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# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Development Commands
### Testing
- **API Testing**: `./scripts/test-api.sh` - Tests all API endpoints with optional authentication
- **Certificate Request Testing**: `./scripts/test-certificate-request.sh` - Tests certificate generation endpoints
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- **Stick-table contract**: `python3 scripts/test-stick-table-contract.py` - offline; holds the templates' `store` clauses, `STICK_TABLE_FIELD_CONTRACT` , and every consumer to each other. Run it after touching any `stick-table` line.
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- **Runtime-map contract**: `python3 scripts/test-runtime-map-contract.py` - offline; asserts the runtime map commands are `@1` -prefixed, reference the map by FILE PATH (never `#<id>` ), carry the value `1` , and that every captured rejection is classified as a failure. Run it after touching any `add map` /`del map` /`clear map` path.
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- **Manual Testing**: Run `curl` commands against `http://localhost:8000` endpoints as shown in README.md
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### Reading stick tables (and why it is easy to get silently wrong)
`/tmp/haproxy-cli` is HAProxy's **master** CLI socket. Worker commands
(`show table` , `show map` , `add map` , ...) need an `@1` prefix. Without it
HAProxy answers `Unknown command: 'show', ...` **and socat still exits 0** — so
an exit-status check passes and the help text gets parsed as data. Always use
`haproxy_cli(cmd, worker=True)` in Python, which inspects the response body.
Stick-table entries are `name=value` / `name(window_ms)=value` pairs, not fixed
columns; the first token is an allocation pointer (`0x...:` ), not the key. Parse
by NAME, and treat a missing field as an ERROR — never default it to `0` . The
`web` table stores only `conn_cur` , `conn_rate` , `http_req_rate` ,
`http_err_rate` ; it holds **no history and no counter of past blocks** . What was
actually denied/tarpitted is in the edge access log on the **host** at
`/var/log/haproxy.log` (shipped 2026.08.8), not in any stick table.
This is written down because `/api/security/stats` and `show-tarpit-ips.sh`
reported "Scan Count"/"BLOCKED" figures parsed from `gpc0` /`gpc1` — fields no
stick table has ever stored — for their entire existence. See the header of
`haproxy_tarpit_config.txt` and the contract test.
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### Changing a runtime map (`add map` / `del map`)
Same socket, two more ways to fail silently — and both were live in
`add_ip_to_runtime_map()` /`remove_ip_from_runtime_map()` for their whole
existence:
* **Reference the map by FILE PATH, never `#<id>` .** Ids are assigned at
config-parse time and move on every config regeneration (on whp01
`blocked_ips.map` is 37, `trusted_ips.map` is 10 — there is no id 0). Use
`add map /etc/haproxy/blocked_ips.map <ip> 1` .
* * *A mutation answers NOTHING on success**, so an empty body is the only
success — any output at all is a rejection. Worse, `@1 add map #0 <ip> 1`
*also* answers nothing and adds nothing, so the body cannot prove an add
worked. **Read it back** with `@1 get map <path> <key>` .
* Entries must carry the value `1` ; haproxy.cfg matches with
`map_ip(...,0) -m int gt 0` , so a valueless entry does not block.
In Python use `haproxy_cli(cmd, worker=True, expect_empty=True)` for mutations
and `runtime_map_lookup()` / `runtime_map_keys()` to verify. The runtime map is
only a fast path: `/etc/haproxy/blocked_ips.map` is authoritative and HAProxy
re-reads it on reload, so a failed runtime command must degrade to
"enforced on reload" and be reported, never swallowed.
