Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude (bootstrap)
9652a71816 extract: skip cpmove-*/homedir/mail tree
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WHP does not import cPanel mailbox data (mail-import is a panel-side
roadmap item, not a sandbox-mode step). Extracting + ClamAV-scanning
the mail tree wastes time and disk: on real customer accounts the mail
dir often dwarfs everything else (10+ GB of historical maildir/mbox),
and clamscan has to walk every message.

Appended to the existing tar --exclude-from list (where we already
strip DANGEROUS-classified symlinks) so the existing plumbing covers
both. tar's fnmatch globs handle nested mail subdirs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 11:57:32 -07:00
Claude (bootstrap)
db78a36935 sanitize-dont-refuse: strip dangerous symlinks via tar --exclude
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Shifts the sandbox's symlink handling from "refuse the whole tarball"
to "drop the dangerous entries from extraction and record them as
quarantine actions". This is what sandbox mode is supposed to do —
make malicious cpmoves safe to import rather than gate-keeping them.

Three coordinated changes:

1. scan-symlinks.php — exit 0 even when DANGEROUS findings exist. The
   JSON report is the source of truth; the caller decides what to do
   with it. Usage/IO errors still exit 2. STDERR still names each
   finding (now "STRIP X -> Y" instead of "refusing tarball") so the
   streamed [container] log on the panel side surfaces them.

2. extract.sh — reads the scan-symlinks report, builds a
   newline-delimited exclude list of DANGEROUS archive_paths, and
   passes it to `tar --exclude-from=`. The stripped entries never
   reach the filesystem; tar skips them silently. Also writes a small
   JSON sidecar at $EXTRACT_DIR/.cpanel-importer-stripped-symlinks.json
   describing each strip-action so the merge step can surface them in
   report.json without re-parsing scan-symlinks output.

3. entrypoint.sh write_report — reads the sidecar, prepends each
   stripped_dangerous_symlink action to the actions[] list, bumps
   files_quarantined by the strip-count, and rewrites
   summary_for_panel.alert_message to call them out distinctly:

     "N dangerous symlink(s) stripped during extract; M files
      quarantined; K cleaned in place. Customer site may have been
      compromised at the source — recommend review."

Result on darkside: instead of the import failing on the ALFA
alfasymlink/root entry, that entry is silently skipped during
extract, recorded as `stripped_dangerous_symlink path=... target=/
reason=absolute target is root /`, and the rest of the tarball
extracts normally. Subsequent ClamAV scan + DB sanitization run
to completion; panel sees a verdict-completed import with the
stripped symlinks visible in the Sanitization Sandbox panel on the
results page.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 11:13:57 -07:00
Claude (bootstrap)
5487dfc8f1 Initial bootstrap: cpanel-importer sanitization sandbox
Skeleton for the cpanel-importer Docker container — a one-shot
sandbox the WHP panel invokes BEFORE extracting a customer cpmove
tarball. See cpanel-import-container-spec.md (in /workspace/) for the
full design.

What this ships in v1.0:

- Dockerfile: almalinux:10-minimal + PHP 8.4 (Remi) + ClamAV 1.4 +
  SaneSecurity Foxhole.PHP rules + tar/mariadb-client/rsync. Runs as
  UID 999 (whp-import) via the panel-side --user 999:999 flag.

- scripts/entrypoint.sh: validates env, runs (optional) freshclam,
  drives extract -> scan-files -> scan-dbs -> rsync -> report.json.

- scripts/extract.sh + scripts/lib/scan-symlinks.php: pre-extract
  symlink scan ported standalone from
  web-files/libs/CpanelBackupImporter.php (the existing 2026-05-29
  whp02 destruction-vector fix). Aborts with exit 3 before tar runs
  if any DANGEROUS symlink is found.

- scripts/scan-files.php: ClamAV walk + classify-and-action. v1.0
  ships with an empty cleaner registry — every hit is
  QUARANTINE_ONLY. Cleaner hooks are stubbed for v1.1.

- scripts/scan-dbs.php: regex MyISAM -> InnoDB rewrite (always
  applied), WordPress identification, and ONE WP content scan check
  (siteurl_external_domain). v1.1 will grow the check set.

- scripts/lib/safety-net.php: container-narrow open_basedir
  allow-list, much tighter than the panel-side one.

- .gitea/workflows/build-push.yaml: builds + smoke-tests +
  PHP-syntax-checks + bash-syntax-checks before pushing to
  repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/cpanel-importer.

- tests/build-fixtures.sh: builds cpmove-clean.tar.gz (benign WP
  dump) and cpmove-alfa.tar.gz (the ALFA-shell symlink-to-/etc
  vector) for local end-to-end testing.

- README.md / CONTRIBUTING.md: docker-run invocation, bind-mount
  catalog, report.json schema, how to add a cleaner pattern or a WP
  scan signature.

Local acceptance test results:
- clean fixture -> status=completed, 3 MyISAM->InnoDB, no flags, 0
- ALFA fixture -> exit 1, status=failed, failed_stage=extract,
  "tarball contains dangerous symlinks; aborting" on stderr
- compromised-siteurl fixture -> imported_into_new_server=false,
  .flagged file written, summary_for_panel.show_alert=true

Image size: 197 MB compressed (gzipped docker save), ~397 MB unique
layers extracted. Well under the spec's 600 MB compressed / 1.2 GB
extracted budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 19:56:57 -07:00