fix(waf): 400 duplicate Content-Type; JSON depth limit 64 (round 1)

- hap_listener.tpl (Coraza block): `http-request deny deny_status 400 if
  { req.fhdr_cnt(content-type) gt 1 }`. With two Content-Type lines Coraza
  evaluates every value (text/xml on either line selects its XML processor,
  which accepts a form body without error) while Apache merges the lines
  and PHP parses the body as a form. Measured with Coraza v3.7.0 + PHP 8.3:
  `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` + `text/xml` put the payload in
  $_POST uninspected. Live: two lines -> 400 over HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2; one
  comma-joined line (browser XHR double-set) is unaffected.
- coraza-spoa/config.yaml: SecRequestBodyJsonDepthLimit 64 (was 1024 from
  the recommended file). Coraza's JSON flattening is quadratic in depth:
  depth 300 (601 B) = 297 ms, depth 1000 (2 KB) = 3.1 s, past the 100 ms
  fail-open timeout. Over the limit it is a 0.1 ms parse error, which WHP's
  enforce-mode rule denies on a complete body (live: depth 65/300/1000 ->
  403, depth 64 and a depth-9 global-styles body -> 200). Legitimate depth
  measured on WordPress core, Gutenberg, WooCommerce and Elementor JSON:
  max 8.
- test-waf-body-inspection.py: 17 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

coraza-spoa/config.yaml

@@ -44,6 +44,19 @@ applications:
       SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072
       SecRequestBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial
 
+      # JSON nesting limit (the recommended file sets 1024). Coraza's JSON
+      # flattener is quadratic in nesting: a 601-byte `[[[...]]]` of depth 300
+      # cost 297 ms and depth 1000 (2 KB) 3.1 s of CPU -- past the 100 ms SPOE
+      # timeout, so the request passed UNINSPECTED (fail-open) while the WAF
+      # burned CPU. Over the limit the body fails to parse (REQBODY_ERROR,
+      # 0.1 ms), which WHP's enforce-mode body-integrity rule denies on a
+      # complete body. Legitimate depth, measured on the JSON shipped in
+      # WordPress 6.x core, Gutenberg, WooCommerce and Elementor (theme.json,
+      # styles/*.json, block.json, checkout schemas): max 8, so a global-styles
+      # save is ~9; 64 leaves ~7x headroom for Divi/Elementor-style module
+      # trees that could not be sampled. Depth 64 itself costs ~21 ms.
+      SecRequestBodyJsonDepthLimit 64
+
       Include @crs-setup.conf.example
 
       # Runtime-managed PRE-CRS exclusions written by WHP UI. Empty by default.

scripts/test-waf-body-inspection.py

@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ class ListenerWithCoraza(unittest.TestCase):
         stamp = index_of(self.lines, r'^http-request set-header X-WHP-WAF-Body %\[var\(txn\.waf_body\)\] if \{ var\(txn\.waf_body\) -m found \}$')
         spoe = index_of(self.lines, r'^http-request send-spoe-group coraza coraza-req$')
         deny = index_of(self.lines, r'^http-request return status 403 .*var\(txn\.coraza\.action\) -m str deny')
+        dup_ct = index_of(self.lines, r'^http-request deny deny_status 400 if \{ req\.fhdr_cnt\(content-type\) gt 1 \}$')
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(dup_ct, 0, 'duplicate Content-Type must be rejected at the edge')
+        self.assertLess(dup_ct, spoe, 'and before Coraza is asked')
         for name, idx in (('client-copy strip', strip1), ('size var', size), ('complete', complete),
                           ('partial', partial), ('no-CL header length', hdrs_len),
                           ('no-CL complete', nocl_complete),
@@ -243,10 +246,18 @@ class CorazaBodyLimits(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertGreaterEqual(int(self.directive('SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit')),
                                 int(self.directive('SecRequestBodyLimit')))
 
+    def test_json_depth_limit_pinned(self):
+        """Quadratic JSON flattening: depth 300 = 297 ms, past the fail-open
+        timeout. Legitimate WordPress JSON measured at depth <= 9."""
+        depth = int(self.directive('SecRequestBodyJsonDepthLimit'))
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(depth, 32, 'too tight for real block/theme payloads')
+        self.assertLessEqual(depth, 64, 'depth 100 already costs ~40 ms')
+
     def test_limits_are_set_after_the_recommended_file(self):
         inc = self.cfg.index('Include @coraza.conf-recommended')
-        lim = [i for i, l in enumerate(self.cfg) if l.startswith('SecRequestBodyLimit ')][0]
+        for name in ('SecRequestBodyLimit ', 'SecRequestBodyJsonDepthLimit '):
-        self.assertLess(inc, lim, 'the recommended file would override our limits')
+            lim = [i for i, l in enumerate(self.cfg) if l.startswith(name)][0]
+            self.assertLess(inc, lim, f'the recommended file would override {name.strip()}')
 
 
 if __name__ == '__main__':

templates/hap_listener.tpl

@@ -635,6 +635,19 @@ frontend web
     # 50 MB upload is not stored at the edge.
     option http-buffer-request
 
+    # Exactly one Content-Type, or 400. With two Content-Type lines Coraza and
+    # the backend disagree about what the body IS: Coraza evaluates every value
+    # (`text/xml` on either line selects its XML processor, which accepts a
+    # form body without error), while Apache merges the lines with ", " and
+    # PHP cuts the media type at the first ',' / ';'. Measured (Coraza v3.7.0
+    # + PHP 8.3): `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` + `text/xml` puts the
+    # payload in $_POST with nothing inspected. req.fhdr_cnt counts header
+    # LINES, so a single comma-joined value (which browsers produce when a
+    # script calls setRequestHeader twice) is not affected here; that form is
+    # parsed consistently enough by both sides (see the report's matrix).
+    # Browsers, curl, PHP-curl and the common HTTP libraries send one line.
+    http-request deny deny_status 400 if { req.fhdr_cnt(content-type) gt 1 }
+
     # Tell Coraza whether it got the whole body. Coraza cannot tell on its
     # own (REQUEST_BODY_LENGTH is only filled by the urlencoded/raw
     # processors), and the difference matters: a TRUNCATED JSON body, or a