fix(haproxy): normalise the URI before matching, closing five gate bypasses

The wp-admin edge gate matched the RAW request path while the backend
normalised and decoded it before resolving a file. Every gap between those
two behaviours was a bypass, and five had already been patched individually:

  //wp-admin/plugins.php            fell through ungated
  /wp-admin/css/../plugins.php      took the static-asset bypass
  /wp-admin/js/%2e%2e/plugins.php   same, percent-encoded
  /wp%2Dadmin/plugins.php           matched no wp-admin ACL at all
  /wp-admin%2Fplugins.php           encoded separator, served by OLS

Stop patching vectors and normalise once, first, so every path-based rule in
the frontend sees the same string the backend will resolve:

    percent-to-uppercase
    percent-decode-unreserved
    path-merge-slashes
    path-strip-dot
    path-strip-dotdot full

Order was determined empirically against real haproxy 3.0.11, not from the
docs: the decoders MUST precede the path walkers, or %2e%2e is decoded to ..
only after path-strip-dotdot has already run and the traversal survives. Plain
path-strip-dotdot also leaves /../../ untouched -- "full" is required.
query-sort-by-name is deliberately not enabled; it reorders query parameters
and would break anything signing or caching on the exact query string.

normalize-uri is experimental in 3.0, so global gains
expose-experimental-directives -- without it haproxy does not start at all.
The two must be added and removed together.

%2F cannot be closed by normalisation ("/" is reserved, so decoding it is
correctly refused), so it gets its own deny, scoped to paths mentioning
wp-admin so non-WordPress apps that pass encoded slashes in path parameters
keep working. Deny rather than redirect: regsub finds no "/wp-admin/" in
"/wp-admin%2F...", so a redirect would point at the request's own URL.

Gate changes:
  * wp_admin_safe_path KEPT -- merge-slashes kills its "//" vector but not
    "/\", which no normalizer touches. Its failure mode (unsafe path is not
    redirected, therefore falls through UNGATED -- the original C1) is now
    closed by an explicit deny instead of being left implicit.
  * wp_admin_asset now excludes .php, so the asset bypass cannot cover a PHP
    entrypoint even if an encoding trick ever survives normalisation.
  * wp_admin_path is case-insensitive, paired with a matching regsub flag --
    adding either alone is an infinite redirect loop.

Verified behaviourally against real haproxy 3.0.11 with raw sockets (curl
normalises client-side and hides these), run twice: once against the rendered
templates and once against the haproxy.cfg generated by a real, healthy
container. 12/12 gated, 19/19 passed through, 7/7 with no off-site Location,
plus ~30 adversarial vectors. haproxy -c exits 0 and the container reaches
healthy. Blast radius measured on a 40-URL production-shaped corpus: 4
rewritten, all RFC-equivalent (%7E->~, /./ , //); query strings and all
non-unreserved escapes byte-identical.

Full evidence:
.superpowers/sdd/2026-08-14-wpadmin-edge-gate/task-4-normalize-report.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-14 09:09:35 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 18750861b4
commit 8a8d9c5fe3
3 changed files with 378 additions and 20 deletions
+177
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ ALLOWLIST = ('/admin-ajax.php', '/admin-post.php',
EXCLUSIONS = ('!wp_admin_allowed', '!wp_admin_asset', '!has_wp_logged_in',
'!wp_gate_exempt', '!is_local', '!is_trusted_ip', '!is_whitelisted')
# The normalizer set, in the order it MUST render. Decoding has to precede the
# path walkers or "%2e%2e" is decoded to ".." only after path-strip-dotdot has
# already run, leaving the ".." unresolved -- measured against real HAProxy
# 3.0.11, both orders side by side.
NORMALIZERS = ('percent-to-uppercase',
'percent-decode-unreserved',
'path-merge-slashes',
'path-strip-dot',
'path-strip-dotdot full')
def render_listener():
return haproxy_manager.template_env.get_template('hap_listener.tpl').render(
@@ -57,6 +67,24 @@ def render_listener():
)
def render_header():
return haproxy_manager.template_env.get_template('hap_header.tpl').render(
cluster_secret=None,
)
def rule_lines(cfg, needle):
"""Non-comment config lines containing `needle`.
