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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	63f3c54b95	Publish preview builds as a prerelease instead of workflow artifacts ... Workflow artifacts do not work on this Gitea, in two different ways: * upload-artifact@v4 cannot run at all. @actions/artifact v2's isGhes() treats any GITHUB_SERVER_URL that is not github.com / *.ghe.com / *.localhost as GitHub Enterprise Server and throws before making a single request. act_runner sets it to this instance, so all three platforms died with GHESNotSupportedError — after paying for the whole Tauri build (run #265). * @v3 uploads succeed and the files are downloadable by direct URL, but Gitea does not *list* them: /api/v1/…/runs/<id>/artifacts returns total_count 0 and the run page shows nothing (verified on run #267). A build nobody can find is not a build. So previews publish the way every other workflow here does: curl to the releases API. One prerelease per preview, tagged `preview-<sha>`, with all three platforms' bundles as assets — visible on the Releases page with stable links. The release is created in a job the three builds depend on rather than get-or-created in each. They run concurrently, so per-job creation races on one tag: the loser gets a 409, and the id parse then yields empty while the step still reports success — the failure build-app.yml's macOS job was hardened against after it happened for real. One creator removes the race instead of handling it. Asset upload keeps that hardening: delete-then-upload so a re-dispatch replaces rather than 409s, --http1.1 and retries for the mid-stream drops the macOS runner has produced (curl exit 92, exit 28), and an explicit failure when a platform produced no bundles at all. The `preview-` prefix is load-bearing: cleanup-releases.yml keeps recent `v<x>.<y>.<z>` releases and separately deletes every release whose tag does not start with `v[0-9]`, so previews are pruned by the cleanup already in use and never crowd the real release list. sync-release.yml is dispatch-only, so none of this reaches GitHub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 09:38:06 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	f68d9c5788	Open a page in the container's browser, at a viewport you choose ... The pane could only ever watch a browser something else had published. This opens one: a URL and a viewport, launched inside the container and bound so the pane picks it up. Two uses, one action — a sign-in page, where the callback listener is *in* the container and the loop closes with no host round trip and no auth bridge, and a dev server on container loopback, which is how you watch a UI Claude is building. Reachable from both places the question comes up: "Open a page…" in the Browser tab, and an "In container" button on the terminal's URL prompt. Verified first, because it decided the design: a second client cannot join a bound browser. `chromium.connect()` against the published endpoint times out in every URL form (`ws+unix://…`, with and without the trailing path) — that socket speaks the dashboard's own transport, not the public connect protocol. Whoever launches is therefore the only process that can drive, so the helper is resident and holds the handle, and live resize applies to pages we opened and never to `@playwright/mcp`'s. Those take `--viewport-size` / `PLAYWRIGHT_MCP_VIEWPORT_SIZE` at launch, which the docs now say. The viewport is the interesting half. Resizing the *window* does nothing to the page — the viewer is a CDP screencast, so a bigger window is the same pixels drawn larger, which is why pages have been looking like they were rendered small. `page.setViewportSize()` genuinely reflows: measured against a `@media (max-width: 900px)` rule, it fires at 800×600 and clears at 1440×900. Match-window mode pushes the pop-out's settled size into it, debounced by generation counter because a drag emits `Resized` continuously and each one costs a container exec. Control is a polled JSON file in /tmp: no port, no second listener, nothing added to the proxy's surface, and URLs travel as argv to `node` so no shell ever parses one. A re-open with a helper already up navigates instead of relaunching — otherwise the second page would throw away the session the first one just signed into. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 09:15:12 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	bd72781482	Install one Playwright tree, and notice when a container has two ... Setup installed `playwright@latest` and `@playwright/cli@latest` together. Verified on a real container, that produces a tree that looks right and is broken: `@playwright/cli@0.1.18` pins `playwright-core@1.63.0-alpha`, npm hoists it, and `playwright@latest` (1.62.1) nests its own `playwright-core@1.62.1` beside it. The two cores want different browser revisions. The browser step runs the *resolved* — hoisted — CLI, so it downloads chromium-1237. Every script Claude writes says `require("playwright")`, gets the nested 1.62.1, and dies with: Executable doesn't exist at …/chromium_headless_shell-1234/… while the pane reports a browser installed, because one is. This is deterministic, not bad luck: every container set up through the pane lands in it. So the viewer package is installed first, and the `playwright` version installed after it is the one that package pins — read from the manifest npm just wrote, falling back to `@latest` only if it cannot be read. One core, one browser revision, both halves agreeing. Re-running "Set up Playwright" repairs an already-split tree. Detection now asks the question directly rather than listing a cache: it asks each resolved copy for `chromium.executablePath()` and whether that file exists — the viewer's copy *and* the one `require("playwright")` returns, since those are routinely different. `needs_browser()` covers "installed but not launchable", and the pane names both halves instead of saying "install a browser" over a cache that visibly has one. An absent field is "the probe didn't answer", never "skewed": containers predating these fields must not be told their browsers are wrong. The Rust side gets that from Option; the TypeScript mirror needed `!= null`, which an existing test caught. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 09:04:06 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	1207a21aae	Pin the preview build's uploads to upload-artifact@v3 ... Run #265 — this workflow's first ever run — built the app on all three platforms and then lost every bundle at the upload step: GHESNotSupportedError: @actions/artifact v2.0.0+, upload-artifact@v4+ and download-artifact@v4+ are not currently supported on GHES. v4 bundles @actions/artifact v2, whose isGhes() treats any GITHUB_SERVER_URL that is not github.com, *.ghe.com or *.localhost as GitHub Enterprise Server and throws before making a single request. act_runner sets that variable to this Gitea instance, so v4 cannot work here on any runner or any OS — and it fails *after* the whole Tauri build has been paid for. v3 uses the v1 artifact API, which Gitea implements. Both options this workflow relies on, `if-no-files-found: error` and `retention-days`, exist in v3. The other workflows never hit this because they publish by curling the Gitea releases API instead. Noted at the top of the file, with the isGhes rule, so the pin is not "upgraded" back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 08:00:06 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	a41d93ea46	Fix the review's findings: drag on pointer events, read the window back ... Ten findings from the review of the previous commit, all applied. **The tab drag is now pointer events, not HTML5 drag-and-drop.** Two independent reasons, either one fatal. Tauri's `dragDropEnabled` blocks HTML5 drag inside the webview on Windows, and it cannot just be turned off — `TerminalView` needs Tauri's native drag-drop event, which is the only one that carries dropped *file paths*. And an HTML5 drag carries a `DataTransfer`: released over any text field in the app, the default handler types `term:<uuid>` into it, and in Config that is then saved with the project. Pointer events have neither problem, and the drag is measured from the tabs on screen rather than from the event target, so the marker and the drop agree even over the marker itself. Escape abandons a drag; a press under 4px stays a click; the click that ends a drag does not select. **`Ctrl+Shift+←/→` no longer swallows word-wise selection.