fix(builder): escape/allowlist all attribute-value sinks incl. numeric/enum props (XSS)

An adversarial pass found 5 Critical XSS sinks where props declared number/enum
in TypeScript were interpolated raw into exported HTML attribute values,
trusting the type — but nothing enforces it at runtime (AI update_props only
validates node_id; deserialized saved state is untyped JSON). Fixed all 5
(NumberCounter data-target, StarRating aria-label, FormContainer method,
ContactForm/InputField input type) plus 6 sibling sinks found by an exhaustive
audit of every attribute-value interpolation across src/components: a
JS-source injection into ContentSlider's inline setInterval script, a
prototype-pollution-adjacent allowlist gap in Section's divider-shape lookup,
TextareaField rows, Testimonials rating aria-label, HeroSimple textAlign, and
MapEmbed zoom. Adds shared sanitizeFormMethod/sanitizeInputType allowlist
helpers to utils/escape.ts alongside the existing escapeAttr/safeUrl/cssValue
primitives. Every fix is TDD'd: a malicious-value test reproduces the raw
injection against the pre-fix code, then passes after the fix.

502 tests green (npx vitest run), tsc + vite build green (npm run build).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

craft/src/components/basic/ButtonLink.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { ButtonLink } from './ButtonLink';
+
+const toHtml = (ButtonLink as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('ButtonLink.toHtml href sanitization (attacker-controlled `href` prop)', () => {
+  test('a javascript: URL is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: 'javascript:alert(1)', text: 'Click' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert');
+  });
+
+  test('a quote-breakout href does not escape the href attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: malicious, text: 'Click' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal href still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: 'https://example.com', text: 'Click' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('ButtonLink.toHtml target (boolean-gated, not raw interpolation)', () => {
+  test('an attribute-breakout value for target does not reach the output raw', () => {
+    const malicious = '_blank" onmouseover="alert(1)' as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'x', target: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover');
+  });
+
+  test('target="_blank" still adds rel=noopener noreferrer', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'x', target: '_blank' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('target="_blank"');
+    expect(html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('ButtonLink.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: '</a><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'Tom & Jerry' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Tom &amp; Jerry');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: '#', text: 'Click Me' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('>Click Me</a>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/ButtonLink.tsx

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
-import { escapeAttr, safeUrl } from '../../utils/escape';
+import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, safeUrl } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface ButtonLinkProps {
   text?: string;
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ ButtonLink.craft = {
     textDecoration: 'none',
     ...props.style,
   });
-  const escapedText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const escapedText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   const targetAttr = props.target === '_blank' ? ' target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"' : '';
   return {
     html: `<a href="${escapeAttr(safeUrl(props.href || '#'))}"${targetAttr}${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${escapedText}</a>`,

craft/src/components/basic/Divider.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Divider } from './Divider';
+
+const toHtml = (Divider as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Divider.toHtml normal rendering', () => {
+  test('renders thickness/color into the border-top style', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: '2px', color: '#ff0000' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('border-top:2px solid #ff0000');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Divider.toHtml XSS hardening (thickness/color into style=)', () => {
+  test('a thickness value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '1px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: malicious as any, color: '#000' }, '');
+    // The quote must not survive unescaped -- otherwise it closes style=""
+    // early and "onmouseover" becomes a live, attacker-controlled attribute.
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a color value with a </style><script> breakout is neutralized', () => {
+    const malicious = '#000</style><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: '1px', color: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a non-string thickness (object) does not raw-splice into style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = { toString: () => '1px" onmouseover="alert(1)' };
+    const { html } = toHtml({ thickness: malicious as any, color: '#000' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Footer.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Footer } from './Footer';
+
+const toHtml = (Footer as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Footer.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '</footer><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Terms & Conditions' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Terms &amp; Conditions');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal copyright text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '© 2026 MySite. All rights reserved.' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('© 2026 MySite. All rights reserved.');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Footer.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
+import { escapeHtml } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface FooterProps {
   text?: string;
@@ -107,6 +108,6 @@ Footer.craft = {
     textAlign: 'center',
     ...props.style,
   });
-  const escapedText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const escapedText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   return { html: `<footer${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${escapedText}</footer>` };
 };

craft/src/components/basic/Heading.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -38,3 +38,21 @@ describe('Heading.toHtml level allowlist (adversarial re-review, same class as C
     }
   });
 });
+
+describe('Heading.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '</h2><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>', level: 'h2' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Fish & Chips', level: 'h2' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Fish &amp; Chips');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Hello world', level: 'h2' }, '');
+    expect(html).toBe('<h2>Hello world</h2>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Heading.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
+import { escapeHtml } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 type HeadingLevel = 'h1' | 'h2' | 'h3' | 'h4' | 'h5' | 'h6';
 
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ Heading.craft = {
 
 (Heading as any).toHtml = (props: HeadingProps, _childrenHtml: string) => {
   const tag = sanitizeHeadingLevel(props.level);
-  const safeText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const safeText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   const styleStr = cssPropsToString(props.style);
   return { html: `<${tag}${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${safeText}</${tag}>` };
 };

craft/src/components/basic/HtmlBlock.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -10,4 +10,16 @@ describe('HtmlBlock.toHtml sanitizes raw code (A4.1)', () => {
     expect(html).not.toContain('onclick');
     expect(html).toContain('<p>hi</p>');
   });
+
+  test('does not wrap output in an unsanitized element carrying the style prop raw', () => {
+    // toHtml only ever returns the sanitized `code` blob -- there is no
+    // wrapper <div style="..."> in the exported HTML, so a malicious
+    // `style` prop (e.g. an attacker-controlled object with a breakout
+    // toString()) has nothing to splice into.
+    const malicious = { toString: () => 'color:red" onmouseover="alert(1)' } as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ code: '<p>hi</p>', style: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/<div/);
+    expect(html).toBe('<p>hi</p>');
+  });
 });

