shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5
4f21bb2f76
Measured on haproxy 3.0.11 + coraza-spoa v0.7.1 + CRS 4.25.0 (local haproxy-manager + coraza-spoa + echo backend): - send-spoe-group fired at header time, so req.body held only what arrived with the headers. A 933180 payload whose body came in a second send(), 2s late, or after Expect: 100-continue passed uninspected; 8 parallel 14 KB payload-first POSTs: 6/40 blocked before, 40/40 after. - Add `option http-buffer-request` (Coraza block only). Uploads are not held: one buffer is inspected, the rest streams (50 MB upload: sha-ok, same timing before/after). - Stamp X-WHP-WAF-Body: complete|partial for Coraza (client copies stripped first, stripped again before the backend). Content-Length: exact compare; chunked/no-CL: body+headers < 12 KB => complete. WHP's generated rules use it to deny body-parse errors (200002/200003) only on complete bodies. - Pin tune.bufsize 16384 (= default) when Coraza is on. Coraza costs ~3.3 ms/KB of body and the 100 ms SPOE timeout fails open: at 32 KB a payload at byte 0 of a 30 KB base64 body bypassed. SPOP frames > 65535 are refused by the agent library. - coraza-spoa/config.yaml: SecRequestBodyLimit 131072 / InMemory 131072 / ProcessPartial (Reject 413s even under DetectionOnly). - Access log gains wafb= (complete|partial) and wafe= (SPOE error = request passed uninspected). - overrides.conf: document (comment only) that the 920440 promotion turns the engine On for every URL with a file extension. - scripts/test-waf-body-inspection.py (16 tests), wired into the build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
116 lines
6.8 KiB
Plaintext
116 lines
6.8 KiB
Plaintext
# WHP day-one enforce overrides for coraza-spoa.
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#
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# Global mode in config.yaml is SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly. The rule ID
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# ranges below are promoted to enforcement individually, chosen for very
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# low false-positive rate on the kinds of customer traffic seen on WHP
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# (WordPress, WooCommerce, Divi page builders).
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#
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# When bumping the upstream coraza-spoa pin (and thus the bundled CRS):
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# 1. Skim the CRS CHANGELOG for new/changed rules in these ID ranges.
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# 2. Verify they're still high-confidence before promoting the new image.
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# 3. Smoke-test in staging detect-only mode for 24h before flipping enforce.
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#
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# Per-customer false-positive tuning lives in a future per-customer
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# override mechanism; v1 is server-wide.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 930120 — LFI: explicit traversal to sensitive system files
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# (/etc/passwd, /proc/self/, /.ssh/, /etc/shadow, /etc/group, etc.)
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# Unambiguous probe pattern; no legitimate site path leads here.
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# Note: 930xxx as a whole includes broader traversal patterns that can FP
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# on legitimate relative-path file browsers — keep those detect-only.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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SecRuleUpdateActionById 930120 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 932100-932160 — RCE: Unix shell command injection
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# Patterns like `; cat /etc/passwd`, `|whoami`, backtick `\`uname\``,
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# $(...) substitution, &&/|| chaining with shell builtins.
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# Don't appear in normal POST bodies, URL params, or headers. Targeting
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# these is unambiguous attempted command execution.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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SecRuleUpdateActionById 932100-932160 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 933170-933200 — PHP Webshell access patterns
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# Direct requests to known webshell paths: c99.php, r57.php, b374k.php,
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# wso.php, alfa.php, mini.php, etc. Almost universally reconnaissance
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# scanning for post-exploitation. Even legitimate WordPress installs
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# never serve these paths.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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SecRuleUpdateActionById 933170-933200 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 944100-944300 — Log4Shell / JNDI injection
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# `${jndi:ldap://}`, `${jndi:rmi://}`, and obfuscated variants thereof
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# in headers, query strings, or bodies. Even our PHP/Node stack isn't
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# vulnerable, but blocking at the edge keeps logs clean and protects
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# any future Java workloads.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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SecRuleUpdateActionById 944100-944300 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 920440 — URL file extension restricted by policy
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# Catches probes for backup / config / dump files: .bak, .old, .save,
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# .swp, .sql, .dist, .backup. Promoted to enforce after empirical
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# observation on whp01 (2026-05-12, first ~30 min of detect-only):
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# 124 events, all backup-file recon — `/wp-config.php.old`,
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# `/db_backup.sql`, `/.env.save`, `/releases.sql`, etc. — from a
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# single GCP-hosted scanner. Zero false positives observed; standard
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# WP/WooCommerce/Divi/HPR URLs do not end in these extensions.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# WARNING (measured 2026-10-09, Coraza v3.7.0 + CRS 4.25.0, in-process AND
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# live behind haproxy): 920440 is a CHAIN whose first link is
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# `REQUEST_BASENAME "@rx \.([^.]+)$"` -- it matches EVERY URL with a file
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# extension. Coraza runs the appended ctl:ruleEngine=On when that first link
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# matches, even though the chain then fails. So on any *.php / *.css / ...
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# request the engine is On for the rest of the transaction: 949110 enforces
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# the whole CRS anomaly score (a 942100 SQLi GET is 403 on /x.php, 200 on /x)
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# and 200002 denies body-parse errors -- in detect_only mode too, because
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# SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly cannot override a runtime ctl. Not changed here
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# (it would loosen live blocking fleet-wide); see waf-body-hardening-report.md.
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SecRuleUpdateActionById 920440 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# 930130 — Restricted File Access Attempt
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# Catches dotfile / VCS / config-disclosure probes: .env (and .env.local /
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# .env.bak / .env.save variants), .git/config, config.php at root or under
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# /admin /backend, etc. Distinct from 930120 (system file paths like
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# /etc/passwd); this targets application secret files.
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#
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# Promoted to enforce on the same observation pass that justified 920440:
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# 117 events split across joshuaknapp.net (136), cgdannyb.com (51),
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# onlinesupplements.net (23) — all `.env`-class disclosure probes.
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# Zero false positives observed. Notably, HPR's `/ccdn.php?filename=...`
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# audio delivery path does NOT trigger this rule — verified empirically.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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SecRuleUpdateActionById 930130 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Rule families intentionally kept at DETECT-ONLY for v1 — high FP rate
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# on customer mix. Promote individually after observation:
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#
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# 913xxx (Scanner UAs)— matches legitimate ActivityPub federation
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# (Mastodon's "...Bot" UA) and SiteLockSpider (a
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# paid customer-security service some sites use).
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# Observed on whp01 burn-in 2026-05-13:
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# 20/185 hits = ~11% FP rate on HPR + greggfranklin
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# + suchascream. Detection adds anomaly score
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# either way; enforce upside is low.
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# 941xxx (XSS) — Divi rich-text editor saves, TinyMCE submissions
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# 942xxx (SQLi) — WP admin queries reflected in params
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# 920xxx (other) — most 920xxx rules; 920440 specifically promoted above
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# 933150 — PHP injection FP on WooCommerce checkout
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# (`session_start` literal appearing in billing form data)
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# 950xxx-953xxx — Data leakage / backup-file disclosure (mixed FP)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# RESERVED RULE-ID RANGE: 990000000 – 990999999
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# WHP's coraza_rule_manager generates per-host-exception rules in this range
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# (rule ID = 990000000 + target_rule_id). Do NOT add new rules in this range
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# from any other source. When bumping the coraza-spoa pin, check the CRS
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# changelog for new rules with 9-digit IDs (rare but possible) and re-namespace
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# if collision risk emerges.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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