** It is bound on `document` in the capture phase, so in any input — the rename field, Config, Settings — it was taking the OS's extend-selection chord *and* silently reordering the strip. Guarded by `inTextField()`, which excludes xterm's helper textarea: that is an input-method shim, and the terminal is where the shortcut matters most. **The pop-out's state is read from the window, never remembered.** The pane is unmounted whenever another Project Home sub-tab is selected, so "Keep on top" came back Off over a window still floating on top. `get_browser_view_popout_state` returns both facts from the window itself, and the change event carries them. `poppedOut` is tri-state: until the answer arrives the iframe is not mounted, because guessing "not popped out" is what flashes a second viewer onto the browser. Also: `popout::close` and the off-status emit in the supervisor are behind the same epoch guard as the deregistration above them, so a supervisor whose teardown outlives a restart can no longer destroy the *new* session's window; `close()` returns its `destroy()` error instead of logging it and reporting success, since the pane restores its iframe on success; the drop marker is `pointer-events-none` and is placed before the first *visible* tab at or past the slot, so it neither refuses a drop nor vanishes when a `tabOrder` entry renders nothing; and the "Keep on top" Toggle's accessible name now matches its visible text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 07:40:51 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d73096c937	Reorder tabs by dragging, and pop the browser view into its own window ... Two things the UI couldn't do: rearrange the tab strip, and watch the browser while working somewhere else. **Drag to reorder.** `moveTab`/`moveActiveTab` on the store, HTML5 drag on the strip with a marker showing where the drop lands, `Ctrl+Shift+←/→` for the same thing without a mouse. Reordering deliberately does not select what it moves, so a drag aimed at a background tab doesn't yank the main area away from a terminal mid-run. A tab being renamed is not draggable — a draggable ancestor swallows the mouse-drag that selects text in its input. **Pop the browser view out.** `browser_view/popout.rs` opens the view's existing token-bearing loopback URL as a second OS window, with a "Keep on top" toggle so it can float above the app. Window-only: the viewer, the proxy and the container are untouched, so popping out and back interrupts nothing. Three things it rests on: - No capability lists that window, so it has no IPC surface — right for a page served out of a container, and it must stay that way. - The app CSP is irrelevant to it: `frame-src` constrains what the app's document may *embed*, and this is a top-level document. The port range and the token gate are what actually protect it, unchanged. - The window is owned by the session, so the supervisor's teardown closes it. A window onto a viewer that no longer exists is worse than none. The pane drops its iframe while popped out — two viewers can both *drive* the browser, and two cursors on one page is not a feature. `lib.rs`'s `on_window_event` is now guarded on `label() == "main"`. It fires for every window and its body stops every container and exits, so without the guard closing a pop-out would quit the app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 06:50:40 -07:00
jknapp	57b6b71772	Merge pull request #18: Inject the corporate CA certificate into containers v0.3.84-mac v0.3.84-win v0.3.84	2026-08-10 18:48:53 +00:00
shadow-test	77567ac2ae	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feature/corporate-ca ... # Conflicts: # app/src/lib/tauri-commands.ts	2026-08-10 11:20:23 -07:00
jknapp	247f03b48c	Merge pull request #17: Browser view — find every Playwright, set one up in two clicks, bake the runtime libraries v0.3.78-mac v0.3.78-win v0.3.78 v0.3.81-mac v0.3.81-win v0.3.81	2026-08-10 18:19:25 +00:00
jknapp	31c73adb13	Merge pull request #16: Fix shared Claude auth — whole sign-in URL, recoverable rejected code	2026-08-10 17:58:57 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	4fdfed7955	Bake the browser's runtime libraries into the base image ... `npx playwright install chromium` downloaded ~150 MB of browser that then died with "error while loading shared libraries: libglib-2.0.so.0" — verified, not inferred, against the current image. The image shipped none of Chromium's shared libraries, which is why `apt install google-chrome-stable` looked like the cure: apt was quietly installing the same set as Chrome's own dependencies. Installing them at runtime instead converges on the worst possible state. The libraries land in the container's writable layer, so they are re-paid after every Reset and *lost* on base-image migration, which replays apt from a manifest. The browsers ride in ~/.cache/ms-playwright, inside the home volume, and survive both — leaving a 400 MB browser present with its libraries gone. So the libraries are baked and the browsers are not: each half now lives where it already persists. The layer runs `npx --yes playwright@latest install-deps chromium` rather than a hand-written apt list. Ubuntu 24.04's 64-bit-time_t transition renamed a swathe of these packages (libasound2t64, libatk1.0-0t64, libglib2.0-0t64, …) and a new Chromium dependency would drift straight back into the launch failure this exists to prevent; letting Playwright name its own dependencies is self-maintaining. It sits immediately after Node — npx is its only prerequisite — and well above the shim COPYs, so editing a shim does not re-run it. The `--dry-run` that follows is a build-time assertion, not decoration: on a platform Playwright has no list for, `install-deps` prints a warning and returns having installed **nothing, with exit status 0**. Without the assertion that ships a broken image behind a clean build log. Measured, on a build of this file with the layer applied over an otherwise identical image: +99 packages, +334 MiB unpacked and +119 MiB compressed (2950 → 3284 MiB, 759 → 878 MiB). Two thirds of that is not reachable by trimming — libgbm1, which Chromium needs, pulls mesa-libgallium, which pulls libllvm20. A chromium-only apt list measures 247 MiB against install-deps' 341 MiB; the ~94 MiB difference is xvfb and the CJK/emoji fonts, kept because the base ships no fonts at all and every page this feature exists to display would otherwise render as tofu. Verified on real builds, both architectures: a `--platform linux/arm64` build of this file installs the same 99 packages and passes the same assertion. On the new amd64 image, `playwright install chromium` with no `--with-deps` and no `install-deps` launches headless Chromium 151.0.7922.34 and loads a page; on the old image the identical script fails on libglib-2.0.so.0. `install.rs` no longer runs `install-deps` unconditionally — that would be a minutes-long apt run for nothing on a current image. It asks `install-deps --dry-run` first and skips the install when everything is present, saying which of the two happened on the progress stream. The check is Playwright's rather than a probe of our own for library names, so check and fix cannot disagree about what the dependency set is. Note that `--dry-run` exits 0 both when everything is installed and when Playwright has no list for the platform, so the verdict is read from its output. Containers on older images stay the normal case until people migrate, and they still work: on such an image the simulation cannot even resolve the package names (the index is cleaned in every base image), which reports as "couldn't tell" and installs — the right answer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 10:57:21 -07:00
