c8d16b69901d6b27f24503af12b381819bf1e4cc
6
Commits
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c8d16b6990 |
fix(ip-blocking): the runtime map fast path has never once run
add_ip_to_runtime_map() and remove_ip_from_runtime_map() sent `add map #0 <ip> 1` / `del map #0 <ip>` to /tmp/haproxy-cli and returned True whenever socat exited 0. Neither command has ever worked, on any deployment, for the entire life of the feature -- while logging "Added IP x to runtime map" every single time. Two independent defects: * NO `@1` PREFIX. /tmp/haproxy-cli is HAProxy's MASTER CLI socket; map commands are worker commands. Captured verbatim on whp01: $ echo "add map #0 192.0.2.77 1" | socat stdio /tmp/haproxy-cli Unknown command: 'add', but maybe one of the following ones is a better match: @!<pid> : send a command to the <pid> process ... $ echo $? 0 socat exits 0 on the rejection, so `result.returncode == 0` was true. Same silence PR #7 fixed on the `show table` path. * `#0` IS NOT A VALID MAP ID. Ids are assigned at config-parse time and move on every config regeneration -- `@1 show map` on whp01 reports blocked_ips.map as 37 and trusted_ips.map as 10. There is no id 0. Hardcoding any number is wrong; the map is referenced by FILE PATH, which is what haproxy.cfg itself names in map_ip(/etc/haproxy/blocked_ips.map,0). And a third silence, which is why a response-body check alone is not enough here: `@1 add map #0 <ip> 1` returns an EMPTY body, exit 0, and adds nothing to any map -- while `@1 del map #0 <ip>` and `@1 show map #0` both answer `Unknown map identifier.`. On the add path the reply is byte-for-byte identical to success. Only reading the entry back can tell them apart. IP blocking itself was never broken: update_blocked_ips_map() rewrites /etc/haproxy/blocked_ips.map and the callers reload HAProxy, which re-reads it. That path is untouched and stays authoritative. What was broken is the no-reload fast path, plus every report that it had worked. * haproxy_manager.py: both functions send `@1 add|del map /etc/haproxy/blocked_ips.map <ip> [1]` and READ THE ENTRY BACK with `get map` before returning True. runtime_map_lookup()/runtime_map_keys() are the read-back primitives. `sync_blocked_ips` loses `clear map #0` (which the master socket rejected just as loudly and just as invisibly) and verifies the whole set with one `show map` instead of counting commands that did not visibly complain; it answers 207 + `runtime_map_synced: false` when the runtime map does not match the database. * haproxy_cli() grows `expect_empty=True` for MUTATING commands: HAProxy answers those with nothing on success, so an empty body is the success and ANY non-empty body is a rejection. That is stricter than the marker list on purpose -- markers only recognise rejections someone has already seen, and it catches `'add map' expects three parameters ...`, which matches nothing. HaproxyCliError carries `.responses` so `del map` answering `Key not found.` (the requested end state) is told apart from a real failure without regex. * The four callers capture the boolean instead of discarding it and report `runtime_map_updated` / `runtime_map_failures` in the API response and the operation log. A runtime failure degrades to "enforced on the reload that already happens two lines later" -- never to an unblocked IP, never to a 500. * scripts/test-runtime-map-contract.py (offline, 26 tests) asserts the bytes on the wire (`@1` first, map by path, value `1`), classifies every captured response, and scans the repo's Python string literals and shell/template code lines for `#<id>` map references -- comments may describe the old form, code may not use it. Verified to fail on each defect reintroduced separately: no `@1` (3 failures), `#0` (4), no read-back (2), trust-the- reply (1). * The `#0` form is also corrected in IP_BLOCKING_API.md, MIGRATION_GUIDE.md and the comment in templates/hap_listener.tpl -- where every copy of it additionally omitted the `1`, which `-m int gt 0` needs to match. The only template change is a comment; `haproxy -c` on the live rendered config with it applied is clean (HAProxy 3.0.11, warnings unchanged). Verified on whp01 against the running container (docker cp + SIGHUP, no recreate). Before: both functions returned True and logged success while `@1 get map` answered `found=no` and entry_cnt stayed at 263. After: the fixed add lands with value "1" and the remove takes it out again; the old command form is now classified as a failure; a `#0` map reference returns False via the read-back. End to end through the API, `runtime_map_updated: true`, and /api/blocked-ips/sync -- which used to be a no-op reporting a full sync -- reports 264/264 verified present. The runtime path was isolated from the reload that normally follows it: with NO map-file write and NO reload (same haproxy worker pid throughout), adding 100.123.171.78 (whp01's own netbird overlay address -- not a customer IP, not in the is_local ranges) to the runtime map alone flipped a live site from HTTP 200 to 403, and removing it flipped it back to 200. That is the fast path working for the first time. All test IPs were removed afterwards: 0 rows in blocked_ips, 0 lines in the map file, entry_cnt back to 263. Six customer sites, the panel /health and `haproxy -c` are byte-identical to the baseline taken before the change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b6a62e7f9f |
fix(security-stats): stop reporting counters the stick tables never stored
/api/security/stats and scripts/show-tarpit-ips.sh reported "Scan Count",
"offense count" and BLOCKED/TARPITTED status parsed from gpc0/gpc1. No stick
table in this repo has ever stored a general-purpose counter -- the `web` table
stores conn_cur, conn_rate(10s), http_req_rate(10s), http_err_rate(30s), and
the two brute-force tables store http_req_rate(60s). Every one of those figures
was fabricated, and an operator was making decisions on them.
