wp-admin gate: state the real residual risks of exempting the install screens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0185ukXi4YX5FxJGqhi6qab6
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@@ -443,11 +443,18 @@ frontend web
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# itself refuses both once the site is installed (setup-config.php exits
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# itself refuses both once the site is installed (setup-config.php exits
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# "wp-config.php already exists"; install.php shows "Already Installed"
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# "wp-config.php already exists"; install.php shows "Already Installed"
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# when the options table has siteurl), so the exemption exposes nothing on
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# when the options table has siteurl), so the exemption exposes nothing on
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# a finished site. RESIDUAL RISK (known tradeoff of exempting these two pages, requested 2026-11-19): a site that
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# a finished site. RESIDUAL RISK (known tradeoff of exempting these two pages,
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# was half-installed and abandoned (wp-config.php present, tables not
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# requested 2026-11-19): (1) WordPress files present but NO wp-config.php
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# created) lets any visitor finish the install via install.php?step=2 and
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# (half upload, deleted by mistake, mid-restore/transfer): any visitor can
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# so choose the admin account. The old blanket gate happened to block that
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# run setup-config.php with their own database and then install.php, i.e.
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# on edge-fronted sites; WordPress itself never did. Matching is exact (path_end on the normalised path,
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# take the site over (admin -> plugin upload -> code execution). Scanners
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# probe for exactly this. (2) A half-installed site (wp-config.php present,
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# no tables, or a $table_prefix pointing at no tables) lets any visitor
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# finish install.php?step=2 and choose the admin account. The old gate
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# blocked cookieless scanners from both on edge-fronted sites (not a real
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# defence: has_wp_logged_in only checks the cookie NAME, so a targeted
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# attacker could always send one); WordPress itself never did.
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# Matching is exact (path_end on the normalised path,
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# case-sensitive): /wp-admin/setup-config.php.php, /wp-admin/Install.php,
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# case-sensitive): /wp-admin/setup-config.php.php, /wp-admin/Install.php,
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# /wp-admin/install.php/x, /wp-admin/evil/install.php are all still gated.
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# /wp-admin/install.php/x, /wp-admin/evil/install.php are all still gated.
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# upgrade.php is NOT exempt: WordPress only sends logged-in users there
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# upgrade.php is NOT exempt: WordPress only sends logged-in users there
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