fix(builder): escape/allowlist all attribute-value sinks incl. numeric/enum props (XSS)

An adversarial pass found 5 Critical XSS sinks where props declared number/enum
in TypeScript were interpolated raw into exported HTML attribute values,
trusting the type — but nothing enforces it at runtime (AI update_props only
validates node_id; deserialized saved state is untyped JSON). Fixed all 5
(NumberCounter data-target, StarRating aria-label, FormContainer method,
ContactForm/InputField input type) plus 6 sibling sinks found by an exhaustive
audit of every attribute-value interpolation across src/components: a
JS-source injection into ContentSlider's inline setInterval script, a
prototype-pollution-adjacent allowlist gap in Section's divider-shape lookup,
TextareaField rows, Testimonials rating aria-label, HeroSimple textAlign, and
MapEmbed zoom. Adds shared sanitizeFormMethod/sanitizeInputType allowlist
helpers to utils/escape.ts alongside the existing escapeAttr/safeUrl/cssValue
primitives. Every fix is TDD'd: a malicious-value test reproduces the raw
injection against the pre-fix code, then passes after the fix.

502 tests green (npx vitest run), tsc + vite build green (npm run build).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

craft/src/components/basic/ButtonLink.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { ButtonLink } from './ButtonLink';
+
+const toHtml = (ButtonLink as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('ButtonLink.toHtml href sanitization (attacker-controlled `href` prop)', () => {
+  test('a javascript: URL is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: 'javascript:alert(1)', text: 'Click' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert');
+  });
+
+  test('a quote-breakout href does not escape the href attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: malicious, text: 'Click' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal href still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: 'https://example.com', text: 'Click' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('ButtonLink.toHtml target (boolean-gated, not raw interpolation)', () => {
+  test('an attribute-breakout value for target does not reach the output raw', () => {
+    const malicious = '_blank" onmouseover="alert(1)' as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'x', target: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover');
+  });
+
+  test('target="_blank" still adds rel=noopener noreferrer', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'x', target: '_blank' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('target="_blank"');
+    expect(html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('ButtonLink.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: '</a><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'Tom & Jerry' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Tom &amp; Jerry');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'Click Me' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('>Click Me</a>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/ButtonLink.tsx

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
-import { escapeAttr, safeUrl } from '../../utils/escape';
+import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, safeUrl } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface ButtonLinkProps {
   text?: string;
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ ButtonLink.craft = {
     textDecoration: 'none',
     ...props.style,
   });
-  const escapedText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const escapedText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   const targetAttr = props.target === '_blank' ? ' target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"' : '';
   return {
     html: `<a href="${escapeAttr(safeUrl(props.href || '#'))}"${targetAttr}${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${escapedText}</a>`,

craft/src/components/basic/Divider.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Divider } from './Divider';
+
+const toHtml = (Divider as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Divider.toHtml normal rendering', () => {
+  test('renders thickness/color into the border-top style', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: '2px', color: '#ff0000' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('border-top:2px solid #ff0000');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Divider.toHtml XSS hardening (thickness/color into style=)', () => {
+  test('a thickness value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '1px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: malicious as any, color: '#000' }, '');
+    // The quote must not survive unescaped -- otherwise it closes style=""
+    // early and "onmouseover" becomes a live, attacker-controlled attribute.
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a color value with a </style><script> breakout is neutralized', () => {
+    const malicious = '#000</style><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: '1px', color: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a non-string thickness (object) does not raw-splice into style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = { toString: () => '1px" onmouseover="alert(1)' };
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: malicious as any, color: '#000' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Footer.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Footer } from './Footer';
+
+const toHtml = (Footer as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Footer.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '</footer><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Terms & Conditions' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Terms &amp; Conditions');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal copyright text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '© 2026 MySite. All rights reserved.' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('© 2026 MySite. All rights reserved.');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Footer.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
+import { escapeHtml } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface FooterProps {
   text?: string;
@@ -107,6 +108,6 @@ Footer.craft = {
     textAlign: 'center',
     ...props.style,
   });
-  const escapedText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const escapedText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   return { html: `<footer${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${escapedText}</footer>` };
 };

