2025-02-19 07:53:26 -08:00
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Global settings
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------
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global
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2026-08-22 10:10:59 -07:00
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# ACCESS LOG DESTINATION.
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2025-02-19 07:53:26 -08:00
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#
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2026-08-22 10:10:59 -07:00
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# This used to be `log 127.0.0.1 local2`, which was a silent black hole:
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# 127.0.0.1 is the CONTAINER's own loopback, nothing has ever listened on
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# udp/514 in the container netns, and there is no /dev/log in the image.
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# Every access log line -- ~1.5M/day across the whole edge -- was written
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# to a socket with no receiver and dropped. Nothing errored, nothing
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# warned, and `haproxy -c` was perfectly happy. The cost only shows up
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# during an incident: per-IP 429s, tarpits, wp-admin gate redirects,
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# WAF 403s and `silent-drop`s left no record anywhere, so the edge could
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# not be asked what it had rejected. Only aggregate stick-table counters
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# survived.
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#
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# Now points at the DOCKER BRIDGE GATEWAY, where the host's rsyslog has an
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# imudp listener bound (installed idempotently by WHP's
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# setup-haproxy-logrotate.sh, which also writes the logrotate stanza).
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# The host writes local2 to /var/log/haproxy.log and stops it there, so it
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# does not also flood /var/log/messages or the Graylog forwarder.
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2025-02-19 07:53:26 -08:00
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#
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2026-08-22 10:10:59 -07:00
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# WHY NOT `log stdout format raw local0`: it is INCOMPATIBLE with the
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# `daemon` keyword below, and incompatible SILENTLY. Verified on the
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# pinned 3.0.11 binary: with `daemon` set, a `log stdout` config serves
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# traffic normally and emits ZERO log lines, and `haproxy -c` returns 0
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# with no error and no warning -- so the CI config gate
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# (scripts/validate-rendered-config.py) cannot catch it either. Making it
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# work means dropping `daemon` / adding -db so haproxy stays in the
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# foreground, which in turn breaks the three synchronous
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# `subprocess.run(['haproxy', '-W', ...], check=True)` launch sites in
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# haproxy_manager.py (they would block until the 180s timeout and then be
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# killed). That is a change to the exact code path whose failure mode is
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# "container Up, ports 80/443 never bound, every site down, /health still
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# 200". Not worth it for a logging change.
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2025-02-19 07:53:26 -08:00
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#
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# UDP means a dead listener degrades to dropped log lines, never to a
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# stalled or failing request path -- the correct failure direction for an
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# edge fronting ~60 customer sites.
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#
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# len 2048 accommodates the enriched log-format in hap_listener.tpl
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# (URL + User-Agent + UUID); the default 1024 would truncate long ones.
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log {{ syslog_target }} len 2048 format rfc5424 local2 info
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2025-02-19 07:53:26 -08:00
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chroot /var/lib/haproxy
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2026-04-02 05:18:48 -07:00
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pidfile /var/run/haproxy.pid
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maxconn 4000
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user haproxy
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group haproxy
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daemon
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# SSL and Performance
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tune.ssl.default-dh-param 2048
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2026-04-01 22:27:07 -07:00
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2026-08-14 09:09:35 -07:00
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# Required by the `http-request normalize-uri` chain at the top of the
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# `web` frontend (hap_listener.tpl). normalize-uri is still flagged
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# EXPERIMENTAL in HAProxy 3.0, and HAProxy REFUSES TO START without this
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# opt-in -- not a warning, a fatal:
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# [ALERT] config : parsing [...] : 'normalize-uri' action is
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# experimental, must be allowed via a global
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# 'expose-experimental-directives'
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# (verified against real haproxy 3.0.11-9e587df: `haproxy -c` exits 1).
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2026-08-14 09:38:49 -07:00
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# So this line and the normalize-uri rules must be added/removed together.
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#
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# Dropping this one alone does NOT crash-loop the container -- the truth
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# is worse: it is a SILENT TOTAL OUTAGE that nothing escalates. Container
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# init (scripts/init.py -> haproxy_manager.do_initial_setup()) calls
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# generate_config() (which still succeeds -- Jinja doesn't validate
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# HAProxy semantics) and then start_haproxy(), which runs `haproxy -c`,
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# sees it fail, logs an error, and RETURNS WITHOUT RAISING. init.py exits
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# 0. scripts/start-up.sh then execs gunicorn as PID 1 regardless. Result:
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# the container stays "Up", ports 80/443 are never bound, EVERY SITE ON
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# THE HOST IS DOWN, and the in-container supervisor loop
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# (ensure_haproxy.py, every HAPROXY_SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL seconds) retries
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# the identical failing render forever without ever escalating. Worse
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# still, GET /health keeps returning HTTP 200 -- health_check() only
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# answers 500 on a database error; a dead haproxy just flips the JSON
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# body's "haproxy_status" to "stopped" while the status code a naive
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# monitor checks never changes. Do not trust /health alone to catch this.
