fix(builder): escape/allowlist all attribute-value sinks incl. numeric/enum props (XSS)

An adversarial pass found 5 Critical XSS sinks where props declared number/enum
in TypeScript were interpolated raw into exported HTML attribute values,
trusting the type — but nothing enforces it at runtime (AI update_props only
validates node_id; deserialized saved state is untyped JSON). Fixed all 5
(NumberCounter data-target, StarRating aria-label, FormContainer method,
ContactForm/InputField input type) plus 6 sibling sinks found by an exhaustive
audit of every attribute-value interpolation across src/components: a
JS-source injection into ContentSlider's inline setInterval script, a
prototype-pollution-adjacent allowlist gap in Section's divider-shape lookup,
TextareaField rows, Testimonials rating aria-label, HeroSimple textAlign, and
MapEmbed zoom. Adds shared sanitizeFormMethod/sanitizeInputType allowlist
helpers to utils/escape.ts alongside the existing escapeAttr/safeUrl/cssValue
primitives. Every fix is TDD'd: a malicious-value test reproduces the raw
injection against the pre-fix code, then passes after the fix.

502 tests green (npx vitest run), tsc + vite build green (npm run build).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

craft/src/components/basic/StarRating.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -40,3 +40,38 @@ describe('StarRating.toHtml XSS hardening (filledColor/emptyColor/size into styl
     expect(html).toContain('color:#ff9900');
   });
 });
+
+describe('StarRating.toHtml XSS hardening (rating/maxStars into aria-label, F2.2 CONFIRMED sink)', () => {
+  test('a maxStars value with an attribute-breakout string is neutralized in aria-label', () => {
+    const malicious = '5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/aria-label="Rating: 3 out of 5" onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a rating value with an attribute-breakout string is neutralized in aria-label', () => {
+    const malicious = '4.5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: malicious as any, maxStars: 5 }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a non-numeric maxStars does not blow up the star loop (no NaN glyph count, no huge output)', () => {
+    const malicious = '5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: malicious as any }, '');
+    const glyphs = html.match(/<i class="fa fa-star"/g) || [];
+    // Falls back to a sane default star count rather than looping 0 or NaN times.
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
+  });
+
+  test('an absurdly large maxStars is clamped to a sane maximum instead of looping unboundedly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: 1e9 as any }, '');
+    const glyphs = html.match(/<i class="fa fa-star"/g) || [];
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
+  });
+
+  test('normal numeric rating/maxStars still render the expected aria-label', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 4.5, maxStars: 5 }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/<span role="img" aria-label="Rating: 4\.5 out of 5"/);
+  });
+});