craft/src/components/basic/Icon.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Icon } from './Icon';
+
+const toHtml = (Icon as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Icon.toHtml normal rendering', () => {
+  test('renders icon class, size/color style, and link href', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ icon: 'fa-star', size: '32px', color: '#3b82f6', link: 'https://example.com' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('class="fa fa-star"');
+    expect(html).toContain('font-size:32px');
+    expect(html).toContain('color:#3b82f6');
+    expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Icon.toHtml XSS hardening', () => {
+  test('an icon name with an attribute-breakout string is escaped, not raw-concatenated', () => {
+    const malicious = 'star"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ icon: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/class="fa star"><script>/);
+  });
+
+  test('a size value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '24px" onerror="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ size: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onerror="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a bgSize/bgColor breakout via background wrapper is neutralized', () => {
+    const malicious = '56px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ bgShape: 'circle', bgColor: '#fff', bgSize: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a javascript: link is neutralized to an empty href', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ link: 'javascript:alert(1)' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
+  });
+
+  test('a link value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape href=""', () => {
+    const malicious = 'https://example.com" onclick="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ link: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onclick="/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Logo.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Logo } from './Logo';
+
+/*
+ * Regression coverage for Logo.toHtml -- audited during the toHtml
+ * attribute-XSS sweep (see task-cssxss-brief.md) and found already fully
+ * sanitized (href/src via escapeAttr(safeUrl()), alt/text via escapeAttr /
+ * escapeHtml, imageWidth/fontSize/etc. routed through cssPropsToString which
+ * sanitizes every value regardless of declared type). No fix was required;
+ * these tests lock that behavior in against regressions.
+ */
+const toHtml = (Logo as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Logo.toHtml href sanitization (attacker-controlled `href` prop)', () => {
+  test('a javascript: URL is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: 'javascript:alert(1)' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert');
+  });
+
+  test('a quote-breakout href does not escape the anchor attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ href: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Logo.toHtml image src/alt sanitization (type="image")', () => {
+  test('a javascript: imageSrc is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'image', imageSrc: 'javascript:alert(1)', text: 'Logo' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert');
+  });
+
+  test('a quote-breakout alt (from `text`) does not escape the img attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'image', imageSrc: 'https://example.com/logo.png', text: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a non-numeric imageWidth (attribute-breakout attempt) does not escape the style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '1"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'image', imageSrc: 'https://example.com/logo.png', imageWidth: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Logo.toHtml text-logo styling sanitization', () => {
+  test('a quote-breakout color does not escape the span style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'text', text: 'MySite', color: malicious }, '');
+    // The raw `"` must never survive un-escaped inside the style attribute
+    // value -- if it did, `onmouseover` would land as a REAL new HTML
+    // attribute (breakout) rather than being inert CSS-value garbage inside
+    // a properly-escaped style="...".
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a normal logo renders as expected', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'text', text: 'MySite', href: '/' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('href="/"');
+    expect(html).toContain('MySite');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/SearchBar.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -11,3 +11,22 @@ describe('SearchBar.toHtml decorative icons (F2.5)', () => {
     icons.forEach((tag: string) => expect(tag).toContain('aria-hidden="true"'));
   });
 });
+
+describe('SearchBar.toHtml XSS hardening (placeholder/buttonText/showButton)', () => {
+  test('a placeholder value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape placeholder=""', () => {
+    const malicious = 'Search..." onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ placeholder: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a buttonText value with a script tag is escaped as text content, not raw HTML', () => {
+    const malicious = '<script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ buttonText: malicious, showButton: true }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a non-boolean showButton (string "false") still yields fixed, safe border-radius values', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ showButton: 'false' as any }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/border-radius:(8px 0 0 8px|8px)/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/SocialLinks.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -14,3 +14,40 @@ describe('SocialLinks.toHtml accessibility (F2.5)', () => {
     expect(html).toMatch(/<i class="fa fa-twitter"[^>]*aria-hidden="true"/);
   });
 });
+
+describe('SocialLinks.toHtml XSS hardening (iconSize/iconColor/iconBgColor/gap into style=)', () => {
+  test('an iconSize value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '20px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconSize: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('an iconColor value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '#fff" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconColor: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('an iconBgColor value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '#374151" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], iconShape: 'circle', iconBgColor: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a gap value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape the wrapper style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '10px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: '#' }], gap: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious platform key does not produce a raw class-attribute breakout', () => {
+    const malicious = 'x"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: malicious, url: '#' }] }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a link url with a javascript: scheme is neutralized', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ links: [{ platform: 'facebook', url: 'javascript:alert(1)' }] }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/Spacer.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Spacer } from './Spacer';
+
+const toHtml = (Spacer as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Spacer.toHtml normal rendering', () => {
+  test('renders height into the style attribute', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ height: '80px' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('height:80px');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Spacer.toHtml XSS hardening (height into style=)', () => {
+  test('a height value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
+    const malicious = '40px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ height: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a height value with a </style><script> breakout is neutralized', () => {
+    const malicious = '40px</style><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ height: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/StarRating.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -40,3 +40,38 @@ describe('StarRating.toHtml XSS hardening (filledColor/emptyColor/size into styl
     expect(html).toContain('color:#ff9900');
   });
 });
+
+describe('StarRating.toHtml XSS hardening (rating/maxStars into aria-label, F2.2 CONFIRMED sink)', () => {
+  test('a maxStars value with an attribute-breakout string is neutralized in aria-label', () => {
+    const malicious = '5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: malicious as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/aria-label="Rating: 3 out of 5" onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a rating value with an attribute-breakout string is neutralized in aria-label', () => {
+    const malicious = '4.5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: malicious as any, maxStars: 5 }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('a non-numeric maxStars does not blow up the star loop (no NaN glyph count, no huge output)', () => {
+    const malicious = '5" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: malicious as any }, '');
+    const glyphs = html.match(/<i class="fa fa-star"/g) || [];
+    // Falls back to a sane default star count rather than looping 0 or NaN times.
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
+  });
+
+  test('an absurdly large maxStars is clamped to a sane maximum instead of looping unboundedly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 3, maxStars: 1e9 as any }, '');
+    const glyphs = html.match(/<i class="fa fa-star"/g) || [];
+    expect(glyphs.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
+  });
+
+  test('normal numeric rating/maxStars still render the expected aria-label', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ rating: 4.5, maxStars: 5 }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/<span role="img" aria-label="Rating: 4\.5 out of 5"/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/StarRating.tsx

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
-import { cssValue } from '../../utils/escape';
+import { cssValue, escapeAttr } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface StarRatingProps {
   rating?: number;
@@ -98,8 +98,19 @@ StarRating.craft = {
 /* ---------- HTML export ---------- */
 
