Triple-C/ROADMAP.md

Triple-C Roadmap — Claude Code Feature Parity

Date: 2026-08-09 · Baseline: v0.3.0 · Claude Code reference: 2.1.226

Companion to DESIGN-REVIEW.md, which covers visual design and information architecture. This document covers which Claude Code capabilities Triple-C should surface, and why.

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Guiding principle

Triple-C shows state and launches things. Claude Code edits its own config.

Triple-C's built-in MCP server management was removed in this cycle because Claude Code absorbed the capability natively (claude mcp add/list/remove, .mcp.json, /mcp). Hooks, skills, agents, plugins, output styles, and statusline are the same species: files under .claude/ with first-class Claude Code TUIs. Building GUI form editors for them means losing the same race again.

What Claude Code cannot do is what Triple-C uniquely owns: the container boundary and what persists behind it — the config volume, workspace mounts, lifecycle, the bundled scheduler, and the fleet view across many projects.

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Current coverage (v0.3.0)

Triple-C sets exactly five settings.json keys, plus a sandbox block:

Key	Surfaced as
tui	TUI Mode select (fullscreen)
effort	Effort Level select (low/medium/high)
autoScrollEnabled	Auto-Scroll Disabled toggle
focusMode	Focus Mode toggle
showThinkingSummaries	Thinking Summaries toggle
sandbox.*	Sandbox toggle (enabled, enableWeakerNestedSandbox, allowUnsandboxedCommands)

Plus four env feature flags — CLAUDE_CODE_NO_FLICKER, CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY, CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB, ENABLE_PROMPT_CACHING_1H — and arbitrary user-set CLAUDE_CODE_* vars via the Env Vars modal.

Also covered: per-project auth backends (Anthropic OAuth, Bedrock incl. SSO refresh, Ollama, OpenAI-compatible), user-level CLAUDE.md composition, claude update on every container start, terminal ergonomics (OAuth URL detection, OSC 52 clipboard, image paste, file drag-drop, STT), the web terminal, and workspace backup.

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Gap analysis

Committed for this cycle

#	Gap	Today	Plan
1	Permission modes	one boolean → --dangerously-skip-permissions	Four-state control (Plan / Default / Accept Edits / Bypass) → --permission-mode. Verified choices on 2.1.226: acceptEdits, auto, bypassPermissions, manual, dontAsk, plan.
2	Session resume	none	List sessions from the config volume; [Resume] opens a terminal on claude --resume <id>.
3	Capability inventory	none	Read-only counts + names for skills / agents / hooks / plugins / commands / native MCP servers. Deep-link to the terminal to manage.
4	Automation	triple-c-scheduler ships in every container with zero UI	Task list, cron editor, run-now, logs, notification badges.
5	Container auth handoff	manual code paste	See "Authentication handoff" below — design decision pending.

Deliberately skipped

Status line builder · output-styles editor · hook editors · checkpoint/rewind browser · plugin marketplace browser. Each is niche, natively handled by Claude Code's own TUI, or a settings-editor trap. Surface counts and deep-link instead.

Not yet scheduled

• Granular permissions.allow / ask / deny rules and additionalDirectories
• Sandbox detail settings (filesystem.allowRead/allowWrite, allowedDomains, excludedCommands) — currently documented for hand-editing via SANDBOX_INSTRUCTIONS
• Project-level .claude/settings.json vs user-level settings hierarchy
• A model picker. Note: the only model strings in the app today are stale placeholders (anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-20250514-v1:0 in AwsSettings.tsx and ProjectCard.tsx, qwen3.5:27b, gpt-4o / gemini-pro / etc.). These are free-text placeholders, not dropdowns, but they should be refreshed to current model identifiers regardless.
• The container's settings.json merge is shallow (jq -s '.[0] * .[1]'), so a user-authored nested block such as sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite is replaced wholesale on every container start. Worth deepening to * recursive merge.

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Authentication handoff

Goal: stop making users hand-copy an auth code into every container.

Constraint discovered during research: claude login's callback server uses an ephemeral port and its redirect URI is not configurable for the main login flow (--callback-port and oauth.callbackPort apply to MCP server OAuth only). So a design that pre-assigns each container a fixed callback port and routes to it cannot work as stated — there is no fixed port to route.

