fix(builder): escape/allowlist all attribute-value sinks incl. numeric/enum props (XSS)

An adversarial pass found 5 Critical XSS sinks where props declared number/enum
in TypeScript were interpolated raw into exported HTML attribute values,
trusting the type — but nothing enforces it at runtime (AI update_props only
validates node_id; deserialized saved state is untyped JSON). Fixed all 5
(NumberCounter data-target, StarRating aria-label, FormContainer method,
ContactForm/InputField input type) plus 6 sibling sinks found by an exhaustive
audit of every attribute-value interpolation across src/components: a
JS-source injection into ContentSlider's inline setInterval script, a
prototype-pollution-adjacent allowlist gap in Section's divider-shape lookup,
TextareaField rows, Testimonials rating aria-label, HeroSimple textAlign, and
MapEmbed zoom. Adds shared sanitizeFormMethod/sanitizeInputType allowlist
helpers to utils/escape.ts alongside the existing escapeAttr/safeUrl/cssValue
primitives. Every fix is TDD'd: a malicious-value test reproduces the raw
injection against the pre-fix code, then passes after the fix.

502 tests green (npx vitest run), tsc + vite build green (npm run build).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-12 18:03:44 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 7ba91d9829
commit 591a51dcc2
45 changed files with 1039 additions and 26 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
import { BackgroundSection } from './BackgroundSection';
const toHtml = (BackgroundSection as any).toHtml;
describe('BackgroundSection.toHtml anchorId', () => {
test('escapes a malicious anchorId (attribute breakout attempt)', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'x" onmouseover="alert(1)' }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('a normal anchorId still renders correctly', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'my-bg-section' }, 'child');
expect(html).toContain('id="my-bg-section"');
});
});
describe('BackgroundSection.toHtml style-value XSS hardening', () => {
test('a malicious bgImage cannot break out of the outer style attribute via url(...)', () => {
const malicious = 'javascript:alert(1)) foo{background:red}</style><script>alert(1)</script';
const { html } = toHtml({ bgImage: malicious }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
});
test('a malicious bgColor cannot break out of the outer style attribute', () => {
const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
const { html } = toHtml({ bgColor: malicious }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('a malicious overlayColor cannot break out of the overlay style attribute', () => {
const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
const { html } = toHtml({ overlayColor: malicious }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('a wrong-typed overlayOpacity (string, not number) cannot break out of the overlay style attribute', () => {
const malicious = '0.4" onmouseover="alert(1)' as any;
const { html } = toHtml({ overlayOpacity: malicious }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('a malicious innerMaxWidth cannot break out of the inner style attribute', () => {
const malicious = '1200px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
const { html } = toHtml({ innerMaxWidth: malicious }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('normal props still render correctly', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ bgImage: 'https://example.com/bg.jpg', bgColor: '#1e293b', overlayColor: '#000000', overlayOpacity: 0.4, innerMaxWidth: '1200px' }, 'child');
expect(html).toContain("url('https://example.com/bg.jpg')");
expect(html).toContain('background-color:#1e293b');
expect(html).toContain('opacity:0.4');
expect(html).toContain('max-width:1200px');
expect(html).toContain('child');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
import { Section } from './Section';
const toHtml = (Section as any).toHtml;
describe('Section.toHtml anchorId', () => {
test('escapes a malicious anchorId (attribute breakout attempt)', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'x" onmouseover="alert(1)' }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('a normal anchorId still renders correctly', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'my-section' }, 'child');
expect(html).toContain('id="my-section"');
});
});
describe('Section.toHtml childrenHtml passthrough', () => {
test('children are preserved', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({}, '<p>hello</p>');
expect(html).toContain('<p>hello</p>');
});
});
describe('Section.toHtml shape divider color/height XSS hardening', () => {
test('a malicious topDividerColor cannot break out of the SVG style attribute', () => {
const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'wave', topDividerColor: malicious }, '');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('a malicious topDividerColor cannot inject a </style><script> breakout', () => {
const malicious = 'red</style><script>alert(1)</script>';
const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'wave', topDividerColor: malicious }, '');
expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
});
test('a malicious bottomDividerHeight cannot break out of the wrapper style attribute', () => {
const malicious = '50px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
const { html } = toHtml({ bottomDivider: 'angle', bottomDividerHeight: malicious }, '');
expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
});
test('a normal divider color/height still renders correctly', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'wave', topDividerColor: '#123456', topDividerHeight: '80px' }, '');
expect(html).toContain('fill:#123456');
expect(html).toContain('height:80px');
});
test('divider shape "none" emits no divider markup', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'none' }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
});
test('an unrecognized divider shape value emits no divider markup and no injected content', () => {
const malicious = 'wave"><script>alert(1)</script>' as any;
const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: malicious }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
});
test('a prototype-property-name divider shape (__proto__) does not leak [object Object]/function source into the SVG path', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: '__proto__' as any }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('[object');
expect(html).not.toContain('native code');
expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
});
test('a prototype-property-name divider shape (toString) does not leak Object.prototype.toString source into the SVG path', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'toString' as any }, 'child');
expect(html).not.toContain('[object');
expect(html).not.toContain('native code');
expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
});
});
+12 -2
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,14 @@ const ShapeDivider: React.FC<{
position: 'top' | 'bottom';
}> = ({ shape, color, height, position }) => {
if (!shape || shape === 'none') return null;
const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape];
// `shape` is attacker-controlled (AI update_props / deserialized state) and
// not runtime-type-checked. A plain-object index lookup with a string key
// like '__proto__', 'toString', or 'constructor' returns an INHERITED
// Object.prototype value (not undefined), which would otherwise leak
// "[object Object]" / a function's source text into the SVG `d` attribute
// below. hasOwnProperty restricts the lookup to the real allowlisted keys.
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DIVIDER_PATHS, shape)) return null;
const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape as Exclude<DividerShape, 'none'>];
if (!path) return null;
const isTop = position === 'top';
@@ -162,7 +169,10 @@ function buildDividerHtml(
position: 'top' | 'bottom',
): string {
if (!shape || shape === 'none') return '';
const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape];
// See the matching hasOwnProperty guard in <ShapeDivider> above -- same
// prototype-pollution-shaped lookup, same fix.
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DIVIDER_PATHS, shape)) return '';
const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape as Exclude<DividerShape, 'none'>];
if (!path) return '';
const isTop = position === 'top';