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2026-08-14 09:09:35 -07:00
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#
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# This exposes ONLY the experimental directives that are actually used --
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# it does not change the behaviour of anything else in this file.
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expose-experimental-directives
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2026-06-24 13:40:11 -07:00
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# HTTP/3 over QUIC. The Debian haproxy package is built against system
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# OpenSSL via the compatibility shim (USE_QUIC_OPENSSL_COMPAT), which is
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# not a native QUIC TLS stack. HAProxy therefore rejects `quic*@` binds
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# unless this opt-in is set. `limited-quic` enables QUIC through the compat
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# layer (no 0-RTT — that needs quictls/aws-lc or native OpenSSL 3.5 QUIC).
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# Without this, the quic bind in the frontend fails to start: "this SSL
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# library does not support the QUIC protocol".
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limited-quic
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{%- if cluster_secret %}
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# Stable secret keying QUIC Retry/address-validation tokens. Self-healed
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# to /etc/haproxy/cluster-secret (named volume) by the manager so it
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# survives recreates; without it haproxy picks a random one per process
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# and tokens don't survive reloads (benign, just a startup notice).
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cluster-secret "{{ cluster_secret }}"
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{%- endif %}
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2026-04-02 05:18:48 -07:00
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# HTTP/2 protection against Rapid Reset (CVE-2023-44487) and stream abuse
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tune.h2.fe.max-total-streams 2000
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tune.h2.fe.glitches-threshold 50
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# Stats persistence for zero-downtime reloads
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stats-file /var/lib/haproxy/stats.dat
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------
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2026-04-01 22:27:07 -07:00
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# DNS resolver for Docker container name resolution
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# Re-resolves backend server addresses so container IP changes
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# (from restarts, recreations, scaling) are picked up automatically
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------
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2026-04-01 22:27:07 -07:00
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resolvers docker_dns
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nameserver dns1 127.0.0.11:53
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resolve_retries 3
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timeout resolve 1s
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timeout retry 1s
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hold valid 10s
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hold other 10s
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hold refused 10s
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hold nx 10s
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hold timeout 10s
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hold obsolete 10s
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2025-02-19 07:53:26 -08:00
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------
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# common defaults that all the 'listen' and 'backend' sections will
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# use if not designated in their block
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------
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defaults
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mode http
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log global
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option httplog
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option dontlognull
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option http-server-close
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option forwardfor #except 127.0.0.0/8
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option redispatch
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retries 3
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2026-03-31 10:00:53 -07:00
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timeout http-request 30s
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timeout queue 2m
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timeout connect 10s
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timeout client 5m
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timeout server 10m
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timeout http-keep-alive 30s
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timeout check 10s
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2025-08-25 06:42:09 -07:00
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timeout tarpit 10s # Tarpit delay for low-level scanners (before silent-drop)
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2025-02-21 06:28:51 -08:00
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maxconn 3000
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2026-05-15 05:41:16 -07:00
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# Per-request unique reference, used:
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2026-08-22 10:10:59 -07:00
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# - in the access log line, as the `id=` field of the custom log-format
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# in hap_listener.tpl. NOTE: `option httplog` does NOT include %ID
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# (verified against haproxy 3.0.11) -- this comment used to claim it
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# did, which made the support workflow below look supported when it
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# was not. The explicit log-format is what actually carries it.
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2026-05-15 05:41:16 -07:00
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# - echoed to clients in the X-Request-Reference response header on
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# WAF blocks so a customer can quote it when opening a support ticket
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# - embedded in /etc/haproxy/errors/403-waf.html so a blocked visitor
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# sees it on the rendered 403 page
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# Support correlates ref → /var/log/haproxy.log line → timestamp+client+host
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# → /var/log/coraza/audit.log entry → rule_id.
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unique-id-format %[uuid()]
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unique-id-header X-Request-Reference
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2025-02-21 06:28:51 -08:00
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