shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.8
591a51dcc2
An adversarial pass found 5 Critical XSS sinks where props declared number/enum in TypeScript were interpolated raw into exported HTML attribute values, trusting the type — but nothing enforces it at runtime (AI update_props only validates node_id; deserialized saved state is untyped JSON). Fixed all 5 (NumberCounter data-target, StarRating aria-label, FormContainer method, ContactForm/InputField input type) plus 6 sibling sinks found by an exhaustive audit of every attribute-value interpolation across src/components: a JS-source injection into ContentSlider's inline setInterval script, a prototype-pollution-adjacent allowlist gap in Section's divider-shape lookup, TextareaField rows, Testimonials rating aria-label, HeroSimple textAlign, and MapEmbed zoom. Adds shared sanitizeFormMethod/sanitizeInputType allowlist helpers to utils/escape.ts alongside the existing escapeAttr/safeUrl/cssValue primitives. Every fix is TDD'd: a malicious-value test reproduces the raw injection against the pre-fix code, then passes after the fix. 502 tests green (npx vitest run), tsc + vite build green (npm run build). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
47 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript
47 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
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import { Icon } from './Icon';
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const toHtml = (Icon as any).toHtml;
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describe('Icon.toHtml normal rendering', () => {
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test('renders icon class, size/color style, and link href', () => {
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const { html } = toHtml({ icon: 'fa-star', size: '32px', color: '#3b82f6', link: 'https://example.com' }, '');
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expect(html).toContain('class="fa fa-star"');
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expect(html).toContain('font-size:32px');
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expect(html).toContain('color:#3b82f6');
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expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com"');
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});
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});
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describe('Icon.toHtml XSS hardening', () => {
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test('an icon name with an attribute-breakout string is escaped, not raw-concatenated', () => {
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const malicious = 'star"><script>alert(1)</script>';
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const { html } = toHtml({ icon: malicious as any }, '');
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expect(html).not.toContain('<script>alert(1)</script>');
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expect(html).not.toMatch(/class="fa star"><script>/);
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});
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test('a size value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape style=""', () => {
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const malicious = '24px" onerror="alert(1)';
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const { html } = toHtml({ size: malicious as any }, '');
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expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onerror="/);
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});
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test('a bgSize/bgColor breakout via background wrapper is neutralized', () => {
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const malicious = '56px" onmouseover="alert(1)';
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const { html } = toHtml({ bgShape: 'circle', bgColor: '#fff', bgSize: malicious as any }, '');
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expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onmouseover="/);
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});
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test('a javascript: link is neutralized to an empty href', () => {
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const { html } = toHtml({ link: 'javascript:alert(1)' }, '');
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expect(html).not.toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
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});
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test('a link value with an attribute-breakout string cannot escape href=""', () => {
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const malicious = 'https://example.com" onclick="alert(1)';
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const { html } = toHtml({ link: malicious as any }, '');
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expect(html).not.toMatch(/"\s+onclick="/);
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});
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});
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