craft/src/components/basic/Heading.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -38,3 +38,21 @@ describe('Heading.toHtml level allowlist (adversarial re-review, same class as C
     }
   });
 });
+
+describe('Heading.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '</h2><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>', level: 'h2' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Fish & Chips', level: 'h2' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Fish &amp; Chips');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Hello world', level: 'h2' }, '');
+    expect(html).toBe('<h2>Hello world</h2>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Heading.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
+import { escapeHtml } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 type HeadingLevel = 'h1' | 'h2' | 'h3' | 'h4' | 'h5' | 'h6';
 
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ Heading.craft = {
 
 (Heading as any).toHtml = (props: HeadingProps, _childrenHtml: string) => {
   const tag = sanitizeHeadingLevel(props.level);
-  const safeText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const safeText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   const styleStr = cssPropsToString(props.style);
   return { html: `<${tag}${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${safeText}</${tag}>` };
 };

craft/src/components/basic/HtmlBlock.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -10,4 +10,16 @@ describe('HtmlBlock.toHtml sanitizes raw code (A4.1)', () => {
     expect(html).not.toContain('onclick');
     expect(html).toContain('<p>hi</p>');
   });
+
+  test('does not wrap output in an unsanitized element carrying the style prop raw', () => {
+    // toHtml only ever returns the sanitized `code` blob -- there is no
+    // wrapper <div style="..."> in the exported HTML, so a malicious
+    // `style` prop (e.g. an attacker-controlled object with a breakout
+    // toString()) has nothing to splice into.
+    const malicious = { toString: () => 'color:red" onmouseover="alert(1)' } as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ code: '<p>hi</p>', style: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/<div/);
+    expect(html).toBe('<p>hi</p>');
+  });
 });