Every assertion about a RULE must be scoped this way. This file's
surrounding comment blocks quote the ACL names and even whole rules, so a
bare `assertIn` over the rendered config passes just as happily when the
rule has been deleted and only its explanation remains.
"""
return [ln.strip() for ln in cfg.split('\n')
if needle in ln and not ln.strip().startswith('#')]
class WpAdminGate(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
@@ -176,6 +204,155 @@ class WpAdminGate(unittest.TestCase):
def test_wp_admin_safe_path_acl_declared(self):
self.assertRegex(self.cfg, r'acl\s+wp_admin_safe_path\s+path_reg')
def test_unsafe_wp_admin_path_is_denied_not_passed_through(self):
"""wp_admin_safe_path being a POSITIVE condition on the redirect means
a path that fails it is simply not redirected -- which used to mean it
fell through to the backend UNGATED, i.e. exactly the PHP-booting
request the gate exists to stop. Normalisation removes the "//"
spelling of that, but not "/\\", so the fall-through must be closed
with an explicit deny rather than left implicit.
"""
denies = rule_lines(self.cfg, '!wp_admin_safe_path')
self.assertTrue(denies,
'no rule denies a wp-admin path that fails wp_admin_safe_path')
self.assertTrue(any(d.startswith('http-request deny') for d in denies),
'the !wp_admin_safe_path rule must be a deny: %r' % denies)
class UriNormalisation(unittest.TestCase):
"""The gate matches the RAW path; the backend normalises and decodes it.
Every gap between those is a bypass -- five were found this way. These
tests pin the normalisation that closes the gap as a class.
NOTE: these are config-TEXT assertions. They are necessary but NOT
sufficient: the previous revision of this file passed while five live
bypasses shipped. The real evidence is the behavioural matrix run against
real haproxy 3.0.11 with raw sockets -- see
.superpowers/sdd/2026-08-14-wpadmin-edge-gate/task-4-normalize-report.md.
"""
def setUp(self):
self.cfg = render_listener()
self.header = render_header()
def test_experimental_directives_exposed_in_global(self):
"""normalize-uri is experimental in 3.0; without this HAProxy does not
start at all (ALERT, exit 1), which crash-loops the container.
"""
self.assertTrue(
[ln for ln in self.header.split('\n')
if ln.strip() == 'expose-experimental-directives'],
'expose-experimental-directives missing from the global section')
def test_all_normalizers_render(self):
for norm in NORMALIZERS:
with self.subTest(normalizer=norm):
self.assertTrue(
rule_lines(self.cfg, 'normalize-uri ' + norm),
'missing normalizer: ' + norm)
def test_normalizer_order_decode_before_path_walkers(self):
"""Reverse this order and /wp-admin/js/%2e%2e/plugins.php reaches the
ACLs as /wp-admin/js/../plugins.php -- decoded but unresolved.
"""
rendered = [ln for ln in self.cfg.split('\n')
if ln.strip().startswith('http-request normalize-uri')]
names = [ln.strip().split('normalize-uri ', 1)[1] for ln in rendered]
self.assertEqual(names, list(NORMALIZERS))
def test_normalisation_precedes_every_path_based_rule(self):
"""A normalizer placed after a path rule normalises nothing for it."""
last_norm = max(self.cfg.index('http-request normalize-uri ' + n)
for n in NORMALIZERS)
for marker in ('acl is_health_check', 'acl wp_login_path',
'acl xmlrpc_path', 'acl wp_batch_path',
'acl wp_admin_path', 'http-request set-path'):
with self.subTest(rule=marker):
self.assertLess(last_norm, self.cfg.index(marker),
marker + ' renders before URI normalisation')
def test_query_sort_by_name_is_not_enabled(self):
"""It reorders query parameters, breaking anything that signs or caches
on the exact query string, and buys this gate nothing (every rule here
matches on `path`, which excludes the query).