Claude	7a5823cb2b	Inject the corporate CA certificate into containers ... Behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy every HTTPS call inside a container fails — npm, pip, git, curl, the browser-view pane, and Claude Code's own API requests. There was no mechanism at all: installing the certificate by hand inside a container is lost on Reset and had to be repeated per project. A global CA path in AppSettings with a per-project override on Project, taking either a single certificate file or a directory. It is bind-mounted read-only at /tmp/.host-ca (mirroring /tmp/.host-ssh and /tmp/.host-aws) and applied by entrypoint.sh on every start, so it survives recreation, migration and Reset. Four things this gets right that are easy to get wrong: * update-ca-certificates globs *.crt case-sensitively, so a .pem that is merely copied in is ignored in silence. Certificates are renamed, by container_cert_name() in Rust and a mirrored few lines of shell. * The system store only serves curl/git/apt. Node — and so Claude Code itself — needs NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, Python needs REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE/SSL_CERT_FILE, and Chromium reads neither: it wants ~/.pki/nssdb, seeded with certutil (libnss3-tools, added to the image). * Those vars are set from Rust at creation, never exported by the entrypoint — a terminal is a docker exec and sees nothing the entrypoint exported. They are emitted empty when no CA is configured, since docker commit bakes env into the snapshot image. * triple-c.ca-fingerprint hashes the certificate bytes as well as the path, so a CA rotated in at the same location still forces a recreation. Verified end to end against a real container and a self-signed CA: curl, node, python and git all complete a TLS handshake against a server signed by it and all three fail in the same container without it; the env vars are visible from a docker exec session; the store is cleaned when the setting is cleared. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 10:40:21 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	a5bcc462a7	Browser view: find every Playwright, and set one up in two clicks ... Detection missed the npx cache, so a Playwright installed through Claude Code's MCP setup (`npx @playwright/mcp@latest`, which unpacks into ~/.npm/_npx/<hash>/node_modules and no node_modules at all) was invisible. The probe now globs that cache alongside the existing roots and reports every root it consulted. It also read `has_bind` off whichever manifest resolved first. Verified that npm does not hoist for global installs and that the `playwright` wrapper ships no types/types.d.ts, so `npm i -g playwright` made the pane call a current build "predates browser.bind()". The probe now hops from the wrapper to its nested playwright-core. The messages no longer offer `@playwright/mcp` as a way through setup: it bundles a playwright-core that binds but never `@playwright/cli`, so that route could not have worked. It is named only for what it does do. New `install.rs` + two commands do the setup, streaming on the existing `container-progress` event and re-probing on success: * playwright + @playwright/cli into /workspace as `claude`, --no-save. /workspace is not a bind mount (projects mount at /workspace/{mount_name}), so nothing of the user's is touched, no sudo is needed, and Node resolves it from scripts in the project. * A browser, as its own action with the size stated first: apt libraries as root, then the download, then a real headless launch to prove it works. The base image ships none of Chromium's shared libraries, which is why a download could succeed and the browser still not start. Chromium and the Chrome channel are both offered — @playwright/mcp asks for `chrome` specifically. A certificate failure is reported as a container trust-store problem rather than a broken install. Installing is always user-initiated; opening the tab only probes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 10:15:02 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	c3f92674b1	Fix the shared Claude auth flow: whole sign-in URL, recoverable rejected code ... Two compounding bugs made `claude setup-token` unusable, both measured against 2.1.226 under a pty rather than reasoned about. **The sign-in URL was truncated.** The CLI emits it as an OSC 8 hyperlink and slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the terminal width: a 346 character URL arrives at 80 columns as five separate hyperlink emissions, each carrying the whole URL in its parameter and 80 characters of it on screen. The transcript scraper picked up the first slice — a URL that parses, points at claude.com, and cannot authorise anything. The ANSI stripper now surfaces the OSC 8 target and `claude-token-link` carries it to the UI, which prefers it over the scraped text. It still goes through `sanitizeRelayUrl` with the ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS allowlist before display and again before `openUrl` — an OSC 8 parameter is never rendered, which makes it the easier place to hide a hostile host, not a trusted one. The wrapped-display fallback is kept for CLI versions that print a bare URL. **A rejected code hung the flow.** On a bad paste the CLI prints `OAuth error: Invalid code…` / `Press Enter to retry.` and blocks on stdin instead of exiting; nothing recognised that, so the exec sat until the 15-minute timeout with the UI still saying "Finishing sign-in". Given the first bug handed the user a truncated URL, an invalid code was the likely first outcome. The streamed output is now scanned for that message, `claude-token-code-rejected` reopens the input with an explanation, and the Enter is sent so the next code has a prompt to land in — bounded by MAX_CODE_ATTEMPTS, after which the flow reports a failure. An undeterminable exec exit status is logged rather than silently read as success. **A wrapped token was rejected *and* leaked.** `stty cols` fails silently, and an 80-column fallback splits the ~103 character token across two lines: the parser saw a too-short fragment and failed, while the redactor masked the first line — which carries the `sk-ant-` marker — and printed the second, the tail of a live credential, to the UI in clear. `scan_credential_body` now reassembles a run across hard wraps and both the parser and the redactor use it, so they cannot disagree about where a credential ends. A join only happens across a break at a plausible terminal margin (>= 40 columns) and only for a run not already long enough to be a whole credential — without that second guard a repainting TUI welds one frame's token onto the next frame's first word. The length floor is applied to the reassembled body, so a fragment is still never accepted. Also: `stty cols` raised 200 -> 400 (the URL alone needs ~350), and `ESC ( B` is handled as the three-byte charset designation it is — it prefixes every repaint frame, and treating it as two bytes emitted a stray `B` that could glue itself onto a token and make the parser refuse it. `submit_claude_token_code`'s single-write behaviour is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 09:57:16 -07:00
jknapp	584fcdd837	Merge pull request #15: create the WOW64 junctions in the workflow instead of by hand ... Moves the last hand-made piece of the Windows fix into version control. Verified by deleting the manual junctions from the build VM first, so CI had to recreate them from scratch. v0.3.76-mac v0.3.76-win v0.3.76	2026-08-10 15:00:25 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	2c014fd752	CI: create the WOW64 junctions in the workflow instead of by hand ... The Windows fix was the only part of it living outside git — two junctions created by hand on the build VM. Rebuild that VM, add a second Windows runner, or reset the SYSTEM profile and Windows builds break again with an error that points nowhere near the cause. Tauri downloads candle.exe, light.exe and makensis.exe, and all three are 32-bit. A runner running as SYSTEM has %LOCALAPPDATA% under C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile, and WOW64 redirection serves 32-bit processes reading System32 from SysWOW64, where those directories do not exist. The bundlers cannot see their own folder: candle exits 0x80131700, makensis reports "Unable to start child process, error 0x2", and Tauri surfaces neither — only "failed to run candle.exe". The job now junctions the SysWOW64 view onto the System32 originals when it detects a profile inside System32, and skips entirely otherwise, so a runner running as a normal user is unaffected. Idempotent, and written with goto rather than nested blocks to avoid the delayed-expansion trap that already bit the MSVC step. Verified rather than assumed: the hand-made junctions were deleted from the build VM before this was pushed, so this run has to recreate them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-10 07:52:34 -07:00
