generate_config() wrote /etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg and only then called
reload_haproxy_safely(), which called create_backup(). The "backup" was
therefore a copy of the config that had just been written, so on a validation
failure restore_backup() restored the identical broken bytes: the advertised
rollback was a no-op and a fatal haproxy.cfg stayed on disk, where
start_haproxy() refuses to launch. Same shape as the June 2026 incident where
a missing template produced a fatal config and took an edge down.
Reproduced end to end before the fix (invalid config generated -> "Backups
created successfully" -> "Backups restored successfully" -> haproxy.cfg on
disk still invalid, `haproxy -c` rc=1).
Changes:
* create_backup() is now called by generate_config() BEFORE the first write,
which also covers blocked_ips.map (rewritten early in generate_config) and
coraza-spoe.cfg - both previously written before the backup and, for the
SPOE file, never backed up at all even though `haproxy -c` parses it.
* create_backup() refuses to promote a config HAProxy already rejects, so a
broken file on disk cannot overwrite a known-good backup ("rollback" must
not mean "restore a different broken config"). It returns (ok, status) so
the caller knows whether a rollback target exists.
* promote_current_config_to_backup() records the config as known-good only
after it has validated AND loaded, so a box whose first generation succeeded
has a rollback target immediately, and a config that never loaded is never
promoted.
* restore_backup() returns (restored, message) and distinguishes "no backup
available" from "restored". Every caller now surfaces the difference; a
failed rollback is logged CRITICAL and reported as ROLLBACK FAILED in the
API error message instead of silently looking like a successful recovery.
* reload_haproxy_safely(backup_status=...) no longer takes its own backup - it
runs after the write, where a backup is meaningless. Called without a status
it logs the contract violation rather than overwriting a good backup.
* validate_config_file() separates "config is invalid" from "validator could
not run" so a missing haproxy binary is not read as a bad config.
* Config writes are atomic (temp file + fsync + os.replace, mode preserved);
a truncated haproxy.cfg is as fatal as an invalid one. Removes the dead
temp_config_path variable whose comment claimed this already happened.
* Fast path: if the live config set is already byte-identical to the backup
(the normal case after a successful reload), skip the re-validation and the
copy, so this adds no `haproxy -c` latency to customer-facing API calls.
Tests: scripts/test-config-rollback.py - 17 self-contained stdlib-unittest
tests, no new dependencies (the repo has no Python test framework; the
existing scripts/test-*.sh are curl integration scripts). A stub `haproxy`
binary stands in for the validator. 12 of the 17 fail against the previous
code; every assertion was mutation-proven (9 mutations, each reddening only
the tests that cover it).
No template, QUIC or HTTP/3 changes.
468 lines
19 KiB
Python
Executable File
468 lines
19 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Regression tests for HAProxy config backup / rollback ordering.
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Why this file exists
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--------------------
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generate_config() used to write the new haproxy.cfg and only THEN call
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reload_haproxy_safely() -> create_backup(), so the "backup" was a copy of the
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config that had just been written. On a validation failure restore_backup()
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restored the identical broken bytes: the advertised rollback was a no-op and a
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fatal haproxy.cfg stayed on disk, where start_haproxy() refuses to launch.
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These tests pin the ordering invariant (backup predates the write) and the
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observable end-to-end behaviour (after a failed validation the file on disk is
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the previous working config and HAProxy will start with it).
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Running
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-------
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python3 scripts/test-config-rollback.py # tests the repo checkout
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HAPROXY_MANAGER_DIR=/some/other/tree \
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python3 scripts/test-config-rollback.py # tests another tree
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The repo has no Python test framework (scripts/test-*.sh are curl-based
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integration scripts against a running API), so this is a self-contained
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stdlib-unittest script - no pytest, no venv, no new dependencies beyond the
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application's own requirements.txt (Flask/Jinja2/psutil), which are already
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present in the container image.
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No HAProxy binary is required: a stub `haproxy` is put on PATH that mimics
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`haproxy -c -f <file>` by rejecting any config containing the token
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__BROKEN__, which is how the tests inject an invalid configuration.
