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199 lines
11 KiB
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199 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
Episode: 3603
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Title: HPR3603: Who the heck is Evil Steve? Part 1
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3603/hpr3603.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-25 02:03:54
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---
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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3603 for Wednesday, the 25th of May 2022.
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Today's show is entitled, O'Hack is Evil Steve, Part 1.
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Hello, welcome to Hacker Public Radio.
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You're listening to Abin Abin with Lurking Pryon.
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This week's episode, who the fuck is Evil Steve?
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Um, I mentioned in my last episode that security is a people problem.
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And this is one of the biggest things the security community has forgotten.
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We focus on viruses, worms, ransomware.
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We focus on the things.
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What we don't stop to think about is that those things are initiated by a person with a specific
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intent.
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Now, sometimes that intent could just be generally to cause damage to any random person or it
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could be going after very specific information that a company or a set of companies owns.
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For example, if they're going after corporate data that you are using to show how it is that
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you keep a competitive advantage, like trade secrets or research and development on a new product
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or state secrets, um, all depends on who the threat actor is and what it is that they
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are after.
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The important thing is you as an organization have information that is valuable to someone
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else in some shape, way or form.
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Now, you as a person, you have information that's valuable.
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You have your social security number or your identification number.
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You have your name, your address, your birthday.
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This information can be used for identity theft.
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Well, your organization also has information that is valuable to someone else.
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What we need to start thinking about is, first of all, what information do we have as
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an organization that is valuable to us and then what kind of people would be interested
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in that kind of information.
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So then we can start putting controls in place that would allow us to properly protect
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those assets.
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Now we for years have been depicting hackers as this teenager wearing a hoodie, sitting
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in mom's basement, eating cheetos and drinking Mountain Dew or Red Bull.
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Those days are gone.
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Are those threat actors still out there?
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Sure.
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But that's not the evil Steve of today.
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The thing is, there is big money in crime, big money.
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So what we need to understand is that these are criminal enterprises, these are state sponsored
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actors, these are military units.
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These are sophisticated units that are developing their own malware, their own ransomware.
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They are looking for weaknesses and developing exploits.
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They are not just passively sitting by using tools that were developed by someone else.
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There are people out there that are building these exploits.
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There's also a commodity market for this.
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For example, today, if you wanted to go to the dark side, you don't have to develop all
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of this stuff yourself.
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You can go to a black market and you could purchase pre-built ransomware that's already set
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up.
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Crypto wallets already set up.
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There's a crypto server set up, all you have to do is put in your crypto wallet when
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somebody gets ransomed, then hey, the information is transferred and they get a cut of it.
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If you wanted to build a botnet, you don't have to build a botnet.
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Today, you could rent a botnet or if you want, you could buy a botnet that someone else
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has already built.
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Crazy.
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Evil Steve is not a kid in a hoodie hacking you.
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That's the biggest thing that we need to understand is that we are dealing with a threat
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actor that really has their eye on a prize and they are looking to make good money off
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of it.
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A lot of times I say that Evil Steve works for Evil IBM.
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Literally, criminal enterprises that are run like IBM, you go in.
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There is a boss that works above you.
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You get vacation time, you punch him Monday through Friday, you work, whatever hours that
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you work, you get benefits, you get vacation time, it's Evil IBM.
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It's just the downside is, when you get fired, things don't always go as well depending
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upon which part of Evil IBM you work for and in what country.
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Of course, you may have to be very careful about where you take vacations because extradition
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treaties.
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Hopefully, this gives you a better idea of when we talk about somebody attacking us or
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something that is occurring on our network.
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We need to not just look at this as a thing that happened.
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Don't look at this as just a static event or a static tool that occurred.
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This is a threat actor, a person or a group of people, an Evil Steve that is trying to
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get specific information out of your network.
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We need to think about who these people are, what they are after, so that we have a better
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idea of what the end game actually is and what they are after.
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This will give us a much better backdrop on which to build a security program that can
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actually protect our people and our information.
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I came up with Evil Steve years ago when I was trying to explain to young security practitioners
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how to go about protecting because everybody was focused on the things that Evil Steve
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did rather than Evil Steve himself.
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For those of you who came out of the intelligence community, you are very familiar with understanding
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human intelligence and the people that are trying to do things.
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The things that they do are all in line with the plans, the objectives or whatever else
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it is that they are trying to achieve.
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We lost that in cybersecurity.
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We forget all about the human element of the threat actor and we focus solely on the tools
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that we see surfacing within our environment.
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We can't do that.
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We have to go back to the basics and we have to think about who are the bad guys that
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are actually after our information and of course there are still the people out there
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who are just randomly scanning the internet and just looking for opportunities.