 (StarRating as any).toHtml = (props: StarRatingProps, _childrenHtml: string) => {
-  const rating = props.rating ?? 4.5;
-  const maxStars = props.maxStars || 5;
+  // `rating`/`maxStars` are declared `number` in TS but arrive unchecked at
+  // runtime (AI update_props only validates node_id; deserialized saved
+  // state is untyped JSON) -- a string like `5" onmouseover="alert(1)`
+  // breaks out of the aria-label attribute below, and an uncoerced/unclamped
+  // maxStars can also blow up the star-glyph loop (NaN, absurd loop count,
+  // or -- observed -- a RangeError from string concatenation overflow with
+  // e.g. maxStars=1e9). Coerce to numbers with sane fallbacks/clamps first.
+  const ratingRaw = Number(props.rating);
+  const rating = Number.isFinite(ratingRaw) ? ratingRaw : 4.5;
+  const maxStarsRaw = Number(props.maxStars);
+  const maxStars = Number.isFinite(maxStarsRaw)
+    ? Math.min(Math.max(Math.trunc(maxStarsRaw), 0), 50)
+    : 5;
   // Sanitized -- raw string-interpolation sinks in the star glyphs below.
   const size = cssValue(props.size) || '24px';
   const filledColor = cssValue(props.filledColor) || '#f59e0b';
@@ -125,7 +136,12 @@ StarRating.craft = {
   // The star glyphs convey nothing to assistive tech on their own -- wrap
   // in role="img" with a textual equivalent, and hide the decorative glyphs
   // themselves (aria-hidden above) so AT doesn't announce each icon.
+  // Belt-and-suspenders: rating/maxStars are already coerced to numbers
+  // above, but the assembled label is still run through escapeAttr() in
+  // case a decimal/negative/Infinity edge case produces odd (though no
+  // longer dangerous) text.
+  const ariaLabel = escapeAttr(`Rating: ${rating} out of ${maxStars}`);
   return {
-    html: `<span role="img" aria-label="Rating: ${rating} out of ${maxStars}"${wrapperStyle ? ` style="${wrapperStyle}"` : ''}>${starsHtml}</span>`,
+    html: `<span role="img" aria-label="${ariaLabel}"${wrapperStyle ? ` style="${wrapperStyle}"` : ''}>${starsHtml}</span>`,
   };
 };

craft/src/components/basic/TextBlock.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { TextBlock } from './TextBlock';
+
+const toHtml = (TextBlock as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('TextBlock.toHtml text escaping (attacker-controlled `text` prop)', () => {
+  test('a tag-breakout attempt in text is neutralized (no injected element)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '</p><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;img');
+  });
+
+  test('ampersand is escaped for well-formed text content (consistency with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Tom & Jerry' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Tom &amp; Jerry');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal text value still renders unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Hello world' }, '');
+    expect(html).toBe('<p>Hello world</p>');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/basic/TextBlock.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
+import { escapeHtml } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface TextBlockProps {
   text?: string;
@@ -95,6 +96,6 @@ TextBlock.craft = {
 
 (TextBlock as any).toHtml = (props: TextBlockProps, _childrenHtml: string) => {
   const styleStr = cssPropsToString(props.style);
-  const escapedText = (props.text || '').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const escapedText = escapeHtml(props.text || '');
   return { html: `<p${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${escapedText}</p>` };
 };

craft/src/components/forms/ContactForm.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -110,3 +110,19 @@ describe('ContactForm.toHtml accessibility (F2.1)', () => {
     expect(ids1).toEqual(ids2);
   });
 });
+
+describe('ContactForm.toHtml field type attribute sanitization', () => {
+  test('malicious field.type cannot break out of the input attribute; falls back to type="text"', () => {
+    const fields = [{ type: 'text"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' as any, label: 'Name', name: 'name', placeholder: 'Your name', required: false }];
+    const { html } = toHtml({ fields }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onerror=');
+    expect(html).toContain('type="text"');
+  });
+
+  test('legitimate email field type still passes through unchanged', () => {
+    const fields = [{ type: 'email' as const, label: 'Email', name: 'email', placeholder: 'you@example.com', required: false }];
+    const { html } = toHtml({ fields }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('type="email"');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/forms/ContactForm.tsx

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import React, { CSSProperties } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
 import { relayFormWiring } from '../../utils/form-relay-wiring';
-import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, slugId, cssValue } from '../../utils/escape';
+import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, slugId, cssValue, sanitizeInputType } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface ContactFormField {
   type: 'text' | 'email' | 'tel' | 'textarea' | 'select';
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ ContactForm.craft = {
       const opts = (field.options || []).map((o) => `<option value="${escapeAttr(o)}">${escapeHtml(o)}</option>`).join('');
       inputHtml = `<select id="${escapeAttr(fieldId)}" name="${escapeAttr(field.name)}" style="${inputStyleStr};cursor:pointer"${reqAttr}><option value="">${escapeHtml(field.placeholder || 'Select...')}</option>${opts}</select>`;
     } else {
-      inputHtml = `<input id="${escapeAttr(fieldId)}" type="${field.type}" name="${escapeAttr(field.name)}" placeholder="${escapeAttr(field.placeholder)}" style="${inputStyleStr}"${reqAttr} />`;
+      inputHtml = `<input id="${escapeAttr(fieldId)}" type="${sanitizeInputType(field.type)}" name="${escapeAttr(field.name)}" placeholder="${escapeAttr(field.placeholder)}" style="${inputStyleStr}"${reqAttr} />`;
     }
     return `<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:6px">${labelHtml}${inputHtml}</div>`;
   }).join('\n  ');

craft/src/components/forms/FormButton.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { FormButton } from './FormButton';
+
+const toHtml = (FormButton as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('FormButton.toHtml', () => {
+  test('normal text renders as-is', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Send it' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('>Send it<');
+    expect(html).toContain('type="submit"');
+  });
+
+  test('type="submit" is a hardcoded literal, not prop-driven', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: 'Submit' }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/<button type="submit"/);
+  });
+
+  test('text content is escaped for <, >, &, and " (consistent with escapeHtml)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ text: '<script>alert(1)</script> & "quoted"' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>');
+    expect(html).toContain('&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;');
+    expect(html).toContain('&amp;');
+    expect(html).toContain('&quot;quoted&quot;');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/forms/FormButton.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
+import { escapeHtml } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface FormButtonProps {
   text?: string;
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ FormButton.craft = {
     cursor: 'pointer',
     ...props.style,
   });
-  const escapedText = (props.text || 'Submit').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+  const escapedText = escapeHtml(props.text || 'Submit');
   return {
     html: `<button type="submit"${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${escapedText}</button>`,
   };

craft/src/components/forms/FormContainer.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -39,3 +39,16 @@ describe('FormContainer.toHtml relay wiring', () => {
     expect(mid1).not.toBe(mid2);
   });
 });
+
+describe('FormContainer.toHtml method attribute sanitization', () => {
+  test('malicious method value cannot break out of the attribute; falls back to POST', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ action: '/legacy', method: 'POST"><script>alert(1)</script>' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script');
+    expect(html).toContain('method="POST"');
+  });
+
+  test('legitimate GET method still passes through unchanged (non-relay path)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ action: '/legacy', method: 'GET' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('method="GET"');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/forms/FormContainer.tsx

