Files
cpanel-importer/scripts/lib/safety-net.php
Claude (bootstrap) 5487dfc8f1 Initial bootstrap: cpanel-importer sanitization sandbox
Skeleton for the cpanel-importer Docker container — a one-shot
sandbox the WHP panel invokes BEFORE extracting a customer cpmove
tarball. See cpanel-import-container-spec.md (in /workspace/) for the
full design.

What this ships in v1.0:

- Dockerfile: almalinux:10-minimal + PHP 8.4 (Remi) + ClamAV 1.4 +
  SaneSecurity Foxhole.PHP rules + tar/mariadb-client/rsync. Runs as
  UID 999 (whp-import) via the panel-side --user 999:999 flag.

- scripts/entrypoint.sh: validates env, runs (optional) freshclam,
  drives extract -> scan-files -> scan-dbs -> rsync -> report.json.

- scripts/extract.sh + scripts/lib/scan-symlinks.php: pre-extract
  symlink scan ported standalone from
  web-files/libs/CpanelBackupImporter.php (the existing 2026-05-29
  whp02 destruction-vector fix). Aborts with exit 3 before tar runs
  if any DANGEROUS symlink is found.

- scripts/scan-files.php: ClamAV walk + classify-and-action. v1.0
  ships with an empty cleaner registry — every hit is
  QUARANTINE_ONLY. Cleaner hooks are stubbed for v1.1.

- scripts/scan-dbs.php: regex MyISAM -> InnoDB rewrite (always
  applied), WordPress identification, and ONE WP content scan check
  (siteurl_external_domain). v1.1 will grow the check set.

- scripts/lib/safety-net.php: container-narrow open_basedir
  allow-list, much tighter than the panel-side one.

- .gitea/workflows/build-push.yaml: builds + smoke-tests +
  PHP-syntax-checks + bash-syntax-checks before pushing to
  repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/cpanel-importer.

- tests/build-fixtures.sh: builds cpmove-clean.tar.gz (benign WP
  dump) and cpmove-alfa.tar.gz (the ALFA-shell symlink-to-/etc
  vector) for local end-to-end testing.

- README.md / CONTRIBUTING.md: docker-run invocation, bind-mount
  catalog, report.json schema, how to add a cleaner pattern or a WP
  scan signature.

Local acceptance test results:
- clean fixture -> status=completed, 3 MyISAM->InnoDB, no flags, 0
- ALFA fixture -> exit 1, status=failed, failed_stage=extract,
  "tarball contains dangerous symlinks; aborting" on stderr
- compromised-siteurl fixture -> imported_into_new_server=false,
  .flagged file written, summary_for_panel.show_alert=true

Image size: 197 MB compressed (gzipped docker save), ~397 MB unique
layers extracted. Well under the spec's 600 MB compressed / 1.2 GB
extracted budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 19:56:57 -07:00

47 lines
2.1 KiB
PHP

<?php
/**
* safety-net.php — container-narrow open_basedir allow-list.
*
* The sibling at /workspace/whp/web-files/includes/safety-net.php is the
* panel's allow-list — it includes /docker, /root/whp, /etc/whp, etc.,
* because the panel legitimately reads from those.
*
* Inside this container, the worker has a much smaller set of paths it
* needs. Anything outside this list is blocked at the PHP filesystem-
* function level (PHP enforces open_basedir in unlink/scandir/fopen/
* RecursiveDirectoryIterator/etc. AFTER symlink resolution, so a planted
* symlink-to-/proc cannot escape the allow-list).
*
* HISTORY — the same destruction-bug class that motivated the panel-side
* safety-net (whp02 /usr/bin + /etc wipe, 2026-05-28/29) is the reason
* this exists. In the container the host /etc /usr /root are not bind-
* mounted, but open_basedir gives belt-and-suspenders enforcement
* against any extracted-archive symlink walker we add later.
*/
if (function_exists('ini_set')) {
// Container-internal paths only. Notable absences:
// - /etc, /usr, /var, /root — never written to by this container
// - /docker — there is no /docker in this image
// - /home — there is no /home in this image
$allowed = implode(PATH_SEPARATOR, [
'/host', // /host/backup (RO), /host/quarantine, /host/sanitized
'/tmp', // tmpfs scratch space
'/opt/whp', // WORKDIR + per-run state
'/scripts', // our own code
'/var/lib/clamav', // ClamAV signature DB
'/var/log/clamav', // freshclam log
'/etc/freshclam.conf', // single file, read-only
'/proc/self', // pid/cgroup introspection
]);
if ((string) ini_get('open_basedir') === '') {
@ini_set('open_basedir', $allowed);
}
// Realpath cache tuning matches the panel — open_basedir adds a
// realpath() to every fs op, so a bigger cache pays back fast.
@ini_set('realpath_cache_size', '512K');
@ini_set('realpath_cache_ttl', '600');
}