Guard test: the capture-frame exception now fails on allow-scripts, a skipped or ignored sanitiser, or src= (G7)
captureFileViolations() pins the one allow-same-origin srcdoc frame: sandbox set once to exactly allow-same-origin, no script/form/popup/navigation tokens, srcdoc only from inlineResources(clean.html), sanitizeCaptureHtml called and its verdict checked before srcdoc. Eight mutated copies of the real source prove each rule fails. Plus a behavioural jsdom test of the real captureHtml frame. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -74,9 +74,61 @@ describe('no same-origin path for composed-page HTML remains in the source', ()
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// never mention allow-scripts), fed only sanitizeCaptureHtml output, CSP-locked, and allow-same-origin is
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// there only so html-to-image can read the frame's layout. See sanitize-capture-html.test.ts and
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// scripts/e2e-capture-security.mjs for the hostile-page proof.
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if (f.endsWith('self-review-capture.ts')) return /allow-scripts/.test(src.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '').replace(/\/\/.*$/gm, '')) || !/sanitizeCaptureHtml\(/.test(src);
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if (f.endsWith('self-review-capture.ts')) return captureFileViolations(src).length > 0;
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return /srcdoc/i.test(src) && /allow-same-origin['"\s]/.test(src.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '').replace(/\/\/.*$/gm, ''));
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});
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expect(offenders.map((f) => f.slice(root.length + 1))).toEqual([]);
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});
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});
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/**
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* The rules the ONE sanctioned allow-same-origin srcdoc frame (utils/self-review-capture.ts) must keep
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* (G7). Returns the broken rules; [] = compliant. Applied to the real source below, and to mutated copies
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* of it so we know each rule actually bites.
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* 1. The frame's sandbox is set exactly once, to exactly "allow-same-origin" (no allow-scripts / forms /
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* popups / modals / top-navigation, no DOMTokenList .add, no .sandbox = assignment, no removeAttribute).
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* 2. The string allow-scripts appears nowhere in code.
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* 3. srcdoc is assigned exactly once, and only from inlineResources(clean.html, ...) -- the sanitiser output.
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* 4. sanitizeCaptureHtml( is called, its result is checked (`!clean.ok` rejects), and that happens BEFORE
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* the srcdoc assignment.
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* 5. The frame is not given a src= (which would bypass srcdoc + the sanitiser).
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*/
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export function captureFileViolations(raw: string): string[] {
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const src = raw.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '').replace(/\/\/.*$/gm, '');
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const v: string[] = [];
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const sandboxSets = Array.from(src.matchAll(/setAttribute\(\s*['"]sandbox['"]\s*,\s*(['"`])([^'"`]*)\1\s*\)/g)).map((m) => m[2]);
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if (sandboxSets.length !== 1 || sandboxSets[0].trim() !== 'allow-same-origin') v.push('sandbox must be set once, to exactly "allow-same-origin"');
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if (/\.sandbox\s*(\.\s*(add|toggle|replace|value)\b|=)/.test(src) || /removeAttribute\(\s*['"]sandbox['"]/.test(src)) v.push('sandbox changed outside the one setAttribute');
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if (/allow-scripts|allow-forms|allow-popups|allow-modals|allow-top-navigation/.test(src)) v.push('a script/form/popup/navigation sandbox token appears');
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const srcdocSets = Array.from(src.matchAll(/\.srcdoc\s*=\s*([^;\n]+)/g)).map((m) => m[1].trim());
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if (srcdocSets.length !== 1) v.push('srcdoc must be assigned exactly once');
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const inl = /inlineResources\(\s*clean\.html\s*,[^)]*\)\.then\(\s*\(\s*(\w+)\s*\)\s*=>/.exec(src);
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if (!inl || srcdocSets[0] !== inl[1]) v.push('srcdoc must come only from inlineResources(clean.html, ..)');
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const san = src.search(/const\s+clean\s*=\s*sanitizeCaptureHtml\(/);
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const chk = src.search(/if\s*\(\s*!clean\.ok\s*\)/);
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const set = src.search(/\.srcdoc\s*=/);
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if (san < 0 || chk < 0 || !(san < chk && chk < set)) v.push('sanitizeCaptureHtml must run and be checked before srcdoc is set');
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if (/\.src\s*=|setAttribute\(\s*['"]src['"]/.test(src.replace(/img\.setAttribute\(\s*'src'[^)]*\)/g, ''))) v.push('frame must not get a src=');
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return v;
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}
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describe('G7: the self-review capture frame exception stays narrow', () => {
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const capture = Object.entries(import.meta.glob(['./self-review-capture.ts'], { query: '?raw', import: 'default', eager: true }) as Record<string, string>)[0][1];
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test('the real capture source complies', () => {
