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@@ -32,18 +32,127 @@ if [ ! -f "$CERT_FILE" ]; then
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-keyout "$KEY_FILE" -out "$CERT_FILE" -subj "/CN=shared-ols" 2>/dev/null
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fi
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## ---- health vhost (catch-all): valid server with zero customer sites +
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## answers HAProxy health checks that hit by IP / unknown Host with a 200 ----
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## ---- health vhost (catch-all) ----
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## This vhost is mapped `map _health *` by render-shared-ols-config.sh, so it
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## answers EVERY Host that no customer vhost claims. It exists so the server is
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## valid with zero customer sites and so local/edge health probes get a 200.
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##
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## IT MUST NOT ANSWER 200 FOR AN UNMAPPED CUSTOMER HOST.
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## It used to serve html/index.html ("shared-ols", 11 bytes) with HTTP 200 to
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## anything that fell through. Measured 2026-08: three live customer sites
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## (their vhost had silently stopped being rendered) served that 200 for ~2
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## months and no monitor noticed, because every uptime check asks "is it 200?"
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## and the answer was yes. A hostname this server cannot serve now gets
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## 421 Misdirected Request -- semantically exact (RFC 7540 s9.1.2: the server is
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## not able to produce a response for the combination of scheme and authority in
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## the request URI) and unambiguous to monitoring in a way 404 is not, since a
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## 404 is a perfectly normal answer from a real, working site.
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##
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## THE DISCRIMINATOR: request path /healthz AND an INTERNAL client address.
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## * Path alone is not enough -- anyone can request /healthz.
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## * REMOTE_ADDR is the half an outside caller cannot choose, BECAUSE of
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## `useIpInProxyHeader 1` in httpd_config_base.tpl: OLS resolves the client
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## IP from X-Forwarded-For, and HAProxy -- the only thing that can reach
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## this tier, which has no host-published ports and sits on client-net --
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## SETS (not appends) that header:
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## `http-request set-header X-Forwarded-For %[var(txn.real_ip)]` in
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## haproxy-manager-base/templates/hap_backend.tpl, which DISCARDS whatever
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## the client sent. So a request arriving from outside carries the real
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## public client IP. Verified on the lab: `-H 'X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8'`
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## on /healthz returns 421.
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## * MEASURED LIMIT OF THE IP GATE, stated plainly rather than assumed away:
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## OLS takes the FIRST element of a multi-value X-Forwarded-For as
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## REMOTE_ADDR. `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1, 8.8.8.8` returns 200 on /healthz
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## here, and anchoring the pattern ^...$ does NOT change that (tested both
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## ways) -- because by the time the rule sees REMOTE_ADDR it is already the
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## single token `10.0.0.1`. The anchors are kept because they are correct
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## and free, not because they close that hole. What closes it is HAProxy:
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## `http-request set-header X-Forwarded-For %[var(txn.real_ip)]` REPLACES
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## whatever the client sent with one value.
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## * AND THE GATE IS NOT LOAD-BEARING ANYWAY. It only guards /healthz. `/`,
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## and every other path, is 421 UNCONDITIONALLY -- no header, source
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## address or Host can talk this vhost into a 200 there. So even a total
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## bypass of the IP gate buys an attacker a 3-byte `ok` on /healthz, never
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## a "the site is up" answer on the URL a monitor actually requests. That
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## is the property this change exists to guarantee, and it does not rest on
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## anything spoofable.
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## * The probes that MUST keep passing all originate inside: the Docker
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## HEALTHCHECK (`curl -sfk https://127.0.0.1/healthz` in Dockerfile.shared-ols,
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## overridden by WHP's setup-shared-ols.sh to `https://localhost/healthz`)
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## connects over loopback and sends no X-Forwarded-For, so REMOTE_ADDR falls
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## back to the peer, 127.0.0.1. An edge/host probe of the container IP comes
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## from the docker gateway (172.16/12), also allowed.
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##
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## `/` is 421 for EVERY client, internal ones included -- there is deliberately
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## no "internal clients still get the old 200 page" escape hatch, because that
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## is exactly the response that hid the outage. Anything probing this tier for
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## liveness must ask for /healthz.
