fix(logging): stop silently discarding every access log line

haproxy.cfg's global section has had `log 127.0.0.1 local2` since day one.
That is the CONTAINER's own loopback: nothing has ever listened on udp/514 in
the container netns and there is no /dev/log in the image. Every access log
line -- ~1.5M/day across ~60 customer sites -- was written to a socket with no
receiver and dropped. Nothing errored, nothing warned, and `haproxy -c` was
perfectly happy, so this survived unnoticed.

The cost only shows up during an incident. Per-IP 429s, tarpits, wp-admin gate
redirects, WAF 403s and `silent-drop`s left no record anywhere, so the edge
could not be asked what it had actually rejected -- only aggregate stick-table
counters survived. That blind spot applies to every WHP host.

Changes:

* hap_header.tpl: point `log` at {{ syslog_target }} (default 172.18.0.1:514,
  the client-net bridge gateway) with `len 2048 format rfc5424 local2 info`.
  WHP's setup-haproxy-syslog.sh installs the matching rsyslog receiver on the
  host, in a dedicated ruleset ending in stop() so 1.5M lines/day cannot flood
  /var/log/messages or the Graylog forwarder, bound to the bridge IP rather
  than 0.0.0.0.

* haproxy_manager.py: render that target from HAPROXY_SYSLOG_TARGET so
  standalone/home deployments on a different bridge subnet can retarget it.

* hap_listener.tpl: add a frontend-scoped `log-format`. `option httplog` is
  not sufficient for incident response -- it omits %ID entirely (verified
  against 3.0.11), and its %ci is the Cloudflare edge rather than the visitor
  for CF-fronted sites. The new format keeps the first 16 fields byte-identical
  to the httplog default (so existing parsers still work) and appends
  cip=<real client, from var(txn.real_ip)>, id=<uuid>, host=, ua=, sni=, hv=.
  Adds a User-Agent capture in slot 1 to feed it.

* hap_header.tpl: correct the comment claiming `option httplog` includes %ID.
  It does not, which made the documented support-correlation workflow
  (X-Request-Reference -> access log -> coraza audit.log -> rule_id) look
  supported when it could never have worked.

Deliberately NOT using `log stdout format raw local0`: it is incompatible with
the `daemon` keyword, and incompatible SILENTLY. Verified on the pinned 3.0.11
binary -- with `daemon` set, a `log stdout` config serves traffic normally and
emits zero log lines, while `haproxy -c` returns 0 with no error and no
warning, so scripts/validate-rendered-config.py could not catch it either.
Making it work would mean dropping `daemon`, which breaks the three
synchronous `subprocess.run(['haproxy', '-W', ...], check=True)` launch sites
in haproxy_manager.py -- the exact code path whose failure mode is "container
Up, ports 80/443 never bound, every site down, /health still 200".

UDP was chosen so a dead listener degrades to dropped log lines rather than a
stalled request path.

Verified: scripts/validate-rendered-config.py passes `haproxy -c` on both the
"default" and "full" scenarios against the real 3.0.11 binary; and a live
haproxy running WITH `daemon` (as production does) was confirmed to emit real
lines carrying the true client IP from CF-Connecting-IP:

  <150>1 2026-08-22T17:05:21+00:00 - haproxy 109 - - 127.0.0.1:51194
  [22/Aug/2026:17:05:21.217] t t/<NOSRV> 0/-1/-1/-1/0 200 73 - - LR--
  1/1/0/0/0 0/0 {cf-site.example|Mozilla/5.0 RealVisitor} "GET /checkout/
  HTTP/1.1" cip=203.0.113.77 id=dfe94fa9-8d95-4126-81e1-821578f22872
  host=cf-site.example ua=Mozilla/5.0 RealVisitor sni=- hv=1

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-2026.08.6
+2026.08.7

haproxy_manager.py

@@ -2351,9 +2351,20 @@ def generate_config():
                 except Exception as e:
                     logger.error(f"Failed to create {suspended_list_path}: {e}")
 