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"""
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import os
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import sys
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import shutil
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import sqlite3
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import logging
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import tempfile
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import textwrap
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import unittest
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BROKEN_TOKEN = '__BROKEN__'
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MODULE_DIR = os.path.abspath(
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os.environ.get('HAPROXY_MANAGER_DIR',
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os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), '..'))
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)
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# haproxy_manager builds its Jinja2 environment from the relative path
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# Path('templates'), so it has to be imported with the module dir as cwd.
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os.chdir(MODULE_DIR)
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sys.path.insert(0, MODULE_DIR)
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# The module opens /var/log/haproxy-manager.log at import time via
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# logging.FileHandler. Redirect that one call so the suite runs unprivileged.
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_LOG_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='haproxy-mgr-test-logs-')
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_real_file_handler = logging.FileHandler
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logging.FileHandler = (
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lambda fn, *a, **kw: _real_file_handler(
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os.path.join(_LOG_DIR, os.path.basename(fn)), *a, **kw)
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)
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try:
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import haproxy_manager as hm
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except ImportError as exc: # pragma: no cover - environment problem, not a failure
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sys.stderr.write(
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f"SKIP: cannot import haproxy_manager ({exc}).\n"
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"Install the application requirements first: pip install -r requirements.txt\n"
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)
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raise SystemExit(77)
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finally:
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logging.FileHandler = _real_file_handler
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logging.getLogger('haproxy_manager').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)
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FAKE_HAPROXY = textwrap.dedent(f"""\
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#!/bin/sh
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# Test stub for the haproxy binary.
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# haproxy -c -f FILE -> exit 1 if FILE contains {BROKEN_TOKEN}, else 0
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# haproxy -W -S ... -f FILE (start) -> same validation, then exit 0
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cfg=""
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while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
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case "$1" in -f) cfg="$2"; shift ;; esac
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shift
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done
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if [ -n "$cfg" ] && grep -q '{BROKEN_TOKEN}' "$cfg" 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "[ALERT] parsing [$cfg:1] : unknown keyword '{BROKEN_TOKEN}'" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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exit 0
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""")
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class RollbackTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
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"""Base fixture: an isolated fake /etc/haproxy plus a stub haproxy binary."""
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def setUp(self):
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self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='haproxy-rollback-test-')
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self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, self.tmp, True)
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bindir = os.path.join(self.tmp, 'bin')
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os.makedirs(bindir)
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stub = os.path.join(bindir, 'haproxy')
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with open(stub, 'w') as fh:
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fh.write(FAKE_HAPROXY)
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os.chmod(stub, 0o755)
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self._old_path = os.environ['PATH']
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os.environ['PATH'] = bindir + os.pathsep + self._old_path
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self.addCleanup(lambda: os.environ.__setitem__('PATH', self._old_path))
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self.etc = os.path.join(self.tmp, 'etc')
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os.makedirs(self.etc)
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overrides = {
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'DB_FILE': os.path.join(self.etc, 'haproxy_config.db'),
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'HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'haproxy.cfg'),
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'HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'haproxy.cfg.backup'),
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'BLOCKED_IPS_MAP_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'blocked_ips.map'),
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'BLOCKED_IPS_MAP_BACKUP_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'blocked_ips.map.backup'),
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'CLUSTER_SECRET_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'cluster-secret'),
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'SSL_CERTS_DIR': os.path.join(self.etc, 'certs'),
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'HAPROXY_SOCKET_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'haproxy.sock'),
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# Added by the rollback fix; older trees do not have it.
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'CORAZA_SPOE_CONFIG_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'coraza-spoe.cfg'),
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'CORAZA_SPOE_BACKUP_PATH': os.path.join(self.etc, 'coraza-spoe.cfg.backup'),
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}
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self._saved = {}
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for name, value in overrides.items():
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self._saved[name] = getattr(hm, name, None)
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setattr(hm, name, value)
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self.addCleanup(self._restore_globals)
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os.makedirs(hm.SSL_CERTS_DIR)
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# log_operation() appends to a hardcoded /var/log path. Injecting `open`
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# into the module namespace shadows the builtin for that module only
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# (module globals are searched before builtins), so the real
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# log_operation code still runs.
