).
- .env.example rate-limit fixed (900000ms / 300) from the accidental ~11k rps.
- Credentials moved out of URLs into the X-MacroPad-Password header; images
  fetched via header + blob URLs; login stores creds in sessionStorage.
- Session creation bounded (max sessions, min password length) and TTL-pruned;
  session store writes are now atomic (temp+rename) and debounced.
- Session IDs lengthened to 12 chars with rejection sampling (no modulo bias).
- Enable helmet CSP; restrict CORS to configured origins.
- Request IDs use crypto.randomUUID; drop postinstall build hook and uuid dep.
- Uniform response for unknown session IDs (removes enumeration oracle).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 10:15:23 -07:00
shadowdao 1f26427328 security(P0): close unauthenticated RCE chain
The local FastAPI server previously exposed macro create/execute over the
network with no authentication while bound to 0.0.0.0, and macro `app`
commands ran via subprocess with shell=True — an unauthenticated RCE for
anyone on the LAN (and, via the relay, the internet).

- Mandatory per-install auth token (secrets.token_urlsafe) required on all
  /api/* routes and the /ws handshake; timing-safe hmac.compare_digest.
  PWA shell + /static assets remain public to bootstrap.
- Token auto-generated and persisted in settings.json (now chmod 0600).
- Bind host is configurable (web.allow_lan); token is the security boundary.
- macro `app` launch no longer uses shell=True — commands are tokenized with
  shlex and exec'd directly, killing ;/&&/|/$() shell chaining.
- Relay client injects the local token and only forwards /api/* paths, and no
  longer forwards attacker-supplied headers to the local server.
- Fixed path traversal in /api/image/{path} (realpath-confined to macro_images).
- GUI embeds the token in the LAN URL/QR; PWA reads it and sends it on API,
  WebSocket, and image requests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 10:14:56 -07:00