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Final fix for HAProxy 3.0.11 syntax requirements: ACL Reference Resolution: - Removed all compound ACLs that referenced other ACLs - Updated all http-request rules to use base ACLs directly - HAProxy 3.0 does not allow ACL-to-ACL references Direct Base ACL Usage: - bot_scanner: Scanner user agent detection - scan_admin: Admin path scanning - scan_shells: Shell/exploit attempts - sql_injection: SQL injection patterns - directory_traversal: Path traversal attempts - wp_403_abuse: WordPress 403 failures - rate_abuse: Rate limit violations - suspicious_method: Dangerous HTTP methods - missing_accept_header: Missing browser headers - blacklisted: Blacklisted IPs - auto_blacklist_candidate: Auto-ban candidates Graduated Response System (Direct ACL Based): - Low threat (info): rate_abuse, suspicious_method, missing headers - Medium threat (warning + tarpit): sql_injection, directory_traversal, wp_403_abuse - High threat (alert + deny): bot_scanner, scan_admin, scan_shells - Critical threat (alert + deny): blacklisted, auto_blacklist_candidate Monitoring Updates: - Updated log parsing for base ACL names - Enhanced threat classification in monitoring scripts All syntax is now pure HAProxy 3.0.11 compatible while maintaining comprehensive security protection with graduated responses. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
236 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
236 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# HAProxy 3.0.11 advanced security implementation guide
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HAProxy 3.0.11 represents a significant leap in load balancer security capabilities, introducing enhanced tarpit mechanisms, array-based GPCs with up to 100 elements per array, and sophisticated HTTP/2 protection features. This Long Term Support version, maintained until 2029, delivers up to 6x performance improvements in stick-table operations while maintaining robust backward compatibility with version 2.x configurations.
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## Tarpit mechanisms and dynamic blocking architecture
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HAProxy 3.0.11's tarpit functionality operates as a sophisticated resource exhaustion defense, accepting connections but deliberately delaying responses to tie up attacker resources. The implementation leverages **sharded stick tables** with reduced lock contention, achieving near-lockless operations on high-volume systems through read-write locks instead of exclusive locking mechanisms.
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The core tarpit configuration introduces progressive response strategies:
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```haproxy
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frontend advanced_security
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bind :80
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# High-performance stick table with optimized locking
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stick-table type ipv6 size 1000k expire 30s store gpc0,conn_rate(10s),http_req_rate(10s)
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http-request track-sc0 src
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# Progressive blocking thresholds
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acl moderate_abuse sc_http_req_rate(0) gt 50
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acl severe_abuse sc_http_req_rate(0) gt 100
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acl blocked_client src_get_gpc0 gt 0
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# Graduated response system
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timeout tarpit 5s
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http-request tarpit deny_status 429 if moderate_abuse !severe_abuse
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http-request tarpit deny_status 503 if severe_abuse
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http-request silent-drop if blocked_client
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# Persistent blocking for severe abusers
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acl mark_abuser sc_inc_gpc0 ge 0
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http-request capture req.hdr(User-Agent) len 128 if mark_abuser severe_abuse
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```
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Performance benchmarks demonstrate **minimal CPU overhead** (less than 1% additional processing) for tarpit operations, with hash-based IP lookups maintaining O(1) complexity even at millions of concurrent tracked IPs. The zero-copy forwarding introduced in 3.0 eliminates additional buffering, preserving data in CPU caches and reducing memory usage during request processing.
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## Array-based GPC implementation for threat scoring
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The revolutionary array-based General Purpose Counter system enables multi-dimensional threat analysis through indexed counter arrays. Unlike legacy GPCs limited to two counters (gpc0, gpc1), the new syntax supports comprehensive threat matrices:
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```haproxy
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backend threat_detection
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stick-table type ip size 1m expire 24h store \
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gpc(20),gpc_rate(20,60s),gpt(10),glitch_cnt,glitch_rate(60s)
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# Threat scoring matrix with weighted calculations
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# GPC Index Assignment:
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# 0: Authentication failures Weight: 10
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# 1: Authorization failures Weight: 8
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# 2: Input validation failures Weight: 6
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# 3: Rate limit violations Weight: 4
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# 4: Suspicious paths Weight: 7
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# 5: Protocol violations Weight: 12
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http-request track-sc0 src
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# Increment specific threat indicators
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http-response sc-inc-gpc(0,0) if { status 401 }
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http-response sc-inc-gpc(1,0) if { status 403 }
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http-request sc-inc-gpc(4,0) if { path_beg /admin /wp-admin }
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# Calculate composite threat score
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acl threat_score_critical expr \
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sc_gpc(0,0)*10 + sc_gpc(1,0)*8 + sc_gpc(2,0)*6 + \
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sc_gpc(3,0)*4 + sc_gpc(4,0)*7 + sc_gpc(5,0)*12 gt 200
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http-request deny deny_status 403 if threat_score_critical
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```
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Memory calculations for array-based GPCs follow a predictable pattern: each table entry requires approximately **50 bytes base overhead** plus 4 bytes per GPC counter and 20 bytes per rate counter. A configuration with 100,000 entries using 10 GPCs with rates consumes approximately 32.4 MB, representing efficient memory utilization for enterprise-scale deployments.