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real_open = open
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log_dir = self.tmp
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def _redirecting_open(path, *args, **kwargs):
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if isinstance(path, str) and path.startswith('/var/log/'):
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path = os.path.join(log_dir, os.path.basename(path))
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return real_open(path, *args, **kwargs)
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hm.open = _redirecting_open
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self.addCleanup(lambda: hm.__dict__.pop('open', None))
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hm.init_db()
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def _restore_globals(self):
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for name, value in self._saved.items():
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if value is None:
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hm.__dict__.pop(name, None)
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else:
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setattr(hm, name, value)
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# -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------
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def add_domain(self, domain, backend_name, address='10.0.0.1'):
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with sqlite3.connect(hm.DB_FILE) as conn:
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cur = conn.cursor()
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cur.execute('INSERT INTO domains (domain, ssl_enabled) VALUES (?, 0)',
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(domain,))
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domain_id = cur.lastrowid
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cur.execute('INSERT INTO backends (name, domain_id) VALUES (?, ?)',
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(backend_name, domain_id))
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backend_id = cur.lastrowid
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cur.execute(
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'INSERT INTO backend_servers '
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'(backend_id, server_name, server_address, server_port) '
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'VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)',
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(backend_id, 'srv1', address, 8080))
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conn.commit()
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def block_ip(self, ip):
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with sqlite3.connect(hm.DB_FILE) as conn:
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conn.execute('INSERT INTO blocked_ips (ip_address, reason) VALUES (?, ?)',
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(ip, 'test'))
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conn.commit()
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def read(self, path):
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with open(path) as fh:
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return fh.read()
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def config_is_loadable(self):
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"""True if HAProxy would accept the config currently on disk."""
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import subprocess
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return subprocess.run(
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['haproxy', '-c', '-f', hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH],
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capture_output=True).returncode == 0
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def generate_good_config(self):
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self.add_domain('good.example.com', 'good_backend')
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hm.generate_config()
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self.assertTrue(self.config_is_loadable(),
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'fixture precondition: first generated config must be valid')
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return self.read(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH)
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def break_the_config(self):
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"""Queue a domain whose rendered backend the validator rejects."""
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self.add_domain('bad.example.com', BROKEN_TOKEN + '_backend', '10.0.0.2')
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class TestBackupOrdering(RollbackTestCase):
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def test_backup_is_taken_before_the_new_config_is_written(self):
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"""The ordering invariant, asserted directly.
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Whatever create_backup() sees on disk must be the OLD config; if the
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write happens first the backup is a copy of the new config and rollback
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is meaningless.
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"""
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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seen = {}
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real_create_backup = hm.create_backup
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def spy(*args, **kwargs):
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seen['config_on_disk'] = self.read(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH)
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return real_create_backup(*args, **kwargs)
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hm.create_backup = spy
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self.addCleanup(setattr, hm, 'create_backup', real_create_backup)
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self.add_domain('second.example.com', 'second_backend', '10.0.0.3')
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hm.generate_config()
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self.assertIn('config_on_disk', seen,
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'create_backup() was never called during generate_config()')
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self.assertEqual(
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seen['config_on_disk'], good,
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'create_backup() ran AFTER the new config was written - the backup '
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'is a copy of the new config, so rollback cannot undo anything')
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def test_backup_tracks_the_last_known_good_config(self):
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"""After a change that validated AND loaded, the backup is that config.
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The rollback target is "the last configuration HAProxy actually ran",
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not "the file that happened to be there last time".
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"""
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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self.add_domain('second.example.com', 'second_backend', '10.0.0.3')
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hm.generate_config()
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live = self.read(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH)
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self.assertNotEqual(live, good, 'fixture sanity: the new config should differ')
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH), live,
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'the successful config was not recorded as known-good')
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def test_backup_is_not_promoted_when_the_change_fails(self):
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"""A config that never loaded must not become the rollback target."""