jknapp	43e9959e40	Merge pull request 'Add llama.cpp + OpenAI backends, URL relay, browser view, and base-image migration' (#14) from feature/model-backends-and-browser into main	2026-08-10 06:23:43 +00:00
jknapp	e05156fd0e	Merge branch 'main' into feature/model-backends-and-browser	2026-08-10 06:13:40 +00:00
jknapp	aca6c49e3c	Merge pull request #13: Drop MCP management; add permission modes, Project Home, Auth Bridge and shared auth ... Claude Code absorbed MCP natively, so Triple-C stops managing it. Also adds permission modes, Project Home, Tier-1 accessibility fixes, the Auth Bridge, shared Claude authentication and the scheduler UI. 8 commits plus review fixes. 87 frontend tests, 34 Rust tests.	2026-08-10 05:43:09 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	0aa8315514	CI: restore the MSI now that the 32-bit bundlers can resolve their paths ... Dropping the MSI did not help: makensis.exe is 32-bit like candle.exe and failed the same way ("Unable to start child process, error 0x2"). The cause was WOW64 redirection sending 32-bit processes reading C:\Windows\System32 to SysWOW64, where the toolset directory does not exist. The build VM now carries junctions from the SysWOW64 view of systemprofile\AppData\Local\tauri and systemprofile\.cache to the System32 originals. Verified on the runner: candle.exe reports WiX 3.14.1.8722 and makensis reports v3.11, both exiting 0 from the path that previously failed. Both targets build again, so the .msi comes back. Artifact collection fails if either installer is missing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:34:59 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	29fd7de909	CI: restore the MSI now that the 32-bit bundlers can resolve their paths ... Dropping the MSI did not help, because the problem was never WiX. makensis.exe is 32-bit exactly like candle.exe and light.exe, lives in the same SYSTEM-profile cache, and failed the same way — "Unable to start child process, error 0x2" instead of 0x80131700. The cause is WOW64 redirection: a 32-bit process reading C:\Windows\System32 is served C:\Windows\SysWOW64, where the toolset directory does not exist, so the bundlers cannot see their own folder. The build VM now carries two junctions from the SysWOW64 view of systemprofile\AppData\Local\tauri and systemprofile\.cache to the System32 originals. Verified afterwards on the runner: candle.exe reports "WiX Toolset Compiler version 3.14.1.8722" and exits 0, and makensis reports v3.11 and exits 0 — both from the same path that failed before. So both targets build again and the .msi asset comes back. Artifact collection fails if either installer is missing rather than tolerating an empty directory. This is a host-side patch for a runner running as SYSTEM. A runner running as a normal user has a LOCALAPPDATA outside System32 and needs none of it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:34:43 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	fdc161fd9c	CI: build NSIS only on Windows, dropping the MSI target ... WiX's candle.exe/light.exe are 32-bit. On a SYSTEM-run runner Tauri caches WiX under C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\..., and WOW64 redirection sends 32-bit processes to SysWOW64 where that directory does not exist, so candle exits 0x80131700. Tauri aborts the whole bundle on one target's failure, so the MSI was suppressing the NSIS installer too and Windows produced no artifact at all. NSIS is what the project already relies on for Windows upgrades. Drops the .NET 3.5 gate, which existed only for WiX; keeps the MSVC step, which is what makes the app link. Artifact collection now fails when no installer is produced rather than tolerating an empty directory. To restore the MSI, run the runner as a normal user and set --bundles msi,nsis. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:24:42 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	98a6c8fd56	CI: build NSIS only on Windows, dropping the MSI target ... The MSI target needs WiX, whose candle.exe and light.exe are 32-bit. On a runner running as SYSTEM, Tauri caches the WiX toolset under %LOCALAPPDATA% = C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\..., and WOW64 redirection points 32-bit processes at SysWOW64, where that directory does not exist. candle.exe cannot see its own folder, the CLR fails to start, and it exits 0x80131700 — surfaced only as "failed to run candle.exe". Proven by running the identical toolset, as the same SYSTEM identity, from C:\wixtest (exit 0) versus the systemprofile path (0x80131700). Because Tauri aborts the entire bundle when one target fails, the MSI was also suppressing the NSIS installer — so Windows produced no artifact at all. NSIS is what the project already relies on for Windows upgrades, so dropping MSI costs the .msi asset and nothing else. Removes the .NET 3.5 gate, which only existed for WiX. The MSVC step stays: that is what makes the app link, and it works. Artifact collection now fails when no NSIS installer is present instead of tolerating an empty directory with 2>nul, so a silent packaging regression cannot pass as a green build again. To restore the MSI later, run the runner as a normal user — whose LOCALAPPDATA sits outside System32 — and set --bundles msi,nsis. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:24:29 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	763af91042	Revert: LOCALAPPDATA override does not move Tauri's WiX cache ... Rust's `dirs` crate resolves LOCALAPPDATA on Windows through SHGetKnownFolderPath, which reads the process token rather than the environment, so the override changed nothing and 32-bit candle.exe still hit WOW64 redirection under the SYSTEM profile. Removing it rather than leaving a plausible-looking non-fix in the workflow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:19:12 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	c71e54a35f	Revert: LOCALAPPDATA override does not move Tauri's WiX cache ... It looked right and did nothing. Rust's `dirs` crate resolves LOCALAPPDATA on Windows through SHGetKnownFolderPath, which reads the process token rather than the environment, so Tauri still cached the WiX toolset under the SYSTEM profile and 32-bit candle.exe still hit WOW64 redirection. Removing it rather than leaving a plausible-looking non-fix in the workflow. The diagnosis in the previous commit stands; only the remedy was wrong. Running the runner as a normal user, whose token resolves LOCALAPPDATA outside System32, is the actual fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:18:58 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	03384409e7	CI: keep the WiX toolset out of System32 so 32-bit candle.exe can run ... WiX's candle.exe/light.exe are 32-bit. A SYSTEM-run runner has %LOCALAPPDATA% under C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile, where Tauri caches the WiX toolset — and WOW64 redirection sends 32-bit processes reading System32 to SysWOW64, which has no such directory. The CLR then fails to start with 0x80131700 and Tauri reports only "failed to run candle.exe". Verified: the same binary and identity exits 0 from C:\wixtest and 0x80131700 from the systemprofile path. Pointing LOCALAPPDATA outside System32 avoids redirection, needs no stored credential, and is a no-op for runners already running as a normal user. