feat(waf): make Coraza see request bodies; stamp complete/partial; 2026.10.2
Measured on haproxy 3.0.11 + coraza-spoa v0.7.1 + CRS 4.25.0 (local haproxy-manager + coraza-spoa + echo backend): - send-spoe-group fired at header time, so req.body held only what arrived with the headers. A 933180 payload whose body came in a second send(), 2s late, or after Expect: 100-continue passed uninspected; 8 parallel 14 KB payload-first POSTs: 6/40 blocked before, 40/40 after. - Add `option http-buffer-request` (Coraza block only). Uploads are not held: one buffer is inspected, the rest streams (50 MB upload: sha-ok, same timing before/after). - Stamp X-WHP-WAF-Body: complete|partial for Coraza (client copies stripped first, stripped again before the backend). Content-Length: exact compare; chunked/no-CL: body+headers < 12 KB => complete. WHP's generated rules use it to deny body-parse errors (200002/200003) only on complete bodies. - Pin tune.bufsize 16384 (= default) when Coraza is on. Coraza costs ~3.3 ms/KB of body and the 100 ms SPOE timeout fails open: at 32 KB a payload at byte 0 of a 30 KB base64 body bypassed. SPOP frames > 65535 are refused by the agent library. - coraza-spoa/config.yaml: SecRequestBodyLimit 131072 / InMemory 131072 / ProcessPartial (Reject 413s even under DetectionOnly). - Access log gains wafb= (complete|partial) and wafe= (SPOE error = request passed uninspected). - overrides.conf: document (comment only) that the 920440 promotion turns the engine On for every URL with a file extension. - scripts/test-waf-body-inspection.py (16 tests), wired into the build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -106,6 +106,41 @@ global
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# Stats persistence for zero-downtime reloads
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stats-file /var/lib/haproxy/stats.dat
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{%- if coraza_spoe_backend %}
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# WAF BODY INSPECTION LIMIT. Only emitted when Coraza is wired in, so a
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# WAF-off / standalone config is unchanged byte-for-byte. 16384 is also
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# HAProxy's default: this line changes no behaviour or memory, it pins
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# the value so nobody raises it without reading this.
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#
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# The request body Coraza sees is whatever `req.body` holds when
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# send-spoe-group fires, and with `option http-buffer-request`
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# (hap_listener.tpl) that is "the whole body, or as much as fits in ONE
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# buffer". So bufsize IS the inspection limit: a body up to roughly
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# bufsize - maxrewrite (1024) - the request headers (~15 KB) is inspected
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# whole and stamped `complete`; anything larger is forwarded intact, its
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# first ~15 KB inspected, and stamped `partial`. Large uploads are never
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# rejected or held for it.
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#
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# DO NOT RAISE THIS WITHOUT RE-MEASURING -- three ceilings, all measured:
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# * TIME. Coraza+CRS 4.25 costs ~3.3 ms per KB of body (linear; 31 KB
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# base64 = 104 ms, 15 KB = ~50 ms on a 32-core box). The SPOE
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# `timeout processing` is 100 ms (hap_coraza_spoe_engine.tpl) and a
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# timeout FAILS OPEN: with tune.bufsize 32768 a payload at byte 0 of a
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# 30 KB base64 multipart body passed 933180 uninspected. A larger
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# buffer is a bypass, not more coverage, unless the timeout (and CPU
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# budget) grows with it.
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# * FRAME. coraza-spoa's SPOP library (dropmorepackets/haproxy-go
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# v0.0.8) refuses a HELLO whose max-frame-size exceeds 65535; HAProxy
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# derives its offer from bufsize. bufsize >= 64 KB = every SPOE
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# handshake fails = WAF silently off for all traffic.
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# * MEMORY. maxconn 4000 x 2 buffers x bufsize, inside the 1 GB edge
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# container.
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# Coraza's SecRequestBodyLimit (coraza-spoa/config.yaml, 131072) must stay
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# above anything this can deliver. Pinned by
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# scripts/test-waf-body-inspection.py.
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tune.bufsize 16384
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{%- endif %}
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------
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# DNS resolver for Docker container name resolution
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@@ -63,7 +63,12 @@ frontend web
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# host=/ua= identify the vhost and client; %ST/%B/%tsc give status,
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# bytes and the termination state that distinguishes a rate-limit
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# deny (PR--) from a tarpit (PT--) from a normal close.
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log-format "%ci:%cp [%tr] %ft %b/%s %TR/%Tw/%Tc/%Tr/%Ta %ST %B %CC %CS %tsc %ac/%fc/%bc/%sc/%rc %sq/%bq %hr %hs %{+Q}r cip=%[var(txn.real_ip)] id=%ID host=%[capture.req.hdr(0)] ua=%[capture.req.hdr(1)] sni=%[ssl_fc_sni] hv=%[fc_http_major]"
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# wafb=/wafe= WAF body coverage: wafb is complete|partial|- (did Coraza
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# get the whole request body, see the Coraza block below);
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# wafe is var(txn.coraza.error), set when the SPOE call failed or
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# timed out and the request went through UNINSPECTED (fail-open).