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You may be something that they are after or you might be something else.
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Who knows.
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Keep in mind whenever we are talking about protecting our network, protecting our information, be
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at home or at work, we need to think about the kind of information we have, who that
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would be valuable to.
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And then what are the typical ways they go about getting that information?
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Once you know who the bad guys are and how they operate, their tactics, techniques and
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procedures, TTPs, then it becomes easier to not only build defenses to protect against
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it, but more importantly to start looking for evidence that they are already there.
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It's a pretty safe assumption to look at an organization that has been around for a minute
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and say, look, if you haven't been hacked yet, you will be.
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It's not if you're going to get hacked, it's a matter of when.
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It's going to happen.
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So what we need to do is focus on finding the threat actor as quickly as possible so that
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we can minimize the amount of damage that's done.
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The longer an evil Steve is in your network, the more damage is going to be done, the more
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information that can be stolen, and this is what we are ultimately trying to do.
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We are trying to stop the bleeding.
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Let's perform triage.
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So we need to do something called active threat hunting.
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So again, we know the TTPs of the threat actor, we know what they're doing, and we know
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what kind of things to look for on our network and within our devices.
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So let's go out and start actively looking for signs of an evil Steve in our network.
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Don't passively sit by and wait for a system to tell you that they found evil Steve.
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Go looking for evil Steve.
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We call this active threat hunting.
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And yes, if your organization is not doing this, then I would highly recommend that you
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look into this and try to get it implemented.
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It will pay off in dividends.
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If your organization isn't focusing on threat actors, then I would highly recommend that
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you look into the threat actors that are out there.
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There are a lot of information sharing sites.
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If you're in a critical infrastructure within the U.S., then there are ISACAs information
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sharing centers where you can get information about threat actors that are coming after your
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specific industry.
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Governments, militaries, businesses, they have started to learn that sharing information
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about threat actors and what they are doing is actually very valuable for the security
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community.
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Sharing that intelligence, you need to avail yourself of that information so that you can
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go about looking for signs of indicators of attack within your organization, understanding
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who the threat actors are that would be trying to attack you, and how you could defend
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the organization against them.
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So again, who's evil Steve?
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Not the kid in your mom's basement.
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Nope.
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Could be Chinese.
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Could be Russian.
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Could be Belarusian.
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Could be American.
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Wait, what?
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Yeah, threat actors come in all shapes and sizes.
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So at the end of the day, it's not things that attack us, it's people that attack us.
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We call this bastard evil Steve.
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So hopefully you all can take a little bit of time and learn who the evil Steve is attacking
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you so that we can all give Steve a big fuck you and make his job a bit harder.
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Security isn't really about being secure.
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It's about being more secure than the next potential victim.
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Kind of goes like that joke where the two guys are running down the mountain from the
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bear.
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The one guy stops to put on his running shoes.
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The other guy says, what are you doing?
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You can't outrun the bear?
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The guy putting on his shoes says, nope, I don't have to outrun the bear.
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I just have to outrun you.
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Yes, it's not about being the most secure.
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That doesn't exist.
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What does exist is your security being better than the next potential victim.
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Consider your wireless network at home.
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If you're sitting there and you're running WPA2 with a long passphrase and your neighbor
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has an open Wi-Fi, well, whose network do you think is going to get hacked?
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Same for your business.
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It's not so much about being the most secure.
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It's about being more secure than the other victims.
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And yes, I know that sounds like a low bar to set.
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But you would be surprised how often that bar is much lower than it should be.
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So hopefully all can do a little bit of homework and find out about the evil steves that are
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threatening you.
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For those of you that have experiences with evil steve, I would appreciate it if you
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would share those experiences.
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What are the types of evil steves that you have dealt with in the past?
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Which ones are you currently dealing with?
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I would like to hear so that we could share some of those experiences.
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We don't focus on the threat actors enough in security.
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This is something that I would like to be able to share.
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So for those of you that have experience, I would appreciate it.
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My tip of the day is if you see anything coming out of the Republican Woldavia, it's probably
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not any good.
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Yay! So, this is the conclusion of who the fuck is evil steve and this concludes another
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episode of Admin Admin.
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Until next time, I'm Lurking Pryon.
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Thank you all for listening and supporting Hacker Public Radio.
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Have a great day.
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You have been listening to Hacker Public Radio.
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Hacker Public Radio does a walk.
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Today's show was contributed by a HBR listener like yourself, if you ever thought
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Hosting for HBR has been kindly provided by an honesthost.com, the internet archive
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and our sync.net.
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On the Sadois status, today's show is released under Creative Commons, Attribution 4.0 International
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License.
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