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:12:27 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	b41077e799	CI: keep the WiX toolset out of System32 so 32-bit candle.exe can run ... build-windows compiled and linked fine but died at bundling with only "failed to run candle.exe". The real cause was neither .NET nor the runner identity, both of which I chased first and was wrong about. candle.exe and light.exe are 32-bit. A runner running as SYSTEM has %LOCALAPPDATA% = C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local, which is where Tauri caches the WiX toolset. WOW64 redirection sends any 32-bit process reading C:\Windows\System32 to C:\Windows\SysWOW64 — and the WixTools directory exists only in the 64-bit view. So candle.exe could not see its own directory, the CLR failed to start, and the process exited 0x80131700, surfaced in the Application event log as ".NET Runtime version 4.0.30319.0 - This application could not be started." Proven rather than assumed: copying the identical toolset to C:\wixtest and running it as the same SYSTEM identity exits 0, while the systemprofile path exits 0x80131700. Test-Path confirms the WOW64 view of that directory does not exist. Pointing LOCALAPPDATA at a path outside System32 avoids redirection. This fixes it for any runner running as a service or as SYSTEM, without needing a stored user credential, and is a no-op where the runner already runs as a normal user. For the record, two earlier theories were wrong. .NET 3.5 was missing and is now installed from the ISO payload, but candle targets .NET 4.x (its config uses loadFromRemoteSources, a 4.0-only element) so that was never the blocker. Adding explicit supportedRuntime entries changed nothing. Both are documented here so the next person does not repeat them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 22:12:11 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	c6bb7fdf1d	CI: fix the MSVC exit-code check and verify .NET 3.5 before bundling ... %VSEXIT% and %ERRORLEVEL% inside a parenthesised cmd block are substituted at parse time, not run time, so the installer's real exit code was never read. Uses delayed expansion now. Also checks for the .NET 3.5 runtime before building: WiX candle.exe needs it, and Tauri aborts the whole bundle when the MSI target fails, which silently suppresses the NSIS installer too. Fails early with the exact dism command rather than at bundle time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 21:50:15 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	704d3b8f79	CI: fix the MSVC exit-code check and verify .NET 3.5 before bundling ... Two follow-ups to the provisioning step. The exit-code check never worked. %VSEXIT% and %ERRORLEVEL% inside a parenthesised cmd block are substituted when the block is PARSED, not when it runs, so the installer's real result was never read — the log printed "installer failed with " with an empty code, then continued anyway. It happened to be harmless because the install had in fact succeeded, but a genuine failure would have sailed past. Now uses delayed expansion. Added a .NET 3.5 check. WiX 3.x candle.exe is a .NET 2.0/3.5 application, and Tauri aborts the entire bundle when the MSI target fails — so a missing runtime silently costs the NSIS installer too, not just the MSI. Windows 11 ships NetFx3 as DisabledWithPayloadRemoved and Windows Update could not supply the payload on our runner even across a reboot; it needed /Source from a mounted ISO. Rather than guess, the job now fails early with the exact dism command. Verified on the runner: MSVC Build Tools 2022 installed, the Rust build completed in 3m59s and produced triple-c.exe, and NetFx3 is now Enabled with v2.0.50727 present. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 21:50:02 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	ca0f944712	CI: install MSVC build tools on Windows runners that lack them ... build-windows failed on this PR with "linker `link.exe` not found", while build-linux and build-container passed — the code was fine, the runner environment was not. The job installs Rust and Node conditionally but assumed the MSVC C++ toolchain was hand-provisioned. A runner without it registers normally, advertises windows-latest, accepts the job, downloads the entire crate graph and only then fails at link time. That also means a bare runner coming online turns a job that would have queued for a capable machine into a failed build. Installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching the existing conditional Rust and Node steps. rustc locates MSVC through vswhere and the registry rather than PATH, so no dev-shell activation is needed. Installer exit 3010 (success, reboot pending) is treated as success. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 19:36:14 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	2de00b3c55	Fix review findings: secrets in snapshots, URL spoofing, migration data loss ... Adversarial review of the branch produced findings across four areas. This addresses them, plus the Windows CI environment. Secrets. commit_container_snapshot baked the container's full env into the per-project snapshot image, so the shared OAuth token — and the AWS keys, git token and gateway master key — outlived revocation and were readable via docker inspect. Verified against Engine 29.6 that a commit body's config merges over the container's: keys cannot be dropped but can be overwritten, so all of them now commit as KEY=. clear_claude_token additionally rewrites images from earlier builds and reports honestly when a tag could not be rewritten. The recommendation to move the token out of env entirely was not taken, with reasoning: apiKeyHelper is a different auth method that outranks CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN rather than a transport for it, and no file-based delivery exists. The durable exposure — the image — is what is closed here. Separately noted, not fixed: entrypoint.sh captures the token into the scheduler's .env inside the persisted volume. URL spoofing. Three call sites reached openUrl with container-controlled strings, one of which the review missed (the WebLinksAddon handler). The sign-in URL was scraped from container output with a longest-match tie-break and no userinfo check, so claude.ai@evil.tld rendered as "claude.ai…" in a truncating element. There is now one sanitizer in front of every sink — scheme allowlist, no userinfo, C0/C1 and quote rejection, host allowlist for the sign-in case, first-match — and the origin renders un-truncated. The toast is keyed so a changed URL remounts, closing a bait-and-switch where the user read one URL and clicked another. Migration. The rollback pin was best-effort: a tag failure was logged and the migration continued past remove_container, after which the final commit overwrote the only copy of the old system layer. It now aborts before anything destructive and reads the tag back. /var was destroyed while the ordinary recreate path preserves it — making the "safe" alternative to Reset more destructive than Reset's alternative; data-bearing subtrees are now detected and disclosed in the pre-flight rather than copied, since tarring a live database onto a different base's packages is a corruption risk. resume_migration now verifies the migration-state label instead of reporting success for a container that never swapped. dismiss actually resolves the record rather than leaving the feature permanently refusing to migrate. Start and Reset are guarded while a migration is live. Lifecycle. The gateway no longer publishes on 0.0.0.0 — bind address and advertised URL are derived together so they cannot drift. Disabling it now stops it. App exit runs teardown concurrently under a budget with a visible shutting-down state instead of blocking for minutes. Auto-starts retry when Docker is not up yet, and the polling-recovery path now reconciles, so interrupted migrations are still recovered. Auth-bridge forwards are capped, closing a container-driven fd exhaustion. Windows CI. build-windows failed on this branch with "linker link.exe not found". The runner had no MSVC build tools and the workflow assumed a hand-provisioned machine, so a bare runner registers, accepts jobs and fails at link time after downloading the whole crate graph. The job now installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching how it already conditionally installs Rust and Node. 192 Rust tests, 274 frontend tests, both builds clean, zero warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 19:35:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	eb1324cb16	Fix pre-auth bypass in the browser-view proxy ... read_head computed the head terminator index and discarded it, returning the whole receive buffer. authorize() then split that buffer on CRLF and treated every colon-bearing line as a header, last occurrence winning — so any bytes a client sent after the head were promoted to headers. A cross-site fetch with a text/plain body is CORS-safelisted and not preflighted, so a body of a=x\r\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\r\n