"""
self.assertFalse(rule_lines(self.cfg, 'normalize-uri query-sort-by-name'))
def test_dotdot_normalizer_uses_full(self):
"""Without "full", ".." segments that climb above the root are left in
place and /../../wp-admin/plugins.php survives -- measured.
"""
lines = rule_lines(self.cfg, 'normalize-uri path-strip-dotdot')
self.assertTrue(lines)
for ln in lines:
self.assertTrue(ln.endswith('path-strip-dotdot full'), ln)
def test_encoded_separator_on_wp_admin_is_denied(self):
"""percent-decode-unreserved deliberately leaves %2F encoded ("/" is
reserved), but OpenLiteSpeed decodes it and serves the file --
/wp-admin%2Fplugins.php was measured booting PHP on the OLS tier while
matching no wp-admin ACL. Normalisation cannot close this; it needs its
own rule.
"""
denies = [ln for ln in rule_lines(self.cfg, 'path_has_encoded_sep')
if ln.startswith('http-request deny')]
self.assertTrue(denies, 'no deny rule for encoded separators')
acl = rule_lines(self.cfg, 'acl path_has_encoded_sep')
self.assertTrue(acl)
self.assertIn('%2f', acl[0].lower())
def test_encoded_separator_deny_is_scoped_to_wp_admin(self):
"""A blanket "deny any %2F in any path" would break non-WordPress
customer apps that legitimately pass an encoded slash in a path
parameter. The deny must be conditioned on the path mentioning
wp-admin.
"""
denies = [ln for ln in rule_lines(self.cfg, 'path_has_encoded_sep')
if ln.startswith('http-request deny')]
for d in denies:
self.assertIn('wp_admin_word', d)
def test_encoded_separator_deny_honors_the_same_whitelist(self):
denies = [ln for ln in rule_lines(self.cfg, 'path_has_encoded_sep')
if ln.startswith('http-request deny')]
for d in denies:
for excl in ('!has_wp_logged_in', '!wp_gate_exempt', '!is_local',
'!is_trusted_ip', '!is_whitelisted'):
with self.subTest(rule=d, exclusion=excl):
self.assertIn(excl, d)
def test_encoded_separator_acl_matches_a_substring_not_a_prefix(self):
"""/blog%2Fwp-admin/plugins.php hides the separator BEFORE "wp-admin",
where an anchored pattern never matches, and OLS still resolves it.
"""
acl = rule_lines(self.cfg, 'acl path_has_encoded_sep')[0]
self.assertIn('-m sub', acl)
def test_wp_admin_asset_bypass_cannot_cover_a_php_entrypoint(self):
"""The asset bypass anchored its prefix but not its suffix, so
/wp-admin/css/../plugins.php took it and the backend then resolved
".." and booted plugins.php. path-strip-dotdot is the real fix; this
keeps the bypass structurally incapable of covering PHP.
"""
acl = rule_lines(self.cfg, 'acl wp_admin_asset')[0]
self.assertIn('.php', acl,
'wp_admin_asset must exclude .php explicitly')
def test_case_insensitive_acl_and_regsub_are_kept_in_sync(self):
"""A case-insensitive wp_admin_path with a case-sensitive regsub is an
INFINITE REDIRECT LOOP: regsub finds no "/wp-admin/" in
"/WP-ADMIN/plugins.php", returns `path` unchanged, and the Location
then points at the request's own URL.