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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self.break_the_config()
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with self.assertRaises(Exception):
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hm.generate_config()
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH), good,
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'a config that failed validation was promoted to backup')
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class TestRollbackEndToEnd(RollbackTestCase):
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def test_failed_validation_leaves_the_last_good_config_on_disk(self):
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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self.break_the_config()
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with self.assertRaises(Exception):
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hm.generate_config()
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on_disk = self.read(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH)
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self.assertNotIn(BROKEN_TOKEN, on_disk,
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'the rejected config is still on disk - rollback was a no-op')
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self.assertEqual(on_disk, good,
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'on-disk config is not byte-identical to the last good one')
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def test_haproxy_would_still_start_after_a_failed_change(self):
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"""The operational consequence: the edge can still come up."""
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self.generate_good_config()
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self.break_the_config()
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with self.assertRaises(Exception):
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hm.generate_config()
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self.assertTrue(self.config_is_loadable(),
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'HAProxy would refuse to start with the config left on disk')
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with self.assertLogs('haproxy_manager', level='INFO') as captured:
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hm.start_haproxy()
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self.assertTrue(
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any('HAProxy started successfully' in line for line in captured.output),
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f'start_haproxy() did not succeed after rollback: {captured.output}')
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def test_blocked_ips_map_is_rolled_back_too(self):
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"""generate_config() rewrites the map file before writing haproxy.cfg."""
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self.block_ip('192.0.2.10')
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self.generate_good_config()
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good_map = self.read(hm.BLOCKED_IPS_MAP_PATH)
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self.block_ip('198.51.100.20')
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self.break_the_config()
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with self.assertRaises(Exception):
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hm.generate_config()
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.BLOCKED_IPS_MAP_PATH), good_map,
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'blocked IPs map was not rolled back with the config')
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def test_first_run_failure_reports_that_rollback_was_impossible(self):
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"""No prior config: there is nothing to restore, and that must be said.
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A missing backup must never be reported as a successful restore, and it
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must never be turned into "restore an empty file".
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"""
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self.break_the_config()
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with self.assertRaises(Exception) as ctx:
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hm.generate_config()
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self.assertIn('ROLLBACK FAILED', str(ctx.exception),
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'a failed change with no backup was not reported as such')
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self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH),
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'a backup was fabricated from the broken config')
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# The broken config is deliberately left in place: start_haproxy() can
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# then detect it and try to regenerate. It must not be blanked.
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self.assertGreater(os.path.getsize(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH), 0,
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'config file was emptied instead of left for diagnosis')
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class TestBackupPrimitives(RollbackTestCase):
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def test_restore_backup_distinguishes_missing_backup_from_success(self):
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restored, message = hm.restore_backup()
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self.assertFalse(restored,
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'restore_backup() reported success with no backup present')
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self.assertIn('cannot roll back', message.lower())
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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with open(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH, 'w') as fh:
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fh.write('scribbled over\n')
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restored, message = hm.restore_backup()
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self.assertTrue(restored, message)
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH), good)
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def test_a_successful_generation_records_a_rollback_target(self):
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"""Even the first-ever generation must leave something to roll back to."""
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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self.assertTrue(
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os.path.exists(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH),
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'after a successful reload there is still no known-good backup')
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH), good)
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def test_a_broken_current_config_does_not_replace_a_good_backup(self):
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"""The known-good marker.
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If the config already on disk is broken (previous failed write, manual
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edit), snapshotting it would make "rollback" mean "restore a different
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broken config". The older validated backup must survive.
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"""
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH), good,
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'fixture: a good backup should exist by now')
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with open(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH, 'w') as fh:
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fh.write(f'garbage {BROKEN_TOKEN} config\n')
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ok, status = hm.create_backup()
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self.assertTrue(ok)
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self.assertEqual(status, 'kept_previous')
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH), good,
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'a broken config overwrote the known-good backup')
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def test_reload_does_not_take_its_own_backup(self):
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"""reload_haproxy_safely() runs after the write, so it must not back up."""
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good = self.generate_good_config()
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with open(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH, 'w') as fh:
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fh.write(f'broken {BROKEN_TOKEN}\n')
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success, message = hm.reload_haproxy_safely(backup_status='created')
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self.assertFalse(success)
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self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH), good,
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|
'reload_haproxy_safely() overwrote the good backup')
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|
self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH), good,
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'reload_haproxy_safely() did not roll the config back')
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|
|
def test_unchanged_config_is_not_revalidated(self):
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|
"""Fast path: if the backup already is the live config, do no work.