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { useNode, Element, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { Container } from '../layout/Container';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
 import { relayFormWiring } from '../../utils/form-relay-wiring';
+import { sanitizeFormMethod } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface FormContainerProps {
   action?: string;
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ FormContainer.craft = {
     ...props.style,
   });
   const { useRelay, marker, actionAttr, honeypot } = relayFormWiring(props.recipientEmail, props.thankYouUrl, props.action, nodeId);
-  const method = useRelay ? 'POST' : (props.method || 'POST'); // relay requires POST
+  const method = useRelay ? 'POST' : sanitizeFormMethod(props.method); // relay requires POST
   const body = honeypot + childrenHtml;                        // honeypot as first child
   return {
     html: `${marker}<form action="${actionAttr}" method="${method}"${styleStr ? ` style="${styleStr}"` : ''}>${body}</form>`,

craft/src/components/forms/InputField.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -58,3 +58,17 @@ describe('InputField.toHtml deterministic + unique ids (thread node id, resolves
     expect(id1).toBe(id2);
   });
 });
+
+describe('InputField.toHtml type attribute sanitization', () => {
+  test('malicious type value cannot break out of the attribute; falls back to type="text"', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ label: 'Name', name: 'name', type: 'text" autofocus onfocus="alert(1)' as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onfocus=');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('autofocus');
+    expect(html).toContain('type="text"');
+  });
+
+  test('legitimate number type still passes through unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ label: 'Age', name: 'age', type: 'number' as const }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('type="number"');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/forms/InputField.tsx

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import React, { CSSProperties } from 'react';
 import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
 import { cssPropsToString } from '../../utils/style-helpers';
-import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, scopeId } from '../../utils/escape';
+import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, scopeId, sanitizeInputType } from '../../utils/escape';
 
 interface InputFieldProps {
   label?: string;
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ InputField.craft = {
   return {
     html: `<div${wrapStyle ? ` style="${wrapStyle}"` : ''}>
   ${labelHtml}
-  <input id="${escapeAttr(fieldId)}" type="${props.type || 'text'}" name="${escapeAttr(props.name || 'field')}" placeholder="${escapeAttr(props.placeholder || '')}"${reqAttr}${ariaLabelAttr} style="padding:10px 12px;border:1px solid #d4d4d8;border-radius:6px;font-size:14px;color:#18181b;background-color:#ffffff;width:100%;box-sizing:border-box" />
+  <input id="${escapeAttr(fieldId)}" type="${sanitizeInputType(props.type)}" name="${escapeAttr(props.name || 'field')}" placeholder="${escapeAttr(props.placeholder || '')}"${reqAttr}${ariaLabelAttr} style="padding:10px 12px;border:1px solid #d4d4d8;border-radius:6px;font-size:14px;color:#18181b;background-color:#ffffff;width:100%;box-sizing:border-box" />
 </div>`,
   };
 };

craft/src/components/forms/SubscribeForm.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { SubscribeForm } from './SubscribeForm';
+
+const toHtml = (SubscribeForm as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('SubscribeForm.toHtml hardcoded attributes stay hardcoded (no raw prop breakout)', () => {
+  test('form method is always POST regardless of any injected props', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ heading: 'Join us', method: 'GET"><script>alert(1)</script>' } as any, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('<form method="POST"');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script');
+  });
+
+  test('email input type is always "email" regardless of any injected props', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ type: 'text"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' } as any, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('<input type="email"');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<img');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onerror=');
+  });
+
+  test('layout enum only ever feeds one of two fixed literal style strings, never raw', () => {
+    const { html: inlineHtml } = toHtml({ layout: 'inline' }, '');
+    const { html: stackedHtml } = toHtml({ layout: 'stacked' }, '');
+    expect(inlineHtml).toContain('flex-direction:row');
+    expect(stackedHtml).toContain('flex-direction:column');
+  });
+
+  test('malicious layout value cannot inject raw CSS/attribute breakout (falls through the isInline boolean check to the stacked literal)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ layout: '"><script>alert(1)</script>' as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script');
+    expect(html).toContain('flex-direction:column');
+  });
+
+  test('normal render still produces expected structure', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ heading: 'Subscribe', placeholder: 'you@example.com', buttonText: 'Go' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Subscribe');
+    expect(html).toContain('placeholder="you@example.com"');
+    expect(html).toContain('>Go<');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/forms/TextareaField.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -50,3 +50,16 @@ describe('TextareaField.toHtml deterministic + unique ids (thread node id, resol
     expect(id1).toBe(id2);
   });
 });
+
+describe('TextareaField.toHtml rows attribute sanitization', () => {
+  test('malicious rows value cannot break out of the attribute; falls back to a numeric rows', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ label: 'Message', name: 'message', rows: '4"><script>alert(1)</script>' as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/rows="\d+"/);
+  });
+
+  test('legitimate numeric rows still passes through unchanged', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ label: 'Message', name: 'message', rows: 8 }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('rows="8"');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/forms/TextareaField.tsx

@@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ TextareaField.craft = {
     ...props.style,
   });
   const reqAttr = props.required ? ' required' : '';
+  // `rows` is declared as a TS `number` but arrives unchecked (AI update_props
+  // path only validates node_id; deserialized saved-state JSON is untyped at
+  // runtime), so a string like `4"><script>...` must be coerced to a real
+  // number before interpolation, not trusted as already-numeric.
+  const rows = Number(props.rows) || 4;
   // Deterministic AND unique id: scoped on the Craft node id so the
   // <label for> always matches the <textarea id> AND two TextareaField
   // instances that share the same (often default) `name` -- e.g. two
@@ -113,7 +118,7 @@ TextareaField.craft = {
   return {
     html: `<div${wrapStyle ? ` style="${wrapStyle}"` : ''}>
   ${labelHtml}
-  <textarea id="${escapeAttr(fieldId)}" name="${escapeAttr(props.name || 'message')}" placeholder="${escapeAttr(props.placeholder || '')}" rows="${props.rows || 4}"${reqAttr}${ariaLabelAttr} style="padding:10px 12px;border:1px solid #d4d4d8;border-radius:6px;font-size:14px;color:#18181b;background-color:#ffffff;width:100%;box-sizing:border-box;resize:vertical;font-family:inherit"></textarea>
+  <textarea id="${escapeAttr(fieldId)}" name="${escapeAttr(props.name || 'message')}" placeholder="${escapeAttr(props.placeholder || '')}" rows="${escapeAttr(String(rows))}"${reqAttr}${ariaLabelAttr} style="padding:10px 12px;border:1px solid #d4d4d8;border-radius:6px;font-size:14px;color:#18181b;background-color:#ffffff;width:100%;box-sizing:border-box;resize:vertical;font-family:inherit"></textarea>
 </div>`,
   };
 };