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### Running the Application
- **Docker Build**: `docker build -t haproxy-manager .`
- **Local Development**: `python haproxy_manager.py` (requires HAProxy, certbot, and dependencies installed)
- **Container Run**: See README.md for various docker run configurations
### Monitoring and Debugging
- **Error Monitoring**: `./scripts/monitor-errors.sh` - Monitor application error logs
- **External Monitoring**: `./scripts/monitor-errors-external.sh` - External monitoring script
- **Health Check**: `curl http://localhost:8000/health`
- **Log Files**:
- `/var/log/haproxy-manager.log` - General application logs
- `/var/log/haproxy-manager-errors.log` - Error logs for alerting
## Architecture Overview
### Core Components
1. **haproxy_manager.py** - Main Flask application providing:
- RESTful API for HAProxy configuration management
- SQLite database integration for domain/backend storage
- Let's Encrypt certificate automation
- HAProxy configuration generation from Jinja2 templates
- Optional API key authentication via `HAPROXY_API_KEY` environment variable
2. **Database Schema** - SQLite database with three main tables:
- `domains` - Domain configurations with SSL settings
- `backends` - Backend service definitions linked to domains
- `backend_servers` - Individual servers within backend groups
3. **Template System** - Jinja2 templates for HAProxy configuration generation:
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- `hap_header.tpl` - Global HAProxy settings, defaults, and HTTP/2 tuning
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- `hap_backend.tpl` - Backend server definitions
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- `hap_listener.tpl` - Frontend listener configurations with rate limiting
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- `hap_letsencrypt.tpl` - SSL certificate configurations
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- `hap_security_tables.tpl` - Stats frontend and security stick tables
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- Template override support for custom backend configurations
4. **Certificate Management** - Automated SSL certificate handling:
- Let's Encrypt integration with certbot
- Self-signed certificate fallback for development
- Certificate renewal automation via cron
- Certificate download endpoints for external services
### Configuration Flow
1. Domain added via `/api/domain` endpoint → Database updated
2. `generate_config()` function → Reads database, renders Jinja2 templates → Writes `/etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg`
3. HAProxy reload via socket API (`/tmp/haproxy-cli` ) or process restart
4. SSL certificate generation via Let's Encrypt or self-signed fallback
### Key Design Patterns
- **Template-driven configuration**: HAProxy config generated from modular Jinja2 templates
- **Database-backed state**: All configuration persisted in SQLite for reliability
- **API-first design**: All operations exposed via REST endpoints
- **Process monitoring**: Health checks and automatic HAProxy restart capabilities
- **Comprehensive logging**: Operation logging with error alerting support
### Authentication & Security
- Optional API key authentication controlled by `HAPROXY_API_KEY` environment variable
- All API endpoints (except `/health` and `/` ) require Bearer token when API key is set
- Certificate private keys combined with certificates in HAProxy-compatible format
- Default backend page for unmatched domains instead of exposing HAProxy errors
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### Rate Limiting & Connection Limits (hap_listener.tpl)
- **Stick table**: `type ip size 200k expire 10m` tracking `conn_cur` , `conn_rate(10s)` , `http_req_rate(10s)` , `http_err_rate(30s)`
- Tracks real client IP via `var(txn.real_ip)` to work correctly behind Cloudflare/proxies
- **Rate limit thresholds**:
- Tarpit at 3000 req/10s (300 req/s)
- Hard block (deny) at 5000 req/10s (500 req/s)
- Connection rate limit: 500/10s
- Concurrent connection limit: 500
- Error rate limit: 100/30s
- **Whitelist bypasses** (exempt from rate limits):
- `is_local` — RFC1918 private address ranges
- `is_trusted_ip` — source IPs listed in `trusted_ips.list`
- `is_whitelisted` — real IPs (from proxy headers) matched in `trusted_ips.map`
### Trusted IP Whitelist Files
- `trusted_ips.list` — Source IP whitelist for rate limit bypass (one CIDR/IP per line)
- `trusted_ips.map` — Real IP whitelist for proxy-header matching (format: `<IP> 1` )
- Both files are baked into the Docker image via `COPY` in the Dockerfile
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- Ship as comment-only templates (no real IPs). Add trusted IPs locally and do **not** commit them — this repo is mirrored publicly. Entries persist in the `/etc/haproxy` named volume across recreates
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### Timeout Hardening (hap_header.tpl)
- `timeout http-request` : 300s -> 30s (slowloris protection)
- `timeout connect` : 120s -> 10s
- `timeout client` : 10m -> 5m
- `timeout http-keep-alive` : 120s -> 30s
### HTTP/2 Protection (hap_header.tpl)
- `tune.h2.fe.max-total-streams 2000` — limits total streams per HTTP/2 connection
- `tune.h2.fe.glitches-threshold 50` — CVE-2023-44487 Rapid Reset protection
### Stats Frontend (hap_security_tables.tpl)
- HAProxy stats page bound to `127.0.0.1:8404` (localhost only, accessible inside container)
- Template: `templates/hap_security_tables.tpl`
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### Deployment Context
- Designed to run as Docker container with persistent volumes for certificates and configurations
- Exposes ports 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS), and 8000 (management API/UI)
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- Stats page on port 8404 (localhost only inside container)
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- Management interface on port 8000 should be firewall-protected in production
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- Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK verifies both port 8000 (Flask API) and port 80 (HAProxy), with `start-period=60s` and `timeout=10s`
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- Supports deployment on servers with git directory at `/root/whp` and web file sync via rsync to `/docker/whp/web/`
- HAProxy is version 3.0.11