+        # Access-log destination for the `log` line in the global section.
+        # Default 172.18.0.1:514 is the docker bridge gateway for WHP's
+        # `client-net`, i.e. the host, where rsyslog's imudp listener is bound
+        # by setup-haproxy-logrotate.sh. Overridable so this image stays usable
+        # on standalone/home deployments with a different bridge subnet or a
+        # remote log collector -- set HAPROXY_SYSLOG_TARGET to `<ip>:<port>`.
+        # UDP, so an absent listener drops log lines and never affects request
+        # handling.
+        syslog_target = os.environ.get('HAPROXY_SYSLOG_TARGET', '172.18.0.1:514').strip()
+
         # Add Haproxy Default Headers
         default_headers = template_env.get_template('hap_header.tpl').render(
             cluster_secret = get_or_create_cluster_secret(),
+            syslog_target = syslog_target,
         )
         config_parts.append(default_headers)
 

templates/hap_header.tpl

@@ -2,20 +2,46 @@
 # Global settings
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------
 global
-    # to have these messages end up in /var/log/haproxy.log you will
+    # ACCESS LOG DESTINATION.
-    # need to:
     #
-    # 1) configure syslog to accept network log events.  This is done
+    # This used to be `log 127.0.0.1 local2`, which was a silent black hole:
-    #    by adding the '-r' option to the SYSLOGD_OPTIONS in
+    # 127.0.0.1 is the CONTAINER's own loopback, nothing has ever listened on
-    #    /etc/sysconfig/syslog
+    # udp/514 in the container netns, and there is no /dev/log in the image.
+    # Every access log line -- ~1.5M/day across the whole edge -- was written
+    # to a socket with no receiver and dropped. Nothing errored, nothing
+    # warned, and `haproxy -c` was perfectly happy. The cost only shows up
+    # during an incident: per-IP 429s, tarpits, wp-admin gate redirects,
+    # WAF 403s and `silent-drop`s left no record anywhere, so the edge could
+    # not be asked what it had rejected. Only aggregate stick-table counters
+    # survived.
     #
-    # 2) configure local2 events to go to the /var/log/haproxy.log
+    # Now points at the DOCKER BRIDGE GATEWAY, where the host's rsyslog has an
-    #   file. A line like the following can be added to
+    # imudp listener bound (installed idempotently by WHP's
-    #   /etc/sysconfig/syslog
+    # setup-haproxy-logrotate.sh, which also writes the logrotate stanza).
+    # The host writes local2 to /var/log/haproxy.log and stops it there, so it
+    # does not also flood /var/log/messages or the Graylog forwarder.
     #
-    #    local2.*                       /var/log/haproxy.log
+    # WHY NOT `log stdout format raw local0`: it is INCOMPATIBLE with the
+    # `daemon` keyword below, and incompatible SILENTLY. Verified on the
+    # pinned 3.0.11 binary: with `daemon` set, a `log stdout` config serves
+    # traffic normally and emits ZERO log lines, and `haproxy -c` returns 0
+    # with no error and no warning -- so the CI config gate
+    # (scripts/validate-rendered-config.py) cannot catch it either. Making it
+    # work means dropping `daemon` / adding -db so haproxy stays in the
+    # foreground, which in turn breaks the three synchronous
+    # `subprocess.run(['haproxy', '-W', ...], check=True)` launch sites in
+    # haproxy_manager.py (they would block until the 180s timeout and then be
+    # killed). That is a change to the exact code path whose failure mode is
+    # "container Up, ports 80/443 never bound, every site down, /health still
+    # 200". Not worth it for a logging change.
     #
-    log         127.0.0.1 local2
+    # UDP means a dead listener degrades to dropped log lines, never to a
+    # stalled or failing request path -- the correct failure direction for an
+    # edge fronting ~60 customer sites.
+    #
+    # len 2048 accommodates the enriched log-format in hap_listener.tpl
+    # (URL + User-Agent + UUID); the default 1024 would truncate long ones.
+    log         {{ syslog_target }} len 2048 format rfc5424 local2 info
 
     chroot      /var/lib/haproxy
     pidfile     /var/run/haproxy.pid
@@ -122,7 +148,11 @@ defaults
     maxconn                 3000
 