craft/src/components/layout/BackgroundSection.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { BackgroundSection } from './BackgroundSection';
+
+const toHtml = (BackgroundSection as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('BackgroundSection.toHtml anchorId', () => {
+  test('escapes a malicious anchorId (attribute breakout attempt)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'x" onmouseover="alert(1)' }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal anchorId still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'my-bg-section' }, 'child');
+    expect(html).toContain('id="my-bg-section"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('BackgroundSection.toHtml style-value XSS hardening', () => {
+  test('a malicious bgImage cannot break out of the outer style attribute via url(...)', () => {
+    const malicious = 'javascript:alert(1)) foo{background:red}</style><script>alert(1)</script';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ bgImage: malicious }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious bgColor cannot break out of the outer style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ bgColor: malicious }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious overlayColor cannot break out of the overlay style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ overlayColor: malicious }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a wrong-typed overlayOpacity (string, not number) cannot break out of the overlay style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '0.4" onmouseover="alert(1)' as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ overlayOpacity: malicious }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious innerMaxWidth cannot break out of the inner style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '1200px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ innerMaxWidth: malicious }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('normal props still render correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ bgImage: 'https://example.com/bg.jpg', bgColor: '#1e293b', overlayColor: '#000000', overlayOpacity: 0.4, innerMaxWidth: '1200px' }, 'child');
+    expect(html).toContain("url('https://example.com/bg.jpg')");
+    expect(html).toContain('background-color:#1e293b');
+    expect(html).toContain('opacity:0.4');
+    expect(html).toContain('max-width:1200px');
+    expect(html).toContain('child');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/layout/Section.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { Section } from './Section';
+
+const toHtml = (Section as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('Section.toHtml anchorId', () => {
+  test('escapes a malicious anchorId (attribute breakout attempt)', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'x" onmouseover="alert(1)' }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal anchorId still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ anchorId: 'my-section' }, 'child');
+    expect(html).toContain('id="my-section"');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Section.toHtml childrenHtml passthrough', () => {
+  test('children are preserved', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({}, '<p>hello</p>');
+    expect(html).toContain('<p>hello</p>');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Section.toHtml shape divider color/height XSS hardening', () => {
+  test('a malicious topDividerColor cannot break out of the SVG style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'wave', topDividerColor: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious topDividerColor cannot inject a </style><script> breakout', () => {
+    const malicious = 'red</style><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'wave', topDividerColor: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious bottomDividerHeight cannot break out of the wrapper style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '50px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ bottomDivider: 'angle', bottomDividerHeight: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal divider color/height still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'wave', topDividerColor: '#123456', topDividerHeight: '80px' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('fill:#123456');
+    expect(html).toContain('height:80px');
+  });
+
+  test('divider shape "none" emits no divider markup', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'none' }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
+  });
+
+  test('an unrecognized divider shape value emits no divider markup and no injected content', () => {
+    const malicious = 'wave"><script>alert(1)</script>' as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: malicious }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
+  });
+
+  test('a prototype-property-name divider shape (__proto__) does not leak [object Object]/function source into the SVG path', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: '__proto__' as any }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('[object');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('native code');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
+  });
+
+  test('a prototype-property-name divider shape (toString) does not leak Object.prototype.toString source into the SVG path', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ topDivider: 'toString' as any }, 'child');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('[object');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('native code');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<svg');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/layout/Section.tsx

@@ -38,7 +38,14 @@ const ShapeDivider: React.FC<{
   position: 'top' | 'bottom';
 }> = ({ shape, color, height, position }) => {
   if (!shape || shape === 'none') return null;
-  const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape];
+  // `shape` is attacker-controlled (AI update_props / deserialized state) and
+  // not runtime-type-checked. A plain-object index lookup with a string key
+  // like '__proto__', 'toString', or 'constructor' returns an INHERITED
+  // Object.prototype value (not undefined), which would otherwise leak
+  // "[object Object]" / a function's source text into the SVG `d` attribute
+  // below. hasOwnProperty restricts the lookup to the real allowlisted keys.
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DIVIDER_PATHS, shape)) return null;
+  const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape as Exclude<DividerShape, 'none'>];
   if (!path) return null;
 
   const isTop = position === 'top';
@@ -162,7 +169,10 @@ function buildDividerHtml(
   position: 'top' | 'bottom',
 ): string {
   if (!shape || shape === 'none') return '';
-  const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape];
+  // See the matching hasOwnProperty guard in <ShapeDivider> above -- same
+  // prototype-pollution-shaped lookup, same fix.
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DIVIDER_PATHS, shape)) return '';
+  const path = DIVIDER_PATHS[shape as Exclude<DividerShape, 'none'>];
   if (!path) return '';
 
   const isTop = position === 'top';

craft/src/components/media/ImageBlock.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { ImageBlock } from './ImageBlock';
+
+const toHtml = (ImageBlock as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('ImageBlock.toHtml src/alt XSS hardening', () => {
+  test('a javascript: src never reaches the output', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ src: 'javascript:alert(1)' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious src cannot break out of the src attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'https://example.com/x.jpg" onerror="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ src: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onerror="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious alt cannot break out of the alt attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'x" onerror="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ src: 'https://example.com/x.jpg', alt: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onerror="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a placeholder/empty src emits no output', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ src: '' }, '');
+    expect(html).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal image still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ src: 'https://example.com/photo.jpg', alt: 'A photo' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('src="https://example.com/photo.jpg"');
+    expect(html).toContain('alt="A photo"');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/media/MapEmbed.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -27,3 +27,41 @@ describe('MapEmbed.toHtml iframe src ampersand encoding (F-export review Minor)'
     expect(srcMatch![1]).not.toMatch(/&(?!amp;)/);
   });
 });
+
+describe('MapEmbed.toHtml address/zoom/height XSS hardening', () => {
+  test('a malicious address cannot break out of the src or title attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'X" onerror="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ address: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onerror="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a wrong-typed zoom (string with attribute-breakout chars) cannot break out of the src attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '14"><script>alert(1)</script>' as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ address: 'X', zoom: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('"><script');
+  });
+
+  test('a wrong-typed zoom is coerced to a safe numeric value in the exported URL (defense in depth beyond escaping)', () => {
+    const malicious = '14"><script>alert(1)</script>' as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ address: 'X', zoom: malicious }, '');
+    const srcMatch = html.match(/<iframe src="([^"]+)"/);
+    expect(srcMatch).toBeTruthy();
+    // Decode the entity-escaped src back to a plain string and confirm the
+    // `z=` param is a bare, well-formed number -- not the raw attacker string.
+    const decoded = srcMatch![1].replace(/&amp;/g, '&').replace(/&quot;/g, '"').replace(/&lt;/g, '<').replace(/&gt;/g, '>');
+    expect(decoded).toMatch(/[&?]z=\d+(&|$)/);
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious height cannot break out of the iframe style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '400px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ address: 'X', height: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a normal zoom/height still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ address: 'X', zoom: 10, height: '300px' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('z=10');
+    expect(html).toContain('height:300px');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/media/MapEmbed.tsx

