Files
site-builder/craft/src/components/forms/FormContainer.toHtml.test.ts
T
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.8 591a51dcc2 fix(builder): escape/allowlist all attribute-value sinks incl. numeric/enum props (XSS)
An adversarial pass found 5 Critical XSS sinks where props declared number/enum
in TypeScript were interpolated raw into exported HTML attribute values,
trusting the type — but nothing enforces it at runtime (AI update_props only
validates node_id; deserialized saved state is untyped JSON). Fixed all 5
(NumberCounter data-target, StarRating aria-label, FormContainer method,
ContactForm/InputField input type) plus 6 sibling sinks found by an exhaustive
audit of every attribute-value interpolation across src/components: a
JS-source injection into ContentSlider's inline setInterval script, a
prototype-pollution-adjacent allowlist gap in Section's divider-shape lookup,
TextareaField rows, Testimonials rating aria-label, HeroSimple textAlign, and
MapEmbed zoom. Adds shared sanitizeFormMethod/sanitizeInputType allowlist
helpers to utils/escape.ts alongside the existing escapeAttr/safeUrl/cssValue
primitives. Every fix is TDD'd: a malicious-value test reproduces the raw
injection against the pre-fix code, then passes after the fix.

502 tests green (npx vitest run), tsc + vite build green (npm run build).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 18:03:44 -07:00

55 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest';
import { FormContainer } from './FormContainer';
const toHtml = (FormContainer as any).toHtml;
describe('FormContainer.toHtml relay wiring', () => {
test('with recipientEmail: marker + placeholder action + honeypot, forces POST', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ recipientEmail: 'a@b.com', thankYouUrl: '/thx', method: 'GET' }, '<input name="email">');
expect(html).toMatch(/<!--WHP-FORM id="F_[0-9a-z]+" recipient="a@b.com" thankyou="\/thx"-->/);
expect(html).toMatch(/action="__WHP_FORM_ACTION__F_[0-9a-z]+__"/);
expect(html).toContain('method="POST"'); // relay forces POST even though method=GET
expect(html).toContain('name="_gotcha"');
// honeypot precedes the form's children
expect(html.indexOf('_gotcha')).toBeLessThan(html.indexOf('name="email"'));
// marker id === action id
const mid = html.match(/id="(F_[0-9a-z]+)"/)![1];
expect(html).toContain(`__WHP_FORM_ACTION__${mid}__`);
});
test('without recipientEmail: legacy action/method, no marker or honeypot', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ action: '/legacy', method: 'POST' }, '<input name="email">');
expect(html).not.toContain('WHP-FORM');
expect(html).not.toContain('_gotcha');
expect(html).toContain('action="/legacy"');
expect(html).toContain('<input name="email">');
});
test('same node id -> identical marker+placeholder ids across two calls', () => {
const { html: html1 } = toHtml({ recipientEmail: 'a@b.com', thankYouUrl: '/thx' }, '<input name="email">', 'node-fc1');
const { html: html2 } = toHtml({ recipientEmail: 'a@b.com', thankYouUrl: '/thx' }, '<input name="email">', 'node-fc1');
expect(html1).toBe(html2);
});
test('two different node ids -> different fids', () => {
const { html: html1 } = toHtml({ recipientEmail: 'a@b.com', thankYouUrl: '/thx' }, '<input name="email">', 'node-fc1');
const { html: html2 } = toHtml({ recipientEmail: 'a@b.com', thankYouUrl: '/thx' }, '<input name="email">', 'node-fc2');
const mid1 = html1.match(/<!--WHP-FORM id="([^"]+)"/)![1];
const mid2 = html2.match(/<!--WHP-FORM id="([^"]+)"/)![1];
expect(mid1).not.toBe(mid2);
});
});
describe('FormContainer.toHtml method attribute sanitization', () => {
test('malicious method value cannot break out of the attribute; falls back to POST', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ action: '/legacy', method: 'POST"><script>alert(1)</script>' }, '');
expect(html).not.toContain('<script');
expect(html).toContain('method="POST"');
});
test('legitimate GET method still passes through unchanged (non-relay path)', () => {
const { html } = toHtml({ action: '/legacy', method: 'GET' }, '');
expect(html).toContain('method="GET"');
});
});