Three independent silences kept it alive:
* `int(parts[3])` on a positional split hit `exp=368842`, raised ValueError,
and the loop `continue`d -- so the endpoint always answered
`active_threats: 0` with an empty list. Live on whp01 it also reported
parts[0], the `0x...:` allocation pointer, as the source IP.
* The command was sent to /tmp/haproxy-cli WITHOUT the `@1` worker prefix.
That is the MASTER CLI socket, which answers "Unknown command: 'show' ..."
-- and socat still exits 0, so the `returncode != 0` guard never fired.
`total_tracked_ips` was the line count of that help text (8) while the real
table held 388 entries.
* The shell consumers wrote `gpc0=${gpc0:-0}`, rendering a field that does
not exist as a confident zero.
Report what the tables actually store, rather than adding gpc counters to make
the old semantics real. Adding them would mean editing hap_listener.tpl -- the
one change here with a silent-total-outage failure mode -- to rebuild
enforcement history that the edge access log (shipped 2026.08.8, on the host at
/var/log/haproxy.log) already records per request, with status codes,
termination states and request references the stick table could never hold.
* haproxy_manager.py: STICK_TABLE_FIELD_CONTRACT names what each table
stores. haproxy_cli() sends worker commands with `@1`, falls back to the
bare form for a plain stats socket, and inspects the RESPONSE BODY because
socat's exit status is worthless here. parse_stick_table_entry() reads
name=value / name(window_ms)=value pairs by NAME, never by position.
read_stick_table() RAISES -- naming the field -- when a row is missing a
contract field, instead of defaulting it to 0.
* /api/security/stats returns the four real counters with their windows, the
true `used:` count, and no invented threat_level/blocked/offense_count.
Fewer numbers, all of them real.
* scripts/show-edge-ip-rates.sh replaces the fabricated report; the four
expected fields are declared once as EXPECTED_FIELDS and drive the parser.
show-tarpit-ips.sh becomes a shim that explains why its numbers are gone
and points at where tarpit events actually live.
* monitor-attacks.sh loses fourteen fabricated "threat" categories and a
composite threat score, all permanently zero; its access-log section now
says the log is on the host instead of silently printing nothing.
* haproxy_tarpit_config.txt -- the never-shipped design sketch these counters
were copied from -- gets a NOT IMPLEMENTED banner.
* scripts/test-stick-table-contract.py (offline, 21 tests) holds the
templates' `store` clauses, STICK_TABLE_FIELD_CONTRACT and every consumer
to each other, and asserts each loud-failure path against the real captured
responses. Template and consumers can no longer drift apart quietly.
No template is touched, so haproxy.cfg is unchanged.
Verified on whp01: total_tracked_ips now tracks `used:` exactly (511 vs the
table's 511, was 8 vs 388), and per-IP values match `show table web key <ip>`
field for field. haproxy PIDs unmoved, `haproxy -c` warnings unchanged, five
customer sites HTTP 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1ff51da6f0 |
sanitize public mirror: drop personal IP and infra/customer hostnames
- trusted_ips.{list,map}: replace home IP with 127.0.0.1 + usage notes
- skill: resolve deploy host from gitignored target-host.local, ask if unset
(no hardcoded server FQDN); customer host in WAF test -> <live-vhost>
- README / coraza README: registry FQDN in run examples -> placeholder
- 403 block page: drop hardcoded support link -> contact provider support
- CLAUDE.md: note whitelist files ship without real IPs
- .gitignore: ignore target-host.local and *.local
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fbb94e6dc3 |
Update CLAUDE.md with HAProxy hardening and AI log monitor docs
Documents HAProxy health checks, watchdog, rate limiting, trusted IP whitelist, timeout hardening, HTTP/2 protection, and the AI-powered log monitor system with two-tier analysis, auto-remediation, and notification support. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f3569402d3 |
Fix HAProxy 3.0 stick-table and ACL syntax errors
HAProxy Manager Build and Push / Build-and-Push (push) Successful in 52s
- Remove duplicate http_err_rate entries (only one period allowed) - Simplify to single http_err_rate(10s) for burst detection - Fix sc0_http_err_rate ACL syntax (remove period argument) - Replace time-based sustained/persistent attack detection with counter-based thresholds - Use gpc0 counter thresholds for sustained (>=15) and persistent (>=30) attack detection This resolves the configuration errors in HAProxy 3.0.11 while maintaining effective exploit scanning protection through counter-based detection. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ca37a68255 |
Add IP blocking functionality to HAProxy Manager
HAProxy Manager Build and Push / Build-and-Push (push) Successful in 1m1s
- Add blocked_ips database table to store blocked IP addresses - Implement API endpoints for IP blocking management: - GET /api/blocked-ips: List all blocked IPs - POST /api/blocked-ips: Block an IP address - DELETE /api/blocked-ips: Unblock an IP address - Update HAProxy configuration generation to include blocked IP ACLs - Create blocked IP page template for denied access - Add comprehensive API documentation for WHP integration - Include test script for IP blocking functionality - Update .gitignore with Python patterns - Add CLAUDE.md for codebase documentation 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |