Adversarial re-review found the C1 fix incomplete plus an adjacent
same-class XSS, both reachable via the AI update_props path and
deserialized saved state:
- cssPropsToString only ran sanitizeCssValue on typeof-string values, so a
non-string style value (array/object) with a valid key skipped
sanitization entirely and was template-coerced raw into style="...",
e.g. { color: ['red', '"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'] }. Now every
non-number value is coerced with String() and sanitized; numbers stay
raw. sanitizeBreakoutChars also now escapes < and > (previously only ;
and ") as defense-in-depth, since values can reach it from non-string
sources.
- props.tag (Container) and props.level (Heading) were interpolated raw
into the tag position of exported HTML (`<${tag}`, `<${level}`) with no
runtime validation, letting a malicious value break out of the tag
entirely. Both are now allowlisted/clamped against their known-safe sets
(div/section/article/header/footer/main; h1-h6), falling back to
div/h2. Applied in Container's live render + toHtml, Heading's live
render + toHtml, and the typeName==='div' fallback branch in
html-export.ts's renderNode (hit for unresolved/legacy node types).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Container.craft.props collected cssId/cssClass since before Phase E1 but
nothing rendered or exported them. Add live "CSS ID" / "CSS Class" text
inputs to ContainerStylePanel (guarded on nodeProps.cssId/cssClass
!== undefined) and emit id=/class= in both the editor render and toHtml.
cssId takes precedence over the existing anchorId prop when both are set
(only one id attribute can be emitted); anchorId is used as a fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.8