"""
acl = rule_lines(self.cfg, 'acl wp_admin_path')[0]
setvar = rule_lines(self.cfg, 'set-var(txn.wp_login_url)')[0]
acl_ci = bool(re.search(r'path_reg\s+-i\s', acl))
regsub_ci = bool(re.search(r'regsub\([^)]*,\s*i\)', setvar))
self.assertEqual(
acl_ci, regsub_ci,
'wp_admin_path case-sensitivity (%s) and regsub flags (%s) disagree'
% (acl, setvar))
if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main(verbosity=2)
+15
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ global
# SSL and Performance
tune.ssl.default-dh-param 2048
# Required by the `http-request normalize-uri` chain at the top of the
# `web` frontend (hap_listener.tpl). normalize-uri is still flagged
# EXPERIMENTAL in HAProxy 3.0, and HAProxy REFUSES TO START without this
# opt-in -- not a warning, a fatal:
# [ALERT] config : parsing [...] : 'normalize-uri' action is
# experimental, must be allowed via a global
# 'expose-experimental-directives'
# (verified against real haproxy 3.0.11-9e587df: `haproxy -c` exits 1).
# So this line and the normalize-uri rules must be added/removed together;
# dropping this one alone crash-loops every container on the fleet.
#
# This exposes ONLY the experimental directives that are actually used --
# it does not change the behaviour of anything else in this file.
expose-experimental-directives
# HTTP/3 over QUIC. The Debian haproxy package is built against system
# OpenSSL via the compatibility shim (USE_QUIC_OPENSSL_COMPAT), which is
# not a native QUIC TLS stack. HAProxy therefore rejects `quic*@` binds
+186 -20
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,83 @@ frontend web
# Capture Host header so it appears in httplog output (in %hr field)
http-request capture req.hdr(Host) len 64
# --- URI normalisation (MUST be the first path-touching block here) ---
# Every path-based control in this frontend (the ACME health-check bypass,
# wp-login, xmlrpc, the wp-json/batch virtual patch, the wp-admin gate, the
# blocked-IP and suspension set-path rules, and everything Coraza inspects)
# matched the RAW request-target while the backend NORMALISED and DECODED
# it before resolving a file. Every gap between those two behaviours is a
# bypass, and each one had to be patched individually. Five were found in
# the wp-admin gate alone, all the same class:
#
# //wp-admin/plugins.php raw path starts "//" -> the safe-path
# guard failed -> request fell through
# ungated, backend served it
# /wp-admin/css/../plugins.php matched the css/js/images asset
# bypass; backend resolved ".." and
# booted plugins.php
# /wp-admin/js/%2e%2e/plugins.php same, with the ".." percent-encoded
# /wp%2Dadmin/plugins.php "wp-admin" spelled with %2D never
# matched any wp-admin ACL at all
# /wp-admin%2Fplugins.php encoded separator; see the dedicated
# rule in the wp-admin gate below
#
# Rather than keep bolting a counter-pattern onto each rule, normalise the
# URI once, here, so every rule below matches the SAME string the backend
# will resolve. HAProxy rewrites the request-target in place, so the
# backend receives the normalised form too.
#
# ORDER IS LOAD-BEARING and was determined empirically against real
# haproxy 3.0.11, not from the docs. The decoders must run BEFORE the path
# walkers: with the reverse order, /wp-admin/js/%2e%2e/plugins.php ends up
# as /wp-admin/js/../plugins.php -- decoded, but the ".." left unresolved,
# because path-strip-dotdot had already run by the time the "%2e%2e"
# became "..". Verified both directions side by side.
#
# percent-to-uppercase %2f -> %2F. Canonicalises the spelling of
# whatever stays encoded, so downstream rules
# need one case of each escape, not two.
# percent-decode-unreserved Decodes ONLY RFC 3986 unreserved chars
# (A-Za-z0-9-._~). This is what turns %2e%2e
# into .. and wp%2Dadmin into wp-admin.
# Reserved escapes are deliberately left
# alone -- %2F in particular, which is why
# the wp-admin gate needs its own encoded-
# slash rule (see below).
