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# Base image mirrored into the in-house registry to remove docker.io
# (Cloudflare R2) as a single point of failure for CI builds. The 2026-05-12
# Cloudflare incident took down docker.io blob pulls and broke this image's CI.
# Refresh procedure (run on a workstation that can reach docker.io, e.g.
# monthly or when Python patches drop):
# docker pull docker.io/library/python:3.12-slim
# docker tag docker.io/library/python:3.12-slim \
# repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/python:3.12-slim
# docker push repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/python:3.12-slim
# Future improvement: a scheduled Gitea Action that does the above automatically.
FROM repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/python:3.12-slim
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# image.source is what ghcr.io uses to link the package to a GitHub repo
# sidebar; pointing at the public GitHub mirror enables that linking. The
# canonical source-of-truth git remote is still Gitea, but Gitea's registry
# doesn't consume this label, so there's no contention.
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# Stamped from the VERSION file by CI (build-arg) so `docker inspect` reports
# what's running on any host. Defaults to "dev" for local/manual builds.
ARG VERSION = dev
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LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title= "haproxy-manager-base" \
org.opencontainers.image.description= "HAProxy management API with Let's Encrypt automation, Coraza WAF integration, and template-driven config" \
org.opencontainers.image.source= "https://github.com/shadowdao/haproxy-manager-base" \
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org.opencontainers.image.version= " ${ VERSION } " \
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org.opencontainers.image.licenses= "MIT"
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# haproxy comes from the UPSTREAM-maintained apt repo https://haproxy.debian.net
# (Vincent Bernat's builds, the Debian maintainer's own), suite
# `trixie-backports-<series>`, NOT from Debian trixie's archive.
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#
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# WHY (2026-11-16 forensics): Debian trixie ships 3.0.11 (+ security revisions).
# That build aborts via HAProxy's own watchdog inside the DNS resolver
# (resolv_process_responses / snr_resolution_cb, haproxy issue #3101) - whole
# edge down 15-52 s per abort on sdbees/whp01. The fix ("dns: bind the
# nameserver sockets to the initiating thread", "resolvers: make
# process_resolvers() single-threaded") is in 3.0.13+, 3.1.11+ and 3.2.6+;
# Debian trixie will not take it. See docs/go-port/haproxy-edge-upgrade-and-logging.md
# in the WHP repo for the version evidence and the rollout plan.
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#
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# Series: 3.2 (LTS, supported to 2030-Q2). Its trixie package is built with
# USE_QUIC=1 against the system OpenSSL 3.5.x NATIVE QUIC API (depends on
# libssl3t64 >= 3.5.1), so no USE_QUIC_OPENSSL_COMPAT layer. (3.0.x upstream
# has no trixie packages and would need a source build.)
#
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# The repo keeps MANY patch versions of a series (27 as of 2026-11: 3.2.10 ..
# 3.2.26, all flagged `NotAutomatic: yes`), so "latest of the series" would let any
# rebuild silently take an untested 3.2.27+. The pin is therefore the EXACT Debian
# package version, HAPROXY_EXACT (default below), and the build:
# * pins apt to it (`Pin: version <full Debian version>`; NOTE a bare
# `3.2.26` does NOT match: apt compares the FULL version "3.2.26-1~bpo13+1",
# and with a non-matching pin apt falls back to Debian's own 3.0.11 package);
# * FAILS unless `dpkg-query` reports EXACTLY HAPROXY_EXACT, and `haproxy -v`
# reports the series (so an unreachable repo, which would leave Debian's
# 3.0.11, fails closed, and a 3.2 -> 3.3/3.4 jump can never arrive by accident);
# * records the resolved version in /haproxy/HAPROXY_VERSION; the `haproxy -c`
# gate below proves the binary accepts the fleet config.
# Taking a new patch is a DELIBERATE edit of the default below (or
# --build-arg HAPROXY_EXACT=3.2.27-1~bpo13+1), tested before it merges; CI never
# passes it, so a rebuild is reproducible.
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# The repo signing key is COMMITTED (keys/haproxy-debian-net/, Vincent Bernat,