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# Both are "-" when the WAF is off or the request had no body.
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log-format "%ci:%cp [%tr] %ft %b/%s %TR/%Tw/%Tc/%Tr/%Ta %ST %B %CC %CS %tsc %ac/%fc/%bc/%sc/%rc %sq/%bq %hr %hs %{+Q}r cip=%[var(txn.real_ip)] id=%ID host=%[capture.req.hdr(0)] ua=%[capture.req.hdr(1)] sni=%[ssl_fc_sni] hv=%[fc_http_major] wafb=%[var(txn.waf_body)] wafe=%[var(txn.coraza.error)]"
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# --- URI normalisation (MUST be the first path-touching block here) ---
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# Every path-based control in this frontend (the ACME health-check bypass,
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@@ -611,7 +616,61 @@ frontend web
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# guards (no point asking the WAF about requests we're already dropping)
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# and AFTER the real-client-IP resolution (so Coraza sees the right src).
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filter spoe engine coraza config /etc/haproxy/coraza-spoe.cfg
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# --- Make Coraza actually see the request body -------------------------
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# send-spoe-group sends `req.body` = whatever body bytes are in the buffer
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# AT THAT MOMENT. Without buffering that is usually NOTHING: measured on
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# haproxy 3.0.11 + coraza-spoa v0.7.1, a 14-byte `content=$a($b)` POST
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# whose body was written in a second send() right after the headers
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# passed 933180 (an enforced rule) uninspected, while the identical bytes
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# in one send() were blocked. A body sent 2s late, or after an
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# `Expect: 100-continue`, was never inspected at all.
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#
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# `option http-buffer-request` makes HAProxy wait, before evaluating the
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# http-request rules, until the WHOLE body is in or the buffer is full,
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# bounded by `timeout http-request` (30s, hap_header.tpl). It answers
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# `Expect: 100-continue` itself so the client actually sends the body.
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# It does NOT hold uploads: once one buffer (tune.bufsize, 16 KB) is full
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# the request is forwarded and the rest streams through as before -- a
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# 50 MB upload is not stored at the edge.
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option http-buffer-request
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# Tell Coraza whether it got the whole body. Coraza cannot tell on its
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# own (REQUEST_BODY_LENGTH is only filled by the urlencoded/raw
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# processors), and the difference matters: a TRUNCATED JSON body, or a
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# multipart body cut inside a boundary/part header, fails to parse by
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# construction, so the body-parse-error rules (200002/200003) may only
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# deny a COMPLETE body. WHP's generated Coraza rules
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# (regenerate-coraza-overrides.sh) key on this header:
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# complete -> 200002/200003 deny on multipart/JSON (enforce mode)
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# partial -> 200002/200003 removed for this request (every mode)
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#
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# With a Content-Length: complete iff req.body_len (buffered) equals
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# req.body_size (= Content-Length).
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# Without one (HTTP/1.1 chunked, HTTP/2-3 without content-length) HAProxy
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# 3.0 has no "end of message" fetch and req.body_size is just what is
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# buffered. But http-buffer-request only releases the request early when
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# the body ENDED or the buffer FILLED (a stalled body gets a 408 instead),
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# and body + headers well below one buffer (12 KB of the ~15 KB usable)
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# cannot have filled it. So that is complete, anything else partial.
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# Without this branch an attacker only had to add
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# `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` to escape enforcement (measured).
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#
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# Client-supplied copies are deleted FIRST so it cannot be forged, and it
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# is deleted again after the SPOE call so backends never see it.
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# txn.waf_body is also logged (`wafb=` in the log-format above) so the
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# complete/partial mix is measurable per host.
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http-request del-header X-WHP-WAF-Body
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http-request set-var(txn.waf_body_size) req.body_size if { req.hdr_cnt(content-length) eq 1 }
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http-request set-var(txn.waf_body) str(complete) if { var(txn.waf_body_size) -m found } { req.body_len,sub(txn.waf_body_size) eq 0 }
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http-request set-var(txn.waf_body) str(partial) if { var(txn.waf_body_size) -m found } !{ req.body_len,sub(txn.waf_body_size) eq 0 }
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http-request set-var(txn.waf_hdrs_len) req.hdrs,length if !{ var(txn.waf_body_size) -m found } { req.body_len gt 0 }
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http-request set-var(txn.waf_body) str(complete) if { var(txn.waf_hdrs_len) -m found } { req.body_len,add(txn.waf_hdrs_len) lt 12288 }
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http-request set-var(txn.waf_body) str(partial) if !{ var(txn.waf_body_size) -m found } { req.body_len gt 0 } !{ var(txn.waf_body) -m found }
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http-request set-header X-WHP-WAF-Body %[var(txn.waf_body)] if { var(txn.waf_body) -m found }
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http-request send-spoe-group coraza coraza-req
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http-request del-header X-WHP-WAF-Body
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# Enforce Coraza's verdict. The SPOA sets var(txn.coraza.action) to
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# "deny" / "drop" / "redirect" when a rule with the corresponding
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