# path-merge-slashes //x -> /x. Also removes the entire class of
# "leading // defeats an anchored regex".
# path-strip-dot /a/./b -> /a/b.
# path-strip-dotdot full /a/b/../c -> /a/c. "full" additionally
# resolves ".." segments that would climb
# above the root (/../../wp-admin/x.php ->
# /wp-admin/x.php); without "full" HAProxy
# leaves those in place and the vector
# survives -- measured, both forms tested.
#
# DELIBERATELY NOT ENABLED: query-sort-by-name. It reorders query-string
# parameters, which silently breaks anything that signs or caches on the
# exact query string (signed asset URLs, HMAC'd callbacks, CDN cache
# keys). It buys this gate nothing -- every rule here matches on `path`,
# which excludes the query string.
#
# BLAST RADIUS: this block applies to EVERY request for EVERY site on
# EVERY tier, so the decoding was kept minimal on purpose.
# percent-decode-unreserved touches only unreserved characters, so
# %20 (space), %2B, %C3%A9 and friends pass through byte-identical --
# verified. The only rewrite a normal site can notice is %7E -> ~ , which
# RFC 3986 defines as the same URI, plus the merge/dot resolution the
# backend would have performed anyway.
#
# normalize-uri is EXPERIMENTAL in 3.0 and requires
# `expose-experimental-directives` in the global section
# (hap_header.tpl). Without it HAProxy does not start. Remove one and you
# must remove the other.
http-request normalize-uri percent-to-uppercase
http-request normalize-uri percent-decode-unreserved
http-request normalize-uri path-merge-slashes
http-request normalize-uri path-strip-dot
http-request normalize-uri path-strip-dotdot full
# --- Trusted-proxy gate (MUST precede real-IP resolution below) ---
# CF-Connecting-IP / X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For are client-supplied. Any
# peer that is not a known reverse proxy gets them stripped, so the
@@ -291,33 +368,68 @@ frontend web
# via /etc/haproxy/wpadmin_gate_exempt.list (operator-managed, seeded
# empty by start-up.sh) for sites where a plugin legitimately serves
# unauthenticated visitors from a /wp-admin/ URL outside this allowlist.
# EVERY ACL BELOW MATCHES THE NORMALISED PATH. The normalize-uri chain at
# the top of this frontend has already merged duplicate slashes, resolved
# "." / ".." segments (including percent-encoded ones) and decoded
# unreserved escapes by the time these run, so these patterns only have to
# describe the ONE canonical spelling the backend will resolve -- they do
# not have to anticipate every encoding of it. That is the whole point of
# the normalisation block; do not "harden" these regexes by re-adding
# encoding variants, fix the normalisation instead.
#
# wp_admin_safe_path guards against an OPEN REDIRECT this gate would
# otherwise introduce. The redirect target below is built by rewriting
# `path` with regsub -- regsub only replaces the matched substring, so
# everything BEFORE the matched "/wp-admin/" survives untouched in the
# output. `path` is not guaranteed to be a clean site-relative string;
# three concrete requests turn that survival into an off-site
# `Location:` header (verified against real HAProxy semantics):
# `Location:` header:
# //evil.example.com/wp-admin/x.php -> //evil.example.com/wp-login.php
# (protocol-relative -- browsers resolve "//host/path" to
# "https://host/path", so this redirects off-site with no scheme
# needed)
# needed). NOW NEUTRALISED UPSTREAM: path-merge-slashes rewrites this
# to /evil.example.com/wp-admin/x.php before any ACL sees it, so the
# Location becomes the same-origin /evil.example.com/wp-login.php.
# Verified live.
# /\evil.example.com/wp-admin/x.php -> /\evil.example.com/wp-login.php
# (browsers normalise a leading "/\" the same as "//")
# (browsers normalise a leading "/\" the same as "//"). STILL LIVE
# after normalisation -- a backslash is not a slash, so no normalizer
# touches it. This ACL is the only thing that stops it.