# fingerprint AEF2 3487 66F3 71C6 89A7 3600 95A4 2FE8 3535 25F9) and used with
# signed-by, never fetched at build time. The fingerprint is asserted below.
ARG HAPROXY_UPSTREAM = 3 .2
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ARG HAPROXY_EXACT = 3 .2.26-1~bpo13+1
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# OPTIONAL internal package cache, e.g. --build-arg PKG_CACHE=https://192.168.1.40
# (CT130 pkg-cache, https only; CI sets it only after probing the cache with the
# pinned CA). Unset = the upstream Debian repositories, exactly as before. The
# apt sources are restored before this RUN ends (restore FAILS the build if any
# reference to the cache is left), so no shipped layer carries the cache address.
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# NOTE: CT130 does not proxy haproxy.debian.net (see the design doc); that one
# repo is always fetched directly.
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# Canonical script + docs: cloud-apache-container (scripts/pkg-cache-repos.sh,
# docs/pkg-cache.md there); this repo carries byte-identical copies.
ARG PKG_CACHE =
COPY ./scripts/pkg-cache-repos.sh /usr/local/sbin/pkg-cache-repos.sh
COPY ./keys/pkg-cache/ /usr/local/share/pkg-cache/
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COPY ./keys/haproxy-debian-net/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg /etc/apt/keyrings/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg
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RUN /usr/local/sbin/pkg-cache-repos.sh apt && \
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apt update -y && apt dist-upgrade -y && \
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apt install -y --no-install-recommends gnupg ca-certificates && \
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keys = " $( gpg --show-keys --with-colons /etc/apt/keyrings/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg) " && \
[ " $( printf '%s\n' " ${ keys } " | grep -c '^pub:' ) " = 1 ] && \
[ " $( printf '%s\n' " ${ keys } " | awk -F: '/^fpr:/{print $10; exit}' ) " = 'AEF2348766F371C689A7360095A42FE8353525F9' ] && \
apt purge -y gnupg && \
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echo "deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg] https://haproxy.debian.net trixie-backports- ${ HAPROXY_UPSTREAM } main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/haproxy-debian-net.list && \
apt update -y && \
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pin = " ${ HAPROXY_EXACT } " && \
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printf 'Package: haproxy\nPin: version %s\nPin-Priority: 1001\n' " ${ pin } " > /etc/apt/preferences.d/haproxy-upstream-pin && \
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apt install socat haproxy cron certbot curl jq net-tools -y && apt-mark hold haproxy && \
rm -f /etc/apt/preferences.d/haproxy-upstream-pin && \
deb_ver = " $( dpkg-query -W -f= '${Version}' haproxy) " && \
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[ " ${ deb_ver } " = " ${ HAPROXY_EXACT } " ] || { echo "FATAL: installed haproxy ' ${ deb_ver } ' is not the pinned ' ${ HAPROXY_EXACT } ' (repo unreachable, or the pin did not match)" >& 2; exit 1; } && \
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case " ${ deb_ver } " in " ${ HAPROXY_UPSTREAM } " .*) ;; *) echo "FATAL: installed haproxy ${ deb_ver } is not series ${ HAPROXY_UPSTREAM } " >& 2; exit 1;; esac && \
haproxy -v | head -n1 | grep -F "version ${ HAPROXY_UPSTREAM } ." && \
haproxy -vv | grep -E 'USE_QUIC=1|\+QUIC ' >/dev/null && \
if haproxy -vv | grep -q 'USE_QUIC_OPENSSL_COMPAT=1' ; then echo "FATAL: QUIC compat layer build, expected native OpenSSL QUIC" >& 2; exit 1; fi && \
mkdir -p /haproxy && { haproxy -v | head -n1; echo "package ${ deb_ver } " ; } > /haproxy/HAPROXY_VERSION && \
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echo "haproxy OK: series ${ HAPROXY_UPSTREAM } , Debian package ${ deb_ver } (exact pin)" && \
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/usr/local/sbin/pkg-cache-repos.sh restore && \
apt clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
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WORKDIR /haproxy
COPY ./templates /haproxy/templates
COPY requirements.txt /haproxy/
COPY haproxy_manager.py /haproxy/
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COPY haproxy_gunicorn_worker.py /haproxy/
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# Read by GET /api/capabilities (WHP gates whole-site re-bundling on it).