@@ -12,7 +12,15 @@ interface MapEmbedProps {
 
 function buildMapUrl(address: string, zoom: number): string {
   const encoded = encodeURIComponent(address);
-  return `https://maps.google.com/maps?q=${encoded}&z=${zoom}&output=embed`;
+  // `zoom` is declared as `number` but is not runtime-type-checked (AI
+  // update_props / deserialized state can hand us anything). The final src
+  // string is still run through escapeAttr(safeUrl(...)) at the toHtml call
+  // site, which already blocks attribute-breakout -- but Number-coercing
+  // here too keeps the emitted URL a well-formed `z=<digits>` query param
+  // instead of smuggling arbitrary attacker text into it.
+  const z = Number(zoom);
+  const safeZoom = Number.isFinite(z) ? z : 14;
+  return `https://maps.google.com/maps?q=${encoded}&z=${safeZoom}&output=embed`;
 }
 
 export const MapEmbed: UserComponent<MapEmbedProps> = ({

craft/src/components/media/VideoBlock.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -72,6 +72,38 @@ describe('VideoBlock.toHtml iframe accessibility (F2.4)', () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe('VideoBlock.toHtml overlay/innerMaxWidth XSS hardening (background mode)', () => {
+  test('a malicious overlayColor cannot break out of the overlay style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = 'red" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ videoUrl: 'https://vimeo.com/123456789', isBackground: true, overlayColor: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a wrong-typed overlayOpacity (string, not number) cannot break out of the overlay style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '50" onmouseover="alert(1)' as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ videoUrl: 'https://vimeo.com/123456789', isBackground: true, overlayOpacity: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious innerMaxWidth cannot break out of the inner style attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = '1200px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ videoUrl: 'https://vimeo.com/123456789', isBackground: true, innerMaxWidth: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious style.borderRadius cannot break out of the style attribute (normal mode, iframe wrapper)', () => {
+    const malicious = { borderRadius: '8px" onmouseover="alert(1)' } as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ videoUrl: 'https://vimeo.com/123456789', style: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious style.borderRadius cannot break out of the style attribute (direct file <video>)', () => {
+    const malicious = { borderRadius: '8px" onmouseover="alert(1)' } as any;
+    const { html } = toHtml({ videoUrl: 'https://example.com/clip.mp4', style: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+  });
+});
+
 describe('VideoBlock.toHtml iframe src ampersand encoding (F-export review Minor)', () => {
   test('embed params joined with literal & are HTML-entity-encoded in the emitted src attribute', () => {
     // autoplay+muted+controls=false forces buildEmbedParams to concatenate

craft/src/components/sections/ContentSlider.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -110,3 +110,23 @@ describe('ContentSlider.toHtml renders slide.imageSrc as a background-image (INT
     expect(html).toContain('background-color:#123456');
   });
 });
+
+describe('ContentSlider.toHtml interval is NOT runtime-type-checked -- must be coerced before it reaches the inline <script> numeric context', () => {
+  test('a malicious interval string cannot inject arbitrary JS into the autoplay setInterval call', () => {
+    const malicious = '5000);alert(document.domain);//';
+    const { html } = toHtml({ slides, autoplay: true, interval: malicious }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('alert(document.domain)');
+    // the setInterval call must still be well-formed with a plain numeral delay
+    expect(html).toMatch(/setInterval\(function\(\)\{show\(current\+1\);\},\d+\);/);
+  });
+
+  test('a non-numeric interval falls back to a safe default delay', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ slides, autoplay: true, interval: 'not-a-number' }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/setInterval\(function\(\)\{show\(current\+1\);\},5000\);/);
+  });
+
+  test('a normal numeric interval still renders as the exact configured delay', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ slides, autoplay: true, interval: 3000 }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/setInterval\(function\(\)\{show\(current\+1\);\},3000\);/);
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/sections/ContentSlider.tsx

@@ -250,11 +250,24 @@ ContentSlider.craft = {
   } = props;
 
   const items = slides.length > 0 ? slides : defaultSlides;
+  // Number() coercion: `interval` is declared `number` in TS but is NOT
+  // type-checked at runtime -- it arrives raw via the AI `update_props`
+  // path or a deserialized saved-state blob and is interpolated directly
+  // into the inline <script>'s `setInterval(fn, ${interval})` call below as
+  // a bare JS numeral (no quotes around it). A string like
+  // `5000);alert(1);//` would previously close the setInterval() call and
+  // splice arbitrary JS into the page's own <script> tag -- worse than an
+  // HTML attribute breakout, since it runs unconditionally on page load.
+  // Number() of anything non-numeric collapses safely to NaN, so we fall
+  // back to the 5000ms default rather than ever interpolating a
+  // non-numeral.
+  const intervalNum = Number(interval);
+  const safeInterval = Number.isFinite(intervalNum) && intervalNum > 0 ? intervalNum : 5000;
   // Deterministic AND unique id, scoped on the Craft node id, for this
   // slider's slide/dot element ids and inline-script globals -- so two
   // ContentSlider instances (e.g. both left at default slides) don't
   // collide and end up driving each other's rotation.
-  const uid = scopeId(nodeId, JSON.stringify(items) + interval, 'cs');
+  const uid = scopeId(nodeId, JSON.stringify(items) + safeInterval, 'cs');
 
