Site builder: security & data-loss hardening + unified asset picker + audit backlog #3
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import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
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import { escapeHtml, escapeAttr, safeUrl } from './escape';
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describe('escapeHtml', () => {
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test('escapes &, <, >, "', () => {
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expect(escapeHtml('a & b <c> "d"')).toBe('a & b <c> "d"');
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});
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test('escapes ampersand first (no double-escaping)', () => {
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expect(escapeHtml('&')).toBe('&amp;');
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});
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test('coerces non-string / null / undefined safely', () => {
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expect(escapeHtml(null as any)).toBe('');
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expect(escapeHtml(undefined as any)).toBe('');
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expect(escapeHtml(123 as any)).toBe('123');
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});
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});
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describe('escapeAttr', () => {
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test('does everything escapeHtml does', () => {
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expect(escapeAttr('a & b <c> "d"')).toBe('a & b <c> "d"');
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});
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test('also escapes single quote and backtick', () => {
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expect(escapeAttr(`'`)).toBe(''');
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expect(escapeAttr('`')).toBe('`');
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});
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test('combined example', () => {
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expect(escapeAttr(`it's a "test" <b>\``)).toBe('it's a "test" <b>`');
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});
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test('coerces non-string / null / undefined safely', () => {
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expect(escapeAttr(null as any)).toBe('');
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expect(escapeAttr(undefined as any)).toBe('');
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});
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});
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describe('safeUrl', () => {
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test('blocks javascript: scheme', () => {
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expect(safeUrl('javascript:alert(1)')).toBe('');
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});
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test('blocks javascript: with leading whitespace and mixed case', () => {
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expect(safeUrl(' JavaScript:alert(1)')).toBe('');
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});
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test('blocks javascript: with tab/control-char obfuscation', () => {
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expect(safeUrl('java\tscript:alert(1)')).toBe('');
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});
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test('blocks entity-obfuscated javascript: scheme (decimal)', () => {
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expect(safeUrl('javascript:alert(1)')).toBe('');
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});
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test('blocks entity-obfuscated javascript: scheme (zero-padded decimal)', () => {
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expect(safeUrl('java:script:alert(1)')).toBe('');
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});
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test('blocks vbscript: scheme', () => {
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expect(safeUrl('vbscript:msgbox(1)')).toBe('');
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});
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test('blocks data:text/html', () => {
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expect(safeUrl('data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD4=')).toBe('');
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});
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test('allows ';
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expect(safeUrl(s)).toBe(s);
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});
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test.each([
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'https://x.com/a?b=1&c=2',
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'http://x',
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'/relative/path',
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'#anchor',
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'mailto:a@b.com',
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'tel:+15551234',
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'',
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])('allows %s unchanged (trimmed)', (input) => {
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expect(safeUrl(input)).toBe(input.trim());
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});
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test('coerces non-string to empty string', () => {
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expect(safeUrl(null as any)).toBe('');
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expect(safeUrl(undefined as any)).toBe('');
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expect(safeUrl(123 as any)).toBe('');
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});
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test('does not mangle query strings on allowed urls', () => {
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expect(safeUrl('https://x.com/a?b=1&c=2')).toBe('https://x.com/a?b=1&c=2');
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});
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});
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@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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/**
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* Shared HTML-escaping and URL-safety utilities.
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*
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* `escapeHtml` / `escapeAttr` are the single source of truth for escaping
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* user-supplied strings before they are interpolated into exported/rendered
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* HTML. `safeUrl` blocks dangerous URL schemes (javascript:, vbscript:,
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* data:text/html) including whitespace/case/entity-obfuscated variants.
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*/
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/** Escapes &, <, >, " for safe use in text content and double-quoted attributes. */
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export function escapeHtml(s: string): string {
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if (typeof s !== 'string') {
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if (s === null || s === undefined) return '';
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s = String(s);
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}
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// Ampersand MUST be escaped first, otherwise the entities produced by the
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// other replacements would themselves be re-escaped (double-escaping).
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return s
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.replace(/&/g, '&')
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.replace(/</g, '<')
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.replace(/>/g, '>')
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.replace(/"/g, '"');
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}
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/** Escapes everything escapeHtml does, plus ' and ` for use in any attribute context. */
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export function escapeAttr(s: string): string {
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if (typeof s !== 'string') {
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if (s === null || s === undefined) return '';
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s = String(s);
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}
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return escapeHtml(s)
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.replace(/'/g, ''')
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.replace(/`/g, '`');
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}
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// Dangerous scheme prefixes, checked against a normalized copy with all
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// colons removed (see safeUrl) so that colon-splicing obfuscation like
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// "java:script:alert(1)" can't slip past a literal "javascript:" check.
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const DANGEROUS_SCHEME_PREFIXES = ['javascript', 'vbscript', 'datatext/html'];
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/** Decodes &#NN; and &#xNN; numeric HTML entities (used to obfuscate scheme names). */
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function decodeNumericEntities(s: string): string {
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return s.replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);?/gi, (_m, hex) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex, 16)))
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.replace(/�*([0-9]+);?/g, (_m, dec) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(dec, 10)));
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}
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/**
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* Returns the trimmed input if it is a safe URL, otherwise returns ''.
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* Blocks javascript:, vbscript:, and data:text/html schemes, including
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* whitespace / control-char / case / HTML-entity obfuscated variants.
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* Allowed URLs are returned UNCHANGED (trimmed only) -- query strings etc.
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* are never mangled.
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*/
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export function safeUrl(s: string): string {
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if (typeof s !== 'string') return '';
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const trimmed = s.trim();
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if (trimmed === '') return '';
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// Build a normalized copy for scheme detection only: decode numeric HTML
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// entities (catches e.g. j -> 'j'), strip whitespace/control chars,
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// and lowercase.
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const normalized = decodeNumericEntities(trimmed)
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.replace(/[\x00-\x20]+/g, '')
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.toLowerCase();
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// Strip any colons before matching the scheme prefix. This defeats
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// obfuscation that splices extra colons into the scheme name itself
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// (e.g. decoding : mid-word produces "java:script:alert(1)", which
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// would otherwise dodge a literal "^javascript:" check) while still
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// reliably catching the real "javascript:"/"vbscript:"/"data:text/html"
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// prefixes once their own colon is removed.
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const collapsed = normalized.replace(/:/g, '');
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if (DANGEROUS_SCHEME_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => collapsed.startsWith(prefix))) {
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return '';
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}
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return trimmed;
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}
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import { componentResolver } from '../components/resolver';
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import { cssPropsToString } from './style-helpers';
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import { escapeHtml } from './escape';
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export interface ExportOptions {
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title?: string;
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@@ -198,10 +199,6 @@ ${bodyHtml}${animationScript}
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</html>`;
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}
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function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
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return str.replace(/&/g, '&').replace(/</g, '<').replace(/>/g, '>').replace(/"/g, '"');
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}
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/**
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* Export serialized Craft.js state to standalone HTML.
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*/
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