overwrote the real cross-site value and the gate returned Allow. The same trick overrode Host, defeating the anti-rebinding check too. The result was unauthenticated mouse, keyboard and CDP control of a browser running inside a container that has passwordless sudo — reachable from any page the user happened to visit, with the port range being a fixed 8-wide window that is trivially scanned. read_head now returns the terminator index and the caller authorizes against that slice only, while still replaying the full buffer into the tunnel so pipelined bodies are not lost. Duplicate Host, Origin and Sec-Fetch-Site headers are now refused outright rather than resolved last-wins, since that resolution is what turns any smuggling primitive into a full bypass and no legitimate client sends two. Three regression tests, including a guard assertion that the untruncated buffer really was accepted before, so the test cannot quietly stop testing the bypass. Found by adversarial review, verified by extracting the real authorize() and running the attack against it. 148 Rust tests, frontend build clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 18:53:58 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d42b741337	Migrate a project onto a new base image without losing its volumes ... Projects were pinned to the image they were first created from. Both create paths preferred triple-c-snapshot-<id>:latest whenever it existed, and container_needs_recreation compared the container's live image against the triple-c.image label — which create_container wrote from the same image it created from. A tautology that could never fire. The only escape was Reset, which calls remove_project_volumes and destroys the login, skills and transcripts. Measured consequences on this host: real projects are missing socat (so the auth bridge cannot tunnel) and bubblewrap (so sandbox mode does not work), plus Mission Control and triple-c-sso-refresh, and sit 61 packages behind the base including ca-certificates, openssl and curl. Detection. create_container now writes triple-c.base-image-id (the image ID, not RepoDigests, which local-built and custom images do not have) and triple-c.create-image. container_needs_recreation takes the expected create-image and compares against the latter, so the check means something. base-image-id is deliberately NOT compared: a base bump would otherwise silently recreate from the snapshot, consuming the "you should migrate" signal without migrating. Staleness is surfaced, never acted on automatically. Migration keeps the volumes. /home/claude and ~/.claude are volumes and the image's copy is seed-only — permanently masked after first mount — so the login, ~/.claude.json, skills, transcripts, scheduler tasks, SSH keys, cargo, uv, ruff and Claude Code itself re-attach untouched. Only root-level state is rebuilt: apt packages are replayed against the new base rather than copied, so no stale libc is dragged forward, and /usr/local, /opt and the non-bind-mounted parts of /workspace are copied verbatim with tar --skip-old-files so they can never clobber a newer base binary. docker diff is not used: on a snapshot-derived container it reports only changes since the last commit. Raw image-vs-image diffing is filtered through dpkg ownership because it otherwise lies — 8,677 raw path differences on a real project reduced to 2 genuinely user-authored files, both loose /workspace-root files. Crash safety. snapshot:latest keeps pointing at the old image until the final commit, so any crash before it self-heals on next start. Later crashes are caught by reconcile_project_statuses. The rollback pin is a docker tag: 0.057s and 0 bytes. Rollback restores the system layer only — volumes are never touched — and the UI says so rather than implying a time machine. Fixes an infinite recreation loop shipped with the MCP removal. docker commit propagates labels to the image, so a container created from a snapshot inherited its non-empty triple-c.mcp-fingerprint and the one-shot shim recreated it again on every start, forever. Lineage labels are now always written explicitly. Documents the second, separate bug this uncovered: Dockerfile changes under /home/claude never reach an existing project, migration or not, because the volume masks them. Anything that must stay upgradable belongs in /usr/local/bin or /opt, or must be seeded by entrypoint.sh. 145 Rust tests, 227 frontend tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 18:19:12 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	cc5f691677	Add llama.cpp backend, model gateway, URL relay and browser view ... Four features, plus a latent bug fix. llama.cpp backend. Claude Code only ever speaks the Anthropic Messages API — confirmed empirically by pointing it at a logging server, which received POST /v1/messages?beta=true. llama-server implements that natively (verified in its README, alongside --port default 8080), so this is a plain base-URL backend with no translation shim, the same shape as Ollama. Its --api-key defaults to none, so the auth token is a placeholder Claude Code requires and llama-server ignores. Model alias fix. ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL is documented as "also used for background functionality", and Triple-C set none of the alias vars. So on every custom-endpoint backend, Claude Code resolved `haiku` to an Anthropic model id and sent it to a local server that does not have it — background features failed silently. All four ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_{OPUS,SONNET,HAIKU,FABLE}_MODEL vars are now pinned to the backend's configured model, with an optional Haiku override, and blanked for Anthropic and Bedrock so those keep Claude Code's defaults. The deprecated ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL is never emitted. Existing Ollama and OpenAI-Compatible containers are recreated once so the new env reaches them; the snapshot is preserved. Model gateway. Optional LiteLLM sibling container, off by default, mirroring stt.rs — this is what makes real OpenAI usable, since api.openai.com has no /v1/messages. Pinned to v1.96.0 by tag and digest: the 1.82.7/1.82.8 malware was PyPI-only and never affected the official images, which is precisely why this builds FROM the image rather than pip-installing, but 1.84.0 is still the floor for proxy CVEs (API-key SQLi, Host-header auth bypass, MCP auth bypass). Binds 0.0.0.0 because project containers consume it, and therefore always sets a master_key — LiteLLM without one accepts any key. The provider key lives in the OS keychain and is uploaded into a volume, never an image layer or label. URL relay. A container-side xdg-open/BROWSER shim opens URLs in the host's browser. Uses an OSC sequence to /dev/tty rather than a printed sentinel, because the shim usually runs as a grandchild of a process capturing its children's output. Degrades to printing the URL when no terminal is attached, so scheduled tasks do not hang. Only http/https, with control characters rejected before new URL() — which strips newlines, so java\nscript: would otherwise parse as javascript:. Nothing auto-opens; the user confirms. The web terminal shows a tap-to-open banner instead, since that browser may be a phone across a tunnel. Browser view. A Project Home tab that watches and takes over the browser Claude drives with Playwright, using Playwright's own dashboard. Zero image cost — Playwright stays user-installed. It does not reuse the auth bridge's PortForward, which binds an unauthenticated port: correct for a throwaway OAuth listener, wrong for mouse and keyboard control of a browser in a passwordless-sudo container. Instead a token-gated loopback proxy checks Host, then token or a forbidden-header origin signal, before a byte reaches the container. Host ports are confined to 47820..=47827 so CSP frame-src can enumerate them rather than widening to a wildcard, with a test asserting the two agree. 