M-5: safeUrl() blocked javascript:/vbscript:/data:text/html but
allowed data:image/svg+xml, which can execute inline <script>/onload=
when loaded as a document/navigation target despite its "image" MIME
type (defense in depth -- not currently reachable to execution via
this sink, but closing it). Added `data:image/svg+xml` to the existing
DANGEROUS_SCHEME_PREFIXES check, so it's caught after the same
entity-decode/whitespace-strip/lowercase normalization used for the
other blocked schemes (obfuscated variants included). Other
data:image/* types (png/jpeg/gif/webp, ...) remain allowed unchanged.
M-6: HtmlBlock's purifyHtml() allowed <iframe src> through with no
`sandbox` attribute -- a clickjacking/phishing vector even with
DOMPurify already stripping script/on*=. Added a DOMPurify
afterSanitizeAttributes hook, scoped tightly to each purifyHtml() call
(added right before sanitize(), removed in a finally right after) so
it can't leak onto other DOMPurify uses or accumulate duplicates
across repeated calls, that force-sets a restrictive sandbox
(allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-forms -- no
allow-top-navigation) and referrerpolicy=no-referrer on every iframe
that survives sanitization.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each component defined a .craft.related.settings panel that was never
rendered -- the right panel renders only GuidedStyles (per-type
*StylePanel components), never .related.settings. Removed all dead
settings components across every component, their settings-only helpers
(including the dead uploadToWhp/showBrowser/handleBrowse asset-browse
blocks in Logo/Navbar/VideoBlock/FeaturesGrid, and CtasEditor in
_cta-helpers), and dropped the now-empty related keys. Render output,
.craft props/rules, and toHtml statics are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Entity-escaping alone doesn't protect JS-string or raw-HTML sinks:
- HtmlBlock.toHtml exported props.code raw; now runs it through the
same purifyHtml (DOMPurify) config already used for the live editor
preview, so <script>/on*= payloads can't survive export either.
- Countdown.toHtml interpolated targetDate directly into
`new Date("${targetDate}")` inside an inline <script> -- a value
like `2026-01-01");alert(1)//` broke out of the string literal. Now
validated against a strict date/datetime shape and JSON.stringify'd
before embedding, falling back to `new Date()` for anything invalid.
- Gallery.toHtml's lightbox used
`onclick="${id}_open('${esc(img.src)}')"`, which a single quote in
img.src could break out of. Replaced with a `data-lb-src` attribute
per thumbnail and one delegated click listener on the grid
(`e.target.closest('[data-lb-src]')`) instead of a per-item inline
handler string.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes XSS hole in HtmlBlock by sanitizing user/AI-supplied markup
through DOMPurify before passing to dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Adds
Vitest + jsdom for unit testing with 5 passing tests covering script
stripping, on-event handler removal, javascript: URL blocking, iframe
allowlist, and form/input stripping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rebuilt the visual site builder from scratch using Craft.js, React 18,
and TypeScript. The new editor renders directly in the DOM (no iframe),
supports 40+ components, multi-page with shared header/footer, 16
templates, full-spectrum color/gradient controls, custom head code
injection, save/publish workflow, and auto-save.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5