# https://evil.example.com/wp-admin/x.php -> https://evil.example.com/wp-login.php
# (RFC 7230 absolute-form request targets can make HAProxy's `path`
# fetch return a full URI, not just the path component)
# None of these vectors reach WordPress today -- this gate is what would
# newly expose them as a phishing primitive on every customer domain on
# the fleet. wp_admin_safe_path requires a well-formed absolute path
# (leading "/" not followed by another "/" or a backslash) and is a
# POSITIVE condition on the redirect rule, not a negation: a path that
# fails it simply is not redirected and falls through to the backend --
# today's (pre-gate) behavior, so failing the check is never a
# regression, only a missed redirect on a pathological input. DO NOT
# remove this ACL as redundant with wp_admin_path -- wp_admin_path's
# `path_reg (^|/)wp-admin/` happily matches all three vectors above.
acl wp_admin_path path_reg (^|/)wp-admin/
# fetch return a full URI, not just the path component). HAProxy's own
# H1 parser answers 400 on this frontend; this ACL is the backstop.
# So wp_admin_safe_path is NOT redundant with the normalisation and must
# not be deleted as such -- one of its three vectors survives normalisation
# untouched.
#
# It is used TWO ways, and the pair matters:
# - as a POSITIVE condition on the redirect, so a pathological path can
# never produce a `Location:` header at all; and
# - as an explicit deny, so such a path is not merely un-redirected.
# The deny is what closes the failure mode the positive-condition form
# introduced on its own: "not redirected" used to mean "falls through to
# the backend UNGATED", i.e. the exact PHP-booting request this gate
# exists to stop, reachable by prefixing "//" (that specific spelling is
# now normalised away, but "/\" is not). Post-normalisation the only
# paths that reach the deny are "/\..." ones, which cannot resolve to a
# real file on any tier, so nothing legitimate is denied.
# -i (case-insensitive) and the matching ",i" flag on the regsub below are
# a PAIR -- adding one without the other produces an infinite redirect
# loop, because a case-sensitive regsub finds no "/wp-admin/" in
# "/WP-ADMIN/plugins.php", returns `path` UNCHANGED, and the Location then
# points at the request's own URL. Verified live that the pair is correct:
# /WP-ADMIN/plugins.php -> /wp-login.php and /blog/WP-Admin/plugins.php ->
# /blog/wp-login.php.
#
# On this fleet's Linux backends /WP-ADMIN/plugins.php 404s without booting
# PHP, so this is hardening rather than a live-bypass fix; it matters if a
# docroot ever sits on a case-insensitive mount, where that same request
# WOULD boot PHP. The cost is that a site with a real directory literally
# named e.g. /docs/WP-Admin/ now gets gated -- the same false positive the
# lowercase pattern already has, which is what the per-site exempt list
# exists to resolve.
acl wp_admin_path path_reg -i (^|/)wp-admin/
# Four literal backslashes here is NOT a typo. HAProxy's config-line word
# parser treats backslash as its OWN escape character before the value
# ever reaches the regex engine: "\\" (two backslashes) in the config
@@ -326,14 +438,68 @@ frontend web
# "missing terminating ] for character class" -- verified against real
# HAProxy 3.0.11. Four backslashes ("\\\\") collapse to two ("\\"),
# which PCRE then reads as a single escaped-backslash class member --
# the intended "reject a literal backslash" semantics. Confirmed live:
# this form accepts /wp-admin/... and /blog/wp-admin/... while rejecting
# both //host/wp-admin/... and /\host/wp-admin/....
# the intended "reject a literal backslash" semantics.
acl wp_admin_safe_path path_reg ^/[^/\\\\]
acl wp_admin_allowed path_end /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php /wp-admin/admin-post.php /wp-admin/load-styles.php /wp-admin/load-scripts.php