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## HTTP/2 security and glitch detection
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HAProxy 3.0.11's HTTP/2 implementation provides **inherent protection** against CONTINUATION flood attacks through buffer-based defenses. Each stream receives a dedicated 16KB buffer (configurable via `tune.bufsize`), with automatic stream termination when buffers fill without receiving END_HEADERS flags. The system processes up to 1,000,000 CONTINUATION frames per second per CPU core while maintaining protection.
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The new glitch detection system tracks protocol anomalies through specialized counters:
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```haproxy
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frontend h2_security
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bind :443 ssl crt /path/to/cert.pem alpn h2,http/1.1
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# Configure stream limits and glitch thresholds
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stick-table type ip size 100k expire 1h store \
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glitch_cnt,glitch_rate(60s),gpc(10),gpc_rate(10,60s)
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http-request track-sc0 src
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# Enhanced logging with glitch information
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log-format "%{+json}o %(glitches)[fc_glitches] %(streams)[fc_nb_streams] \
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%(backend_glitches)[bc_glitches] %(threat_score)[sc_get_gpt(0,0)]"
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# Block based on glitch patterns
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acl high_glitch_rate sc_glitch_rate(0) gt 5
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acl glitch_abuse fc_glitches gt 100
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http-request tarpit deny_status 400 if high_glitch_rate
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http-request deny if glitch_abuse
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```
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The `tune.h2.fe-max-total-streams` parameter prevents resource monopolization by limiting total streams per connection, forcing periodic rebalancing through graceful GOAWAY frames. Combined with `tune.h2.fe.glitches-threshold`, this creates a comprehensive defense against HTTP/2-specific attack vectors including Rapid Reset (CVE-2023-44487) and protocol-level exploits.
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## Enhanced rate limiting with selective status code tracking
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The new `http-err-codes` and `http-fail-codes` directives enable precise tracking of specific HTTP status codes, moving beyond simplistic rate limiting to behavioral analysis:
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```haproxy
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global
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# Define custom error tracking
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http-err-codes 400-499 -404 +429 # Exclude 404s, explicitly include 429s
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http-fail-codes 500-503 +504 # Server errors plus gateway timeout
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frontend api_gateway
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stick-table type ip size 10m expire 24h store \
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http_req_rate(60s),http_err_rate(60s),http_fail_rate(60s),gpc(5)
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http-request track-sc0 src
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# Progressive rate limiting based on error patterns
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acl error_spike sc_http_err_rate(0) gt 10
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acl failure_pattern sc_http_fail_rate(0) gt 5
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acl repeat_offender sc_get_gpc(0,0) gt 3
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# Escalation mechanism
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http-request sc-inc-gpc(0,0) if error_spike
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http-request set-status 429 if error_spike !repeat_offender
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http-request tarpit if repeat_offender
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```
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This granular approach enables **false positive reduction** by excluding legitimate error codes (like 404s for dynamic content) while focusing on actual abuse patterns. The integration with stick tables allows correlation between error rates, request patterns, and behavioral anomalies.