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##
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## WHY REWRITE AND NOT A REDIRECT CONTEXT: `context / { type redirect
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## statusCode 421 }` was measured on this image (OLS 1.8.4) and does NOT work --
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## 421 is not in OLS's accepted status-code list, so it silently degrades to a
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## 302 with a literal, unexpanded `Location: $DOC_ROOT/?`. A rewrite `[R=421,L]`
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## does emit a real 421.
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##
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## WHY THE THE_REQUEST GUARD ON THE ERROR PAGE: a bare [R=421] has no body, and
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## a bare 421 with no explanation is a support ticket. `errorpage 421` supplies
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## the body, but OLS fetches that URL as a fresh internal request that runs
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## through these same rules -- without an exception it is itself 421'd and the
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## body comes back empty (measured: content-length 0). %{IS_SUBREQ} and
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## %{ENV:REDIRECT_STATUS} are NOT populated by OLS's rewrite engine (both
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## measured, both no-ops), but %{THE_REQUEST} keeps the ORIGINAL request line
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## across the internal fetch. So: serve misdirected.html when the client did not
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## itself ask for it, which lets the error page render while a direct external
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## GET /misdirected.html still gets 421 -- no path on this catch-all answers 200
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## to an outside caller.
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##
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## The body is deliberately generic: no branding, no customer names, nothing
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## that reveals which hostnames this server does serve. Every unmapped Host and
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## every path gets the byte-identical 421, so the response cannot be used to
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## enumerate configured vs unconfigured hostnames.
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cat > "$HEALTH_DIR/vhconf.conf" <<'EOF'
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docRoot $VH_ROOT/html
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enableScript 0
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errorpage 421 {
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url /misdirected.html
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}
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rewrite {
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enable 1
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rules <<<END_rules
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RewriteCond %{THE_REQUEST} !\s/+misdirected\.html
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RewriteRule ^/?misdirected\.html$ - [L]
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RewriteCond %{REMOTE_ADDR} ^(127\.0\.0\.1|::1|10\.[0-9.]+|192\.168\.[0-9.]+|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.[0-9.]+)$
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RewriteRule ^/?healthz$ - [L]
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RewriteRule .* - [R=421,L]
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END_rules
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}
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context / {
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allowBrowse 1
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location $DOC_ROOT/
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}
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EOF
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printf 'ok\n' > "$HEALTH_DIR/html/healthz"
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printf 'shared-ols\n' > "$HEALTH_DIR/html/index.html"
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cat > "$HEALTH_DIR/html/misdirected.html" <<'EOF'
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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<html lang="en">
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<head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>421 Misdirected Request</title></head>
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<body>
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<h1>421 Misdirected Request</h1>
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<p>This hostname is not configured on this server.</p>
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<p>If you own this domain, check that its DNS points to the correct server and
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that the site is active in your hosting control panel.</p>
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</body>
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</html>
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EOF
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## The old catch-all index.html ("shared-ols") is gone on purpose, and actively
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## removed so an in-place upgrade of a long-lived container cannot leave it
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## behind. If these rewrite rules were ever to stop applying, `context /` would
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## fall back to serving the docRoot index -- with no index.html that is a 403,
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## which is wrong-but-loud, instead of a 200 that is wrong-and-silent.
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rm -f "$HEALTH_DIR/html/index.html"
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## ---- ownership: OLS reads conf/ as lsadm. chown the base conf dir + health dir
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## NON-recursively (the per-site files under conf/shared-sites are written by the
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@@ -51,7 +160,7 @@ printf 'shared-ols\n' > "$HEALTH_DIR/html/index.html"
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## every container (re)start, delaying first-listen after a crash). The render
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## script chowns the httpd_config.conf it produces. ----
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chown lsadm:nogroup "$LSWS_CONF" "$HEALTH_DIR" "$HEALTH_DIR/html" 2>/dev/null || true
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chown lsadm:nogroup "$HEALTH_DIR/vhconf.conf" "$HEALTH_DIR/html/healthz" "$HEALTH_DIR/html/index.html" 2>/dev/null || true
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chown lsadm:nogroup "$HEALTH_DIR/vhconf.conf" "$HEALTH_DIR/html/healthz" "$HEALTH_DIR/html/misdirected.html" 2>/dev/null || true
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## ---- assemble httpd_config.conf from the panel's per-site files ----
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/scripts/render-shared-ols-config.sh
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