     # Per-request unique reference, used:
-    #   - in the log line (httplog includes %ID)
+    #   - in the access log line, as the `id=` field of the custom log-format
+    #     in hap_listener.tpl. NOTE: `option httplog` does NOT include %ID
+    #     (verified against haproxy 3.0.11) -- this comment used to claim it
+    #     did, which made the support workflow below look supported when it
+    #     was not. The explicit log-format is what actually carries it.
     #   - echoed to clients in the X-Request-Reference response header on
     #     WAF blocks so a customer can quote it when opening a support ticket
     #   - embedded in /etc/haproxy/errors/403-waf.html so a blocked visitor

templates/hap_listener.tpl

@@ -19,9 +19,44 @@ frontend web
     # response, including haproxy-generated ones (blocks, default page).
     http-after-response set-header alt-svc "h3=\":443\"; ma=86400"
 
-    # Capture Host header so it appears in httplog output (in %hr field)
+    # Capture Host header so it appears in httplog output (in %hr field).
+    # ORDER IS LOAD-BEARING: this is capture slot 0, referenced by the
+    # access log-format below as %[capture.req.hdr(0)].
     http-request capture req.hdr(Host) len 64
 
+    # Capture slot 1 = User-Agent. Incident response needs it to tell a
+    # scanner from a browser, and it is not in `option httplog` output.
+    # Any new capture MUST be appended AFTER this line, never inserted
+    # above it, or the slot indices in the log-format silently shift and
+    # the access log starts attributing the wrong string to the wrong field.
+    http-request capture req.hdr(User-Agent) len 200
+
+    # --- Access logging -----------------------------------------------------
+    # Scoped to THIS frontend on purpose: it references capture slots and
+    # var(txn.real_ip), which only exist here. Putting it in `defaults` would
+    # apply it to the stats frontend and every backend too, where those
+    # samples are undefined.
+    #
+    # `log-format` overrides `option httplog` for this proxy (haproxy emits a
+    # harmless warning saying so). The first 16 fields are byte-identical to
+    # the 3.0 httplog default, so anything that already parses httplog keeps
+    # working; the `key=value` tail is additive.
+    #
+    # Why the default httplog is not enough for incident response:
+    #   %ci  is the PROXY's address for Cloudflare-fronted sites, not the
+    #        visitor. The real client is var(txn.real_ip), resolved further
+    #        down from CF-Connecting-IP / X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For and only
+    #        honoured from trusted proxies. BOTH are logged: cip= is who to
+    #        rate-limit or block, %ci is which edge it arrived through.
+    #   %ID  is NOT included by `option httplog` (verified against
+    #        haproxy 3.0.11). Without it the documented support workflow
+    #        -- X-Request-Reference -> access log -> coraza audit.log -> rule_id
+    #        -- cannot be completed. id= is what makes that join possible.
+    #   host=/ua= identify the vhost and client; %ST/%B/%tsc give status,
+    #        bytes and the termination state that distinguishes a rate-limit
+    #        deny (PR--) from a tarpit (PT--) from a normal close.
+    log-format "%ci:%cp [%tr] %ft %b/%s %TR/%Tw/%Tc/%Tr/%Ta %ST %B %CC %CS %tsc %ac/%fc/%bc/%sc/%rc %sq/%bq %hr %hs %{+Q}r cip=%[var(txn.real_ip)] id=%ID host=%[capture.req.hdr(0)] ua=%[capture.req.hdr(1)] sni=%[ssl_fc_sni] hv=%[fc_http_major]"
+
     # --- URI normalisation (MUST be the first path-touching block here) ---
     # Every path-based control in this frontend (the ACME health-check bypass,
     # wp-login, xmlrpc, the wp-json/batch virtual patch, the wp-admin gate, the