shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5
0ffccac4b8
/home/$user is the customer's bind mount; they can plant symlinks in it. The entrypoints ran as root and wrote/chowned through customer paths, so e.g. logs/php-fpm/error.log -> /etc/shadow (or a dangling crontab -> /etc/...) handed the customer that file, i.e. container root. New scripts/safe-paths.sh, used by entrypoint.sh and entrypoint-fpm.sh: - secure_home: refuse to start if /home/$user is not a real dir; logs/ must be a real dir and every symlink under logs/ is removed and logged (apache and php-fpm open those files as root at start). - dirs, the pool error_log and the default crontab are created AS THE CUSTOMER (setpriv, runuser fallback); a pre-existing root-owned error_log is fixed with chown -h (never dereferences). - the user crontab is read as the customer and piped to `crontab -u $user -` (root reading it could install any root-readable file where the customer can `crontab -l` it). DEV-mode crontab/mysql_creds are written via as_user tee. - the o+x directory pass (find -type d, no -L) runs as the customer, so a dir swapped for a symlink before chmod can only reach what the customer owns. - chown -R is unchanged: GNU default -P lchown()s symlinks, never follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
99 lines
4.2 KiB
Bash
99 lines
4.2 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# shellcheck disable=SC2154 # $uid / $user come from the container environment
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## safe-paths.sh — sourced by entrypoint.sh and entrypoint-fpm.sh. Not executed directly.
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##
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## /home/$user is the customer's bind-mounted site directory: the customer can
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## create anything in it, including symlinks, from SFTP/FTP, cron, or PHP. The
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## entrypoints run as root, and root following a customer symlink is a
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## privilege escalation: `touch`/`chown`/`>` on logs/php-fpm/error.log ->
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## /etc/shadow hands the customer /etc/shadow (container root).
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##
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## Rules the entrypoints follow:
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## * /home/$user itself is the bind-mount point and must be a real directory.
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## * logs/ is WHP-owned and apache / php-fpm open files in it as root, so it
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## must be a real directory and every symlink under it is removed + logged.
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## * Files and dirs are CREATED as the customer (as_user), so a symlink or a
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## swapped path can only reach what the customer could reach anyway.
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## * Ownership changes use `chown -h` / `chown -R` (GNU default -P: never
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## follows symlinks, lchown()s them), never a dereferencing chown.
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## * Customer files are READ as the customer (crontab), never as root.
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# as_user CMD... : run CMD as the customer uid/gid (no root, no caps).
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as_user() {
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if command -v setpriv >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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setpriv --reuid="$uid" --regid="$uid" --init-groups -- "$@"
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else
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runuser -u "$user" -- "$@"
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fi
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}
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# drop_symlink PATH : if PATH is a symlink, unlink it (rm on a symlink never
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# touches the target) and log it.
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drop_symlink() {
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if [ -L "$1" ]; then
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echo "entrypoint: SECURITY: $1 was a symlink to '$(readlink "$1")' - removed" >&2
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rm -f -- "$1"
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fi
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}
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# secure_home : run once, right after adduser, before anything else touches
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# /home/$user.
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secure_home() {
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local h="/home/$user" d
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if [ -L "$h" ] || [ ! -d "$h" ]; then
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echo "entrypoint: FATAL: $h is not a real directory (symlink or missing) - refusing to start" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# The mount point itself: owned by the customer so as_user can create in it.
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chown -h "$user:$user" "$h"
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drop_symlink "$h/logs"
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# public_html may legitimately be a symlink (release-dir deploys); it is left
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# alone and every root-side operation on it runs as the customer instead.
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if [ -d "$h/logs" ]; then
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# find without -L never follows symlinks (start path verified real above).
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find "$h/logs" -xdev -type l -print0 2>/dev/null | while IFS= read -r -d '' d; do
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drop_symlink "$d"
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done
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fi
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}
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# user_mkdir DIR... : create directories as the customer.
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user_mkdir() {
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as_user mkdir -p -- "$@"
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}
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# user_touch FILE : create FILE as the customer. If it already exists owned by
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# someone else (root-created by an older image), fix ownership with chown -h,
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# which never follows a symlink; a symlink there is dropped first.
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user_touch() {
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drop_symlink "$1"
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as_user touch -- "$1" 2>/dev/null || chown -h "$user:$user" -- "$1" 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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# load_user_crontab : install /home/$user/crontab, read AS THE CUSTOMER. Root
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# reading it (`crontab -u $user /home/$user/crontab`) would follow a symlink to
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# any root-readable file and install it where the customer can `crontab -l` it.
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load_user_crontab() {
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local f="/home/$user/crontab"
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if [ ! -e "$f" ] && [ ! -L "$f" ]; then
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as_user sh -c 'printf "%s\n" "# User crontab for $1" "# Add your cron jobs here" "# Example: */5 * * * * /home/$1/scripts/my-script.sh" > "$2"' sh "$user" "$f"
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fi
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# No temp file: root writing a predictable /tmp path is the same bug class.
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local content
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if content=$(as_user cat -- "$f" 2>/dev/null); then
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printf '%s\n' "$content" | crontab -u "$user" -
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else
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echo "entrypoint: WARNING: $f not readable as $user - user crontab not loaded" >&2
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fi
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}
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# open_dir_traversal : chmod 755 the home dir, then add o+x to every directory
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# lacking it (apache/nginx run as their own user and must traverse). Run AS THE
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# CUSTOMER: `find -type d` without -L skips symlinks, but chmod would follow a
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# dir swapped for a symlink between find and chmod; as the customer that can
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# only reach what the customer already owns.
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open_dir_traversal() {
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chmod 755 "/home/$user"
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as_user find "/home/$user" -type d ! -perm -o=x -exec chmod o+x {} + 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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