   const sectionStyle = cssPropsToString({
     position: 'relative',
@@ -339,7 +352,7 @@ ContentSlider.craft = {
     window["${uid}_prev"]=function(){ markManualNav(); show(current-1); };
     ${autoplayActive ? `
     var timer=null;
-    function start(){ if(!timer && document.visibilityState!=="hidden"){ timer=setInterval(function(){show(current+1);},${interval}); } }
+    function start(){ if(!timer && document.visibilityState!=="hidden"){ timer=setInterval(function(){show(current+1);},${safeInterval}); } }
     function stop(){ if(timer){ clearInterval(timer); timer=null; } }
     var root=document.getElementById(uid);
     if(root){

craft/src/components/sections/HeroSimple.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { HeroSimple } from './HeroSimple';
+
+const toHtml = (HeroSimple as any).toHtml;
+
+describe('HeroSimple.toHtml textAlign enum sink (attacker-controlled prop, not enforced at runtime)', () => {
+  test('malicious textAlign value cannot break out of the content div style attribute', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({
+      heading: 'Hi',
+      subtitle: 'There',
+      textAlign: 'center;"><script>alert(1)</script>',
+    }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('center;">');
+  });
+
+  test('unrecognized textAlign value falls back to a safe default rather than being echoed raw', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ heading: 'Hi', subtitle: 'There', textAlign: 'not-a-real-value' as any }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('text-align:not-a-real-value');
+  });
+
+  test('valid textAlign values are preserved', () => {
+    const { html: left } = toHtml({ heading: 'Hi', subtitle: 'There', textAlign: 'left' }, '');
+    expect(left).toContain('text-align:left');
+    const { html: right } = toHtml({ heading: 'Hi', subtitle: 'There', textAlign: 'right' }, '');
+    expect(right).toContain('text-align:right');
+  });
+
+  test('normal default render is sane', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ heading: 'Welcome', subtitle: 'Sub text' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('Welcome');
+    expect(html).toContain('Sub text');
+    expect(html).toContain('text-align:center');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/sections/HeroSimple.tsx

@@ -229,7 +229,13 @@ HeroSimple.craft = {
     videoHtml = `<video src="${escapeAttr(safeUrl(props.bgVideo))}" autoplay muted loop playsinline style="position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;object-fit:cover;z-index:0"></video>`;
   }
 
-  const textAlign = props.textAlign || 'center';
+  // Allowlisted -- `textAlign` is declared as a 'left'|'center'|'right' union
+  // but arrives unchecked via AI update_props / deserialized state; it is
+  // interpolated raw into the content div's style attribute below, so any
+  // other value must collapse to a known-safe default rather than being
+  // echoed into the markup.
+  const ALLOWED_TEXT_ALIGN = ['left', 'center', 'right'];
+  const textAlign = ALLOWED_TEXT_ALIGN.includes(props.textAlign as string) ? (props.textAlign as string) : 'center';
   const justifyBtn = textAlign === 'center' ? 'center' : textAlign === 'right' ? 'flex-end' : 'flex-start';
 
   const ctas = normalizeCtas(props);

craft/src/components/sections/NumberCounter.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -47,3 +47,29 @@ describe('NumberCounter.toHtml deterministic + unique scope ids (thread node id,
     expect(wrapId1).not.toBe(wrapId2);
   });
 });
+
+describe('NumberCounter.toHtml counter.number is NOT runtime-type-checked -- must be sanitized before it reaches data-target', () => {
+  test('a malicious counter.number cannot break out of the data-target attribute to inject a <script> tag', () => {
+    const malicious = [
+      { number: '150"><script>alert(1)</script>', suffix: '+', label: 'Evil' },
+    ];
+    const { html } = toHtml({ counters: malicious }, '', 'node-nc-evil1');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('"><script>');
+  });
+
+  test('a malicious counter.number cannot break out of the data-target attribute to inject an onmouseover handler', () => {
+    const malicious = [
+      { number: '150" onmouseover="alert(1)', suffix: '+', label: 'Evil' },
+    ];
+    const { html } = toHtml({ counters: malicious }, '', 'node-nc-evil2');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('onmouseover=');
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/data-target="150" onmouseover/);
+  });
+
+  test('normal numeric counter.number values still render as data-target="150"', () => {
+    const normal = [{ number: 150, suffix: '+', label: 'Projects' }];
+    const { html } = toHtml({ counters: normal }, '', 'node-nc-normal');
+    expect(html).toContain('data-target="150"');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/sections/NumberCounter.tsx

@@ -140,8 +140,20 @@ NumberCounter.craft = {
   });
 
   const countersHtml = items.map((counter, i) => {
+    // Number() coercion + escapeAttr: `counter.number` is declared `number`
+    // per-item inside an array prop, but is NOT type-checked at runtime --
+    // it arrives raw via the AI `update_props` path or a deserialized
+    // saved-state blob and was previously interpolated straight into this
+    // data-target attribute, letting a string like `150"><script>...`
+    // break out of the attribute and inject markup. Number() collapses any
+    // non-numeric value safely to NaN (then 0), and escapeAttr is kept as
+    // defense-in-depth in case Number()'s string coercion output ever
+    // contains a stray character (it can't today, but the sink should never
+    // rely solely on the coercion).
+    const numberVal = Number(counter.number);
+    const safeNumber = Number.isFinite(numberVal) ? numberVal : 0;
     return `<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;align-items:center;gap:8px">
-      <span id="${uid}_n${i}" data-target="${counter.number}" data-suffix="${escapeAttr(counter.suffix)}" style="font-size:${numberSize};font-weight:700;color:${numberColor};line-height:1.1;font-family:Inter,sans-serif">0${escapeHtml(counter.suffix)}</span>
+      <span id="${uid}_n${i}" data-target="${escapeAttr(String(safeNumber))}" data-suffix="${escapeAttr(counter.suffix)}" style="font-size:${numberSize};font-weight:700;color:${numberColor};line-height:1.1;font-family:Inter,sans-serif">0${escapeHtml(counter.suffix)}</span>
       <span style="font-size:15px;color:${labelColor};font-family:Inter,sans-serif;font-weight:500">${escapeHtml(counter.label)}</span>
     </div>`;
   }).join('\n    ');

