shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.8
bf4a9f48eb
M-5: safeUrl() blocked javascript:/vbscript:/data:text/html but allowed data:image/svg+xml, which can execute inline <script>/onload= when loaded as a document/navigation target despite its "image" MIME type (defense in depth -- not currently reachable to execution via this sink, but closing it). Added `data:image/svg+xml` to the existing DANGEROUS_SCHEME_PREFIXES check, so it's caught after the same entity-decode/whitespace-strip/lowercase normalization used for the other blocked schemes (obfuscated variants included). Other data:image/* types (png/jpeg/gif/webp, ...) remain allowed unchanged. M-6: HtmlBlock's purifyHtml() allowed <iframe src> through with no `sandbox` attribute -- a clickjacking/phishing vector even with DOMPurify already stripping script/on*=. Added a DOMPurify afterSanitizeAttributes hook, scoped tightly to each purifyHtml() call (added right before sanitize(), removed in a finally right after) so it can't leak onto other DOMPurify uses or accumulate duplicates across repeated calls, that force-sets a restrictive sandbox (allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-forms -- no allow-top-navigation) and referrerpolicy=no-referrer on every iframe that survives sanitization. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
102 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
102 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
import React, { CSSProperties, useMemo } from 'react';
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import { useNode, UserComponent } from '@craftjs/core';
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import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
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interface HtmlBlockProps {
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code: string;
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style?: CSSProperties;
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aiName?: string;
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node_id?: string;
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}
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const PURIFY_CONFIG = {
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ALLOWED_TAGS: [
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'a','p','br','hr','div','span','section','article',
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'header','footer','main','aside','nav',
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'ul','ol','li',
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'h1','h2','h3','h4','h5','h6',
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'em','strong','b','i','u','s',
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'blockquote','code','pre',
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'img','figure','figcaption',
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'iframe',
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],
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ALLOWED_ATTR: [
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'href','src','alt','title','target','rel',
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'width','height','class',
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'allowfullscreen','allow','frameborder',
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'sandbox','referrerpolicy',
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],
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ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP: /^(?:(?:https?|mailto|tel|data:image\/[a-z]+;base64,):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i,
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FORBID_TAGS: ['script','style','object','embed','link','meta','form','input','button','select','textarea'],
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FORBID_ATTR: [/^on/i],
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};
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// M-6: `<iframe>` is allowed (maps/video embeds are a legitimate use case)
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// but an iframe with a `src` and NO `sandbox` attribute is a clickjacking/
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// phishing vector (DOMPurify already strips <script>/on*=, but an
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// unsandboxed iframe still gets full script execution, same-origin-ish
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// access via document.domain tricks, top-level navigation, etc., inside
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// itself). This hook force-sets a restrictive sandbox on every iframe that
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// survives sanitization, keeping `allow-scripts`/`allow-same-origin`/
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// `allow-popups`/`allow-forms` (needed for interactive maps/video/oauth
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// popups) but deliberately omitting `allow-top-navigation` so an embedded
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// page can never redirect/hijack the parent tab.
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const IFRAME_SANDBOX_HOOK = (node: Element): void => {
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if (node.nodeName === 'IFRAME') {
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node.setAttribute('sandbox', 'allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-forms');
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node.setAttribute('referrerpolicy', 'no-referrer');
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}
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};
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export function purifyHtml(input: string): string {
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// Hook is added immediately before sanitize() and removed immediately
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// after, scoped tightly to this single call -- so it can never leak onto
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// (or accumulate duplicate copies across) any other DOMPurify.sanitize()
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// call elsewhere in the app, and repeated purifyHtml() calls never stack
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// multiple copies of the same hook.
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DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', IFRAME_SANDBOX_HOOK);
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try {
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return DOMPurify.sanitize(input || '', PURIFY_CONFIG as any) as unknown as string;
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} finally {
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DOMPurify.removeHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', IFRAME_SANDBOX_HOOK as any);
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}
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}
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export const HtmlBlock: UserComponent<HtmlBlockProps> = ({ code = '', style = {} }) => {
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const { connectors: { connect, drag }, selected } = useNode((node) => ({ selected: node.events.selected }));
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const clean = useMemo(() => purifyHtml(code), [code]);
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const setRef = (ref: HTMLElement | null): void => { if (ref) connect(drag(ref)); };
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return React.createElement('div', {
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ref: setRef,
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style: {
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minHeight: '40px',
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outline: selected ? '2px solid #3b82f6' : 'none',
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...style,
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},
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dangerouslySetInnerHTML: { __html: clean },
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});
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};
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/* ---------- Craft config ---------- */
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HtmlBlock.craft = {
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displayName: 'HTML',
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props: {
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code: '',
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style: {},
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},
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rules: {
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canDrag: () => true,
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canMoveIn: () => false,
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canMoveOut: () => true,
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},
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};
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/* ---------- HTML export ---------- */
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(HtmlBlock as any).toHtml = (props: HtmlBlockProps, _childrenHtml: string) => {
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// Run through the same DOMPurify config used for the live editor preview
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// so exported pages can't carry <script>/on*= payloads either.
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return { html: purifyHtml(props.code || '') };
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};
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