fix(builder): escape/allowlist all attribute-value sinks incl. numeric/enum props (XSS)

An adversarial pass found 5 Critical XSS sinks where props declared number/enum
in TypeScript were interpolated raw into exported HTML attribute values,
trusting the type — but nothing enforces it at runtime (AI update_props only
validates node_id; deserialized saved state is untyped JSON). Fixed all 5
(NumberCounter data-target, StarRating aria-label, FormContainer method,
ContactForm/InputField input type) plus 6 sibling sinks found by an exhaustive
audit of every attribute-value interpolation across src/components: a
JS-source injection into ContentSlider's inline setInterval script, a
prototype-pollution-adjacent allowlist gap in Section's divider-shape lookup,
TextareaField rows, Testimonials rating aria-label, HeroSimple textAlign, and
MapEmbed zoom. Adds shared sanitizeFormMethod/sanitizeInputType allowlist
helpers to utils/escape.ts alongside the existing escapeAttr/safeUrl/cssValue
primitives. Every fix is TDD'd: a malicious-value test reproduces the raw
injection against the pre-fix code, then passes after the fix.

502 tests green (npx vitest run), tsc + vite build green (npm run build).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

craft/src/components/basic/SocialLinks.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -14,3 +14,40 @@ describe('SocialLinks.toHtml accessibility (F2.5)', () => {
     expect(html).toMatch(/<i class="fa fa-twitter"[^>]*aria-hidden="true"/);
   });
 });
+
+describe('SocialLinks.toHtml XSS hardening (iconSize/iconColor/iconBgColor/gap into style=)', () => {
+  test('an iconSize value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '20px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconSize: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('an iconColor value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '#fff" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconColor: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('an iconBgColor value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '#374151" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconShape: 'circle', iconBgColor: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a gap value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape the wrapper style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '10px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], gap: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious platform key does not produce a raw class-attribute breakout', () => {
+    const malicious = 'x"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: malicious, url: '#' }] }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a link url with a javascript: scheme is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: 'javascript:alert(1)' }] }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
+  });
+});