fix(entrypoint): no recursive chmod on the customer home; root never follows customer symlinks #3

Merged
jknapp merged 5 commits from fix/no-recursive-chmod-on-start into main 2026-10-21 00:01:32 +00:00
+76 -10
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@@ -19,8 +19,53 @@ else
echo "User $user already exists"
fi
mkdir -p /home/$user/app
mkdir -p /home/$user/logs/{nginx,nodejs}
# ---- root never follows customer symlinks under /home/$user ----
# /home/$user is the customer's bind mount: they can plant symlinks in it, and
# root touching/chowning/writing through one (e.g. logs/nginx -> /etc) gives
# them that target. logs/ is WHP-owned and nginx opens files in it as root, so
# symlinks there are removed and logged; everything under /home/$user is created/written AS THE CUSTOMER.
as_user() {
if command -v setpriv >/dev/null 2>&1; then
setpriv --reuid="$uid" --regid="$uid" --init-groups -- "$@"
else
runuser -u "$user" -- "$@"
fi
}
# Fail closed: refusing to start only hurts the customer who planted the path,
# which is preferred to root following it.
die() {
echo "entrypoint: FATAL: $* - refusing to start" >&2
exit 1
}
# Unlink AS THE CUSTOMER: rm on the final component never touches the link
# target, and if a parent dir is swapped for a symlink mid-way the customer can
# only delete what they already could. Still a symlink afterwards -> refuse to
# start (fail closed).
drop_symlink() {
if [ -L "$1" ]; then
echo "entrypoint: SECURITY: $1 was a symlink to '$(readlink "$1")' - removing" >&2
as_user rm -f -- "$1"
[ -L "$1" ] && die "could not remove symlink $1"
fi
return 0
}
if [ -L /home/$user ] || [ ! -d /home/$user ]; then
die "/home/$user is not a real directory"
fi
chown -h $user:$user /home/$user
# app/ may legitimately be a symlink (releases/current deploys): it is left
# alone, and every root-side operation on it below runs as the customer.
drop_symlink /home/$user/logs
if [ -d /home/$user/logs ]; then
# nginx opens its logs here as root. As the customer: find without -L never
# follows symlinks, -delete unlinks the link itself, and a raced parent swap
# can only reach what the customer could already delete. Re-checked
# fail-closed immediately before nginx starts.
as_user find /home/$user/logs -xdev -type l \
-printf 'entrypoint: SECURITY: %p was a symlink to %l - removed\n' -delete >&2 || true
fi
as_user mkdir -p /home/$user/app /home/$user/logs/nginx /home/$user/logs/nodejs
# Link log directories
rm -rf /var/log/nginx
@@ -30,9 +75,31 @@ ln -s /home/$user/logs/nodejs /var/log/nodejs
# Configure nginx for reverse proxy
/scripts/create-nginx-config.sh
# Set ownership and permissions
# Set ownership and permissions. GNU chown -R defaults to -P: symlinks are
# lchown()ed, never followed.
chown -R $user:$user /home/$user
chmod -R 755 /home/$user
# Do NOT `chmod -R 755` here. /home/$user is the customer's bind-mounted
# directory; a recursive 755 on every start made every file (.env, app
# secrets) world-readable AND executable, and reverted any tighter
# permissions the customer had set. nginx workers run as `nginx` (not the
# customer) and serve /static/ straight from /home/$user/app/public/, so they
# only need to traverse directories. Normalise that and nothing else: open the
# home dir itself (adduser -m creates it 0700 when it does not exist yet), and
# add o+x to directories that lack it. Regular files are never touched.
# The find runs AS THE CUSTOMER: `-type d` without -L skips symlinks, and if a
# dir is swapped for a symlink before chmod runs, the customer can only reach
# what they already own.
chmod 755 /home/$user
as_user find /home/$user -type d ! -perm -o=x -exec chmod o+x {} + 2>/dev/null || true
# nginx opens its logs under /home/$user/logs as root: last fail-closed check
# immediately before it starts. logs/, logs/nginx, logs/nodejs must be real
# dirs and nothing under logs/ may be other than a regular file or directory.
for d in /home/$user/logs /home/$user/logs/nginx /home/$user/logs/nodejs; do
[ -d "$d" ] && [ ! -L "$d" ] || die "$d is not a real directory"
done
bad=$(find /home/$user/logs -xdev ! -type f ! -type d -print -quit 2>&1)
[ -z "$bad" ] || die "unsafe entry under /home/$user/logs: $bad"
# Start nginx
nginx
@@ -59,15 +126,13 @@ fi
# Create app directory if it doesn't exist
if [ ! -d /home/$user/app ]; then
echo "Creating app directory at /home/$user/app"
mkdir -p /home/$user/app
chown -R $user:$user /home/$user/app
as_user mkdir -p /home/$user/app
fi
# If app directory is empty, copy the simple-website example
if [ -z "$(ls -A /home/$user/app)" ]; then
echo "App directory is empty, copying simple-website example..."
cp -r /examples/simple-website/* /home/$user/app/
chown -R $user:$user /home/$user/app
as_user cp -r /examples/simple-website/. /home/$user/app/
echo "Copied simple-website example to provide a working application"
fi
@@ -85,8 +150,9 @@ su -c "npm install" $user
# Check if ecosystem.config.js exists, if not generate it
if [ ! -f /home/$user/app/ecosystem.config.js ]; then
echo "No ecosystem.config.js found, generating from package.json..."
/scripts/generate-ecosystem-config.sh "$user" "/home/$user/app"
chown $user:$user /home/$user/app/ecosystem.config.js
# As the customer: it reads their package.json and writes into their app dir.
drop_symlink /home/$user/app/ecosystem.config.js
as_user /scripts/generate-ecosystem-config.sh "$user" "/home/$user/app"
fi
# Mirror logs to docker logs in the background.