COPY VERSION /haproxy/VERSION
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COPY scripts /haproxy/scripts
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COPY trusted_ips.list /etc/haproxy/trusted_ips.list
COPY trusted_ips.map /etc/haproxy/trusted_ips.map
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# /etc/haproxy is a named volume in deployed containers, so baked-in files
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# under that path get shadowed by the volume on existing deployments. The
# trusted_ips.* pair above predates that discovery and is handled by the
# older start-up.sh guard (out of scope here). cloudflare_ips.list and
# trusted_proxies.list are staged under /haproxy/defaults instead, so
# start-up.sh can always read the image's baked copy regardless of what the
# volume shadows /etc/haproxy with.
COPY cloudflare_ips.list /haproxy/defaults/cloudflare_ips.list
COPY trusted_proxies.list /haproxy/defaults/trusted_proxies.list
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COPY wpadmin_gate_exempt.list /haproxy/defaults/wpadmin_gate_exempt.list
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# Place errorfiles outside the volumed path; the HAProxy config references
# them by absolute path.
COPY errors /haproxy/errors
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RUN chmod +x /haproxy/scripts/*
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RUN pip install -r requirements.txt
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Build gate: no image ships unless the real haproxy binary accepts the config
# this image's templates actually produce.
#
# On 2026-08-14 a template change rendered fine, passed all 13 unit tests, and
# was rejected by HAProxy ("invalid arg 2 in converter 'regsub'"). It was only
# caught because someone built an image by hand and ran `haproxy -c`. Nothing
# in the build or in CI would have stopped it: .gitea/workflows/build-push.yaml
# is checkout -> build -> push, and test-config-rollback.py's "haproxy" is a
# shell stub that only rejects a sentinel token. In production an invalid
# haproxy.cfg means init.py refuses to start HAProxy while the container stays
# Up - ports 80/443 unbound, every site on the host down, /health still 200.
#
# This lives in the Dockerfile rather than in the workflow deliberately:
# * it cannot be skipped, and it protects local `docker build` too;
# * no workflow restructuring (build-push-action builds and pushes in one
# step, so gating in CI would mean splitting build from push);
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# * it validates against the EXACT haproxy binary in this image. The
# installed haproxy can move between builds (Debian revisions) - this
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# turns "the new haproxy rejects our config" from a silent production
# risk into a build failure.
#
# The unit suites run here too. They had never run anywhere automated either,
# and they cost a few seconds.
RUN python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-wpadmin-gate.py \
&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-trusted-proxy-gate.py \
&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-xmlrpc-rate-limit.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-default-splash.py \
&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-access-log-receiver.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-haproxy-stderr-relay.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-haproxy-supervisor.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-config-rollback.py \
&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-cert-write-safety.py \
&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-cert-scripts.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-waf-body-inspection.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-gunicorn-socket-timeouts.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-gunicorn-access-logging.py \
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&& python3 /haproxy/scripts/validate-rendered-config.py
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# Create log directories
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RUN mkdir -p /var/log/haproxy && touch /var/log/haproxy-manager.log /var/log/haproxy-manager-errors.log
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RUN chmod 755 /var/log/haproxy-manager.log /var/log/haproxy-manager-errors.log
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# Set up cron for certificate renewal with proper permissions and environment
RUN mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs && \
echo 'PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin' > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root && \
echo '0 */12 * * * /haproxy/scripts/renew-certificates.sh >> /var/log/haproxy-manager.log 2>&1' >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root && \
chmod 600 /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root && \
chown root:crontab /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
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# 443/udp carries HTTP/3 (QUIC). EXPOSE is documentation only — the container
# must still be run with `-p 443:443/udp` for the UDP listener to be reachable.
EXPOSE 80 443 443/udp 8000
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# Health check: management API (:8000, short timeout) AND HAProxy (:80).
# See scripts/healthcheck.sh. NOTE: WHP's lib-edge-container.sh passes its own
# --health-cmd, which REPLACES this one on deployed hosts; it must be pointed
# at /haproxy/scripts/healthcheck.sh for the fleet to get the :8000 probe.
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HEALTHCHECK --interval= 30s --timeout= 10s --start-period= 60s --retries= 3 \
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CMD /haproxy/scripts/healthcheck.sh
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CMD [ "/haproxy/scripts/start-up.sh" ]