craft/src/components/basic/Icon.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Icon } from './Icon';
+
+const toHtml = (Icon as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Icon.toHtml normal rendering', () => {
+  test('renders icon class, size/color style, and link href', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ icon: 'fa-star', size: '32px', color: '#3b82f6', link: 'https://example.com' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('class="fa fa-star"');
+    expect(html).toContain('font-size:32px');
+    expect(html).toContain('color:#3b82f6');
+    expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Icon.toHtml XSS hardening', () => {
+  test('an icon name with an attribute-breakout string is escaped, not raw-concatenated', () => {
+    const malicious = 'star"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ icon: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/class="fa star"><script>/);
+  });
+
+  test('a size value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '24px" onerror="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ size: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onerror="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a bgSize/bgColor breakout via background wrapper is neutralized', () => {
+    const malicious = '56px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ bgShape: 'circle', bgColor: '#fff', bgSize: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a javascript: link is neutralized to an empty href', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ link: 'javascript:alert(1)' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
+  });
+
+  test('a link value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape href=""', () => {
+    const malicious = 'https://example.com" onclick="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ link: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onclick="/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Logo.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Logo } from './Logo';
+
+/*
+ * Regression coverage for Logo.toHtml -- audited during the toHtml
+ * attribute-XSS sweep (see task-cssxss-brief.md) and found already fully
+ * sanitized (href/src via escapeAttr(safeUrl()), alt/text via escapeAttr /
+ * escapeHtml, imageWidth/fontSize/etc. routed through cssPropsToString which
+ * sanitizes every value regardless of declared type). No fix was required;
+ * these tests lock that behavior in against regressions.
+ */
+const toHtml = (Logo as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Logo.toHtml href sanitization (attacker-controlled `href` prop)', () => {
+  test('a javascript: URL is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: 'javascript:alert(1)' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert');
+  });
+
+  test('a quote-breakout href does not escape the anchor attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Logo.toHtml image src/alt sanitization (type="image")', () => {
+  test('a javascript: imageSrc is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'image', imageSrc: 'javascript:alert(1)', text: 'Logo' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert');
+  });
+
+  test('a quote-breakout alt (from `text`) does not escape the img attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'image', imageSrc: 'https://example.com/logo.png', text: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a non-numeric imageWidth (attribute-breakout attempt) does not escape the style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '1"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'image', imageSrc: 'https://example.com/logo.png', imageWidth: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Logo.toHtml text-logo styling sanitization', () => {
+  test('a quote-breakout color does not escape the span style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'text', text: 'MySite', color: malicious }, '');
+    // The raw `"` must never survive un-escaped inside the style attribute
+    // value -- if it did, `onmouseover` would land as a REAL new HTML
+    // attribute (breakout) rather than being inert CSS-value garbage inside
+    // a properly-escaped style="...".
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a normal logo renders as expected', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'text', text: 'MySite', href: '/' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('href="/"');
+    expect(html).toContain('MySite');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/SearchBar.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -11,3 +11,22 @@ describe('SearchBar.toHtml decorative icons (F2.5)', () => {
     icons.forEach((tag: string) => expect(tag).toContain('aria-hidden="true"'));
   });
 });
+
+describe('SearchBar.toHtml XSS hardening (placeholder/buttonText/showButton)', () => {
+  test('a placeholder value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape placeholder=""', () => {
+    const malicious = 'Search..." onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ placeholder: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a buttonText value with a script tag is escaped as text content, not raw HTML', () => {
+    const malicious = '<script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ buttonText: malicious, showButton: true }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a non-boolean showButton (string "false") still yields fixed, safe border-radius values', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ showButton: 'false' as any }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/border-radius:(8px 0 0 8px|8px)/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/SocialLinks.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -14,3 +14,40 @@ describe('SocialLinks.toHtml accessibility (F2.5)', () => {
     expect(html).toMatch(/<i class="fa fa-twitter"[^>]*aria-hidden="true"/);
   });
 });
+
+describe('SocialLinks.toHtml XSS hardening (iconSize/iconColor/iconBgColor/gap into style=)', () => {
+  test('an iconSize value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '20px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconSize: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('an iconColor value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '#fff" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconColor: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('an iconBgColor value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '#374151" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconShape: 'circle', iconBgColor: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a gap value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape the wrapper style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '10px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], gap: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious platform key does not produce a raw class-attribute breakout', () => {
+    const malicious = 'x"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: malicious, url: '#' }] }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a link url with a javascript: scheme is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: 'javascript:alert(1)' }] }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Spacer.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Spacer } from './Spacer';
+
+const toHtml = (Spacer as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Spacer.toHtml normal rendering', () => {
+  test('renders height into the style attribute', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ height: '80px' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('height:80px');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Spacer.toHtml XSS hardening (height into style=)', () => {
+  test('a height value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '40px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ height: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a height value with a </style><script> breakout is neutralized', () => {
+    const malicious = '40px</style><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ height: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/StarRating.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -40,3 +40,38 @@ describe('StarRating.toHtml XSS hardening (filledColor/emptyColor/size into styl
     expect(html).toContain('color:#ff9900');
   });
 });
+
+describe('StarRating.toHtml XSS hardening (rating/maxStars into aria-label, F2.2 CONFIRMED sink)', () => {
+  test('a maxStars value with an attribute-breakout string is neutralized in aria-label', () => {
+    const malicious = '5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/aria-label="Rating: 3 out of 5" onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a rating value with an attribute-breakout string is neutralized in aria-label', () => {
+    const malicious = '4.5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: malicious as any, maxStars: 5 }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a non-numeric maxStars does not blow up the star loop (no NaN glyph count, no huge output)', () => {
+    const malicious = '5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: malicious as any }, '');
+    const glyphs = html.match(/<i class="fa fa-star"/g) || [];
+    // Falls back to a sane default star count rather than looping 0 or NaN times.
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
+  });
+
+  test('an absurdly large maxStars is clamped to a sane maximum instead of looping unboundedly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: 1e9 as any }, '');
+    const glyphs = html.match(/<i class="fa fa-star"/g) || [];
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
+  });
+
+  test('normal numeric rating/maxStars still render the expected aria-label', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 4.5, maxStars: 5 }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/<span role="img" aria-label="Rating: 4\.5 out of 5"/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/StarRating.tsx