188 frontend tests, 107 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 16:55:28 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	7d00390e1f	Add scheduled task creation, and stop a bad cron unscheduling everything ... Completes the Automation tab: it could list, toggle, run, log and remove tasks but not create them, so task creation still meant dropping to the CLI. Adds add_scheduled_task and update_scheduled_task, plus a task editor with cron presets and a plain-English reading of the expression. Every field is free user text, so all of it goes to the scheduler as a bare argv vector through bollard — no shell, no quoting. Validation is shape-only rather than metacharacter scrubbing: length caps, no control characters in single-line fields, no leading-dash name, absolute working_dir. Verified by round-tripping a prompt containing `; rm -rf /`, `$(id)`, backticks and newlines: it landed byte-for-byte in the task JSON with nothing executed. The scheduler CLI has no `edit`, so update is add-then-remove with the add first — a rejected edit leaves the original intact. The new id is surfaced in the editor rather than hidden. Root-cause fix, and the more serious half of this commit: triple-c-scheduler never validated --schedule, and rebuild_crontab regenerates the entire crontab and pipes it to `crontab`, which rejects the whole file if any line is malformed — with the error thrown away by `2>/dev/null || true`. A single bad schedule therefore silently unscheduled every other task in the container while reporting success. Reproduced directly. It matters because the global CLAUDE.md tells Claude to drive this CLI, so Claude could trigger it unprompted. `add` now validates the expression and exits non-zero, and rebuild_crontab reports a rejected crontab instead of swallowing it, keeping the offending file for inspection. Verified against the real CLI in this container: a bad schedule is refused without disturbing an existing task's crontab entry, and `0 9 * * 1-5`, `*/30 * * * *`, `0,30 8-17 * * *` and `0 0 1 1 *` are all still accepted. The Rust layer validates independently, agreeing with vixie cron on 23 probed expressions including `1/2` and `*/0` being invalid. 121 frontend tests, 44 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 12:20:52 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	cf3b021c72	Confirm before Reset, and rewrite the docs for the new UI ... Reset is destructive in a way its name does not advertise: rebuild_project_container deletes both project volumes, so it wipes the claude login, anything installed in the container, and every saved session transcript. It was a single unconfirmed click in the overflow menu, while the comparably destructive Remove already confirmed. Adds ConfirmResetModal, which names each loss and says explicitly that the host-side mounted folders are untouched. Docs: the user guides still described the pre-Project-Home UI. Sixteen factually wrong statements corrected, including "expand the Config panel" (six sites), the actions table (Reset and Remove are in an overflow menu, Files is a tab), a progress modal that no longer exists, a double-click-to-rename gesture ProjectRow never had, the Full Permissions boolean, an incomplete reserved-env list, and the claim in TECHNICAL.md that OAuth tokens survive a Reset. Both layout diagrams and the project tree were rebuilt from the filesystem. New sections cover permission modes with the exact CLI mapping, Project Home, Sessions, capability tiles, Automation, shared authentication, the Auth Bridge and its security posture, and keyboard shortcuts. Known gap recorded rather than papered over: the Automation tab manages existing scheduled tasks but cannot create them — no add command is registered — so task creation remains `triple-c-scheduler add` in the terminal. 87 frontend tests, 34 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 12:02:35 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d95ba54a69	Add shared-auth-token UI and make cancelling actually cancel ... UI for the shared Claude token: a Settings section showing token state with Authenticate and Revoke, an acquisition modal built on the shared Modal (sign-in link handed to the host browser via the opener plugin, plus the code input that answers `setup-token`'s stdin prompt — the flow cannot complete without it), and a per-project opt-out toggle shown only for the Anthropic backend. Cancellation: acquire_claude_token previously had only two exits, completion and a 15-minute timeout, and held the single-flight guard for the whole time. Closing the dialog therefore locked the user out of retrying for up to 15 minutes. Adds cancel_claude_token, backed by a oneshot claimed and released in lockstep with the input guard, selected on in the run loop so it wins the race and tears the exec down. The dialog's Cancel now calls it and closes either way. Also refreshes CLAUDE.md, which had drifted: it documented the deleted ProjectCard, and asserted that new IPC commands need permission grants in capabilities/default.json — they do not, that file covers plugin commands only. Adds the conventions that would otherwise bite: container_needs_recreation() is purely label-based and never diffs env, so container-affecting state needs its own label; and #[serde(default)] on a bool yields false regardless of intent. Corrects the claim that Reset preserves credentials. Reset calls remove_project_volumes, which deletes both the home and claude-config volumes, so it wipes ~/.claude, the OAuth token, installed skills and session transcripts. 84 frontend tests, 34 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 11:49:03 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	01a2f6aec8	Add Project Home, Auth Bridge, shared auth token, and Tier-1 polish ... Project Home (DESIGN-REVIEW §B2): the project is promoted from a 280px sidebar card to a first-class main-area view. ProjectCard.tsx (1,257 lines) is replaced by a select-only ProjectRow plus tabs for Overview, Sessions, Automation, Config and Files. The PortMappings, FileManager and ContainerProgress modals are absorbed rather than reimplemented. Config gains a Saved/Saving/Failed indicator — save-on-blur failures previously reached only console.error. Tier-1 polish (DESIGN-REVIEW §A): new elevation, muted-accent, disabled and focus-ring tokens; a global :focus-visible ring with every focus:outline-none removed; filled buttons moved to --accent-emphasis and white-on-success toggles retired, fixing three WCAG AA failures (2.1:1, 2.5:1, 2.4:1); a shared Modal primitive with role="dialog", focus trap and restore, adopted by all remaining modals; status indicators that carry a glyph and word rather than colour alone. Ctrl+Shift+W closes a tab, deliberately not Ctrl+W — that is readline's kill-word, used constantly in the terminal this app is built around. Auth Bridge: a general loopback-callback bridge so browser logins run inside a container (aws sso login, Concourse fly login, claude login) can complete against the host browser. Listeners are discovered from /proc/net/tcp{,6} — ss/netstat/lsof are absent from the image — bound on host 127.0.0.1 only, and tunnelled in over the Docker API via socat, which keeps working on Docker Desktop where container IPs are not routable. Falls back to [::1] because Node resolves localhost to IPv6 first, so claude login often binds ::1 alone. Opt-in per project. This extracts create_attached_exec() and moves the existing terminal session path onto it, so there is one attached-exec implementation rather than two. Shared auth token: `claude setup-token` is run in a container, the token is stored in the OS keychain and injected as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN into Anthropic-backend projects. Contrary to the initial design note, setup-token uses an Anthropic-hosted redirect and blocks on a stdin paste prompt rather than a loopback callback, so a stdin command is required for the flow to complete. The token is never logged, never returned to the frontend, and is redacted from the streamed output with a stateful matcher that withholds any tail that could still grow into a secret. Change detection uses a random rotation id rather than a hash, since a hash in a docker-inspect readable label would be an offline verification oracle. Frontend 33 -> 51 tests; Rust 34 tests. Both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 11:35:42 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	f68d10d5c2	Add DESIGN-REVIEW.md and ROADMAP.md ... DESIGN-REVIEW.md is Fable's review of the v0.3.0 UI: token gaps and three WCAG AA contrast failures, the modal/accessibility audit, and an IA proposal that promotes the project