There is also a known container gotcha: on Linux, Node resolves localhost to IPv6 first, so the callback server may bind [::1]:PORT only and be unreachable over IPv4 (anthropics/claude-code#44844).

Two viable options:

Option A — long-lived token injection (simple)

claude setup-token (verified present on 2.1.226: "Set up a long-lived authentication token (requires Claude subscription)") returns a ~1-year OAuth token. Triple-C runs it once on the host, stores the token in the OS keychain via the existing secure.rs, and injects CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN into every container that uses the Anthropic backend.

• No routing, no ports, no proxy.
• One auth event covers every project.
• Cost: small. Reuses existing keychain and env-injection plumbing.
• Limits: token is subscription-scoped and expires annually; per the docs a setup-token token cannot drive Remote Control sessions or claude.ai connector fetches.

Option B — the Auth Bridge (general loopback-callback bridge)

Option A only solves Claude Code. The same problem affects every CLI that authenticates by starting a temporary loopback listener and opening a browser at a URL that redirects back to it — Concourse fly login (random loopback port serving /auth/callback), aws sso login, and many others. Inside a container the host browser cannot reach that listener, so login stalls.

Because the ports are ephemeral and unconfigurable, nothing can be pre-assigned. The bridge discovers listeners instead:

1. While enabled for a running project, poll the container for loopback TCP listeners by reading /proc/net/tcp and /proc/net/tcp6 over docker exec — no dependency on ss/netstat/lsof, which aren't guaranteed in the image.
2. For each newly-appeared loopback listener, bind the same port on the host's 127.0.0.1 (never 0.0.0.0 — that would expose container internals to the LAN).
3. Proxy each accepted connection into the container over the Docker API via socat - TCP:127.0.0.1:<port> (socat already ships in the image), reusing the existing attached-exec streaming in docker/exec.rs. Going through the Docker API rather than a container IP keeps this working on Docker Desktop, where container IPs are not routable from the host.
4. Fall back to TCP6:[::1]:<port> when the listener appeared only on IPv6 — on Linux, Node resolves localhost to IPv6 first, so claude login frequently binds ::1 only (anthropics/claude-code#44844).
5. Tear down when the listener vanishes, the container stops, the bridge is disabled, or the app exits. Ports already covered by the project's explicit port mappings are skipped; host-side conflicts are reported rather than silently swallowed.

Opt-in per project (auth_bridge_enabled, default off), since it makes container-internal loopback services reachable from the host.

Plan: ship A for Claude Code specifically — it removes the pain for the common case at a fraction of the cost — and B as the general mechanism covering every other CLI. They compose: A means most users never trigger a browser login at all; B catches AWS SSO, Concourse, and anything else that needs a real callback.

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Sequencing

Phase 0 — done. Remove MCP (frontend, backend, entrypoint, docs) with a self-healing migration for containers created against the old per-project Docker network.

Phase 1 — foundations. Permission modes end-to-end (including the scheduler bug fix below). Read-only introspection backend: sessions, capabilities, scheduler.

Phase 2 — Tier-1 polish. Focus rings, contrast fixes, real buttons, inline start/stop progress, status labels, onboarding welcome screen, shared accessible <Modal>.

Phase 3 — Project Home. Move project config out of the sidebar card into a tabbed main-area view (Overview / Sessions / Automation / Config), dissolving the modal pile and splitting the 1,257-line ProjectCard.

Phase 4 — authentication handoff. Option A, then evaluate B.

Phase 5 — Library. Global skills/agents/commands with per-project enable, synced into the config volume by the entrypoint. Generalizes the pattern the MCP tab was reaching for.

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Bugs found during this review

1. Scheduled tasks ignore the project's permission setting. container/triple-c-task-runner:69 runs claude -p "$PROMPT" --dangerously-skip-permissions unconditionally, regardless of the project's Full Permissions toggle. Being fixed as part of Phase 1.

2. Docs claim Reset preserves credentials; it does not. rebuild_project_container calls remove_project_volumes, which deletes both triple-c-home-{id} (holding ~/.claude.json) and triple-c-claude-config-{id} (holding ~/.claude). README.md, HOW-TO-USE.md, and CLAUDE.md all still state that OAuth tokens survive a Reset. Pre-existing; not yet corrected.

3. Stale model placeholders — see "Not yet scheduled" above.

4. Silent save failures. Project config saves on blur; failures go only to console.error. No user-visible indication. Addressed in Phase 3.