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
-import { cssValue } from '../../utils/escape';
+import { cssValue, escapeAttr } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface StarRatingProps {
   rating?: number;
@@ -98,8 +98,19 @@ StarRating.craft = {
 /* ---------- HTML export ---------- */
 
 (StarRating as any).toHtml = (props: StarRatingProps, _childrenHtml: string) => {
-  const rating = props.rating ?? 4.5;
-  const maxStars = props.maxStars || 5;
+  // `rating`/`maxStars` are declared `number` in TS but arrive unchecked at
+  // runtime (AI update_props only validates node_id; deserialized saved
+  // state is untyped JSON) -- a string like `5" onmouseover="alert(1)`
+  // breaks out of the aria-label attribute below, and an uncoerced/unclamped
+  // maxStars can also blow up the star-glyph loop (NaN, absurd loop count,
+  // or -- observed -- a RangeError from string concatenation overflow with
+  // e.g. maxStars=1e9). Coerce to numbers with sane fallbacks/clamps first.
+  const ratingRaw = Number(props.rating);
+  const rating = Number.isFinite(ratingRaw) ? ratingRaw : 4.5;
+  const maxStarsRaw = Number(props.maxStars);
+  const maxStars = Number.isFinite(maxStarsRaw)
+    ? Math.min(Math.max(Math.trunc(maxStarsRaw), 0), 50)
+    : 5;
   // Sanitized -- raw string-interpolation sinks in the star glyphs below.
   const size = cssValue(props.size) || '24px';
   const filledColor = cssValue(props.filledColor) || '#f59e0b';
@@ -125,7 +136,12 @@ StarRating.craft = {
   // The star glyphs convey nothing to assistive tech on their own -- wrap
   // in role="img" with a textual equivalent, and hide the decorative glyphs
   // themselves (aria-hidden above) so AT doesn't announce each icon.
+  // Belt-and-suspenders: rating/maxStars are already coerced to numbers
+  // above, but the assembled label is still run through escapeAttr() in
+  // case a decimal/negative/Infinity edge case produces odd (though no
+  // longer dangerous) text.
+  const ariaLabel = escapeAttr(`Rating: ${rating} out of ${maxStars}`);
   return {
-    html: `<span role="img" aria-label="Rating: ${rating} out of ${maxStars}"${wrapperStyle ? ` style="${wrapperStyle}"` : ''}>${starsHtml}</span>`,
+    html: `<span role="img" aria-label="${ariaLabel}"${wrapperStyle ? ` style="${wrapperStyle}"` : ''}>${starsHtml}</span>`,
   };
 };

craft/src/components/basic/TextBlock.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { TextBlock } from './TextBlock';
+
+const toHtml = (TextBlock as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('TextBlock.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '</p><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Tom & Jerry' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Tom &amp; Jerry');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Hello world' }, '');
+    expect(html).toBe('<p>Hello world</p>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/TextBlock.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
+import { escapeHtml } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface TextBlockProps {
   text?: string;
@@ -95,6 +96,6 @@ TextBlock.craft = {
 
 (TextBlock as any).toHtml = (props: TextBlockProps, _childrenHtml: string) => {
   const styleStr = cssPropsToString(props.style);
-  const escapedText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const escapedText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   return { html: `<p${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${escapedText}</p>` };
 };