acl wp_admin_asset path_reg (^|/)wp-admin/(css|js|images)/
# The (?!.*\.php) lookahead is DEFENCE IN DEPTH, not the primary fix. This
# ACL grants an un-gated bypass to everything under wp-admin/css|js|images,
# and it used to anchor its prefix but not its suffix, so
# /wp-admin/css/../plugins.php took the bypass and the backend then
# resolved ".." and booted plugins.php. path-strip-dotdot now rewrites that
# to /wp-admin/plugins.php before this ACL runs, which is the real fix; the
# lookahead additionally makes the bypass structurally incapable of
# covering a PHP entrypoint even if a future encoding trick survives
# normalisation. It excludes ".php" ONLY -- no static asset contains that
# substring, so it cannot cause the silent "login page renders unstyled"
# regression that an extension allowlist would risk. Requires PCRE2, which
# both the Debian (deployed) and Alpine haproxy builds have (+PCRE2).
acl wp_admin_asset path_reg (^|/)wp-admin/(css|js|images)/(?!.*\.php).*$
acl wp_gate_exempt hdr(host),lower -f /etc/haproxy/wpadmin_gate_exempt.list
http-request set-var(txn.wp_login_url) path,regsub(/wp-admin/.*,/wp-login.php) if wp_admin_path
# ENCODED SEPARATOR. percent-decode-unreserved deliberately does NOT decode
# %2F -- "/" is a reserved character, and decoding it in the normalizer
# would change the path's structure (it would invent new segments), which
# is precisely why HAProxy refuses to. But OpenLiteSpeed DOES decode it and
# then serves the file: /wp-admin%2Fplugins.php was measured returning 302
# from a real WordPress site on the OLS tier, i.e. full PHP boot, while
# matching none of the ACLs above. Apache returns 404 for the same request
# (AllowEncodedSlashes Off), so this is an OLS-tier defect -- and OLS is the
# tier currently saturating.
#
# DENY, not "treat it as a wp-admin path and redirect". Two reasons:
# 1. The redirect target is computed by regsub(/wp-admin/.*) which finds
# no "/wp-admin/" in "/wp-admin%2Fplugins.php", so `path` would come
# back UNCHANGED and the Location would point at the request's own
# URL -- an infinite redirect loop, not a gate.
# 2. Nothing legitimate emits it. A path segment cannot contain a literal
# "/", so %2F inside a path is always either a probe or a proxy-
# confusion attempt, and the Apache tier has been 404ing it all along,
# so no site on the fleet can depend on it.
#
# SCOPED to paths that mention wp-admin, not all paths. A blanket "deny any
# %2F in any path" would also hit REST/API-style routes on non-WordPress
# customer apps that legitimately pass an encoded slash inside a path
# parameter. Scoping keeps the blast radius inside the attack surface this
# gate owns.
#
# Matching is on the SUBSTRING, not an anchored pattern, on purpose:
# /blog%2Fwp-admin/plugins.php hides the separator BEFORE "wp-admin", where
# an anchored (^|/)wp-admin/ never matches, and OLS still resolves it to
# /blog/wp-admin/plugins.php. Substring matching catches the separator
# wherever it is. percent-to-uppercase has already folded %2f into %2F;
# the -i is belt and braces so this rule stands on its own if the
# normalizer is ever reordered.
#
# %5C (encoded backslash) is denied on the same terms. On this fleet's
# Linux backends a backslash is an ordinary filename character, so
# /wp-admin%5Cplugins.php 404s rather than booting PHP -- measured, it is
# not a live bypass today. It is included because it is the same
# encoded-separator trick against a backend that happens to treat "\" as
# one, it costs nothing, and no legitimate path contains it.
acl wp_admin_word path -i -m sub wp-admin
acl path_has_encoded_sep path -i -m sub %2f %5c
http-request deny deny_status 403 if wp_admin_word path_has_encoded_sep !has_wp_logged_in !wp_gate_exempt !is_local !is_trusted_ip !is_whitelisted
http-request deny deny_status 403 if wp_admin_path !wp_admin_safe_path !has_wp_logged_in !wp_gate_exempt !is_local !is_trusted_ip !is_whitelisted
http-request set-var(txn.wp_login_url) path,regsub(/wp-admin/.*,/wp-login.php,i) if wp_admin_path
http-request redirect code 302 location %[var(txn.wp_login_url)]?redirect_to=%[path,url_enc] if wp_admin_path wp_admin_safe_path !wp_admin_allowed !wp_admin_asset !has_wp_logged_in !wp_gate_exempt !is_local !is_trusted_ip !is_whitelisted
# IP blocking using map file (manual blocks only)