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|
generate_config() runs inside customer-facing API calls and
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|
`haproxy -c` is expensive on an edge with hundreds of certificates.
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|
"""
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|
self.generate_good_config()
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|
calls = []
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|
real_validate = hm.validate_config_file
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|
hm.validate_config_file = lambda path: (calls.append(path),
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|
real_validate(path))[1]
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self.addCleanup(setattr, hm, 'validate_config_file', real_validate)
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|
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|
ok, status = hm.create_backup()
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|
self.assertTrue(ok)
|
|
self.assertEqual(status, 'created')
|
|
self.assertEqual(calls, [],
|
|
'the unchanged live config was re-validated needlessly')
|
|
|
|
def test_fast_path_does_not_hide_a_drifted_broken_config(self):
|
|
"""If the live config drifted from the backup, the gate must still run."""
|
|
good = self.generate_good_config()
|
|
with open(hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH, 'w') as fh:
|
|
fh.write(f'hand edited {BROKEN_TOKEN}\n')
|
|
|
|
ok, status = hm.create_backup()
|
|
self.assertTrue(ok)
|
|
self.assertEqual(status, 'kept_previous',
|
|
'a drifted broken config was silently accepted')
|
|
self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.HAPROXY_BACKUP_PATH), good)
|
|
|
|
def test_backup_set_covers_every_file_generate_config_writes(self):
|
|
pairs = dict(hm._config_backup_pairs())
|
|
for path in (hm.HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH, hm.BLOCKED_IPS_MAP_PATH,
|
|
hm.CORAZA_SPOE_CONFIG_PATH):
|
|
self.assertIn(path, pairs,
|
|
f'{path} is written by generate_config() but is not '
|
|
'part of the backed-up config set')
|
|
|
|
def test_coraza_spoe_config_round_trips(self):
|
|
self.generate_good_config()
|
|
with open(hm.CORAZA_SPOE_CONFIG_PATH, 'w') as fh:
|
|
fh.write('spoe-good\n')
|
|
hm.create_backup()
|
|
with open(hm.CORAZA_SPOE_CONFIG_PATH, 'w') as fh:
|
|
fh.write('spoe-broken\n')
|
|
restored, message = hm.restore_backup()
|
|
self.assertTrue(restored, message)
|
|
self.assertEqual(self.read(hm.CORAZA_SPOE_CONFIG_PATH), 'spoe-good\n')
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestAtomicWrite(RollbackTestCase):
|
|
|
|
def test_write_is_atomic_and_preserves_mode(self):
|
|
path = os.path.join(self.etc, 'atomic.cfg')
|
|
with open(path, 'w') as fh:
|
|
fh.write('old')
|
|
os.chmod(path, 0o644)
|
|
|
|
hm.write_config_atomically(path, 'new content\n')
|
|
|
|
self.assertEqual(self.read(path), 'new content\n')
|
|
self.assertEqual(oct(os.stat(path).st_mode & 0o777), oct(0o644))
|
|
leftovers = [n for n in os.listdir(self.etc) if n.endswith('.tmp')]
|
|
self.assertEqual(leftovers, [], f'temp files left behind: {leftovers}')
|
|
|
|
def test_failed_write_leaves_the_previous_file_intact(self):
|
|
path = os.path.join(self.etc, 'atomic.cfg')
|
|
with open(path, 'w') as fh:
|
|
fh.write('old content\n')
|
|
|
|
# Anything that makes f.write() blow up mid-flight stands in for a full
|
|
# disk / killed container.
|
|
with self.assertRaises(Exception):
|
|
hm.write_config_atomically(path, object())
|
|
|
|
self.assertEqual(self.read(path), 'old content\n',
|
|
'a failed write clobbered the previous config')
|
|
leftovers = [n for n in os.listdir(self.etc) if n.endswith('.tmp')]
|
|
self.assertEqual(leftovers, [], f'temp files left behind: {leftovers}')
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
|
print(f"testing haproxy_manager from: {MODULE_DIR}")
|
|
unittest.main(verbosity=2)
|