craft/src/components/sections/Testimonials.toHtml.test.ts

@@ -46,3 +46,28 @@ describe('Testimonials.toHtml decorative star icons (F2.5)', () => {
     stars.forEach((tag: string) => expect(tag).toContain('aria-hidden="true"'));
   });
 });
+
+describe('Testimonials.toHtml rating aria-label sink (attacker-controlled `rating`, typed number but unchecked)', () => {
+  test('malicious rating value cannot break out of the star row aria-label attribute', () => {
+    const malicious = [
+      { quote: 'Q', name: 'N', title: 'T', rating: '5"><script>alert(1)</script>' as any },
+    ];
+    const { html } = toHtml({ testimonials: malicious, layout: 'grid' }, '');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+    expect(html).not.toContain('5"><script>');
+  });
+
+  test('non-numeric rating falls back to a safe numeric value', () => {
+    const malicious = [
+      { quote: 'Q', name: 'N', title: 'T', rating: 'not-a-number' as any },
+    ];
+    const { html } = toHtml({ testimonials: malicious, layout: 'grid' }, '');
+    expect(html).toMatch(/aria-label="Rating: 0 out of 5"/);
+  });
+
+  test('normal numeric rating still renders correctly', () => {
+    const { html } = toHtml({ testimonials, layout: 'grid' }, '');
+    expect(html).toContain('aria-label="Rating: 5 out of 5"');
+    expect(html).toContain('aria-label="Rating: 4 out of 5"');
+  });
+});

craft/src/components/sections/Testimonials.tsx

@@ -41,10 +41,16 @@ function renderStars(count: number, color: string): React.ReactNode {
 }
 
 function starsHtml(count: number, color: string): string {
+  // `count` is `Testimonial.rating`, typed `number` but arrives unchecked via
+  // AI update_props / deserialized state -- coerce to a real number before
+  // it's interpolated into the aria-label attribute below (both the loop
+  // comparison and the escapeAttr(String(...)) call are safe against any
+  // non-numeric/garbage value).
+  const safeCount = Number(count) || 0;
   const stars = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].map((i) =>
-    `<i class="fa ${i <= count ? 'fa-star' : 'fa-star-o'}" style="color:${color};font-size:14px" aria-hidden="true"></i>`
+    `<i class="fa ${i <= safeCount ? 'fa-star' : 'fa-star-o'}" style="color:${color};font-size:14px" aria-hidden="true"></i>`
   ).join('');
-  return `<div style="display:flex;gap:2px;justify-content:center;margin-bottom:12px" role="img" aria-label="Rating: ${count} out of 5">${stars}</div>`;
+  return `<div style="display:flex;gap:2px;justify-content:center;margin-bottom:12px" role="img" aria-label="${escapeAttr(`Rating: ${safeCount} out of 5`)}">${stars}</div>`;
 }
 
 export const Testimonials: UserComponent<TestimonialsProps> = ({

craft/src/utils/escape.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
-import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, safeUrl, stableHash, scopeId } from './escape';
+import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, safeUrl, stableHash, scopeId, sanitizeFormMethod, sanitizeInputType } from './escape';
 
 describe('escapeHtml', () => {
   test('escapes &, <, >, "', () => {
@@ -140,3 +140,56 @@ describe('scopeId', () => {
     expect(scopeId('node-abc', 'seed', 'tabs')).toMatch(/^tabs_/);
   });
 });
+
+describe('sanitizeFormMethod', () => {
+  test('allows GET and POST unchanged', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod('GET')).toBe('GET');
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod('POST')).toBe('POST');
+  });
+
+  test('is case-insensitive and normalizes to uppercase', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod('get')).toBe('GET');
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod('post')).toBe('POST');
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod('PoSt')).toBe('POST');
+  });
+
+  test('falls back to POST for anything not in the allowlist', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod('DELETE')).toBe('POST');
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod('')).toBe('POST');
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod(undefined as any)).toBe('POST');
+  });
+
+  test('neutralizes an attribute-breakout injection instead of passing it through', () => {
+    const malicious = 'POST"><script>alert(1)</script>';
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod(malicious)).toBe('POST');
+  });
+
+  test('coerces non-string input safely', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod(123 as any)).toBe('POST');
+    expect(sanitizeFormMethod(null as any)).toBe('POST');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('sanitizeInputType', () => {
+  test('allows known-safe input types unchanged', () => {
+    ['text', 'email', 'tel', 'number', 'password', 'url', 'search', 'date', 'checkbox', 'radio', 'hidden'].forEach((t) => {
+      expect(sanitizeInputType(t)).toBe(t);
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('falls back to text for anything not in the allowlist', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeInputType('bogus')).toBe('text');
+    expect(sanitizeInputType('')).toBe('text');
+    expect(sanitizeInputType(undefined as any)).toBe('text');
+  });
+
+  test('neutralizes an attribute-breakout injection instead of passing it through', () => {
+    const malicious = 'text"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>';
+    expect(sanitizeInputType(malicious)).toBe('text');
+  });
+
+  test('coerces non-string input safely', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeInputType(123 as any)).toBe('text');
+    expect(sanitizeInputType(null as any)).toBe('text');
+  });
+});

craft/src/utils/escape.ts

@@ -154,3 +154,32 @@ export function scopeId(nodeId: string | undefined, fallbackSeed: string, prefix
   const slug = (nodeId || '').toString().toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '');
   return `${prefix}_${slug || stableHash(fallbackSeed)}`;
 }
+
+// Shared enum allowlists for `toHtml` attribute sinks fed by props that are
+// declared as a TS union (e.g. `method?: 'GET' | 'POST'`) but are NOT
+// type-checked at runtime -- they arrive raw via the AI `update_props` path
+// (only `node_id` is validated there) or a deserialized saved-state blob.
+// Allowlisting -- rather than escaping -- is correct here because the only
+// legitimate values are the fixed set below; anything else is either an
+// honest mistake or an attribute-breakout attempt, and both collapse safely
+// to the same known-good default.
+
+const ALLOWED_FORM_METHODS = ['GET', 'POST'] as const;
+
+/** Allowlists a `<form method>` value, case-insensitively, falling back to 'POST'. */
+export function sanitizeFormMethod(m: unknown): 'GET' | 'POST' {
+  const upper = (typeof m === 'string' ? m : '').trim().toUpperCase();
+  return (ALLOWED_FORM_METHODS as readonly string[]).includes(upper) ? (upper as 'GET' | 'POST') : 'POST';
+}
+
+const ALLOWED_INPUT_TYPES = [
+  'text', 'email', 'tel', 'number', 'password', 'url', 'search',
+  'date', 'time', 'datetime-local', 'month', 'week',
+  'checkbox', 'radio', 'hidden', 'color', 'range', 'file',
+] as const;
+
+/** Allowlists an `<input type>` value, falling back to 'text'. */
+export function sanitizeInputType(t: unknown): string {
+  const value = typeof t === 'string' ? t : '';
+  return (ALLOWED_INPUT_TYPES as readonly string[]).includes(value) ? value : 'text';
+}