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expect(captureFileViolations(capture)).toEqual([]);
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});
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test.each([
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['adds allow-scripts to the sandbox', (s: string) => s.replace("setAttribute('sandbox', 'allow-same-origin')", "setAttribute('sandbox', 'allow-same-origin allow-scripts')")],
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['adds allow-scripts via DOMTokenList', (s: string) => s.replace("frame.setAttribute('aria-hidden'", "(frame as any).sandbox.add('x'); frame.setAttribute('aria-hidden'")],
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['adds allow-forms', (s: string) => s.replace("'allow-same-origin')", "'allow-same-origin allow-forms')")],
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['drops the sandbox entirely', (s: string) => s.replace("frame.setAttribute('sandbox', 'allow-same-origin');", '')],
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['skips the sanitiser (raw html into srcdoc)', (s: string) => s.replace('frame.srcdoc = inlined;', 'frame.srcdoc = html;')],
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['sanitises but ignores the verdict', (s: string) => s.replace(/if \(!clean\.ok\) \{[^}]*\}/, '')],
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['never calls the sanitiser', (s: string) => s.replace(/const clean = sanitizeCaptureHtml\([^;]*;/, 'const clean = { ok: true as const, html, csp: "" };')],
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['loads the page by src=', (s: string) => s.replace('frame.srcdoc = inlined;', 'frame.srcdoc = inlined; frame.src = url;')],
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])('the guard FAILS when capture %s', (_label, mutate) => {
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const mutated = mutate(capture);
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expect(mutated).not.toBe(capture);
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expect(captureFileViolations(mutated).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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});
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});
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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
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import { describe, expect, test, vi } from 'vitest';
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import { captureHtml } from './self-review-capture';
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/**
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* G7 behavioural half: run the real captureHtml on a hostile page and inspect the frame it actually
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* builds (jsdom never loads it, so the call ends on its time limit -- that is fine, the frame is what
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* we look at). The source-level rules live in sandboxed-preview.test.ts (captureFileViolations).
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*/
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describe('self-review capture frame (G7)', () => {
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test('hostile page: script-less sandbox, sanitised srcdoc, CSP meta first in head', async () => {
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const hostile = '<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><script>window.parent.__pwned=1</script>'
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+ '<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:alert(1)"></head>'
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+ '<body><img src=x onerror="parent.__pwned=2"><a href="javascript:alert(3)">x</a>'
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+ '<iframe src="https://evil.example/"></iframe><form action="https://evil.example/"><input name=a></form>'
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+ '<div style="background:url(https://evil.example/t.png)">t</div><p>Hello</p></body></html>';
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let frame: HTMLIFrameElement | null = null;
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const orig = document.body.appendChild.bind(document.body);
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const spy = vi.spyOn(document.body, 'appendChild').mockImplementation(<T extends Node>(n: T): T => {
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if (n instanceof HTMLIFrameElement) frame = n;
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return orig(n);
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});
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try {
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const res = await captureHtml(hostile, { timeoutMs: 400, settleMs: 0, injectFontAwesome: false });
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expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
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} finally { spy.mockRestore(); }
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expect(frame).not.toBeNull();
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const f = frame!;
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expect(f.getAttribute('sandbox')).toBe('allow-same-origin');
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const doc = f.srcdoc;
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expect(doc).toContain('Hello');
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for (const bad of ['<script', 'onerror', 'javascript:', '<iframe', 'evil.example', 'http-equiv="refresh"']) {
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expect(doc.toLowerCase(), bad).not.toContain(bad);
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}
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expect(/<head><meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="[^"]*script-src 'none'/i.test(doc) || /<head><meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'/i.test(doc)).toBe(true);
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expect((window as unknown as { __pwned?: number }).__pwned).toBeUndefined();
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});
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});
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