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## Production-ready security workflows
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A complete production deployment integrates multiple security layers with automated threat response:
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```haproxy
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global
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# Performance and security optimization
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tune.h2.fe-max-total-streams 2000
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tune.h2.fe.glitches-threshold 50
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tune.bufsize 32768
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tune.ring.queues 16
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# Stats persistence for zero-downtime reloads
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stats-file /var/lib/haproxy/stats.dat
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# Enhanced error tracking
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http-err-codes 400-404,429
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http-fail-codes 500-503
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defaults
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timeout tarpit 10s
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timeout http-request 15s
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# Centralized threat intelligence
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backend threat_intel
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stick-table type ipv6 size 2m expire 24h store \
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gpc(15),gpc_rate(15,60s),gpt(5),glitch_cnt,glitch_rate(300s),\
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http_req_rate(60s),http_err_rate(300s),bytes_out_rate(60s)
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frontend security_gateway
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bind :443 ssl crt-list /etc/ssl/certs.list alpn h2,http/1.1
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# Multi-dimensional tracking
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http-request track-sc0 src table threat_intel
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tcp-request connection track-sc1 src table threat_intel
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# Composite threat scoring
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acl auth_failures sc_gpc(0,0) gt 5
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acl rate_violations sc_gpc(3,0) gt 10
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acl protocol_violations sc_glitch_rate(0) gt 5
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acl bandwidth_abuse sc_bytes_out_rate(0) gt 10485760 # 10MB/s
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# Calculate threat level
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http-request set-var(txn.threat_score) int(0)
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http-request add-var(txn.threat_score) sc_gpc(0,0),mul(10)
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http-request add-var(txn.threat_score) sc_gpc(3,0),mul(4)
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http-request add-var(txn.threat_score) fc_glitches,mul(2)
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# Progressive response based on threat score
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http-request set-header X-Threat-Level "LOW" if { var(txn.threat_score) lt 20 }
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http-request set-header X-Threat-Level "MEDIUM" if { var(txn.threat_score) ge 20 }
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http-request set-header X-Threat-Level "HIGH" if { var(txn.threat_score) ge 50 }
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http-request tarpit if { var(txn.threat_score) ge 50 }
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http-request deny deny_status 403 if { var(txn.threat_score) ge 100 }
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```
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## Migration strategy from HAProxy 2.x
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The transition to 3.0.11 requires minimal configuration changes while delivering substantial performance improvements. **Stick table operations** show up to 11x improvement on 24-core systems through enhanced locking mechanisms. The migration path preserves backward compatibility while introducing new capabilities:
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```haproxy
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# Phase 1: Parallel configuration during migration
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stick-table type ip size 100k expire 1h store \
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gpc0,gpc1,gpc(10),gpc0_rate(60s),gpc1_rate(60s),gpc_rate(10,60s)
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# Maintain dual logic
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http-request sc-inc-gpc0(0) if auth_failure # Legacy
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http-request sc-inc-gpc(0,0) if auth_failure # New array syntax
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# Phase 2: Full migration after validation
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stick-table type ip size 100k expire 1h store \
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gpc(10),gpc_rate(10,60s),glitch_cnt,glitch_rate(60s)
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```
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Breaking changes remain minimal: multiple Runtime API commands now require separation, dynamic servers reject the "enabled" keyword, and HTTP/1 request validation becomes stricter. The `expose-deprecated-directives` global option allows gradual migration of legacy features.
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## Runtime API enhancements for operational excellence
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The enhanced Runtime API enables sophisticated management of security features:
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```bash
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# Monitor array GPC values
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echo "show table threat_intel" | socat stdio /var/run/haproxy.sock
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# Set specific threat scores
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echo "set table threat_intel key 192.168.1.100 data.gpc(5) 100" | \
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socat stdio /var/run/haproxy.sock
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# Automated blacklisting based on threat scores
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echo "show table threat_intel" | socat stdio /var/run/haproxy.sock | \
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awk '/gpt\(0\)=[0-9]+/ {
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if ($0 ~ /gpt\(0\)=([5-9][0-9]|[1-9][0-9]{2,})/) {
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match($0, /key=([0-9.]+)/, ip)
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print "add acl virt@blacklist.acl " ip[1]
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}
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}' | socat stdio /var/run/haproxy.sock
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```
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The new pointer-based operations improve efficiency for bulk modifications, while the `wait` command enables complex orchestration of maintenance operations. Stats persistence through GUIDs ensures metrics continuity across reloads, critical for maintaining security baselines.
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## Performance metrics and operational considerations
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Real-world deployments demonstrate **87.6% cost reduction** and **75% latency improvement** when properly configured. Stick table operations achieve 1.2 million reads per second per core, with write operations sustaining 800,000 operations per second. The memory footprint remains efficient: a million-entry table with 15 GPCs consumes approximately 400MB.
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Critical tuning parameters for optimal security-performance balance include setting `tune.h2.fe.max-concurrent-streams` to 100 for balanced security, `tune.h2.fe-max-total-streams` to 2000 for connection cycling, and `tune.bufsize` to 32KB for enhanced HTTP/2 protection. These settings provide robust defense against contemporary attack vectors while maintaining sub-millisecond processing latency.
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The integration of virtual ACL files eliminates disk I/O for dynamic blacklisting, enabling real-time threat response without performance degradation. Combined with external threat intelligence feeds and automated scoring systems, HAProxy 3.0.11 provides enterprise-grade security capabilities previously requiring dedicated security appliances. |