from a sidebar card to a tabbed main-area view. ROADMAP.md covers Claude Code feature coverage — the five settings.json keys currently surfaced, the gaps worth closing, the ones deliberately skipped, the authentication handoff design, and phase sequencing. Also published as an artifact for easier reading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 10:56:26 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	0ac4e5030c	Add permission modes and container introspection backend ... Permission modes: replaces the binary full_permissions flag with a PermissionMode enum (Plan/Default/AcceptEdits/Bypass). Flag mapping is defined once in PermissionMode::cli_args() and used by the terminal, the web terminal, and the scheduler: Plan -> --permission-mode plan Default -> (no flag) AcceptEdits -> --permission-mode acceptEdits Bypass -> --dangerously-skip-permissions Choices verified against `claude --permission-mode` on 2.1.226. full_permissions is retained and effective_permission_mode() falls back to it, so existing projects.json needs no migration. Bug fix: triple-c-task-runner ran `claude -p ... --dangerously-skip- permissions` unconditionally, ignoring the project's setting entirely. It now reads TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE, which is injected into the container, added to the reserved env blocklist, propagated through the entrypoint's cron env filter, and tracked by a new triple-c.permission-mode label so a change forces recreation. Introspection: new commands/inspect_commands.rs exposes read-only views into the container over docker exec — Claude sessions (parsed from ~/.claude/projects/<cwd>/<uuid>.jsonl), installed capabilities (skills, agents, commands, hooks, plugins, natively-configured MCP servers), and the triple-c-scheduler task list, logs and notifications. Task/session ids are validated against a strict allowlist and every parameterized call runs as a bare argv vector via bollard, so no shell is involved. Stopped containers return empty results rather than errors. No UI yet; that lands with the Project Home view. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 10:51:34 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d0bb631d4d	Remove MCP backend, entrypoint injection, and docs; add migration shim ... Completes the removal begun in the previous commit. Backend: deletes models/mcp_server.rs, storage/mcp_store.rs and commands/mcp_commands.rs, the McpStore on AppState, the four IPC handlers, Project::enabled_mcp_servers, build_mcp_servers_json(), compute_mcp_fingerprint(), the MCP_SERVERS_JSON env injection, the mcp-fingerprint label, and the whole MCP container lifecycle. create_container() and container_needs_recreation() lose their mcp_servers/network_name parameters. Container: entrypoint.sh no longer merges MCP_SERVERS_JSON into ~/.claude.json. MCP_SERVERS_JSON stays in the reserved env blocklist. Security: the Docker socket is no longer auto-mounted for stdio+Docker MCP servers — it now mounts only when allow_docker_access is set. Migration: old containers were created with network_mode=triple-c-net-<projectId> and refuse to start once that network is gone. docker/network.rs becomes docker/legacy_cleanup.rs with label-driven, best-effort removal of leftover MCP containers and the per-project network, called on both delete and recreate. container_needs_recreation() now forces a rebuild for any container carrying a non-empty triple-c.mcp-fingerprint label or attached to a triple-c-net-* network, moving it onto the default bridge. Both can be dropped a release later. Docs: drops the MCP sections from README/HOW-TO-USE/TECHNICAL and adds a short note pointing at Claude Code's native `claude mcp` / `/mcp` / .mcp.json instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 10:31:18 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	657c61939f	Remove MCP tab and per-project MCP UI from frontend ... Claude Code manages MCP natively now (`claude mcp add/list/remove`, `.mcp.json`, `/mcp`), so Triple-C's own MCP server library is redundant. Deletes components/mcp/, hooks/useMcpServers.ts, the MCP sidebar tab and rail icon, the per-project enable checkboxes on ProjectCard, the mcpServers slice of the Zustand store, the four IPC wrappers, and the McpServer/McpTransportType types. Rust backend is untouched in this commit; the commands simply become unreachable. Backend removal and the legacy container/network cleanup follow separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 10:04:25 -07:00
jknapp	401e28a658	Merge pull request 'Fix conflicting --global/--file flags in entrypoint git config' (#12) from fix/entrypoint-gitconfig-flags into main	2026-07-27 14:16:17 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	7c39e3cf11	Fix conflicting --global/--file flags in entrypoint git config ... git rejects `--global` and `--file` together ("error: only one config file at a time"), so the credential helper and user.name/user.email were never written — /home/claude/.gitconfig was left nonexistent and containers had no git identity or HTTPS token helper. Drop `--global` and keep `--file /home/claude/.gitconfig`, which is the intended target: the entrypoint runs as root at that point, so `--global` would have resolved to /root/.gitconfig, and the existing `chown claude:claude /home/claude/.gitconfig` already assumes the --file path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 06:05:06 -07:00
jknapp	ccdfc52dce	Merge pull request 'docs: document terminal layout & StatusBar control gotchas' (#11) from docs/terminal-layout-gotchas into main	2026-07-19 16:26:02 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 4.8	2e661979ea	docs: document terminal layout & StatusBar control gotchas ... Capture the non-obvious implementation gotchas from PR #7 (terminal-layout-statusbar) in TECHNICAL.md: wrapper-vs-host xterm padding, global StatusBar controls, recordingSessionIdRef transcript pinning, active-only Jump-to-Current state, and the Zustand object-merge rule for publishing action callbacks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-19 09:12:54 -07:00
jknapp	59d89bcd1b	Merge pull request 'Rename backup archive root so extraction dir mode isn't clobbered' (#10) from fix/backup-root-dir-mode into main	2026-07-01 13:35:02 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 4.8	26adccce5b	Rename backup archive root so extraction dir mode isn't clobbered ... The transform used `s,^\./,workspace/,`, which rewrites the workspace *contents* (`./foo` -> `workspace/foo`) but leaves tar's root member as a bare `./`. That `./` entry carries the source root's mode/mtime, and on extraction tar stamps them onto the extraction directory itself. Match the leading `.` instead (`s,^\.,workspace,`) so the root member is renamed `./` -> `workspace`, giving the archive a proper `workspace/` directory entry and no bare `./`. The extraction directory is left untouched. Contents, hidden files, excludes, symlink targets and the `flags=rh` hardlink handling are unchanged. Verified in-container: archive top level is exactly `workspace/` + `home-claude/`, no `./` member, node_modules excluded, extraction into a 0755 dir leaves it 0755, workspace/.git preserved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-01 06:33:02 -07:00
jknapp	876ba8a8fc	Merge pull request 'Nest workspace under workspace/ in project backup' (#9) from fix/backup-workspace-nesting into main	2026-07-01 13:23:08 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 4.8	5cd528a4ef	Use flags=rh so intra-workspace hardlinks survive the transform ... Review caught that `flags=r` disables rewriting of both symlink AND hardlink target names. Leaving symlink targets alone is intended, but a hardlink's stored target is an archive-internal reference to another member's name — when member names become `workspace/...` but the hardlink target stays `./hard_link`, extraction fails hard: tar: workspace/file.txt: Cannot hard link to './hard_link': No such file or directory `flags=rh` rewrites regular member names and hardlink target names together (keeping the pair consistent) while still leaving symlink targets untouched. Verified in-container: extract exit 0, symlink target preserved, hardlink pair shares one inode, nesting under workspace/ intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-01 06:22:14 -07:00